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A HISTORY OF EUROPE

Edited by D. B. HORN, D.Litt.

MODERN EUROPE

1789–1930

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Vol. IV

MODERN EUROPE, 1789–1930

By D. B. HORN, D.Litt.

LOUIS XVI

From an engraving after a painting by Callet

Fr.

A HISTORY OF EUROPE

VOL. IV

MODERN EUROPE

1789–1930

BY

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AUTHOR OF "SIR CHARLES HANBURY WILLIAMS AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY"
"A HISTORY OF EUROPE 1871–1920" ETC.

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PREFACE

This text-book is intended primarily for students of history, whether in their last years at school or first year at the university, but it is hoped that it will appeal also to the increasing body of the general public who, seeing in the past, and particularly the immediate past, the key to the present, wish to obtain in a reasonably small compass a guide to the history of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

I have attempted to combine the history of the chief European states with the story of their relations with each other, holding the balance level between the claims of domestic and diplomatic history, although I must confess a personal bias toward the latter. No attempt has been made to include world history, except when it directly affects Europe, since the history of the other continents is another story. Throughout the emphasis is laid upon political developments, but other aspects also receive attention, and in my last chapter I have attempted to give a conspectus of the economic development of Western Europe from the French Revolution to the present day.

The task of compression becomes increasingly difficult as the present day is reached. I have therefore limited my treatment of the post-War period to a sketch of some of the more significant features of contemporary European history.

D. B. H.

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MODERN EUROPE
1789–1930

CHAPTER I

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Section I: The Constituent Assembly

THE opening of the nineteenth century may conveniently be dated at 1789, since Democracy and Nationalism—the keynotes of the century—received a tremendous impetus from the revolutionary movement which broke out in France in that year. To appreciate fully the causes of this French Revolution it would be necessary to survey the history of France in the preceding centuries. But a brief account of the political and social condition of France in 1789 is sufficient to establish its importance and to reveal the beneficent changes in the old order of things which it effected directly in France, and less directly and immediately over all Europe.

France in 1789 consisted of a number of provinces, each under the nominal rule of a governor chosen by the king from among the great nobles. These provinces had come under the direct rule of the Kings of France at different times and in different ways. Their customs, their direct and indirect taxes, even their laws, varied, and it has been said that they resembled a bundle of sticks bound together by the common tie of the monarchy rather than the branches of a growing tree. At one time most of the provinces had had local assemblies, or 'estates,' for the management of local affairs, and had also sent delegates to the States-General of the whole kingdom. But as the kings became despotic they dispensed with the States-General, which had not met since 1614, and suppressed or reduced to insignificance the local estates.

For more than a century before the Revolution the effective

administrative division was the *généralité*, of which there were thirty-six, each ruled over by an Intendant, who was virtually omnipotent within his sphere of rule, but entirely dependent upon the king. As the king was also the sole law-maker the Government of France was in theory and practice an autocracy. When the legality of one of his acts was challenged by the Parlement of Paris Louis XVI replied, "It is legal because it is my desire"; and on another occasion he informed the Parlement that in the exercise of his sovereign power he was accountable to God only.

Without legal sentence the king could confiscate the property of any of his subjects, or by royal writs called *lettres de cachet* imprison them by *le bon plaisir du roi* in one of his castles for an unlimited period. These powers were not exceptional —on an average Louis XVI signed a *lettre de cachet* at least once a week in the first fifteen years of his reign. Even the thoughts of his subjects were not free—no book or pamphlet could be published without the previous approval of the censors. Newspapers had to obtain a licence, and each number was examined by the censors. Political meetings were strictly forbidden. Foreign policy, including the power of peace and war, lay entirely in the hands of the king.

The king raised what taxes he pleased and spent the proceeds as he thought fit. The taxes were of two kinds, direct and indirect. The most important direct tax was the *taille*, which dated from the Hundred Years War. It was levied in some provinces on the total income each taxpayer was presumed to have; while in others, chiefly in the south, it was a tax on land. Another burden was the *corvée*, or obligation to make and repair roads, which fell solely on the lower classes. It has been estimated that at least half of the ordinary (unprivileged) taxpayer's net income was taken by the State by means of direct taxation. The indirect taxes were let out to farmers-general, who paid a fixed sum to the royal exchequer, and made as large a profit as possible out of collecting them. The most burdensome was the *gabelle*, or salt-tax, which varied from province to province. The tax on wine was hardly less burdensome. Each family had to consume a certain quantity of salt each year to guarantee a minimum revenue to the tax-

farmers; any family which consumed more than a certain amount of wine had to pay a heavy tax over and above the ordinary duties. This system of taxation seemed to have been designed to hamper agriculture, industry, and commerce, and to press hardest upon the poorest and most industrious classes.

Great as were the sums wrung from their unfortunate subjects, the Kings of France, owing to their ambitious foreign policy and their personal extravagance, rarely lived within their income. Annual deficits were met by loans, until the interest on these loans exceeded half of the king's ordinary revenue. Hardly any attempt was made to reduce expenditure; nothing more could be wrung from the oppressed taxpayers. The royal credit had sunk gradually to zero; national bankruptcy appeared inevitable. The financial straits of the monarchy brought the Crown into violent conflict with the *parlements*, and compelled Louis XVI to yield to the popular demand and summon the States-General.

The social state of France was as anachronistic as its political organization. Not merely was it full of anomalies, but it was based in principle on inequality. There were three classes, called 'estates,' or 'orders'—the clergy, the nobles, and the Third Estate—*i.e.*, the commons. The first two orders were privileged. They alone might be presented at Court; they alone could hold many lucrative and honourable offices; they alone might hunt or keep pigeons. Their chief privilege, however, was that they were exempted from payment of certain taxes, including as a rule the *taille*, and paid others at a lighter rate. Thus the burden of taxation fell chiefly on the Third Estate—the great bulk of the nation, including most of the professional classes, the merchants, and employers of labour, workmen and artisans, peasants and agricultural labourers. All the children of a noble were regarded as nobles, while it was difficult for even a wealthy member of the Third Estate to secure entry into the order of nobles. Thus the orders were kept apart. The nobles thought of themselves as a superior caste, and looked down upon all who engaged in trade and industry.

The clergy as a body had enormous revenues from the Church lands, tithes, and feudal dues. But the great bulk of

these revenues went into the pockets of the higher clergy, nearly all of whom were nobles by birth and many of whom lived worldly and often evil lives, which tended to bring contempt upon the whole Church. The parish clergy were usually drawn from among the peasants; they were poor and often illiterate, but by hard work and self-sacrifice they won the respect and love of their parishioners. This division of the clerical order proved important in the early months of the Revolution.

In medieval and early modern times the nobles had played a great part in the State as soldiers and as administrators. Although stripped of their powers by the despotic monarchy, they had retained their privileges, notably the right to exact feudal dues of all kinds from their former vassals, although they no longer did anything in exchange for these payments and services. The peasant had to grind his corn at the lord's mill and make his wine at the lord's presses; he had to pay tolls on roads and at ferries; above all he had to pay to the lord a certain part of the value of his harvest, and until the lord's steward had counted his sheaves he could not gather in his crop. Sometimes he had still to give an occasional day's work on the lord's land without pay or to perform other services, such as beating the marshes to keep the frogs from croaking at night round the lord's castle. It has been reckoned that the peasant who was liable to feudal dues as well as royal taxes and Church tithes would receive only twenty francs out of every hundred which he earned.

After the resistance of the *parlements* and the imminence of national bankruptcy had forced the King to summon the States-General it became necessary to settle their constitution. As there had been no meeting since 1614, and the medieval precedents varied, this was no easy matter. Two questions in particular caused great difficulty: (i) Was the Third Estate —by far the most numerous of the three estates—to have as many representatives as the other two taken together? (ii) Were the three estates to deliberate and vote together, or should each order vote separately? If the orders voted separately the number of representatives of each order was of no consequence, as the privileged orders would then be able to

join together and outvote the remaining order. Ultimately the influence of Necker secured a royal decision in favour of the "double representation" of the Third Estate; the more important question of whether the vote should be by head or by order was left unsettled by the executive Government. Vote by head would make the Third Estate absolute; vote by order would enable the privileged orders to thwart the reforms in taxation which were essential for the restoration of the finances.

The States-General met on May 5, 1789—the nobles and clergy had roughly three hundred delegates each, the Third Estate six hundred. The Third Estate at once demanded that the voting should be by head. This would give them a clear majority, since two-thirds of the clerical order was composed of *curés* and monks whose sympathies lay entirely with the Third Estate. The nobles refused to sit and vote with the Third Estate; the clergy vainly sought to arrange a compromise; at last on June 10 the Third Estate issued a final invitation to the other orders to meet jointly and verify the powers of their members. When the other orders returned evasive answers they proceeded alone to the verification of powers, and on the 17th, "in view of the fact that they represented 96 per cent. of the nation," they assumed the name of the "National Assembly." The first act of the Assembly was to declare the existing taxes illegal and to assume the sole right of granting supplies to the Crown. A few bold *curés* had already appeared in the Third Estate; two days later the order of the clergy by a narrow majority decided to join the self-styled National Assembly.

The Court, in the hope of preventing the threatened union of clergy and commons, closed the hall in which the Third Estate had hitherto met. But the Assembly was not to be cowed; it adjourned immediately to a neighbouring tennis-court,[1] and there all the deputies, with a single exception, and amid scenes of wild enthusiasm, took a solemn oath to meet whenever circumstances required until the constitution was firmly established. A second attempt by the Court to overawe resistance likewise failed. When on June 23 Louis XVI

[1] *Not* a lawn-tennis court.

entered the Assembly, ordered its immediate dissolution, and enjoined the orders to meet henceforth in separate houses, the nobles and most of the clergy left the hall, but the commons remained in sombre silence. Workmen began to dismantle the royal dais; but when a Court official asked the President, Bailly, if he had not heard the King's orders, Mirabeau, a noble by birth, but an elected member of the Third Estate, rose and in a voice of thunder ordered the official to tell his master that they were there by the will of the people and would not depart unless driven out at the point of the bayonet.

Louis XVI realized that the *coup d'état* which he had attempted at the bidding of the reactionaries had failed. When told that the Assembly refused to break up he remarked placidly: "Well, if they won't separate let them stay where they are." The first great step in the Revolution had been taken, for the Assembly had defied the royal authority, and the monarch had acknowledged his defeat. Absolute monarchy no longer existed in France. On the 27th, at the King's bidding, the whole of the clergy and nobles took their places in the National Assembly, which now took the name of the "Constituent Assembly," and began the task of drawing up a new constitution, which was to occupy its attention for more than a year.

Intimidation having failed, the reactionaries, headed by the Queen, Marie-Antoinette, and by the King's brother, the Count of Artois, induced the King to try the effect of armed force. Under the command of the Marshal de Broglie, veteran of the Seven Years War, troops, especially foreign mercenaries, since the native regiments were already becoming influenced by the Revolutionary spirit, were concentrated round Versailles. The fears of the Assembly were increased when the King dismissed Necker, the one Minister in whom it had any confidence.

Against military force the Assembly was powerless, but it found a doughty champion in the mob of Paris. Bread-riots were already an everyday event in the capital, and the fear of a shortage of food inflamed political passion. Agitators, such as Camille Desmoulins, prophesied a St Bartholomew of the patriots, and egged on the mob to seize all the arms and powder on which they could lay hands. Encouraged by a successful

raid upon the royal armoury, the mob turned their attention to the royal fortress in the east of Paris, the Bastille. The governor on July 14, after a feeble resistance which merely infuriated the mob, surrendered the fortress, and its demolition was at once begun. The Assembly had inflicted a moral defeat on the King on June 23; now the capital had successfully defied the monarchy and defeated its military forces.

The fall of the Bastille meant the end of the old order, and established the sovereignty of the people. There were now three powers in France, the monarchy, the National Assembly, and the mob, and the greatest of these was the Parisian mob. When the King learned of what had happened in Paris he had no choice but to capitulate. He went personally to the Assembly, which was sitting night and day in fear of forcible dissolution, and announced the withdrawal of the troops. Three days later he paid a State visit to Paris, wearing on his hat a red, white, and blue cockade,[1] the badge of the new France.

The provinces hastened to follow the example of the capital. In the towns prominent citizens formed themselves into municipalities and undertook the duties of local government. In the country districts the peasants banded themselves together and refused to pay the feudal dues. In some parts they burned and pillaged the castles of their oppressors, and murdered the nobles and their families. All over France the middle classes took up arms and joined the National Guard, which had now a double duty to perform—not only was it the defender of liberty, but also the guardian of order.

To the National Assembly the best way of ending the disorder both in Paris and in the provinces seemed to be the removal of the popular grievances. On August 4 two young noblemen, Aiguillon, who owned more feudal rights than anyone else in France except the King, and Noailles, proposed in the Assembly the abolition of feudal rights. The proposal was received with enthusiasm, and deputy after deputy proposed the surrender of some privilege of his order. At two o'clock in the morning, when no one could think of anything else to abolish, Louis XVI was declared "the restorer of French liberty," and the deputies went home to bed.

[1] Red and blue were the colours of Paris, white that of the King.

In a single sitting the Assembly had overthrown the social order which had existed in France for centuries. Not only were the burdensome and oppressive rights of the feudal lords abolished, but the tithes were to be commuted for a moderate money-tax; certain clerical abuses, notably the holding by one man of several benefices, were forbidden; the close oligarchies which had dominated trade and industry were dissolved; justice was to be free to all; offices were not to be sold; all citizens were to be equally admissible in future to all employments, civil and military; in short, the feudal system was abolished, and the principle of the equality of all men before the law was set up in its place. The political revolution effected on June 23 and confirmed on July 14 was now supplemented by a social revolution. The old *régime* had ceased to exist; the Constituent Assembly could commence its work on a clean slate.

Parties now began to form in the Assembly. On the right of the President sat the reactionary supporters of absolute monarchy and class privilege, who steadily lost ground. Always outvoted, they sought their revenge by making noisy scenes and holding up business. Their chief importance was that on occasion they allied themselves with the extremists on the left to carry measures which they hoped would discredit the Assembly. In the centre sat the moderates, who looked with increasing distrust upon the popular commotions in Paris, thought that the Revolution had now gone far enough, and wished to establish a constitutional monarchy with a two-chamber Parliament on the British model. The remainder of the deputies sat on the left. They were enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution, believed firmly in the sovereignty of the people, and wished to establish a democratic constitution. But they differed widely among themselves on the interpretation of these principles. The Republicans, chief among whom was a neat, bespectacled lawyer from Arras, named Robespierre, were as yet an insignificant clique.

The most prominent members of the Left were the Abbé Sieyès, who played a great part in drafting the resolutions of the Assembly, and Mirabeau, the outstanding orator in an assembly of orators. But Mirabeau was not a mere maker of

phrases. His energy and fearlessness had already done much to destroy the old order; his constructive ability, although never given opportunity to show itself, was equally great. He was satisfied with the destruction of the privileged classes, and wished to re-establish the monarchy on a broader and more popular basis, since he believed that a strong central Government was essential to the welfare of France. Unfortunately the King and Queen detested and distrusted him, and, in the hope of retaining his popularity and securing the position of Minister, which he coveted, he tried to coerce the monarch by making common cause with the democrats of the Left on certain occasions, while on others he openly championed the monarchy. This apparent inconsistency weakened his position in the Assembly. Moreover, he had no regular following, but found his supporters among the more moderate men of all parties. Finally, he was heavily in debt throughout his public career, and was thus singularly open to charges of venality, which appear to have had some considerable foundation in fact. It is therefore unlikely that Mirabeau, as is sometimes asserted, would have been able to check the Revolution in mid-course, and carry out his ambitious schemes for the political reconstruction of France.

Thus when the Assembly began its work of constitution-making the lack of unanimity among the supporters of the Revolution was soon revealed, and the King was encouraged to delay giving his sanction to the decrees of August 4, and later to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which the Assembly had adopted on the 27th. These delays and the intrigues of the Duke of Orléans, who wished to see the King deposed and himself set up in his cousin's place, the arrival of fresh troops at Versailles, and, above all, the scarcity of food provoked fresh disturbances in Paris. On October 5 a mob of women marched on Versailles and, in spite of the intervention of the National Guard, compelled the King and his family to leave Versailles for Paris. The royal carriage was accompanied by a motley crowd of women, who chanted joyfully that there would now be no scarcity of bread since the "baker, and the baker's w[illegible] and little baker-boy" were coming to live in Paris. A few days later the Assembly followed the King to

Paris. Henceforth the legal government of France lay at the mercy of the Parisian mob.

The Assembly now took up in earnest the drafting of a constitution. The first essential was to bring local government into harmony with the new central organization. The old provinces in their local traditions and privileges were abolished; France was divided as equally as possible into eighty-three departments, whose boundaries were merely geographical. With a few changes these departments remain to this day. Each department was divided into 'districts,' each district into cantons, and each canton into communes, each of which might be a town, or a large village, or a group of villages. Each department and district had a local assembly, or council, and an executive committee, called a 'directory'; the 'active citizens' in each canton met and elected the 'electors,' who elected the councils, which elected the directories. The qualification of an active citizen was the payment of a small sum in direct taxation; to become an elector it was necessary to pay a much larger amount in taxes. The commune became much the most important of these divisions; it too had a council and a small executive committee, both elected directly by the citizens. The new organization was designed to bind France together in an indissoluble unity; the Assembly hoped that uniformity would lead to unity. In fact, there was for some time the danger that the loyalty to the local unit would overcome national feeling and break France up into a loose federation of communes.

The old judicial system, including, of course, the *parlements*, was abolished, and a new hierarchy of courts set up. In each canton magistrates, called *juges de paix*, dealt with minor cases; each district had a civil court; each department a criminal court; above all was the supreme court of 'cassation,' which sat at Paris. Trial by jury was introduced in criminal cases, the use of torture and *lettres de cachet* prohibited, the privileged corporations of advocates swept away, and the severity of punishments under the penal code greatly reduced, although capital punishment was not entirely abolished. All judges were to be elected by the active citizens for a period of years—a dangerous application of the principle of popular election.

The great question of the finances occupied much of the Assembly's time. One by one Necker's paltry expedients were tried and found wanting—they served merely to postpone the evil day at the cost of increasing the burden of debt. The Assembly seemed powerless to avert any longer the national bankruptcy. In this crisis Talleyrand, the Bishop of Autun, proposed the confiscation of the estates of the Church, which covered one-fifth of France. Adopting the arguments of the sixteenth-century States-General, he maintained that the clergy merely held their estates on trust, and that the State could take over these estates without injustice to anyone if at the same time it assumed responsibility for the public services to which the clergy had devoted part of their wealth—the expenses of public worship, including the payment of salaries to the clergy, the upkeep of the fabric of the churches, and the provision of hospitals and schools.

The sale of the enormous estates of the clergy, especially in the disturbed situation of France, would be a work of years, and ready money was urgently required to meet the expenses of government and to pay off part of the national debt. Hence the Assembly, on the security of the estates it had confiscated from the clergy, issued a new paper money, called *assignats*, because a portion of the national estates was *assigned* to pay off each note, if the holder of the note wished to use it in purchasing land (December 1789). At first the *assignats* circulated freely, enabled the Government to meet the most pressing claims on the exchequer, and helped to stabilize the Revolution, since the holders of the notes would certainly lose their money if the old *régime* were restored. But soon *assignats* were issued recklessly, far in excess of the value of the national estates; the notes inevitably depreciated in value, and after a few years became practically worthless.

The confiscation of the lands of the clergy was only the first of a series of anti-clerical measures. The next step was the suppression, with a few exceptions, of the monastic orders. Monks and nuns were declared to be free from their vows, and received pensions from the State, while the lands of the various orders were confiscated. A group of decrees, called collectively the "Civil Constitution of the Clergy," was passed in

July 1790. The general effect of these decrees was to establish in France a State Church and to make it independent of the Papacy. The old bishoprics were abolished; in future each department was to be a bishopric. Bishops and *curés* were to be elected, like the officials of the civil Government, by the electors in each department. Newly elected bishops were to receive investiture not from the Pope, but from a French archbishop, and papal authority over the Church in France was expressly repudiated. The State having already assumed responsibility for payment of salaries, these were now fixed. The bishops were paid much less than before, but the *curés* received a living wage.

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy was one of the capital blunders of the Constituent Assembly. It could not be accepted by honest Catholics, and therefore provoked a conflict between the Revolution and the organized forces of religion in France. Exasperated by the clerical opposition which it had itself provoked, the Assembly in November ordered all priests, upon pain of loss of office, to take an oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution. All the bishops, except four, and half the parish clergy refused. Their places were gradually filled by more amenable men, and the Church was torn asunder by the schism between the clergy who had taken the oath and the refractory non-jurors. The latter had the sympathy of their congregations in many parts of the south and west, and the discontent of the peasants soon brought on a civil war.

The second great blunder of the Constituent Assembly was its decree that none of its members should be eligible for re-election in the next Assembly. This self-denying ordinance was perhaps suggested first of all by the reactionaries, who regarded it as the best means of weakening the Revolution; it was strenuously advocated by Robespierre, eagerly adopted by the demagogues of the Left, and carried by a coalition of extremists of both sides. Hardly less serious was the clause of the Constitution which prohibited the King from choosing his Ministers from the members of the Assembly, which was designed to prevent royal influence over the Assembly, but merely fostered mutual suspicion between the legislature and the executive. Another obvious defect was the giving of a

merely temporary veto on legislation to the King, which satisfied neither the King nor the Assembly, and seems to have been designed to make trouble between them and to rouse popular feeling.

Two still more fundamental criticisms of the Constitution have been made. There was a glaring discrepancy between the principle of equality of man preached in the preamble and the actual division made by the Constitution between active and passive citizens, a distinction based entirely on wealth, and no less invidious than the class distinction of the old *régime*. Another fundamental defect was the failure to provide any adequate means of control from the centre over the local authorities established by the Constitution. The Communes might easily have developed into semi-independent republics —that they did not was due chiefly to the passion for national unity, which had found expression in the ceremony of the Federation at Paris on July 14, 1790. Fourteen thousand deputies, chosen from the National Guard, paraded in the Champ-de-Mars, and swore everlasting loyalty to the nation and to the Constitution.

Before the new Constitution was finally adopted two important events happened which reduced still further the already slender hope that it would work efficiently and end the Revolution. On April 2, 1791, Mirabeau died, prematurely worn out by his exertions in the cause of liberty and by the dissipated life which he had led. With him, it has been said, perished the last hope of the French monarchy. Still more disastrous to the monarchy was the failure after his death of a scheme, originally suggested by him in order to free the monarchy from the dictation of the mob, for the flight of the King from Paris. Sound in conception, the scheme was badly executed; the royal party were arrested at Varennes and forced to return to Paris. As soon as the King's flight was known the Assembly suspended him from the execution of his powers and undertook the government in its own name and by its own authority. After the King's return his suspension was continued; yet the Government seemed to go on as before. Thus the flight to Varennes did not merely arouse ineradicable distrust of Louis XVI in the mind of France, but gave a

practical demonstration that the monarchy could be dispensed with. The very word 'royal' became unpopular, so much so that a circus proprietor, in order to retain his patrons, called his 'Royal tiger' the 'National tiger.' The flight to Varennes created the Republican party.

Section II: The Legislative Assembly

Up to this time the course of events in France had proceeded undeflected by foreign intervention. But in the second phase of the Revolution, which lasts from the meeting of the Legislative Assembly under the new Constitution on October 1, 1791, to the fall of the monarchy on September 20, 1792, foreign intervention, threatened and actual, plays a decisive part in determining the course of events. The princes of the petty states on the Rhine, especially the Electors of Mainz and Trier, dreaded the spread of Revolutionary doctrines among their subjects, and regarded the Revolution with abhorrence. They had already promised to assist the *émigrés*, as the malcontent nobles who made their escape from France were called, to raise an army to invade France and restore the King's power and the nobles' privileges. But in spite of their boasts, *émigrés* and German princelings were powerless without the support of some at least of the Great Powers. Britain under the Ministry of William Pitt was the most pacific of states, and a large section of her people sympathized openly with the ideals of the Revolution. Catherine II of Russia had herself no intention of intervening, but was eager to induce her neighbours, Austria and Prussia, to intervene, since this would give her a free hand in the next partition of Poland. Frederick William of Prussia might have fallen into the trap; but the new Emperor, Leopold II, who had succeeded his brother, Joseph, in 1790, was a shrewd and level-headed statesman, whose interests and inclinations were all in favour of peace. He had obtained a complete ascendancy over the volatile King of Prussia, and when the two monarchs met at Pillnitz on August 27, 1791, they bluntly rejected a scheme for armed intervention set before them by the Count of Artois, and issued a joint manifesto, in which they declared that since the restora-

tion of tranquillity in France was a matter of general European concern they could act only after reaching an agreement with the other Powers. Since Britain would certainly be no party to armed intervention, the Pillnitz Declaration was clearly intended by its authors as an assurance of peace. Unfortunately it was so phrased that it could be represented as a promise of assistance to Louis XVI.

The self-denying ordinance had excluded from the Legislative Assembly practically all the leading supporters of the Revolution. Many of the new men were as able as the old, but they lacked experience and had not that personal interest which its authors would have had in making the Constitution of 1791 work. Not only were the men different, but also the parties. The nobles and clergy who had formed the Right of the Constituent Assembly had practically disappeared. The new Right was composed of the supporters of the Constitution of '91, or Feuillants, who thought that the Revolution had now gone far enough. The Centre was composed of independent members, who voted now with the one party, now with the other, and consequently reduced the respect in which the Assembly was held, because it was impossible to forecast how it would vote on any question. On the left sat the Republicans, a party almost unknown in the Constituent Assembly, but now a large and influential section, divided into two groups, Girondins and Jacobins. The Girondins were so called because many of their leaders came from the Gironde (the district round Bordeaux); the Jacobins took their name from one of the clubs (so called because it met at the convent of the Jacobins) which had sprung up in Paris at the Revolution and now, under the presidency of Robespierre, controlled a great network of affiliated political clubs all over the country. In the Assembly the Girondins were much the stronger of the two, but the Jacobins could count on the organized support of the Jacobin clubs and the spasmodic outbreaks of the Paris mob.

The first problem which faced the Legislative Assembly was the treatment of the *émigrés* and of the non-jurors among the clergy. While the *émigrés* sought to enlist the support of foreign rulers against the new order in France, the non-jurors preached rebellion to the peasants, and had already caused

serious disturbances in the west of France. The Assembly decreed the confiscation of the property of all *émigrés* who had not returned before January 1, 1792, and ordered the non-jurors to take an oath of allegiance, known as the Civic Oath, to the nation, law, king, and constitution, on pain of loss of their pensions. The King interposed his veto on both measures, and thus brought himself into open conflict with the Assembly.

Still more serious consequences followed from the intervention of the Assembly in the sphere of foreign policy. Leopold as head of the Empire was bound to defend the feudal rights of the Imperial princes in Alsace and Lorraine, which had been abolished by the Constituent Assembly in 1789; his unconciliatory methods of carrying on negotiations with France bitterly offended the sensitive patriotism of the dominant Girondins, who succeeded early in March 1792 in forcing a Ministry of their friends upon the reluctant King. They regarded the presence of the *émigrés* in the Rhenish states of the Empire as an insult as well as a menace to France, and announced that if the Emperor did not secure the disbandment of the armed forces in the electorate of Trier they would invade the electorate. Leopold retorted that he would assist the Elector if attacked by France. War seemed imminent; the last hope of peace was removed when Leopold died on March 1 and was succeeded by his young and inexperienced son, Francis II. Dumouriez, the Girondin Foreign Minister, demanded satisfaction in menacing tones, and on April 20 France declared war upon Austria.

The war began badly for France, partly because of the disorganization of the French armies, partly because the French plan of campaign was betrayed by the Queen to the enemies of France. Meantime in the south and west the religious troubles became more serious. To combat the external and internal dangers the Assembly disarmed the Royal Guard, summoned to Paris 20,000 picked men from the National Guard, and ordered the deportation *en masse* of the non-juring clergy. The King interposed his veto on the last two measures; the extremists organized on June 20 a great demonstration against the monarchy. The mob poured into the royal palace of the Tuileries and brutally insulted the King and Queen.

This demonstration caused a reaction in favour of the monarchy, but Louis XVI failed, as always, to take his chance. He and his queen placed their reliance on the success of the armies which Francis II and Frederick William II of Prussia were preparing to pour into France. They would have done better to pray to be saved from their friends. On July 27 the Allied commander, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a manifesto in which he threatened to destroy Paris if any fresh insults were offered to the King. This impolitic advertisement of the alliance between the King and the enemies of France brought about the downfall of the monarchy. The mob, now armed with pikes and to a considerable extent organized in regular companies, demanded the deposition of the King. When the Assembly temporized the mob rose as at a given signal, took over the municipal government of Paris, and on August 10 sacked the Tuileries. The royal family barely escaped in time to take refuge with the Assembly.

But the Assembly, even had it wished, had no longer the power to protect them. After August 10 the insurrectionary municipal Government of Paris, called the Commune and dominated by Danton, could dictate alike to King and Assembly. The King was suspended from office; he and his family were imprisoned in the old fortress of the Temple. The Assembly decided that a new constitution was necessary, and ordered the election, without distinction between active and passive citizens, of a constituent assembly, called the Convention.

The Commune of Paris, to which Robespierre was now elected, remained one of the dominant powers in the State for more than two years. Its first task was to organize the national defence. Lafayette, who had been entrusted with the chief command against the Prussians, sought to induce his troops to march upon Paris to suppress the Commune. Failing in this, he fled to Holland, leaving the army in hopeless confusion. The Prussians continued to advance practically without opposition; the fall of Verdun on September 2 opened the road to Paris.

The greatness of the danger provoked an outbreak of frenzy in panic-stricken Paris. A special tribunal had already been

established to try in the most summary manner suspected enemies of the people. The Commune then ordered door-to-door visits, and thousands of suspected Royalists were thrown into prison to await trial. But the extremists, notably Marat and other members of the Watch Committee and the Commune, in whose control the prisons lay, broadcast the question: "How can we march against the Prussians, leaving behind us prisons full of enemies who may easily break out and murder our wives and children?" Thus instigated, an organized mob, headed by a band of volunteers from Marseilles, visited the prisons in turn and massacred some 1400 prisoners—the remainder were either set free by the assassins or contrived to make their escape. The authorities made no serious attempt to stop the massacre, and for three days the streets of Paris ran with blood. When the prisons were empty and the wages promised by the Watch Committee to the assassins had been paid the men of Marseilles left Paris—not for the front, but for their homes in Marseilles.

The September Massacres are an ineffaceable stain upon the Revolution, and did nothing to save Paris. On the eastern frontier Dumouriez worked manfully to instil his own optimism and gallantry into his troops. After the fall of Verdun he held the wooded passes of the Argonne, and on September 20 the French infantry stood firm on Valmy hillock, while their artillery demonstrated its superiority over the Prussians. As a military event the cannonade of Valmy was a mere indecisive skirmish, but it astonished the Prussians, who had reckoned on an easy victory, and filled the French army with confidence. Dumouriez and his colleague Kellermann had saved France.

CHAPTER II

THE CONVENTION

On the day following the battle of Valmy the Convention met at Paris. Not a single Royalist or supporter of the Constitution of '91 was among its members. The Right was formed by the Girondins, who, chiefly as a result of the September Massacres, which they deplored, but had been powerless to prevent, had broken definitely with the Jacobins, who were now often called the Mountain, because many of them sat in the upper tiers of benches. In the centre, called the Plain and the Marsh, sat the moderate majority of the deputies, who voted now with the Right and now with the Left. Parties in the Convention were not founded on any fundamental difference of principles. All were alike Republicans, and on September 21, at the first meeting of the Convention, the monarchy was abolished and a republic formally proclaimed.

The chief difference between Jacobins and Girondins lay in their attitudes toward the Commune. The Girondins, nearly all deputies of districts with a strong local tradition, disliked the dominant place in the State which Paris had usurped after August 10. They wished to curb the power of the Commune, and, as one of them said, to reduce the share of Paris in controlling the Government to an eighty-third, equal to that of any other department. Their chief aim, therefore, was to restore to the Assembly the actual exercise of the supreme authority which it legally possessed and had never ceased to claim. To secure their aims they denounced the excesses of the Paris mob, demanded the punishment of the ringleaders in the September Massacres, and accused the three leading Jacobins, Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, of aiming at a dictatorship.

The Jacobins, on the other hand, were the partisans of centralization; Paris, they believed, was the brain and the

heart of France and ought to dominate and control the whole country. Moreover, the Jacobins cared little for the letter of the law, which was dear to the hearts of the Girondins: to secure the Revolution and what they called the "public safety" they were ready to ride roughshod over all law, and to institute a form of tyranny ten times more arbitrary and oppressive than the old monarchy had ever been. When the Girondins accused them of aiming at a dictatorship they replied that the Girondins in attacking the Commune were really aiming at the breaking up of France into a federation of republics, and thus threatening to undo the work of the Revolution and leave France powerless against her foreign and domestic enemies.

The Girondins had at first a majority in the Convention, but failed to make use of their superiority. They alienated Danton, the ablest and most moderate of the Jacobin trio; they insisted on the re-election of the Commune, but did nothing to prevent the return of Jacobin members; their leaders in the Ministry proved incompetent and vacillating administrators; finally, they had no idea of discipline, and soon broke into discordant sections, which proved an easy prey to the Jacobins, ruthless, enterprising, and well organized as ever.

The monarchy having been abolished, the fate of the King naturally occupied much of the time of the Assembly. The Girondins wished to observe the Constitution of 1791, which had declared the person of the King to be inviolable. The Jacobins saw an opportunity to discredit still further their opponents, whose popularity was already impaired by the accusation of federalism launched against them by Danton. Robespierre and his friends swept aside legal sophistries. They urged that a deposed king was too dangerous an enemy to the Republic to be allowed to live, that the public safety demanded the immediate execution of the King without any trial. The Girondins lacked the moral courage to appear as the defenders of the King. Accordingly the Convention of January 20 decreed by a majority the immediate execution of "Louis Capet," and the sentence was carried out the following day in what is now the Place de la Concorde in Paris.

The execution of the King, as the Jacobins had intended, made a final breach with the past, and rendered impossible

for the time being the restoration of the monarchy. They had hoped in addition to intimidate the crowned heads of Europe. "You have declared war on kings," said Danton, "you have thrown down your glove before them, and this glove is the head of a tyrant." The immediate result of the execution, however, was not to intimidate the kings, but to cause them to declare war on the Republic.

After the battle of Valmy the Prussians had withdrawn without molestation from French soil. Encouraged by this first success, France took the offensive. The King of Sardinia was punished for his support of the *émigrés* by the occupation of Savoy and Nice, two French-speaking districts which had little in common with the more important parts of the Sardinian kingdom. The inhabitants welcomed the French invaders as deliverers, and both provinces were annexed to France in November 1792. Farther north General Custine established a firm hold on the Rhenish provinces of the Empire, capturing Spires, Worms, Mainz, and, for a short time, Frankfurt. Here part of the population sympathized with the doctrines of the French Revolution; but a short experience of the French invaders, who lived on the country, sensibly cooled their ardour.

Still more important and striking successes were won by Dumouriez, who had obtained the sanction of the Convention for an attack on the Austrian Netherlands. These provinces were loosely bound together and were cut off from the centre of Habsburg power; their once famous barrier-fortresses were mere heaps of ruins; the Austrian garrisons were few in number and badly led; worse still, the anti-clerical and centralizing policy of Joseph II had alienated the bulk of the population from the Habsburg rulers. A single pitched battle at Jemappes on November 6 settled the campaign; the whole country passed into Dumouriez's hands.

Revolutionary France had adopted the traditional policy of the French monarchy, the extension of her frontiers to the natural boundaries—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. The old policy of territorial aggrandizement was, however, pursued with somewhat different motives. The Republic could not be considered really safe until she had established around her a ring of friendly states. Moreover, the Republican

leaders had come to believe that the French Republic had a sacred mission to fulfil, and wished to extend the blessings of liberty and Republican government to all countries. On November 19 the Convention formally promised friendship and help to all peoples who would rise against their rulers. Incitement to rebellion was henceforth a regular part of Republican policy.

On December 15 the Convention laid down a general rule for the organization of all countries which had won their 'liberty' by the help of French troops. All existing authorities and privileges were to be abolished; the sovereignty of the people and the equality of all citizens were to be proclaimed; the property of the sovereign and his adherents, and of religious or civil corporations, was to be sold and the proceeds remitted to the French exchequer in order to defray the expenses of the war. In Belgium, where the application of these principles was first attempted by the commissaries of the Convention with Danton at their head, the immediate result was a reaction against France.

The successes of the French armies in the autumn of 1792, the Convention's attempt to incite the subjects of all other states to rebellion, and, finally, the execution of the King led to the formation of the First Coalition, which was joined by every important European state. Great Britain, where popular sympathies had at first been on the side of the Revolution, was alienated by its excesses, and in particular by the execution of the King. The French occupation of Belgium and a decree of the Convention (November 6, 1792), which declared the Scheldt open to trade and Antwerp a free port, threatened the political security and commercial ascendancy of Britain, and convinced Pitt that war was necessary. On February 8, 1793, the Convention anticipated British action by a declaration of war. Holland, threatened by Dumouriez's campaign, and alarmed at the possible revival of the prosperity of Antwerp, also joined the Coalition. Spain, Portugal, the Papal States, and Naples soon followed the Dutch example. Russia, Prussia, the Empire, and Sardinia were already at war with France.

The campaign of 1793 began with an invasion of Holland by Dumouriez with a small army of picked troops. In his

absence the Austrians under the Prince of Coburg took the offensive in Belgium so successfully that Dumouriez had to abandon the Dutch campaign and give battle to Coburg at Neerwinden (March 18–19). Defeated at Neerwinden, and again at Louvain a few days later, Dumouriez knew that he would never be pardoned by the Convention. He therefore decided to get in the first blow. By promising to evacuate the Netherlands he obtained a promise of the inactivity of the Austrian army, while he marched on Paris to dissolve the Convention and re-establish the Constitution of 1791. Like Lafayette before him, Dumouriez speedily discovered that his troops placed France before their general; in despair he took refuge with the Austrians.

Their conduct during the trial of the King had undermined the position of the Girondins; the treachery of Dumouriez, who had been closely associated with many of their leaders, embittered party strife in the Convention and led directly to their fall. The Girondins made two fatal mistakes—they alienated Danton, the consistent advocate of unity between Gironde and Mountain against the foreign foe, by accusing him of complicity with Dumouriez, whom he had met in Belgium; and they attempted to get Marat executed by the newly established revolutionary tribunal—known as the Committee of Public Safety—and thus undermined the personal inviolability of the deputies. As a result of a fresh insurrectionary movement in Paris 80,000 armed men surrounded the meeting-place of the Convention on June 2 and demanded the arrest of the Girondin chiefs. The Convention sallied forth, and in the name of the law the President ordered the commander of the insurgents to withdraw his troops. But the besiegers were not to be overawed. The Convention had to recognize that it was impotent in the hands of the mob, and passed a decree for the arrest of the leading Girondins.

The fall of the Gironde brought to a head the internal troubles which had long been simmering in the departments. Earlier in the year a widespread and well-organized revolt had broken out in La Vendée and the neighbouring departments of Anjou and Poitou, where the simple country-folk remained loyal to their nobles and their priests. Now most of the

arrested Girondins escaped to Caen, which, had they possessed any powers of initiative and organization, would have become the centre of a formidable insurrection. The province of Calvados took up arms for the monarchy. The great provincial towns of the south, where Girondin influence was strong, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Lyons, Toulon, Nîmes, one after another revolted against the dictation of Paris. The Royalists of La Vendée hoped to open up a connexion with the British fleet, and attacked the great seaport of Nantes, which barely managed to beat off the attack. By the beginning of June 1793 sixty departments out of the eighty-three were in arms against Paris.

France, divided against herself, seemed an easy victim for the First Coalition. The Spaniards invaded the Eastern Pyrenees, the Sardinians advanced from the south-east, the British occupied Toulon and laid siege to Dunkirk, the Prussians recovered Mainz, and an Austro-British force took Valenciennes and Condé and opened the way to Paris.

The Jacobins met these manifold dangers with equal ability and success. Within a fortnight they had drafted and passed a new constitution which was as short and simple as possible. Its chief feature was a single Chamber elected annually by manhood suffrage and endowed with the sole law-making power. Ministers were to be chosen at frequent intervals by the Chamber from candidates named by the departments. The votes of the Assembly were liable to cancellation by a direct appeal to the people by a kind of referendum; rebellion was declared "the most sacred of rights and the most essential of duties." Under such a scheme there could be no stability even in normal times. It would have been madness to put it into force at a time of crisis; and the real purpose of the constitution was served when it satisfied the departments, and calmed their fears of the dictation of the capital.

While making on paper this bid for popular support in the provinces the Convention was in reality establishing a despotic and arbitrary central power. The Committee of Public Safety, established in April, was reorganized in July, when Robespierre displaced Danton as its leading member. Henceforth it exercised supreme military and civil authority. Any

order of the Committee had the force of law. These orders were carried out partly by the local associations of Jacobins in provincial centres, partly by agents, called representatives *en mission*, who were generally members of the Convention dispatched for a special object to the armies or the provinces, and were endowed with almost unlimited powers. The Revolutionary Tribunal was transformed into an auxiliary of the committee for the trial of 'suspects'—a term which the Convention defined on September 17 as including all Royalists, Federalists, nobles, relatives of *émigrés*, and also all those who were suspect to the local authorities.

The energy of the Revolutionary Government soon made itself felt. A *levée en masse* of the population was voted, a forced loan was extracted from well-to-do citizens, a special force was raised to suppress the domestic rebellions, and the scarcity of food and other necessaries was met by fixing maximum prices, and declaring any trader who gave up his trade a suspect. Hoarding of provisions was made a capital offence. But the chief weapon of the Committee against its enemies was the establishment of the Reign of Terror. The members of the Committee cared nothing for justice; their aim was to overawe all opposition by a display of ferocity. Thousands of suspects, including the Queen and many who had played honourable parts in the early stages of the Revolution, were guillotined.

By the end of 1793 armed resistance to the Convention was almost at an end within France. The new constitution weakened provincial jealousy of Paris; it was impossible for Royalists and Girondins to co-operate; the mere suspicion that the Girondin risings were being exploited by the Royalists brought upon the Girondins the stigma of treachery to the sacred cause of Revolution. In La Vendée, the most dangerous centre of resistance, the Royalist leaders failed to co-operate effectively, and although the peasants, who composed the bulk of their troops, fought gallantly, they were no match for the regular troops at the disposal of the Jacobins. Caen, the centre of the northern rising, was the first to fall; Bordeaux soon afterward submitted. Marseilles was taken on August 23; Lyons on October 9. Toulon, assisted by a British fleet, held out till December 19. In each case the Jacobin victory was

followed by wholesale massacres, in which little attempt was made to distinguish the innocent from the guilty. In La Vendée the rebels were defeated in a series of engagements, and after the decisive battle of Savenay on December 23 the Vendéan army ceased to exist, although a few leaders still maintained a desperate guerrilla warfare against the Jacobins. Wholesale massacres of prisoners and suspects, which surpassed in horror all the other atrocities of the Revolution, took place at Nantes.

The jealousies of the European Powers, especially of Austria and Prussia, and the lethargy of their generals enabled the Convention to win almost as notable triumphs against foreign invaders as over its domestic enemies. The Allies, moreover, had lost the support of those classes in France which might have risen to support them in earlier years—partly because the Terror made resistance to the Convention almost impossible, partly because the Allies had now abandoned entirely the pretence of disinterested support of the house of Bourbon, and were openly pursuing a selfish policy of territorial aggrandizement. On its side the Convention made blunders, but gradually the incompetent generals were weeded out. Most of the troops were imbued with the Revolutionary patriotic spirit, which provided an admirable basis for discipline; and gradually, in the hard school of experience, they learned how to fight.

The fall of the border fortresses of Condé and Valenciennes had opened the road to Paris. The Allies did not pursue it, but separated to conduct a war of sieges. The British failed to take Dunkirk and were forced to raise the siege. Shortly afterward the Austrians suffered a defeat at Wattignies. The Austro-Prussian invasion of Alsace was likewise defeated, chiefly owing to the ability of two youthful generals who had risen from the ranks, Hoche and Pichegru. Hoche followed up this victory by invading the Palatinate, where he took Mainz and Worms, but failed in a winter march on Trier. Much of the credit for the successes must be given to the genius of Carnot, a member of the Committee of Public Safety, who took no part in party squabbles, but devoted himself entirely to the organization of the armies of the Convention.

As soon as the danger from foreign and domestic foes passed

away the Mountain split up into three well-marked sections. Danton, or rather his followers, since Danton took little part in politics after he had ceased to be a member of the Committee of Public Safety in July 1793, urged that the Terror had served its purpose and should now be discarded and the reign of law restored. Their views were openly proclaimed by Camille Desmoulins in his newspaper, *Le Vieux Cordelier*, in which he compared the work of the Terror to the worst atrocities of the Roman emperors, and demanded the establishment of a "Committee of Mercy." This party was called the moderates, or indulgents.

The second party, known as the *enragés*, pandered to the worst elements in the Paris mob. They found the Terror much too merciful and clamoured for more blood. The assassination of Marat by Charlotte Corday (July 13, 1793) deprived this party of its leader; but it remained powerful, chiefly because its heads virtually controlled the Commune of Paris. In October 1793 they secured the adoption by the Convention of a new calendar, in which the 'decade' took the place of the week, and the Church festivals were abolished. Encouraged by the success of their first attack on Christianity, they next proclaimed the abolition of the Catholic Church in France. All churches were closed, and all priests ordered to cease to hold services. Not content with this, the *enragés* clamoured for the destruction of the church steeples, which, they said, "being loftier than other buildings, were contrary to the Revolutionary principle of equality." On November 10 they celebrated at the cathedral of Notre-Dame in Paris the "feast of reason"—the new divinity, represented by a ballet dancer, was installed on the altar "in place of the former Madonna."

The excesses of this party were equally distasteful to the Dantonists and to the Centre party, which consisted of the followers of Robespierre. Robespierre's mastery of the Jacobin clubs was still undisputed, and he had a secure majority on the Committee of Public Safety. As a disciple of Rousseau he believed in the existence of God, and considered the atheists of the Commune as a danger to society. Moreover, he was undoubtedly jealous of the power possessed by the Commune, which was now the only institution capable of resisting his

authority. Secretly determined to overthrow both parties, Robespierre allied himself with the Dantonists to crush the *enragés* and execute their leaders (March 1794). The turn of Danton and his friends came a few days later. His party was weakened by the suspicions of Royalism which always clung to 'moderates' and by financial scandals in which some of the Dantonist leaders were involved. Although he knew that Robespierre intended to arrest him, Danton refused to take any steps either to escape or to turn the tables on his rival. He preferred, he said, to be guillotined rather than to guillotine others. Never had he shown to better advantage than at his trial. He triumphantly demolished the case of his accusers; even the servile jury would have refused to convict him had not the trial been dropped; but the Convention, fearing the revival of Danton's popularity, ordered the immediate execution of all the accused Dantonists.

Robespierre now reigned alone. The fall of the extremists was followed by the election of a new Commune entirely devoted to him; and the execution of Danton removed the only leader whose past services and outstanding position made him a serious rival to Robespierre. Nevertheless the Terror was continued, and became a weapon for the removal of all whose loyalty to himself Robespierre doubted. Meantime, on his proposal, the Convention declared that the French people believed in the existence of a supreme being and the immortality of the soul. Robespierre himself presided at the first festival of the new State religion, at which he preached two sermons and set fire to an image representing atheism.

Two days later, in an attempt to make his own position unassailable, Robespierre overreached himself. He forced the Convention to pass an infamous law for "the perfecting of the Revolutionary Tribunal" (June 10–22 Prairial). Henceforth no witnesses need be called; any proofs of guilt, material or moral, which satisfied the conscience of the packed jury would suffice. Even members of the Convention could in future be brought before the Tribunal without the previous consent of the Convention. The law of 22 Prairial created a general feeling of insecurity among the members of the Convention, especially as the daily total of executions rose to a

terrifying figure. A clique of deputies of all parties, in fear of their lives, banded themselves together; and, in order to secure the support of the obscure members of the Centre party in the Convention, posed as moderates. On July 27 (9 Thermidor) the decisive debate took place in the Convention. Robespierre was refused a hearing, and he and his chief supporters were arrested by decree of the Convention. His fate was, however, by no means settled. The Revolutionary Tribunal was packed with his friends, and it was almost certain that he would be acquitted. The Commune was likewise devoted to Robespierre: it ordered a general insurrection as soon as his arrest was known, effected his release, and carried him in triumph to the Town Hall. There the Robespierrists sat debating when action was imperative, and their irresolution caused their downfall. The Convention outlawed them; Barras, the most energetic of the conspirators, organized a military force composed chiefly of a section of the National Guard, and prepared to march on the Town Hall. Meantime the conspirators had won over nearly all the 'sections' (or 'wards') of Paris, and induced them to order their gunners to abandon the defence of the Town Hall. The Robespierrist body-guard melted away, and when the troops of the Convention entered the Town Hall they met with no resistance. Robespierre and most of his friends made feeble attempts to commit suicide; they were arrested by the troops of the Convention and executed a few hours later. The fickle mob jeered at their former hero and greeted the strokes of the guillotine with thunders of applause.

The fall of Robespierre, although it had been effected largely by men of his own kidney, who wished merely to exercise themselves the dictatorship of Robespierre, was followed by the 'Thermidorian reaction.' The *raison d'être* of the Terror had long ceased to exist; public opinion at length began to assert itself and to demand the modification and, later on, the ending of the Terror. The moderates in the Convention plucked up heart. Sieyès began to play once again a prominent part in affairs. When questioned as to what he had done during the Terror he replied drily: "I kept alive." The moderates had now a majority in the Convention, and their

ascendancy was confirmed when the Girondin and Dantonist members, who like Sieyès had "kept alive," were permitted to resume their seats. The Committee of Public Safety was reorganized, its powers were defined, and it was placed under the control of the Convention. The powers of the Commune were transferred to executive committees appointed by the Convention. The Revolutionary Tribunal was likewise reorganized; its notorious Public Prosecutor, Fouquier-Tinville, was brought to trial and executed by the reorganized Tribunal; the law of 22 Prairial and the earlier law of suspects were repealed; many political prisoners were released. Finally in December 1794 the last stronghold of the Terrorists, the Jacobin Club, was closed by the Convention.

Abroad 1794 was a year of victories for France, whose armies were aided by the jealousies of the principal members of the First Coalition, Austria and Prussia. The chronic antagonism of these Powers had been roused by events in Poland, and Prussia would have withdrawn altogether from active participation in the Western war had not Britain hired 60,000 Prussian troops by a subsidy treaty. The opening of the campaign was indecisive. The Austrians took Landrecies, but made no further progress against Pichegru, while the English were defeated at Turcoing. The outbreak of Kosciusko's revolt in Poland attracted the attention of Austria and Prussia to Poland, and turned the balance decisively in favour of France. In spite of the treaty of subsidy, the Prussians took no active part in the campaign, and their inactivity enabled Jourdan to join Pichegru in his attack on Charleroi and to defeat the Austrians at Fleurus (June 26)—a decisive battle which led to the French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands. The Prussians hastily retreated homeward without fighting, and the Austrians were driven across the Rhine. France occupied Cologne and Bonn, and was now in possession of the long-coveted left bank of the Rhine. Mainz and Luxemburg alone held out.

The Northern campaign closed with Pichegru's conquest of Holland in mid-winter and the capture of the Dutch fleet as it lay frozen in the Texel. The Stadtholder took refuge in England; the Republican party, long in alliance with France,

took control and welcomed the organization of their country as the Batavian Republic, in complete dependence upon their 'deliverers.' In the south French successes were less marked. Against Sardinia the French armies held some important passes and threatened Turin, while other armies had crossed the Pyrenees and invaded both the Catalan and the Basque provinces of Spain. The only defeat of the Convention was at sea, where the British fleet took Corsica and some French colonies in the West Indies, while on "the glorious first of June" Lord Howe partially destroyed a French fleet which was escorting a large convoy.

The defeats of 1794 broke up the First Coalition, and its dissolution was registered in a series of peace treaties in 1795. Tuscany led the way. In April Prussia signed the Treaty of Basel, by which France was to occupy the left bank of the Rhine, on the understanding that Prussia would obtain on the right bank compensation for her losses at the general peace. France also promised to respect the neutrality of certain North German states allied to Prussia. In May the Batavian Republic had to pay a large indemnity, surrender slices of territory, and accept other conditions which gave France control of the Scheldt. Spain's turn came in June, when she purchased the restoration of French conquests by the cession of her share of San Domingo. Britain, Austria, and Sardinia alone remained active members of the Coalition.

These successes confirmed the ascendancy of the reactionary Thermidorians within France. On April 1, and again on May 20, 1795, outbreaks of the Parisian mob against the Convention, due chiefly to famine, were successfully put down by regular troops. This success, however, brought a new danger in its train, and a 'White Terror' followed in Paris. The Mountain ceased to exist as a powerful organized party. Murders and massacres of Terrorists followed in Lyons, Marseilles, Tarascon, and other provincial cities. Everywhere the Royalists began to emerge from hiding, and many of the *émigrés* slipped back across the frontier. In the hope of animating the Royalists and uniting them under a single leader, the Count of Artois landed in the west with a motley army of *émigrés*, deserters and prisoners from the Republican armies,

and some 5000 British regulars. The Chouans of Brittany and the Vendéans had never been disarmed, although most of them had accepted the general armistice offered by the Convention in 1794 after the failure of its attempts to pacify the north-west by indiscriminate pillage and massacre. They rose again in rebellion, but the incompetence and jealousies of their leaders brought the rising to naught. The Count of Artois himself had no intention of sharing the discomfort and dangers of a guerrilla war; he never actually landed on the mainland of France, and most of the peasants soon returned to their homes. The remainder prolonged the hopeless struggle till June 1796. The main credit for the suppression of the rising must be given to the tactical skill and conciliatory policy of Hoche, who repaired the mistakes of his predecessors, and ended one of the bitterest and most ruinous of civil wars.

Meantime the Convention had accomplished its last great work—the drafting of a new constitution. The anarchic Constitution of 1793, which the Convention now declared had been "dictated by tyranny and accepted by fear," had never been put into force and was now set aside. The Declaration of the Rights of Man was retained at the head of the new Constitution, but was succeeded by a Declaration of Duties, which included the golden rule. Legislative power was divided between two Chambers, both elected by all citizens over twenty-one who possessed a certain property qualification —less than had been required in 1791. The "Council of Five Hundred" alone could initiate legislation; the "Council of Seniors," composed of 250 married men over forty, either gave or refused its consent to the proposals of the Five Hundred. To secure continuity of policy one-third of the members of each council retired each year. The executive power was entrusted to a Directory of five members, who had practically the powers of a constitutional king, except a veto on legislation. They were to be elected by the councils, and one Director was to retire each year.

Fearing a complete reversal of their policy, the Convention decreed that in the first election to the new councils the electors must choose two-thirds of the members of the Convention. Royalists and Terrorists combined to denounce the attempt of

the Convention to secure for itself a new lease of power. The turbulent 'sections' of Paris took the lead in opposition, and rose once again against the Convention on 13 Vendémiaire (October 5). The Convention placed Barras in command of its forces. He chose as his lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte, a young Corsican, who had already made his mark as an artilleryman at the siege of Toulon (1793), and now, after a period of disgrace owing to his alleged association with the Robespierrists, seized the opportunity given to him by Barras to suppress the rebellion with a "whiff of grapeshot," and thus win the confidence of the Thermidorians.

On October 26 the Convention declared that it had accomplished its task, and dissolved itself to make way for the new constitution. The importance of its work can hardly be exaggerated. It had suppressed the domestic troubles which threatened the disruption and ruin of France; it had flung back the forces of a formidable European coalition. It had broken up the coalition and had conquered for France, Belgium, Holland, the Rhineland, Savoy, and Nice. Above all it had taken the initiative in the internal organization of France. Its numerous committees worked hard and laid the foundations on which many of the great institutions of France were to be reared. It consolidated on paper the national debt; it began in earnest the codification of the laws suggested by the Constituent Assembly; it gave to France the metric system of weights and measures; it proclaimed in principle the duty of the State to provide free elementary education, and it established the Institute of France. The evil deeds of the Convention ended with it; its good work endures.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF BONAPARTE

THE two councils established by the new constitution met on October 27, and elected the five Directors. Barras and Carnot, "the organizer of victory," were the most prominent of the five. Sieyès refused to accept office. France was in a deplorable state. The *assignats* had fallen to a three-hundredth of their nominal value; the heavy taxes imposed were paid in *assignats* and brought in an insignificant return; the exchequer was therefore empty. The army clamoured for pay, and the populace for bread. The close restriction of the franchise gave political power to the plutocracy, which had continued to make private profit out of the national disasters, and threatened to carry the Thermidorian reaction still further. On the other hand, the scattered remnants of the Jacobins strove to organize themselves afresh, and win popular support by demanding the restoration of the Constitution of 1793. Some would willingly have massacred the Directors and revived the Reign of Terror. A few had definitely adopted Communistic views. The north-western rebellion might break out again; abroad war had to be waged against Austria and Britain.

The Directory solved these difficulties with a fair measure of success. They postponed national bankruptcy by issuing a new paper money—*mandats*—which they used to buy up the depreciated *assignats*. The Jacobin danger was averted by the discovery of a plot in May 1796, and the arrest of the conspirators. Hoche achieved, by a judicious combination of firmness and conciliation, the final pacification of La Vendée and Brittany. The danger of reaction was, however, increased by the election to the councils in May 1797 of ultra-moderate and even Royalist candidates, who at once made their influence

felt by electing Barthélemy, a constitutional Royalist, and the negotiator of the Treaties of Basel, in place of the retiring Director. At the same time Pichegru—whose loyalty to the Republic was suspect—was elected President of the larger council.

Abroad the campaign of 1795, begun so hopefully with the break-up of the First Coalition, went definitely against France. Jourdan crossed the Rhine in September; Pichegru, who had secretly been negotiating with the Austrians and hoped to win a marshal's *bâton* by joining forces with the *émigrés* to restore the monarchy, reluctantly followed. His advance was checked near Heidelberg, and the Austrian generals for once pushed home their victory. The French armies were driven across the Rhine in considerable disorder, and Mainz was relieved.

The Directory determined to atone for the failure of its generals in 1795. Carnot drew up an ambitious plan of campaign for 1796, designed to bring Austria to her knees by a simultaneous attack upon her territories in Italy and Germany. Napoleon Bonaparte, who had recently married Josephine Beauharnais, the discarded mistress of his protector, Barras, was given command of the Italian army over the heads of many senior officers. His first step was to animate the spirits of his starving and half-naked soldiers by the promise of unlimited plunder in Italy. Then he succeeded in separating the Sardinian and Austrian armies. By a rapid advance toward Turin at the heels of the defeated Sardinians he compelled Victor Amadeus III to accept an armistice, by which he withdrew from the Coalition, disbanded his army, and later, by the definitive Treaty of Paris (May 1796), formally ceded Savoy and Nice to France. Bonaparte meantime hastened to pursue the Austrians. By skilful manœuvring and without fighting a pitched battle he compelled them to fall back from the Ticino to the Adda, and then carried the line of the Adda by his victory at Lodi. The Austrians fell back on the great fortress of Mantua, which commanded the valleys of the Mincio and the Adige, the chief routes between Austria and Italy. Bonaparte entered Milan in triumph, dictated peace to the princes of Parma and

Modena, and laid siege to Mantua. Heavy war contributions were levied upon the population of the occupied territories, and remitted to fill the empty exchequer of the Directory.

The siege of Mantua lasted for six months. Four Austrian armies were successively poured into Italy through the Alpine passes. Bonaparte beat off each attempt to relieve the fortress, and won the great victories of Arcola (November 1796), where his personal bravery saved the day, and Rivoli (January 1797). Mantua surrendered on February 2. The Pope, a large number of whose possessions were already occupied by Bonaparte's troops, tried to save the remainder by signing the Treaty of Tolentino. He surrendered to France Avignon and the Romagna, with the two important cities of Bologna and Ancona, and paid a large war indemnity.

Bonaparte was now the master of Northern and Central Italy. The southern section of Carnot's plan had been successful beyond the wildest hopes of the Directors; but their chosen agent was already showing a dangerous independence, and had repeatedly disregarded their instructions. They were less ready to quarrel with Bonaparte because the contributions which he extorted from the defeated rulers and their subjects staved off for a time the national bankruptcy, and because the northern part of Carnot's plan had completely broken down.

In Germany the French forces were divided into two: one army under Jourdan was to advance by the valley of the Main, the other under Moreau by the Neckar. The campaign opened late, the Austrians withdrew some of their best troops and generals to the Italian front, and the French penetrated into the heart of Germany. The Archduke Charles, who had been left in command of the Austrian forces, hurled himself upon Jourdan and forced him across the Rhine. Moreau had advanced almost unopposed into Bavaria, but the disastrous repulse of his colleague left him isolated. Retreat was difficult and dangerous, but he succeeded in recrossing the Rhine without serious loss. Jourdan's command was given to Hoche, and strenuous efforts were made to discipline and equip the northern armies for the campaign of 1797.

Bonaparte had no desire to share the glory of forcing peace upon Austria with a possible rival, and determined to invade

the Habsburg lands from the south. The Archduke Charles, who had won a great reputation in the German campaign of 1796, failed to prevent Bonaparte's advance. The passes of the Eastern Alps were forced, and when the French advance-guard was within a few days' march of Vienna the Austrian Government reluctantly accepted the preliminaries of Leoben (April 18), which were transformed into the definitive Treaty of Campo Formio on October 17, 1797. By the public articles of this treaty France obtained Belgium, Lombardy as far as the Adige, which was to be organized as the Cisalpine Republic, and the Ionian Islands. Austria was given the rest of the Venetian territories on the Adriatic and in Italy as far west as the Adige. A congress was to be held at Rastadt to arrange peace between France and the Empire, and to provide for the compensation of the German princes on the left bank of the Rhine, who had been dispossessed by France. By the secret articles the Emperor promised to use all his influence to obtain the cession of the left bank to France; in exchange Austria was promised Salzburg and part of Bavaria, and received the assurance that her rival Prussia would obtain no compensation at Rastadt.

The Treaties of Basel and of Campo Formio violated the fundamental principles of the Revolution, and showed no respect for the rights of peoples. By securing to France her natural frontiers the men of the Revolution had carried to a successful issue the secular policy of the French monarchy by the traditional methods—aggressive militarism and skilful diplomacy. In Italy Napoleon's campaign had indeed surpassed the ambitions of the Bourbons, and realized the dreams of the Kings of France who had sought to establish their supremacy in North and Central Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Venice had attempted in vain to preserve its independence by observing an exact neutrality between Austria and France. Bonaparte did not hesitate to violate its neutrality in his struggle with the armies of Austria; the Austrians soon followed his example. Then Bonaparte posed as the champion of democracy against the Republican oligarchy which ruled Venice; and, by stirring up the democrats, so alarmed the

feeble Government that it took precautionary measures, which he seized upon as a new *casus belli*. The exactions of the French troops on Venetian soil provoked a riot in Verona, known as the *Pâques véronaises*, in which a few French soldiers were killed. Shortly afterward a French ship entering the harbour of Venice was fired upon: Napoleon demanded satisfaction for what he called "the most atrocious affair of the century." Seizing these flimsy pretexts, he dispatched a French army to attack Venice: the Senate in a feeble attempt at self-preservation accepted all that Bonaparte demanded. The constitution was democratized, and a French garrison admitted into the city. All was in vain; Venice was destined to share the fate of Poland and to fall a victim to the neighbouring Great Powers. The French garrison only quitted Venice after the Austrians were in possession of their gains under the Treaty of Campo Formio.

The policy of territorial aggrandizement and 'compensations' to which Venice fell a victim illustrates the survival of the aims of the monarchy in the foreign policy of the Republic. The better side of the activities of Bonaparte in Italy is seen in the organization of the Cisalpine Republic, which at first included the territory of Milan, and was soon extended to include Modena and a large part of the Papal States. Its establishment marks a definite step in the growth of the movement for Italian unity, since it provided on Italian soil a concrete example of the new political and social organization, inspired by the French Revolution, which was to revolutionize the states of Europe. The corrupt oligarchy which ruled Genoa was likewise overthrown; the constitution of the State was democratized, and it was named the Ligurian Republic.

Meantime the constitution adopted by the Convention had proved unworkable, since it provided no constitutional method of averting a deadlock between the legislative and executive powers. After the elections of May 1797 the ultra-moderates had a secure majority in the councils and frequently came into conflict with the Directors, three of whom were regicides—*i.e.*, they had voted for the execution of the King. In order to retain power the majority of the Directory pretended to have discovered a Royalist plot, and arrested their co-Director,

Barthélemy, and a number of deputies. Carnot, the other Director marked out for arrest, contrived to escape, but a corps of 12,000 men, detached by Bonaparte from the Army of Italy, overawed the councils and compelled them to accept the dictates of the three Directors. Carnot, Barthélemy, and their friends were exiled; the elections in forty-nine departments were annulled, so as to allow the Directors to appoint whom they pleased; two new Directors were elected at their dictation; the freedom of the Press was suspended; and in short the Directors usurped absolute powers. By using the army to settle a domestic dispute the Directors set an example which was later to be fatal to their own power.

The Directors now turned their attention to the one Power which still remained in arms against the Republic—Great Britain. In spite of mutinies at the Nore and at Spithead, Britain had more than maintained her maritime ascendancy in 1797. In an effort to defeat the British fleet the Directory obtained control of the Spanish and Dutch naval forces, but in February 1797 the Spanish fleet was defeated at the battle of St Vincent, and when the Dutch fleet ventured out of the Texel it was practically destroyed at Camperdown (October 1797). In face of her maritime ascendancy a French invasion of Britain was virtually impossible.

Bonaparte had been appointed to command the Army of England in December 1797, and, in consultation with the Directors, he decided to launch an attack on Britain in the East, where the risks were less and the prospects of success greater, since the mutinies of 1797 had compelled the recall of the British fleet from the Mediterranean. The Directors were glad to be rid for a time of their domineering and too successful general; Continental peace forced Bonaparte to seek a new field on which to win victories which would increase his popularity with the army, and enable him to overthrow the Directors and establish his own dictatorship.

Sailing from Toulon with a picked force of veterans, Bonaparte captured Malta from the Knights of St John and landed near Alexandria on July 1, 1798. Egypt at this time was governed by the military caste of Mamelukes under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. The conquest of Egypt

would strengthen the French power in the Mediterranean, and provide France with an excellent base for an attack either on the British power in India or on the decadent Ottoman Empire. Bonaparte sought to conciliate the native population and win their support against the oppressors. The Mameluke army was routed, and Bonaparte entered Cairo in triumph, but a week later Nelson found the French fleet at Aboukir Bay, and utterly destroyed it in the battle of the Nile (August 1). The French army was thus shut up in Egypt.

Meantime the Congress of Rastadt had opened on December 16, 1797. In March 1798 it reluctantly agreed to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, and thus brought to the front the question of compensation for the dispossessed princes. The French proposal, in accordance with the tradition of French diplomacy, that the ecclesiastical states should be 'secularized'—*i.e.*, handed over to the secular princes who had lost their possessions on the left bank—was welcomed by Prussia and many of the lesser states, but was extremely distasteful to Austria, whose ascendancy in Germany was to a large extent dependent on the support of the ecclesiastical electors and princes.

The threat of secularization induced Austria to consider reopening the war, and the aggressive acts of the French Republic soon gave her and some of the other Powers fresh provocation. In Rome the Democrats, incited by French agents, aimed at the overthrow of the Papal Government. Riots broke out; French troops came to the support of the Democrats and established a republic on the French model, although the names of the chief magistrates and councils were borrowed from classical times. Pius VI, who refused to surrender his temporal power, was deported and died at Valence. Similar disturbances broke out in Piedmont—again France intervened. Turin was occupied in July 1798, and the King forced to take refuge in Sardinia. In December Piedmont and also Tuscany were definitely annexed to France. The Cisalpine Republic after its organization by Bonaparte had made feeble attempts to act independently of France—it was now reduced to complete dependence. In Switzerland the pretext for French intervention was provided by an appeal from the

canton of Vaud for assistance against the governing oligarchy. Berne was taken by the French, and the old federal and oligarchical constitution was abolished. The Helvetic Republic "one and indivisible" was set up as a centralized state in strict subordination to France.

The power of the French Republic seemed to increase day by day. It had established itself in spite of all the efforts of the First Coalition: the dissolution of the Coalition had allowed it to surround itself with a ring of satellite republics, endowed on paper with democratic constitutions, but in reality governed absolutely from Paris. Its flagrant acts of aggression alarmed the neighbouring states, each of which wondered whose turn would come next, and aroused the wrath of the Great Powers. The Bourbon King of Naples, alarmed at the French occupation of Rome, and encouraged by the arrival at Naples of Nelson and his victorious fleet, took the first step. The Neapolitan army under an incompetent Austrian commander, General Mack, marched on Rome and restored the papal authority. Mack's success was short-lived, and he was speedily driven out of Rome. Naples was occupied by the French. The wretched King barely escaped to the British fleet: his subjects waged a gallant but futile guerrilla warfare against the French, but by the end of January 1799 all resistance was at an end. Naples was now reorganized as the Parthenopean Republic.

The rash intervention of Naples forestalled the plans of the Great Powers, and hastened the completion of the Second Coalition. Britain, the only Power which had not made peace after the dissolution of the First Coalition, and whose naval victories had encouraged the other Powers to resume the struggle, was the nucleus round which the Coalition formed. Russia, under the crafty Tsaritza Catherine, had taken no active part in the First Coalition, but the accession of her son Paul I in 1796 caused a reversal of Russian policy. Paul's acts during the whole of his reign show that his mind was quite unbalanced: at this time he was inspired with a fanatical hatred of the Revolution. Moreover, he dreamed, like his predecessors, of making Russia a Mediterranean Power, and used as a pretext for intervention there Napoleon's seizure of Malta from the Knights of St John, of which order he was now Grand

Master. In December 1798 he accepted a subsidy from Britain and promised to co-operate in depriving France of her Revolutionary conquests. He concluded also a close alliance with Austria, which had hung back at first until after the French conquest of Naples, and promised to send a Russian army into Italy to assist the Austrian forces. Prussia held ostentatiously aloof, but most of the German states followed the Austrian lead. Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt presented the Allies with a new recruit—the Sultan.

The Coalition possessed an overwhelming superiority in man-power and financial resources, while the British fleet secured the command of the sea. Bonaparte and the flower of the French armies were locked up in Egypt. The French generals at their best were no more than equal to the Archduke Charles and his lieutenants, and were surpassed by the fiery genius of Suvorov, the commander of the Russian auxiliary corps in Italy. The French frontier extended from the South of Italy to the North Sea; it was open to attack all along the line. The recent conquests were still unorganized and seething with discontent at the rapacity of their French conquerors.

The French plan of campaign was as usual based on the maxim that attack is the best means of defence. Jourdan's army was to advance through Germany by the Danube valley to attack Vienna; in the centre Masséna was ordered to advance from Switzerland so as to cut communications between the Austrian armies in Italy and Germany; farther south in Italy the French under Scherer were to stand on the defensive until Masséna had cut off the Austrian lines of communication, when Masséna and Scherer would combine to overwhelm the isolated armies of Austria in Italy.

This ambitious plan speedily broke down. Jourdan was defeated and forced across the Rhine by the Archduke Charles; in Italy Scherer was driven from his defensive position. The failure of the wings nullified Masséna's successes in Switzerland, and compelled him to retreat to a strong position near Zürich, where he established himself firmly and resisted all attempts to dislodge him. Scherer and his successors were not so fortunate in Italy, where Suvorov and his Austrian allies, in a lightning campaign of two months (April–

June 1799), destroyed the French field armies and blockaded the few fortresses which held out for France. The Austrians, however, refused to co-operate in an invasion of France, on which Suvorov had set his heart. They preferred to establish themselves securely in the territories already won, and one by one they reduced the remaining French garrisons. In August 1799 Suvorov defeated at Novi the army which the Directory had raised for the reconquest of Northern Italy. The Cisalpine Republic had already been swept away; the Roman Republic now collapsed; the Parthenopean Republic was also overthrown, and after the return of the King a "White Terror" was instituted in direct violation of the King's promise of a general amnesty. At the other extremity of the battle-line, in Holland, a joint Russo-British force disembarked without opposition, captured the Dutch fleet, and threatened to overthrow the Batavian Republic.

Once again France was saved by the jealousies of her enemies. The Austrians, intent on re-establishing their hegemony in Italy, were anxious to get rid of Suvorov, who was therefore sent to co-operate with another Russian corps under Korsakov, which was already in Switzerland, while the Austrian troops in Switzerland were to reinforce the Archduke Charles on the Rhine. Masséna seized the opportunity to annihilate Korsakov's army at the battle of Zürich (September 25–26, 1799), before Suvorov could cross the Alps. When Suvorov arrived he found himself in a precarious position, unsupported by the Austrians. Although he managed to effect a hazardous and laborious crossing of the mountains and extricated the greater part of his army, he believed that he had been betrayed by the Austrians, and threw up his command in disgust. In Holland the Allied armies were defeated and forced to capitulate, largely owing to the incapacity of their commanders. Paul, disgusted at the selfishness of Austria and the defeat of his troops, withdrew from all active share in the struggle. The Coalition was clearly on the point of dissolution.

The disasters to the French cause in the early part of 1799 produced an immediate reaction in France against the Directory. The election of May 1799 once again gave its opponents in the councils a secure majority. Sieyès, finding

it much easier to keep alive under the Directory than during the Terror, plucked up courage and accepted office as the new Director. The fresh deadlock between the legislative and executive powers ended this time in the triumph of the councils, which deposed one Director and compelled two others to resign. Barras, the only survivor of the original Directory, had lost all influence; of the new Directors Sieyès alone was more than a respectable nonentity, and he was already planning the overthrow of the constitution. Discontent was general, Jacobinism began to revive, and the new Directors soon proved no more efficient or successful than the old.

At this point Bonaparte returned to France. When he discovered that his attack on Egypt had brought Turkey into the Second Coalition he took the offensive and marched into Syria. He captured Jaffa, but failed before Acre, which was resolutely defended by the Turkish garrison with the support of British marines and battleships under Sir Sidney Smith. By May 1799 he was back in Egypt with his prestige shaken, his army decimated, and his dreams of a career of conquest in the East rudely shattered. After suppressing a rising of the Mamelukes at the battle of Aboukir Bonaparte with a few of his generals abandoned his army, and sailed secretly for France. The desertion of their commander sealed the fate of the French garrison in Egypt, although they held out gallantly until August 1801.

Bonaparte's arrival in France was admirably timed. The failure of his successors had emphasized the great achievements of his Italian campaign; his own recent defeat was not counted against him, since it had taken place in a distant field and had attracted little attention in France. The Directory was unpopular and divided against itself; the constant upheavals of the Revolutionary period had at last wearied the great mass of the people of political strife, and made them ready to accept any Government which promised stability and good order. Sieyès as usual had a ready-made constitution in his pocket, and his influence was supreme in the smaller council; Bonaparte's brother, Lucien, had just been elected president of the larger council. Bonaparte hoped for a time that he would be raised to supreme power in the State by

popular acclamation and without the use of force. When he saw that this was not going to happen he joined forces with Sieyès. Talleyrand, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Fouché, Chief of Police, were also in the plot. The assemblies were induced to remove from Paris to Saint-Cloud, and on November 10 (19 Brumaire) the *coup d'état* was accomplished. When he found that his popularity was not sufficient to induce the councils to vote away their own existence Bonaparte completely lost his head; but his brother Lucien saved the day by encouraging his brother's devoted troops to enter the hall and expel the defiant legislators. The rump then met, voted for the revision of the constitution, and appointed three Consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyès, and another conspirator, Ducos, to carry on the provisional Government and to supervise the drafting of the new constitution.

Sieyès then produced his draft constitution, the chief objects of which were (i) to establish a system of checks and balances which would prevent any one factor in the State from usurping supreme power; and (ii) to create a Government which should have the confidence of the people and yet not be dependent on frequent popular elections. Sieyès solved these problems admirably on paper. The people were to draw up lists of men who alone were to be eligible for office in local government. These selected citizens were then to draw up another list from which all members of the Government and of the legislature were to be chosen. Up to this point the scheme was not unlike the earlier constitutions; the novelty lay in the fact that the actual choice of all officials from the list of eligible candidates was vested in the Government.

The nominal head of the Government was to be the Great Elector, who was to make the appointments to nearly all the important offices and, in general, to take the place of a constitutional monarch. Two Consuls were to be at the head of the executive authority. The legislative power was to be divided between as many councils as there are legislative processes—one to initiate, another to discuss, and a third to pass or reject without discussion legislative proposals. In addition a Senate whose members were appointed for life was given a veto on legislation.

Bonaparte agreed with Sieyès in his distrust of direct control of the Government by the electors, and the power given by Sieyès to the executive of nominating the legislature exactly suited his requirements. But he disapproved entirely of the doctrine of the separation of powers which Sieyès had adopted with such enthusiasm that his constitution would wellnigh have put an end to government. Bonaparte was determined that the new Government should be a centralized bureaucracy with himself at its head. From Sieyès' scheme he therefore selected the points of which he approved and discarded those which he disliked. While retaining the appearance of popular control he transformed the impotent executive of Sieyès into a dictatorship to be exercised by the First Consul and two colleagues, also called Consuls, whose sole duty was to advise their chief. Bonaparte took the office of First Consul, his colleagues being Cambacérès and Lebrun, competent assistants who lacked the popularity and ambition which might have made them his rivals. In future the consular offices were to be filled by a 'Conservative Senate,' which was carried over along with the legislative councils from Sieyès' scheme. All these bodies were merely "playthings to keep well-behaved children occupied, while Bonaparte was left to look after all important matters." The new constitution was accepted in 1800 by an immense majority when it was submitted to a popular vote (or plebiscite). Bonaparte had tamed the Revolution; his personal despotism had, in fact, begun.

The first act of the First Consul was the administrative reorganization of France. Here Bonaparte reverted to the tradition of the absolute monarchy; every local official from the lowest to the highest was appointed by the First Consul and held office during his pleasure. The local assemblies created by the Constitution of '91 did not disappear, but became merely deliberative bodies with almost exclusively financial duties. In practice the departments were governed as despotically by prefects as they had been by the Intendants of the absolute monarchs. Below the prefects there was a regular hierarchy of bureaucrats; the driving-force of the whole administrative system came from the centre: popular control there was none. The new system worked well, since

Bonaparte was careful to choose capable administrators, irrespective of the political party to which they belonged. His long absence from France had insured his own freedom from party ties, and he was able to pose at first as the mediator between the contending factions, whose selfish struggles had wearied the great mass of Frenchmen and made them ready to exchange their exercise of the Rights of Man for a stable and orderly Government.

The foreign policy of the First Consul was equally astute. By writing personal letters to the sovereigns of Britain and Austria he paraded before France a desire for peace. The rejection of these vague and insincere overtures enabled him to continue the war with the whole-hearted support of France, and the withdrawal of Paul I from the Coalition gave him a good chance of success. His plan of campaign for 1800 was an adaptation of the celebrated plan devised by Carnot in 1796. Moreau crossed the Rhine, traversed Bavaria, and drove the Austrians before him as far as Ulm, where he halted in obedience to Bonaparte's orders. Meantime Bonaparte himself crossed the Alps by the easy route of the little St Bernard Pass, and, instead of relieving Masséna, who was holding out bravely at Genoa against overwhelming Austrian forces under Melas, marched into Lombardy in order to cut off Melas' retreat. Genoa fell, and Melas then marched eastward, took Bonaparte by surprise on June 14 at Marengo, and inflicted on him a severe defeat. Another French force under Desaix, hearing the sound of guns, arrived in time to turn defeat into victory. Desaix was killed in the battle, and in the official reports of the battle Bonaparte took the credit to himself. Marengo ended the campaign in Italy, since Melas had now no option but to conclude an armistice, but the decisive battle of the campaign of 1800 was fought in Germany. After the failure of peace negotiations Moreau resumed the advance in Germany, and his utter defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden (December 3, 1800) opened the way to Vienna, and compelled the Emperor to conclude peace at Lunéville on February 9, 1801.

The new peace was in the main a repetition of the Treaty of Campo Formio. France's possession of the left bank of the Rhine was confirmed: the question of the compensation of the

dispossessed princes which the Congress of Rastadt had left unsolved was to be settled "according to arrangements which shall be determined later." In Italy the only important change in the 1797 settlement was the cession of Tuscany and Elba to the Cisalpine Republic. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was to receive compensation in Germany. Austria retained her Venetian territories, and the King of Naples was spared owing to the intervention of Paul I, but France was now the predominant power in Italy. Austria was also compelled to recognize all the satellite states created by France—the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics.

Britain alone remained undefeated, thanks to her command of the sea. But the exercise by her navy of the right to search neutral ships for goods belonging to her enemies and for contraband of war roused the opposition of all the neutral Powers whose carrying-trade was affected. After his withdrawal from the Second Coalition Paul I remained neutral for a time, but soon he developed an unreasoning admiration for the First Consul, whom he regarded as the conqueror of the Jacobins. Bonaparte carefully encouraged the good disposition of the half-mad Tsar toward him by sending back without ransom the Russian prisoners taken in Holland, and by promising to restore Malta to the Knights of St John. Britain, on the other hand, refused to commit herself to the restoration of Malta. Paul then showed his displeasure by organizing a league of neutrals, which was joined by Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia. The Baltic Powers bound themselves jointly to resist by force, if necessary, Britain's exercise of the right of search. Britain treated this revival of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 as a declaration of war, and acted with vigour and promptitude. On April 2, 1801, Copenhagen was bombarded and the Danish fleet destroyed, and Denmark was forced to withdraw from the League. The dissolution of the League had already been assured by the assassination of Paul I, whose insane policy had created widespread discontent in Russia and led to a palace revolution which placed his son Alexander I on the throne. The new Tsar at once made peace with Britain.

At last in March 1802 France and Britain, one supreme on

land, the other at sea, concluded the Treaty of Amiens. Britain restored all her colonial conquests except Trinidad, which she had taken from Spain, and Ceylon, captured from Holland, both of which Powers were now closely allied to France. Egypt was to be restored to the Sultan; Malta, subject to a number of conditions, to the Knights of St John. France promised to evacuate the Papal States and Naples and to allow the formation of the Ionian Islands into a republic. Nothing was said of the more fundamental causes of the war—notably the French control of Holland and Belgium, which Britain regarded as a pistol pointed at her heart. Although the peace was immensely popular both in Britain and in France, the failure of the negotiators to settle vital questions and the renewed aggressions of Bonaparte soon brought about a recommencement of the war.

CHAPTER IV

NAPOLEON AS THE DICTATOR OF FRANCE AND OF EUROPE

Section I: France

THE popularity of the peace and the breathing-space which it offered enabled Bonaparte to make great strides toward an unfettered dictatorship. Already in December 1800 he had made use of an attempt to assassinate him to induce the Senate, contrary to the constitution, to exile the Jacobin leaders. When the Tribunate, the body charged with the duty of discussing proposed laws, ventured to express an independent opinion it was reduced to subservience by being 'purged' of those members who had dared to criticize the measures of the First Consul. In August 1802 Bonaparte became Consul for life, not as the Senate had suggested for ten years, as a result of a plebiscite. Soon afterward further constitutional changes were made—the powers of the subservient Senate were increased, and the Tribunate was remodelled so as to deprive it of all importance.

More important measures, which were to have a lasting effect on the political and social life of France, were also taken at this time. Bonaparte hastened to put an end to the religious troubles which had distracted France ever since the promulgation of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The attempt to establish a constitutional Church independent of the Papacy had proved an utter failure. Refractory priests were allowed to return to France and to resume their duties. This complete breach with the traditions of the Revolution was designed to win the support of the Clergy, which he believed would prove invaluable in buttressing his power. "A state without a religion," he declared, "was like a vessel without a compass."

After Marengo the Pope, Pius VII, had been restored to the

Papal States, but the presence of a French garrison in Rome was a menace to his authority, and he could hardly be regarded as a free agent in the negotiations which ended in April 1802 with the promulgation of the Concordat. Roman Catholicism became once again the religion of the State; its services and officials were to be supported out of the revenues of the State; on the other hand, the First Consul secured the right to nominate archbishops and bishops, whom the Pope could reject only if they were proved guilty of heresy and immorality. Not content with this measure of authority over the Church, Bonaparte insisted upon adding to the Concordat a number of clauses, known as the "Organic Articles," which limited strictly the papal authority over the Catholic Church in France. Without the previous consent of the civil Government no papal Bull could be published and no Church council held in France, nor could the bishops leave their dioceses. Other clauses mark the beginning of State intervention in education, hitherto left to the Church. Worse still, Bonaparte did not give his support exclusively to the Catholic Church—the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches, and even the Jews, received financial support and were brought under the control of the State. The support of the Army had carried him far; he believed that the combined support of the Army and Church would make his position unassailable.

The immediate results justified Napoleon's hopes, but it remains doubtful whether in the end he gained or lost more by the Concordat. Catholics were grateful to Napoleon, but State control irked them and they never ceased to associate his power with the hated Revolution. On the other hand, most of his own supporters agreed with Joseph Bonaparte that the Concordat was a "retrograde and thoughtless" step. In the end it was the Church itself which gained the greatest advantage.

Another of the measures of the First Consul, though this was not completed until long afterward, was the elaboration of the five Napoleonic Codes, the most important of which was the Civil Code. Napoleon's claim to credit for the drawing up of the codes which were formulated between 1804 and 1810 has been hotly disputed; valuable preliminary work had been done

by the Constituent Assembly and the Convention, but it was Napoleon who carried their work to completion and gave it a logical and coherent form. Napoleon's personal intervention on the side of authority weakened the Revolutionary principles of liberty and equality as expressed in the codes, but

> the codes preserve the essential conquests of the revolutionary spirit—civil equality, religious toleration, the emancipation of land, public trial, the jury of judgment . . . in a clear and compact shape they presented to Europe the main rules which should govern a civilized society.

If Napoleon in the Civil Code reduced the intensity of Revolutionary principles he gave them a much greater extension—notably in Germany and Italy.

By the new Constitution and the Concordat, and to a less extent by the codes, Bonaparte broke definitely with the fundamental principles of the Revolution. Equally opposed to the Revolutionary ideal of equality was his institution in 1802 of the Legion of Honour. This distinction was given chiefly to soldiers, but also to eminent civilians. Believing that the French would be best governed by their vanity, and that his own prestige would be raised by interposing between himself and the mass of people a regular hierarchy of rank, after 1804 he soon raised up a new Court nobility of princes and dukes, marshals and counts, barons and knights. Many of these were 'new men,' but Napoleon preferred as far as possible to surround himself with members of the old nobility, who took his wages, but sneered at the upstart ruler behind his back and felt no loyalty toward him. On the other hand, the former Revolutionaries, who pocketed their principles and entered Bonaparte's service, must always have felt uncomfortable at his Court.

The attitudes of these two sections in Bonaparte's *entourage* may be illustrated by the careers of the only two men, apart from the Marshals, of outstanding ability who served Bonaparte—Talleyrand, the Foreign Minister, and Fouché, Chief of Police. Talleyrand was a true representative of the old *régime* in subtlety of mind and faculty for intrigue; Fouché in his calculating brutality was a worthy successor of the Jacobins. Both men saw too clearly the dangers which were to overthrow

Napoleon to be altogether loyal to him; both fell deservedly under suspicion. Talleyrand retired in 1808, and Fouché was dismissed in 1810. Like many legitimate monarchs, Bonaparte became increasingly suspicious of men of real ability, and preferred to retain exclusive control of all branches of government by ruling through subordinates who loved routine and were incapable of initiative.

Bonaparte's work in the sphere of education may be taken as typical of his whole administration. Here he made a strenuous effort to carry out in practice the ideas proclaimed by the Revolution—and notably by the Convention. Rigid centralization is the key-note of the system he strove to establish. The whole system of primary, secondary, and technical schools and provincial colleges and faculties was to be controlled by a single university. Although the Imperial University was actually founded in 1808 in order to "ensure uniformity of teaching, and to train up citizens attached to their religion, their ruler, their fatherland and family," the scheme remained largely a paper one.

Napoleon's treatment of the Institute of France brings out clearly another aspect of his rule. While encouraging its artistic, literary, and scientific sections he suppressed the sections devoted to the study of the moral and political sciences. A rigid censorship of books, newspapers, and plays was also enforced. The leading authors of the period, Chateaubriand and Mme de Staël, the daughter of Necker, were both in opposition to his power.

These domestic activities of Bonaparte, although their guiding principles were very different from those of the Constituent Assembly and the Convention, nevertheless did much to consolidate the best work of the Revolution without making an absolute breach with the old *régime*. His work certainly lacks originality, but it would have been much less durable had it owed less to his predecessors. It is a more serious defect that in some respects it was not really well adapted to the needs of the time. Still, taken all in all, it gives Bonaparte a claim to statesmanship, and proves that he was not a mere destroyer, as an exclusive study of his foreign policy would suggest. His condemnation as a statesman lies in his deliberate sacrifice of

the needs of domestic policy to a wanton and reckless policy of aggression against the other states of Europe, which can be explained, but not justified, by his belief that his power in France was dependent on his military prestige and could only be maintained by a succession of victories. Frenchmen, he believed, would accept his dictatorship only so long as he maintained the position of France as the dictator of Europe.

The prospect that the Treaty of Amiens might give Europe a period of peace was never great, and speedily disappeared as the result of Bonaparte's aggressions. In January 1802 the Cisalpine Republic changed its name to the Italian Republic, and its representatives were summoned to Lyons and forced to offer the Presidency to Bonaparte. Piedmont and the island of Elba were definitely annexed to France in the same year. In Switzerland Bonaparte acted on the maxim " Divide and rule." He took advantage of the strife of parties to impose a new constitution on the Helvetic Republic, which deprived the federal Government of all effective control over the nineteen cantons and paralysed resistance to French dictation. The cantons, moreover, were now bound to contribute troops to France. In spite of the guarantee in the Treaty of Lunéville of the independence of the republics created by France, Bonaparte maintained garrisons in all of them.

The Treaty of Amiens had also enabled Bonaparte to take tentative steps to revive the colonial power of France. The negro population of the island of San Domingo (or Hayti) under a negro general, Toussaint l'Ouverture, had established its independence of France. Bonaparte at once dispatched an army, which suppressed the rising and restored the rule of France. Even more alarming to Britain were the suspicions entertained of the ultimate designs of French agents in India and Egypt. In January 1803 the French official newspaper, the *Moniteur*, seemed to justify these suspicions by publishing the report of one of the French agents in the Levant, who mentioned casually that an army of 6000 Frenchmen could easily conquer Egypt. Bonaparte on his side was furious at the attacks made upon himself and his Government in British newspapers, and complained that the British Government was violating the Treaty of Amiens by allowing the Bourbon

princes and their following of *émigrés* to remain on British soil. He demanded also that Britain should evacuate Malta, as she had promised to do at Amiens. The British Government had no intention of fulfilling its promise, and retorted that the conditions on which the promise had been made remained unfulfilled by Bonaparte. Diplomacy was powerless to avert the conflict, and war was declared in May 1803.

Section II: Europe

Two months earlier the reconstruction of Germany in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lunéville had been completed. Bonaparte in co-operation with the Tsar, whom he hoped to flatter and conciliate, acted as mediator. The details of the settlement, nominally the work of the Diet, were in reality worked out by Talleyrand in a series of separate negotiations with the princes of Germany. Thanks to the land-hunger of the princes, with Austria and Prussia at their head, France was able to effect a reorganization of the Empire, which secured the dominant influence of France and seemed to destroy all hope of national unity. Talleyrand had realized at last the secular ambition of the Bourbons—"Détruire l'Allemagne par l'Allemagne même."

With one exception all the ecclesiastical states were secularized; forty-four out of the fifty Imperial cities and most of the Imperial knights disappeared. Austria obtained only the city of Trent, since she was the only German state capable of opposing France. Toward Prussia Bonaparte showed himself well disposed — she received adequate compensation in Northern Germany for her losses on the Rhine, and was further conciliated by the suggestion that some day Hanover might be hers. More than ever to outward seeming was Prussia capable of counterbalancing the Habsburg power. But Bonaparte's favours were reserved mainly for the middle states, in which he saw a group which would, under French influence, hold the balance between Austria and Prussia and secure the ascendancy of France in the Empire. Bavaria lost much, especially the Palatinate, on the Rhine, but she gained Bamberg, Würzburg, and Augsburg. Smaller but, in proportion to

their size, enormous gains were made by Württemberg and Baden. Germany in 1792 had contained 360 so-called states; in 1803 there were only eighty-two.

These revolutionary changes had a permanent effect on Germany. The disappearance of the ecclesiastical states reversed the religious balance and destroyed the Roman Catholic majority on which Austrian supremacy rested. The Imperial constitution had long been a hollow sham, maintained only by inertia and by the prestige of the house of Habsburg. Now even the Habsburgs regarded it as not worth maintaining. The barriers were down; already in the eighteenth century Germany had become in art and letters a province of France; now French domination was extended to legal, political, and constitutional matters. Those parts of the Empire which were annexed to France received directly all the legal and social heritage of the Revolution, and many of the other parts gradually modified their institutions in accordance with French examples.

The renewal of the war with Britain was immediately followed by a Royalist plot against the First Consul. The leading conspirators were Cadoudal, a former chief of the Chouans, and Pichegru, the renegade Republican general and politician. Their schemes were well known to Fouché and his spies, and they were arrested early in 1804 and executed. Not satisfied with the defeat of the conspiracy, Bonaparte determined to take vengeance on the Bourbon princes, who had instigated the conspirators. The Count of Artois was certainly in the plot, but he was not to be enticed from his refuge in England. Bonaparte, not to be baulked of a Bourbon victim, ordered the seizure of the Duke of Enghien on the territory of the Grand Duke of Baden. The unfortunate Prince was brought to Vincennes, 'tried' before a military commission, and shot at dead of night in the moat of the Castle of Vincennes. No evidence of the Duke's connexion with the plot has been found, and the wanton murder remains one of the darkest blots on the career of Napoleon Bonaparte.

The murder of Enghien shocked Europe and terrorized France. When Fouché in obscure terms proposed the establishment of a hereditary monarchy the Tribunate

hastily took the hint, and Carnot alone ventured to oppose the suggestion. Bonaparte then adopted the title Emperor of the French and officially styled himself Napoleon. The sanction of the people was obtained by the usual plebiscite, and it was decided that the title should be hereditary in his family by male succession. On December 2 the coronation of the new Emperor took place at the cathedral of Notre-Dame, in Paris. The Pope, Pius VII, was induced to be present at the ceremony, but Napoleon carefully evaded any appearance of submission to the Papacy by placing the Imperial crown on his own head.

The war between Britain and France, which had broken out in May 1803, was not at first eventful. Britain had no Continental allies, and, while her fleets took possession once again of the colonies she had restored to France and her allies at Amiens, Napoleon did as he pleased in Europe. Naples was reoccupied and plans considered for a descent on Malta; Hanover was occupied by a French army in defiance of the provisions of the Treaty of Basel, which Prussia, under the feeble rule of Frederick William III, made no attempt to enforce; above all, an enormous army was concentrated along the Channel coast, with its headquarters at Boulogne, destined for the invasion of Britain.

Pitt had returned to office in May 1804 and resumed at once his old policy of forming a Continental coalition against France. He found the leading Powers of Europe inclined to listen to his overtures. The monarchs by this time realized even more clearly than before that the permanent victory of the French Revolution, even as modified by Napoleon, would fatally undermine the idea of absolute monarchy by divine right and create endless disturbances among their own subjects. Moreover, the aggressions of Napoleon during the period of peace after the Treaty of Lunéville convinced them that, even if they reconciled themselves to the final surrender of the provinces they had lost, the ambitions of Napoleon would mean further losses of influence and territory and would completely overthrow the Balance of Power, already undermined by the victories and territorial aggrandizement of Revolutionary France.

Sweden, which had hitherto taken no active part against France, was the first state to be won over. More important converts soon followed. The Tsar Paul's pro-French policy, which was contrary to the traditions and commercial interests of Russia, had been a main cause of his downfall, and his successor, Alexander I, was committed to a change of policy. Moreover, Alexander's own ambitions were to restore to Russia the position of arbiter of Europe which his grandmother Catherine had occupied toward the close of her reign, and to resume her aggressive policy in the Near East. In both respects his desires were in conflict with the avowed aims of Napoleon. More tangible grievances were not lacking. Alexander saw that he had been duped in the joint mediation with Napoleon in the affairs of the Empire; he was indignant at Napoleon's annexation of Piedmont in 1802 and reoccupation of Naples after the outbreak of war with Britain; the atrocious murder of the Duke of Enghien provoked him to break off diplomatic relations with France.

Austria had spent the years of peace in reforming her finances and her army, and was now ready to resume the struggle in the hope of revenging the humiliating defeats of the earlier campaigns. The end of her hegemony in Italy and the domination of France there was a serious blow. The Napoleonic reorganization of the Empire touched Austrian interests and pride at their most sensitive point. Feeling that the Holy Roman Empire would soon disappear altogether, Francis II assumed the title of Emperor of Austria, so that in any event he would remain on an equal footing with the rulers of Russia and France.

Even Prussia, obstinately neutral since 1795, began to doubt the wisdom of her policy. Although she had made substantial gains, the Napoleonic settlement of Germany was not altogether to her liking, and latterly Napoleon had openly violated the Treaty of Basel by seizing Hanover, interfering with the commerce of the Elbe, and, in flagrant violation of international law, arresting Rumbold, the British resident at Hamburg. Frederick William III, "the most respectable and the most ordinary man who has ever reigned in Prussia," was restive under these provocations and inclined to listen to the

tempting voices of Pitt and Alexander I. In May 1804 he went so far as to sign a treaty with Russia under the influence of Hardenberg, who, when Prussia was exhausted, had been chiefly responsible for the Treaty of Basel, but now advocated war with France for the recovery of the honour and independence of Prussia. But Frederick William had another adviser, Haugwitz, who consistently advocated the jackal policy of subservience to France in the hope of further territorial gains (especially Hanover).

Napoleon himself gave the final impulse to the formation of the Coalition by committing further aggressions in Italy. The Italian Republic was transformed into the kingdom of Italy; Parma and Piacenza were annexed to it. Genoa was divided into departments and incorporated in the French Empire. In April 1805 Britain and Russia concluded the treaty which formed the basis of the Third Coalition. Austria, Sweden, and Naples acceded to it; but in the end Haugwitz, aided by Frederick William's jealousy of Austria, defeated Hardenberg, and Prussia continued her wavering policy of neutrality. The success of the Napoleonic settlement of Germany is shown by the transference of the alliance of the lesser German states, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, to France. Spain also, under the incapable rule of Godoy, was dragged helplessly at the chariot-wheels of France.

The avowed objects of the Coalition were to deprive France of her conquests and to restore them to their rightful rulers. At the end of the war disputed questions were to be settled by a congress, and a federal system for the preservation of the peace of Europe was to be established. The Third Coalition treaties contain in germ the idea of the settlement of all the affairs of Europe by regular congresses, which reached maturity after the overthrow of Napoleon.

The strength of the Coalition consisted of the immense naval and financial resources of Britain and the apparently vast military power of Austria and Russia. Napoleon knew from experience that the defeat of the Allies on land did not bring with it the surrender of Britain. He determined, therefore, to change his tactics in the hope of overthrowing the whole Coalition by a swift blow against Britain. The Grand Army

was still at Boulogne, constantly practising embarkation and disembarkation in the flat-bottomed boats which were to carry it across the Channel. But before the crossing could be attempted with any prospect of success the French fleet must gain the mastery of the Channel. With this aim Napoleon ordered his admiral Villeneuve to sail toward the West Indies and decoy Nelson after him. Villeneuve was then to give his pursuers the slip, raise the blockade of Brest, and obtain control of the Channel. Nelson was successfully decoyed to the West Indies, but the British Government received news of Villeneuve's return in time, and when the French Admiral arrived off Cape Finisterre he was met by another British squadron, which succeeded in shutting him out from the Channel and maintaining the blockade of Brest. The projected invasion of Britain was now clearly impracticable.

Shortly afterward Nelson, returning from the West Indies, met and destroyed the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafalgar (October 21). The heroic death of the British Admiral in the hour of victory adds to the imperishable glory he had already won by an unbroken succession of naval victories. Trafalgar crowned his work. For the rest of the war Britain's mastery of the seas remained unchallenged and unchallengeable.

Even before Trafalgar had been fought Napoleon realized that his plans had failed. At the end of August he broke camp at Boulogne, and within a month transported the Grand Army to the Danube valley and began the campaign against Austria. The Austrians had postponed the opening of the campaign until they felt sure that the Russians would join them before they could come to grips with Napoleon. The painful slowness of the Russian march and the extraordinary rapidity of Napoleon's movements falsified their expectations. Under Mack the Austrians had invaded Bavaria and advanced up the Danube as far as Ulm in ignorance of Napoleon's movements. Napoleon by a sweeping march through Germany far from Mack's line of advance reached the Danube at Donauwoerth and thus cut off Mack from Vienna. Surrounded on all sides, Mack capitulated at Ulm (October 20). In a campaign of fourteen days Napoleon had removed from

his path the main Austrian field force. Three weeks later he was in occupation of Vienna, and advanced into Bohemia to meet the Russians, who had at last joined forces with the main Austrian army. The Tsar, confident in the warlike spirit of his troops, was anxious to demonstrate their superiority over the victors of Ulm by striking an immediate blow. Napoleon encouraged him in this design by feigning indecision, and induced the joint Austro-Russian armies to attack him on ground chosen by himself between his headquarters at Brunn and the little village of Austerlitz, which gave its name to the battle (December 2). In spite of the superior numbers of the attackers and their reckless bravery, superiority in generalship gave to Napoleon one of the greatest victories ever won in European warfare. The Russian army suffered enormous losses and withdrew northward; the Austrian forces were completely broken and could not be reformed. Francis II concluded an armistice two days later, and accepted at the dictation of Napoleon on December 26, 1805, the humiliating Treaty of Presburg.

The basis of this treaty was the exclusion of Austria from all influence in Germany and Italy. The outlying provinces of Austria in Western Germany, the original heritage of the house of Habsburg, and the Tyrol, always the most loyal of its provinces, were handed over to France and divided by Napoleon between his German allies, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. These cessions closed to Austria the routes to Italy and to the Rhine valley. The electors of Bavaria and Württemberg received the title of King; the Elector of Baden took the title of Grand Duke. The Emperor expressly renounced the exercise of all Imperial authority over these states. The nominal headship of the Empire was now quite worthless, and was soon to be formally resigned. In Italy Francis II surrendered the gains he had made at Campo Formio and Lunéville. Venice and its dependencies were annexed to the kingdom of Italy, which he now recognized. Austria had not a single fief left to her in Italy—her nominal suzerainty over Italy, which the Habsburgs had inherited from the Hohenstaufen Emperors, ceased to exist.

Napoleon's victory over the Austro-Russian alliance was due

to his consummate generalship; the feeble, vacillating policy of Frederick William III placed Prussia in his power at the same time. During the march of the French across Germany to the Danube a detachment had violated the neutrality of Anspach, a Prussian fief in South Germany. This insult gave a momentary ascendancy to the 'patriot' party headed by Hardenberg and supported by Queen Louise. The Austrian capitulation at Ulm gave Haugwitz the ascendancy once again. But the Tsar, weary of Prussian indecision, came to Berlin, and in an interview with the King at the grave of Frederick the Great secured his promise to join the Coalition unless France, at the demand of Prussia, evacuated Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland within a month. The envoy chosen to present this ultimatum to Napoleon was none other than the head of the peace party, Haugwitz. He delayed matters so successfully that before the ultimatum had actually been presented the battle of Austerlitz had been fought. Napoleon, however, was well aware of the nature of Haugwitz's mission, and by a judicious combination of threats and promises secured his signature to the humiliating Treaty of Schönbrunn (December 15). The outlying Prussian possessions of Neuchâtel, Cleve, and Anspach were surrendered to France and Bavaria. Prussia became the ally of France and was promised the electorate of Hanover. Never before, not even under Frederick the Great, had Prussia so openly sacrificed the interests of Germany in the hope of her own territorial aggrandizement.

Napoleon's victory over his enemies, actual and potential, was the greater because Pitt, the organizer of the Third Coalition, died on January 23, 1806, struck down in middle age by a fatal disease and heart-broken by the ruin of his hopes at Austerlitz. It is true that he had made mistakes, but his long tenure of power and his singleness of purpose had won the confidence of European rulers and statesmen. There was no outstanding British statesman to take his place and maintain the close connexion between Britain's financial and naval power and the military resources of the Continental monarchies, which proved necessary to effect the defeat of Napoleon. The breach of that connexion and the outbreak of discord and

jealousies between the Continental Powers (which in fact resulted from it) enabled Napoleon to reign as the arbiter of Europe in the years that followed.

Napoleon had inherited from the Revolution the idea of buttressing France by the creation of satellite republics on her frontiers, but he did not merely extend their boundaries and transform them into monarchies. He regarded himself as the heir of Charlemagne, and attempted to establish an empire which should dominate Europe. He realized that direct rule by himself was impracticable, and tried to attain his aims by the creation of dependent principalities. In imitation of the Bourbons, he intended to give these client states rulers chosen by himself from among the members of his own and his wife's families, with the mistaken idea that they would prove loyal and capable administrators. The first move had been made in 1805, when he appointed his stepson, Eugène Beauharnais, as Viceroy of the kingdom of Italy. The Treaty of Presburg was immediately followed by new creations. His brother Joseph Bonaparte was proclaimed King of the Two Sicilies on March 30, 1806, although the British fleet limited his power to Naples and maintained the Bourbon King in Sicily. In June the Batavian Republic, which had already been placed under a Grand Pensionary, became a kingdom, with Louis Bonaparte and Hortense Beauharnais as king and queen. The German duchy of Berg and the former Prussian principality of Neuchâtel were given to other members of the Bonaparte family, and marriages were arranged between the princely houses of Germany and other members of it.

These exploits were soon overshadowed by the establishment in July 1806 of the Confederation of the Rhine. The Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg, the Archbishop of Mainz, who was still *ex officio* the Arch-Chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire, the Grand Duke of Baden, and a number of lesser princes broke away from the Empire at the behest of Napoleon and formed themselves into a Confederation under the protection of France. The diet of the Confederation, the component states of which remained independent and sovereign, was to meet at Frankfurt, but was never in fact summoned. A close offensive and defensive alliance was formed between France and the

Confederation. Napoleon became protector of the Confederation, and received power to fix the contingents to be supplied by each member of it in the event of war. The princes of the Confederation were in reality his vassals rather than his allies, and their common subordination alone held the Confederation together. The recess of 1803 had suppressed the ecclesiastical states of the Empire; the organization of the Confederation resulted in the almost complete disappearance of the Imperial knights and cities which still survived. Germany was further consolidated, but at the same time Napoleon's scheme for her permanent division into three sections was unmistakably revealed.

The Power most closely affected by Napoleon's activities in Germany was Austria, whose emperor was still the titular head of the Empire. But Austria was impotent to resist. When Napoleon formally intimated to the Imperial Diet that he no longer recognized the existence of the Empire Francis II tamely renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor, and the most venerable of European institutions passed away almost unnoticed.

Even Frederick William and the pacifists at Berlin could not be altogether blind to the trend of events in Germany. For a time the King hoped to obtain compensation by assuming an Imperial title and organizing a North German confederation, but Napoleon, now that he averted the menace of the Third Coalition, prevented the realization of a scheme which he himself had originally suggested in order to secure the neutrality of Prussia. Then Frederick William discovered that the possession of Hanover, which had coated the bitter pill of the Treaty of Schönbrunn, was far from secure. Prussia found out that Napoleon, in secret negotiations with Fox, who had succeeded Pitt in the British Government, had offered to restore Hanover to George III as the price of peace. Fear that he would be deprived of the territorial gains for which he had sold his honour threw Frederick William into the arms of the increasingly vocal war party at Berlin. A minor incident —Napoleon's arrest of Palm, the publisher of a pamphlet attacking the French rule in Germany—roused patriotic war fever in Prussia to a dangerous pitch. Frederick William was

still intent on avoiding risks by a continuance of neutrality, but he yielded to the entreaties of his wife, the advice of his leading Ministers and generals, and the clamour of the 'patriots.' When he asked doubtfully whether the Prussian army could resist the conqueror of the Austro-Russian forces he was told: "Your Majesty has several generals who are at least the equals of M. de Bonaparte." War was declared against France on October 9.

Prussia's entry into the war took place at the worst possible time for herself, and Frederick William was soon to regret the safe, if inglorious, period of neutrality. The French troops had not yet been withdrawn from Germany and were turned at once against Prussia. Austria, after Ulm and Austerlitz, was quite unable to resume the struggle, and in any case was so indignant at the Prussian combination of inactivity and rapacity in the previous Coalitions that she was not altogether sorry to see her German rival suffer humiliation at the hands of Napoleon. Britain as ever was ready to encourage and support any Power which offered resistance to Napoleon, but she could give no immediate military aid. Russia, like Britain, had engaged in peace negotiations with France in the summer of 1806, but these were hastily dropped, and the Russian army prepared to march again to support a German ally against Napoleon. But once more the ally was crushed before the Russians came into action.

The campaign of 1806 was in essentials a repetition of that of 1805. The French armies by a wide encircling movement threatened the communications of the Prussian army. The main force under the Duke of Brunswick retreated hastily, leaving a detachment under Hohenlohe to hold up the French at Jena as long as possible. Hohenlohe's division was overwhelmed by the big battalions and superior tactics of Napoleon (October 14). Brunswick himself was defeated at Auerstadt by Marshal Davoust, but retreated in good order until his troops were met by the fugitives from Jena. Then without warning the *moral* of the whole army broke. The retreat became a rout. Fortress after fortress surrendered to the French without making the feeblest attempt at resistance. Napoleon entered Berlin and was received without enthusiasm

but without hostility by the people of the capital. On November 7 Blücher, who alone among Prussian generals had offered a gallant if forlorn resistance to the French advance, was compelled to surrender at Lübeck. All Brandenburg was now in the hands of Napoleon.

The King and Queen retreated into East Prussia to join the slow-moving armies of the Tsar, while Napoleon, nothing loth, advanced into Poland and occupied Warsaw. The difficulties of a winter campaign in that thinly inhabited and frost-bound land and the stubborn resistance of the Russians made his progress extremely slow. Nevertheless he found time to discuss with some of the chief Poles the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, and tried by holding out this hope to induce them to take up arms on behalf of France. At Eylau on February 8, 1807, it was only with the greatest difficulty that Napoleon succeeded in maintaining his ascendancy over the Russians under Benningsen. Alexander I and Frederick William III had now hopes of success, especially when a new Ministry came into power in Britain and decided to send a Baltic expedition to their support. In April 1807, therefore, they pledged themselves by the Treaty of Bartenstein to carry on the war until a settlement of European affairs could be reached. Napoleon was furious at the unexpected power of resistance shown by the Russians and determined that the campaign of 1807 should prove decisive. He summoned reinforcements from every part of the Empire and its client states, and began operations by threatening Königsberg, the only Prussian fortress not surrendered to France and an important base of supply for the Prusso-Russian field army. Benningsen was forced to fight under disadvantageous conditions the decisive battle of Friedland (June 14). In spite of a gallant and prolonged resistance the Russians were defeated by weight of numbers and driven across the Niemen. Königsberg surrendered to the victors, and an armistice was arranged. At a personal meeting on a raft in the Niemen the terms of peace were settled by the two emperors to the exclusion of the wretched King of Prussia. To the astonishment of Europe the two emperors did not merely conclude peace; they concocted in strictest privacy a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.



ALEXANDER I OF RUSSIA

Gerard. Versailles

X photo

The reasons which prompted Alexander I's sudden change of policy were a puzzle to his contemporaries and are still a source of controversy among historians. Metternich found the explanation in the 'periodicity' of Alexander I's character, by which he meant that Alexander was prone to take up an idea or policy with enthusiasm, to weary of it in view of the difficulties of execution, and then to take up with equal enthusiasm another and usually contradictory scheme. The Tsar was undoubtedly dazzled by Napoleon, who won at Tilsit a short-lived but none the less real ascendancy over the volatile Romanov. He was weary of the war; the crushing defeats of Austria and Prussia, the failure of the British Government to make any serious diversion to reduce pressure on the Russian army, its refusal in tactless fashion to guarantee a proposed Russian loan, the useless slaughter of his own troops at Eylau and Friedland, were all strong arguments against continuing the struggle with the invincible armies of France. Alexander's former *idée fixe* of overthrowing the French domination of Europe, weakened by the difficulties of execution, gave way completely when Napoleon suggested a fresh scheme—that Russia should assist France against Britain and receive in exchange a share in the domination of Europe which had been won by the armies of France in a long series of successful wars.

Napoleon's motives are self-evident. The friendship of Alexander would be cheaply bought by a few concessions—especially as Napoleon had no conception of the binding force of treaties and would observe them only so long as suited himself. He was particularly anxious to secure Russian friendship, because, while engaged in the struggle with Prussia, he had definitely adopted a method of warfare against Britain which had been suggested by the Convention, but not seriously applied in practice. He shared the belief of the Convention that the strength of Britain, which had been the mainstay of successive coalitions, was due chiefly to her export-trade. Since this export-trade was almost exclusively with the Continent, and he controlled the greater part of the Continent, Napoleon proposed to bring Britain to her knees by excluding her ships from all ports under his control. He therefore issued

from Berlin in November 1806 a famous decree, which declared the British Isles in a state of blockade. All commerce between them and the lands dependent on France was prohibited under penalty of confiscation of both ships and goods. Thus was instituted the "Continental System." To attain the aims of its creator this system must be extended to the whole of Europe, and Napoleon welcomed an opportunity of securing the co-operation of Alexander I in enforcing it.

There were no important tangible causes of strife between Russia and France, and in their eagerness to reach a settlement at Tilsit the two emperors had no scruples in throwing over their respective allies. The chief of these was, of course, Prussia. Frederick William was compelled by the desertion of his ally to accept the terms offered to him on July 9. These included the surrender of all his possessions west of the Elbe, which were united with Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick to form the kingdom of Westphalia, ruled by Jerome Bonaparte, the youngest brother of Napoleon. Polish Prussia was also taken from him. One province was added to Russia; the remainder was formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and transferred to Saxony, whose ruler had already received the title of king after expiating his feeble resistance to Napoleon by joining the Confederation of the Rhine. The formation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was regarded by the more sanguine Poles as the first step to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland. Danzig, one of the leading Baltic seaports, became nominally a free state, but was in reality controlled by France. Frederick William lost half of his territories; a heavy war indemnity and other burdensome restrictions were imposed upon the remainder. The kingdom of Westphalia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, like the kingdom of Saxony, became members of the Confederation of the Rhine, and their military resources were thus brought under the direct control of Napoleon.

Two days before the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Tilsit the two emperors had signed a treaty of defensive and offensive alliance, the essential parts of which were kept secret. The Tsar recognized all the changes made by Napoleon in Southern and Central Europe. In addition to

his share in Polish Prussia Alexander was to be allowed to conquer Finland from his ally, Sweden, and there was some talk of a partition of the Ottoman Empire between the two emperors. If Britain would not renounce her claims to maritime supremacy and make peace with France under Russian mediation, Russia and France agreed to make war jointly against Britain and to force Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal to close their ports to British commerce and join in the war. The combined fleets of these states might enable Napoleon to challenge once again Britain's mastery of the seas.

In spite of the extraordinary efforts of the two emperors to secure the secrecy of their deliberations the gist of the secret articles was speedily known in London. Faced by a coalition of the two autocrats who between them controlled the resources of nearly the whole of Europe, the British Government acted with unusual decision. The Berlin Decree was countered by the orders in council (January–November 1807) which forbade all trade between countries which accepted the Continental System and the rest of the world, and proclaimed a blockade of all ports belonging to these countries. A new phase in the struggle had begun—both parties sought to gain their ends by economic weapons. Henceforth the armies of France and the fleets of Britain were largely occupied in the prevention of smuggling. The war had become a war of endurance, and both parties suffered in the struggle. In Britain there was much unemployment and many bankruptcies; France and, to a much greater extent, her Central European allies suffered from the disappearance of colonial products, and still more from a general rise in prices to a level which placed the poorer classes on the verge of starvation. It is true that the Continental System nearly ruined Britain, but it destroyed the possibility of the permanent establishment of the Napoleonic Empire in Central Europe, which suffered most severely from the economic war.

Before the Treaty of Tilsit could be put into force against Denmark the British Government had anticipated the danger of France and Russia obtaining control of the Danish fleet. A British squadron appeared off Copenhagen, and by a prolonged

bombardment coerced the Danish Government into surrendering its fleet. This violation of the law of nations can be justified only by the dangerous plea that "necessity knows no law." The motives which prompted and partially excused the act were unknown to the public at the time; and the bombardment of the capital of a friendly state deprived Britain of her moral superiority, and seemed to degrade her cause to the level of that of the adventurer against whom she was waging war.

Sweden, the second state whose assistance was reckoned upon by the two emperors at Tilsit, was not attacked by Britain, but fell a victim to the Franco-Russian allies. The Tsar's troops promptly overran Finland. Although they were at the gates of Stockholm Gustavus IV obstinately refused to make peace. He was deposed in 1809 and the throne given to his uncle Charles XIII, the last king of the great house of Vasa. Contrary to the wishes of Napoleon, who was unwilling to give his Russian ally cause for jealousy, one of his Marshals, Bernadotte, was chosen by the Swedes as successor to Charles XIII. By the irony of fate the Bernadotte dynasty was the only *parvenu* dynasty which survived the downfall of Napoleon.

Napoleon's attempt to apply the provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit to Portugal raised much more serious difficulties, partly because of the ancient alliance between Britain and Portugal, but chiefly because Britain's sea-power made it impossible for Napoleon to act against Portugal except in concert with Spain. His chief motive was undoubtedly to secure the exclusion of British commerce from Portugal, almost the last European market left open to Britain. He intended also to effect the conquest of Portugal in order to secure there some compensation for the son-in-law of his ally, the King of Spain, whose titular kingdom of Etruria (or Tuscany) was marked out for annexation to the kingdom of Italy. When Portugal did not at once accept his ultimatum ordering her to enforce the Continental System, which would have completely ruined the country, he sent an army across the Spanish frontier to invade Portugal. The Prince Regent John could offer no opposition, and, when Junot approached Lisbon, he and his Court set sail for Brazil, at that time a Portuguese colony

(November 29, 1807). The whole of Portugal seemed to be securely under the domination of France. A month earlier Napoleon had already divided out the spoil by the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau (October 27). The northern provinces were to compensate the King of Etruria for the loss of his Italian kingdom; Godoy, the all-powerful Minister of the King and favourite of the Queen of Spain, was to receive a principality in the south; the remainder of the kingdom was to be provisionally occupied by France. The Portuguese colonies were also divided.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL RISINGS AGAINST NAPOLEON

Section I: National Reconstruction in Prussia, Austria, and Spain

NAPOLEON was now at the apex of his career, although the empire which he had created was to receive in the next few years great additions of territory. The leading states of Central Europe had been decisively defeated, and their powers of further resistance drastically curtailed. The smaller Central European states and all Southern and Western Europe, except Spain, still loosely attached to the Empire, were securely in his grasp. The only other Continental Power of any importance was Russia, now apparently his close ally.

But Napoleon's overweening ambition and the false sense of security resulting from the Treaty of Tilsit drove him to further acts of aggression, made the maintenance of the Russian alliance increasingly difficult, and involved him in a series of wars which ultimately proved fatal to him. The Governments of the old *régime* had failed alike to crush the French Revolution and to set bounds to the expansion of its sphere of influence under the military genius of Napoleon. The character of the wars undergoes a change from this time onward. The principles proclaimed by the Revolutionaries and in part introduced in the Napoleonic Codes and administrative system had at first caused the French invaders to be welcomed with enthusiasm by many subjects of the 'enlightened despots.' The Liberal movements of the nineteenth century may be traced back to this fountain-head. Then had come disillusionment. The Liberal features of the French domination were found to exist almost entirely on paper; in practice French rule was chiefly felt in increased taxation to pay for the cost of the Emperor's wars, conscription of ever-increasing

numbers to serve in the Emperor's armies, and, finally, the harsh enforcement of the Continental System, which resulted in a myriad cases of individual hardship and injustice and in a general lowering of the standard of life. From community of suffering the feeling of Nationalism emerged. Napoleonic despotism proved a powerful impetus toward national unity in Italy and Germany. A more immediate result was the growing reluctance of the people in states still unconquered to accept the extension to them of the Napoleonic rule, which culminated in general risings in Spain and Prussia in defence of their ancient monarchy and institutions.

Ever since her withdrawal from the First Coalition in 1795 Spain had been the humble and dependent ally of France. Britain had been allowed by Napoleon to retain Trinidad by the Treaty of Amiens; since then she had annihilated the Spanish fleet at Trafalgar and seized Buenos Aires. In exchange for these sacrifices Napoleon had given Spain no compensation. When the Spanish Government discovered that behind its back he had actually proposed the surrender of the Balearic Islands to compensate the King of Naples, whom he had dethroned, it was furious. The adhesion of Prussia to the Third Coalition encouraged Godoy to throw off the hard yoke of Napoleon, but Jena ended his hopes. Although Napoleon pretended to receive Godoy back into favour, from that moment he had determined on the conquest of Spain. He felt insecure so long as a Bourbon, even such a wretched and incapable member of the family as Charles IV, sat on the Spanish throne. The corruption and inefficiency of the Government made it incapable of enforcing the Continental System as rigidly as Napoleon desired. Direct control of Spanish naval resources might help him one day to challenge British naval supremacy, while the Spanish colonies would give France a fresh start as a colonial Power. Above all, Napoleon as an opportunist could not resist the temptation offered by the incompetence of the Government and the presence on Spanish soil of French troops, ostensibly intended for the occupation of Portugal. He believed that the conquest would prove a simple task. "I shall write on my banner," he wrote, "the words Liberty, Freedom from Superstition, the

Destruction of the Nobility, and I shall be received as I was in Italy, and all the classes that have national spirit will be on my side . . . they will regard me as a liberator." Napoleon reckoned without the strongest two traits of the Spanish national character—that detestation of foreigners, which had provoked the rising of the *comuneros* under the Emperor Charles V, and that intense loyalty to the Church, corrupt and lethargic as it was, inbred in the Spaniard by the long centuries of crusade against the Moslem.

The quarrels of the Spanish royal house gave Napoleon the desired pretext for intervention. The general discontent with the rule of Godoy and his vicious paramour, the Queen, found a champion in the heir apparent, Ferdinand, who had inherited the cowardice of his father and the treacherous spitefulness of his mother. The fact that Prince Ferdinand was on the worst terms with his parents and Godoy sufficed to make him a popular hero, especially as he was believed to be the opponent of the French alliance, which had brought untold disaster to Spain. But in 1807, fearing to be arrested by Godoy, he appealed to Napoleon for protection, and thus made the Emperor the arbiter of the quarrels of the Spanish royal family. A riot at Aranjuez intimidated the King, who publicly abdicated in favour of Ferdinand, but repudiated his abdication in a private letter to Napoleon. The French troops, who had for some time been in occupation of the northern provinces of Spain, now occupied Madrid (March 23, 1808). Charles IV and Ferdinand were lured to Bayonne and there coerced into surrendering to Napoleon all claims to the crown, which was offered by an assembly of notables convened on French soil to Joseph Bonaparte, the titular King of the Two Sicilies.

Napoleon's idea that the conquest of Spain was now well-nigh complete soon proved unfounded. The Spanish monarchy had always, owing to the incorrigible provincial separatism, been a decentralized absolutism, so that the real strength of Spain lay in its local institutions. Thus Napoleon's mastery of the central Government did little to help him to control the whole country; province after province, town after town, declared against him and formed local committees (or *juntas*) to organize resistance. As in the rising of the *comuneros*, these

local committees soon established a central and supreme committee, although the Spaniards showed little capacity for co-operation in large and concerted plans of campaign. But the nature of their country, with its desolate plains and rugged mountain-ranges, was admirably adapted for guerrilla warfare, and Napoleon's generals were soon in despair. Dupont was forced to capitulate with all his troops at Baylen (July 19). The insurgents advanced on Madrid, and Joseph Bonaparte fled hurriedly from his new kingdom.

The national rising in Spain cut the communications of Junot's army in Portugal, and encouraged the British Government to send an expedition under Wellesley to the peninsula. Wellesley defeated Junot at Vimiera, but the French army was saved from annihilation by the Convention of Cintra (August 30), concluded by Wellesley's superior officer, Sir Harry Burrard. The French agreed to evacuate Portugal, but were to be conveyed to France in British ships.

The Capitulation of Baylen and the Convention of Cintra forced Napoleon to take command of the peninsular campaign in person. Sweeping aside the hastily raised levies of Spain, he occupied Madrid and restored Joseph to his capital. In fulfilment of their promise of prompt assistance the British Government had dispatched an expedition under Sir John Moore to co-operate with the Spaniards. The disappearance of the Spanish field forces left Moore unsupported, and it was only with great difficulty that he reached the coast and, by a successful action at Corunna, succeeded in embarking his troops. Spain was now at the mercy of Napoleon, and the local risings were one by one suppressed.

The early defeats of the hitherto invincible French in the Peninsular War had made a tremendous sensation in Europe, and above all in Prussia, where it gave much needed encouragement to the party of reform, which had taken control of the Government after the disasters of 1806. The enormous prestige of Frederick the Great had mummified the Prussian state for a generation—the mere suggestion that there might be room for improvement in the military and political system he had created and bequeathed to Prussia was regarded as impious. Jena broke the spell, and within a few years Prussia

emerged from enlightened despotism into the new world of ideas inspired by the Revolution. The political and social reorganization of Prussia was chiefly the work of Stein, although the Queen and Hardenberg are entitled to a share in the credit. Their fundamental aim was to bring the people into organic relation to the State.

The social system of Prussia under Frederick the Great had been one of caste. Nobles, citizens, and peasants were cut off from each other by rigid divisions. The nobles filled the important posts in the Civil Service and officered the army; the citizens were comparatively free from military service, and occupied themselves with trade and industry, which was controlled by oligarchical guilds; the peasants were in a worse condition than the serfs of pre-Revolutionary France, and from them the common soldiers were recruited. Land in Prussia was divided likewise into three categories, noble, peasant, and burgher land, and could not pass freely from a member of one class to a member of another. Politically the State was governed by a centralized bureaucracy, designed to suppress all local initiative and individual independence. Self-government in local affairs was unknown even in the towns. The inevitable result of this system was to deprive the population of Prussia of all interest in public affairs, and to dissociate completely in their minds the ideas of public and private welfare.

Serfdom was now abolished by the emancipating edict of 1807, and the peasants in 1811 became proprietors of two-thirds of the lands which they had formerly tilled for their lords. The caste system and the corresponding division of the land were likewise abolished. Henceforth any man was legally free to pursue any occupation he pleased and to buy and sell land without restriction. The peasants, although the future was to show the danger of their drifting to the towns, had now a personal interest in fighting for their land.

Stein then turned his attention to the towns, with the avowed aim of breaking down the barriers between them and the rest of the country. He reorganized the municipalities and gave the citizens a measure of self-government in local affairs. A beginning was thus made in the establishment of democratic

representative institutions; Stein further favoured the creation of similar institutions for the country districts and of a central assembly for the whole kingdom. The reactionary party in Prussia, which denounced such schemes as the prelude to a Jacobin revolution, was, however, bitterly hostile, and, indeed, self-government was to prove a slow and laborious growth on Prussian soil.

Barely a year after his taking office Stein was dismissed by Frederick William in obedience to the demands of Napoleon, who had at first approved of the new Minister, but soon realized the tendency of his policy. His Ministry, although short, had helped to awaken Prussia politically as she was already intellectually awake. The Tugendbund, Otto Jahn's gymnastic society, and other secret societies organized public opinion as never before in Prussia, and prepared the way for a national rising against the oppressor of Germany.

While Stein was reorganizing the State, Scharnhorst, with the help of Gneisenau, was effecting radical changes in the military system. The army was nationalized by the exclusion of foreigners and the abolition of the noble-officer and peasant-soldier castes. All citizens were now liable for military service: officers were to be chosen on the ground of ability and not of birth. The obsolete tactics and brutal punishments of Frederick the Great were discarded. Napoleon, in the hope of keeping Prussia powerless, had fixed the maximum strength of the Prussian army at 42,000 men. Scharnhorst adopted a short period of service and passed the soldiers as soon as trained into a reserve force. He proposed also to form a militia, or *Landwehr*, for home defence. These reforms in organization could not be completely adopted, but they laid down in outline the programme accomplished later in the nineteenth century. At the same time Clausewitz preached the ideas of tactics and strategy, which were adopted by the commanders of the reorganized army in Prussia's nineteenth-century wars.

Under the enlightened Ministry of Count Stadion Austria, the only other Central European Power which still preserved a semblance of independence, broke with all her traditions and carried out a number of reforms, designed to give at least the appearance of national unity to the motley Habsburg

Empire. The Archduke Charles devoted his attention to the reorganization of the army. The Emperor himself was induced to make a half-hearted appeal to the loyalty of his subjects. Napoleon knew that the Peace of Presburg would be accepted by Austria only until she felt strong enough to repudiate it; these and other signs clearly portended a speedy renewal of the struggle.

To intimidate Austria while a large part of his armies were occupied in Spain Napoleon induced the Tsar to meet him at Erfurt (October 1808), in order to demonstrate to Austria and the lesser Central European Powers the solidarity of the Franco-Russian alliance. All the potentates of Germany came to pay homage to the new Charlemagne; poets, with Goethe at their head, philosophers, and scientists swelled the train of sycophants. Never before, not even at Tilsit, had Napoleon's power and splendour appeared so great. Erfurt is to outward seeming the highest point in his career, but beneath the surface all was not well. The news from Spain went from bad to worse; Central Europe would obey only so long as the might of the Napoleonic arms endured. It was clear already that the Russian alliance could only be maintained, if at all, by further concessions on the French side—concessions which Napoleon was not willing to make. The Tsar refused to be dazzled by the prospect of a joint attack on the Ottoman Empire held out by Napoleon; the most he would give in exchange was a half-hearted assurance of assistance if Austria attacked France. The Tsar was encouraged in this attitude by Talleyrand's calculated indiscretions. Talleyrand and Fouché were determined to safeguard themselves in the event of the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire; they betrayed their master and justified their action by drawing a distinction between the interests of France, which demanded peace, and the instincts of Napoleon, who was for ever reaching out after new conquests. And Talleyrand and Fouché were far from being the only traitors in Napoleon's camp. Clearly Napoleon was now faced by problems which could not be solved by the only methods known to him—intimidation and brute force.

The Erfurt Conference may have postponed but did not avert the renewal of the Franco-Austrian War. Believing that

the bulk of the French forces would be locked up in Spain, encouraged by the Tsar's assurance that he would give Napoleon no effective assistance, reckoning on the outbreak of popular risings in Germany, Austria resumed the struggle. The peasants of the Tyrol, always loyal to the Habsburgs, rose *en masse* under the leadership of an innkeeper, Andreas Hofer. The main Austrian army, under the Archduke Charles, invaded Bavaria, but after winning a few early successes was driven out in "the campaign of five days," each of which was marked by a French victory (April 18–22, 1809). Vienna was occupied once again by the French on May 13, and a fortnight later the rising in Northern Germany under Major Schill, on which Stadion had placed his hopes, fizzled out in spite of the heroism of its leader.

But the reorganized Austrian army now proved its mettle. Napoleon's first attempt to cross the Danube was repulsed in the stubbornly contested battle of Aspern, which was hailed throughout Europe as an Austrian victory, the more notable because achieved against the Emperor himself. Napoleon knew that his position was critical and strained every nerve. Reinforcements were rushed up, the river completely covered with rafts and bridges, and in a night an enormous army crossed to the northern bank. The battle of Wagram which followed was a complete French victory, but was won at enormous cost, and the Archduke Charles withdrew his army in good order into Moravia, where an armistice was concluded (July 12). The repulse of Wellesley's first invasion of Spain, although his victory at Talavera won him the title of Viscount Wellington, and the disastrous failure of the Walcheren expedition, designed by the British Government to capture Antwerp, convinced Austria of the futility of prolonging the struggle, and she accepted the Treaty of Schönbrunn (or Vienna) on October 14, 1809.

Salzburg and other German fiefs were ceded to Bavaria; Western Galicia along with the historic city of Cracow was added to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; the Adriatic coastal provinces, including most of what is now Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia, were ceded to Napoleon and formed into the "Illyrian provinces" under his direct rule. Another block of

coastline was thus added to the Continental System, and a base secured for operations against the Turks. In all Austria lost a population of nearly four millions; she was cut off from the Mediterranean and from Germany; her existence as an independent state was nominal rather than real, and even this shadow of independence might be terminated at any moment at the will of her conqueror. The unfortunate peasants of the Tyrol were left to the mercy of the Emperor of the French. Overwhelmed by superior numbers, their gallant resistance proved fruitless, and their leader Hofer was captured and shot as a rebel.

Even in the midst of the Austrian War Napoleon, in his eager pursuit of the Continental System, had committed an act which outraged the conscience of Catholic Europe. Pope Pius VII, in spite of the Concordat, had proved an intractable ally. His worst offence in Napoleon's eyes was his refusal to close his ports to British ships. In May 1809 Napoleon, by a decree, abolished the temporal power, annexed the Papal States to France, and gave them French institutions. Pius VII held out obstinately against intimidation, and was imprisoned by Napoleon. In the following year Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland, was likewise deposed because he preferred the interests of his subjects to those of his brother, and his kingdom was incorporated in France. Soon afterward the Continental System received its farthest extension by the annexation, with the exception of the Prussian territories, of the whole coast of Germany, including Hamburg and the Duchy of Oldenburg.

Only in the Iberian peninsula did Continental resistance to Napoleon continue. Wellington's failure in 1809, for which the Spaniards themselves were largely to blame, enabled the French to reduce the whole of the Spanish provinces with the exception of a small district around Cadiz. After repeated delays the Cortes met at Cadiz in 1810, elected freely and on a liberal franchise. They transformed themselves into a Constituent Assembly in imitation of the French States-General at the beginning of the Revolution and drew up a new constitution, based on what was for Spain the entirely novel principle of the sovereignty of the people. The legislative power was entrusted to the Cortes, a single Chamber elected indirectly by manhood suffrage. The hereditary monarchy was given

that Alexander could not be treated in the same way as a German princeling. He was convinced that the Tsar could have prevented Austria from attacking him in 1809, and was furious at the inactivity of the Russian troops against Austria.

The Continental System was a continual source of irritation on both sides. Napoleon knew that British commerce was carried on in secret with Russia, and was annoyed at the heavy customs duties imposed upon imports from France. The Tsar knew that the French alliance, and particularly the interference with trade which even partial enforcement of the Continental System involved, was extremely unpopular in Russia. The rouble depreciated enormously in value as exports of grain, naval stores, and timber to Britain dwindled away. Remembering his father's fate and fearing the economic ruin of Russia, the Tsar withdrew openly from the Continental System at the end of 1810. Henceforth a Franco-Russian war was inevitable.

The year 1811 was spent by both sides in diplomatic and military preparations. Both made bids for Polish support; the balance of advantage here rested with Napoleon, and hundreds of Poles fought with enthusiasm on his side. Fear kept Central Europe outwardly loyal to Napoleon. Austria and Prussia as well as the lesser states sent troops to swell the Imperial armies. Russia, on the other hand, was able, thanks to British mediation, to conclude her wars with Sweden and Turkey. Bernadotte, who had now been adopted as the heir of Charles XIII of Sweden, knew well that his old master disapproved of his elevation and threw in his lot with his new country. He received in exchange the promise of the Tsar's support in finding compensation for the loss of Finland by conquering Norway from its Danish rulers, who had been the close allies of Napoleon since the British bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. In 1809, when Napoleon was fully occupied with the Austrian and Peninsular Wars, the Tsar had sought to secure parts of the bribe with which he had been dazzled at Tilsit and invaded Moldavia and Wallachia. The Turks offered a stout resistance, and Britain mediated a peace of compromise at Bukarest (May 28, 1812), which fixed the Pruth as the boundary of the Ottoman and Russian Empires.

Freed from these distractions and liberally subsidized by Britain, Russia was able to concentrate her forces against Napoleon.

In June 1812 Napoleon and the Grand Army of 600,000 men crossed the Niemen. The Russian commanders fell back before this overwhelming force, but its advance was necessarily slow. At Smolensk the Russians proved their mettle in an obstinate rearguard action. This success and the depletion of the French army by disease, desertion, and the need of protecting its lines of communication encouraged Kutusov, who had recently been appointed Commander-in-Chief, to fight a pitched battle at the Borodino (September 7). The losses on both sides were roughly equal; the Russian army continued its retreat, and Napoleon occupied Moscow a week later without opposition. Fires broke out in the abandoned city and destroyed great stores of provisions and forage. Napoleon might possibly have remained in Moscow cut off from Europe till the spring, but he dreaded the effect which his absence might have, and after some weeks of indecision he began the retreat on October 19. His attempt to follow a more southerly route was foiled by Kutusov at Jaroslavetz, and he was forced to return through the country which he had already swept bare of supplies. The Russians hung on his rear, cut off stragglers, and broke the *moral* of his troops. When the Russian winter set in on November 6 the *débâcle* was complete. In mid-December the shattered remnants of the Grand Army crossed the Niemen into Prussian territory. Its losses have been reckoned at nearly 200,000 killed and the same number of prisoners.

The annihilation of the Grand Army created a sensation throughout Europe. Everywhere in the French Empire there were tentative stirrings which foreshadowed revolt. Prussia, placed by its geographical position between the Russian hammer and the French anvil, was driven to make the first choice between Napoleon and the Tsar. Frederick William III was as undecided as ever. His fortresses were garrisoned by French troops. Napoleon was holding out to him promises of territorial gains if he remained true to the French alliance. The Tsar's policy was notoriously unstable,

and there was no guarantee that he might not once again purchase peace with France by deserting Prussia. Fortunately the decision was virtually taken out of Frederick William's hands by General Yorck, the commander of the auxiliary corps furnished by Prussia to France, who concluded the Convention of Tauroggen (December 1812), and promised to remain neutral in the Franco-Russian struggle. The King at first repudiated the Convention, but soon changed his mind. As the Russians advanced East Prussia rose spontaneously. Stein, who was now the trusted adviser of the Tsar, summoned the provincial diet, which decreed the raising of men and money for war with France.

In Brandenburg there was wild enthusiasm for war with France. The work of the reformers had already borne fruit in an outburst of patriotic feeling, inspired by the verse and songs of Arndt, Körner, and Rückert, and organized by the Tugendbund. The military reforms had given Prussia a model army of 150,000 men. The events in East Prussia and the outburst of patriotism in Brandenburg virtually forced Frederick William to conclude with the Tsar the Treaty of Kalisch (February 1813). The two sovereigns pledged themselves not to make a separate peace, and there was more or less definite agreement that Prussia should give up to Russia part of her former Polish territories in exchange for compensation in Germany, where Prussia was also to recover all her old possessions.

The rest of Germany was not yet ready to follow Prussia's example. Most of the princes believed that their interests were bound up with those of Napoleon; their subjects murmured, but they dared not openly rebel. Sweden, however, under the control of Bernadotte now openly joined the Coalition (April 1813) and sent troops to co-operate with the Russo-Prussian allies. Napoleon on his side had spent the winter in restoring order in France, making provision for a Regency in the event of his death, and, above all, in raising a fresh army. Without much difficulty he collected the requisite number of infantry, but the new levies were young and untrained. The cavalry and artillery which had been lost in the Russian *débâcle* were only in part replaced, and

the weakness of these two arms, on which Napoleon had chiefly relied in the past, crippled his tactics and reduced his power to follow up the victories which he was still able to win.

The first two battles of the "War of Liberation" at Lützen and Bautzen (May 1813) were victories for Napoleon, but neither of them was a victory of the Austerlitz and Jena type. The opposing armies retreated in perfect order, and their losses were not greater than those of Napoleon. Nevertheless the Russians and Prussians were somewhat discouraged, and might have been decisively defeated had Napoleon pushed home his advantage. But Metternich, still loud in professions of attachment to the French alliance, persuaded Napoleon to sign an armistice which was to be occupied in negotiating the preliminary articles for a general peace congress.

Metternich had hitherto refused to join the Coalition against Napoleon. He had no sympathy with the Liberal and Nationalist aspirations of the Prussian reformers, and denounced Stein as a Jacobin. But he was determined to recover for the Habsburgs the territories and the hegemony in Germany and Italy which they had lost in the previous wars. He had counselled the sacrifice of the Archduchess as Napoleon's bride in order to preserve Austria till the day of deliverance. The stubborn resistance of the Russo-Prussian armies and the general discontent in Germany convinced him that the hour had come. The armistice he had arranged gave him time to mobilize the whole forces of the monarchy, and meantime he could delay to join the Russo-Prussian alliance until he secured his own terms. On June 27 he concluded the Treaty of Reichenbach, by which he promised to join the Allies if Napoleon refused to conclude peace on certain conditions, which included the restoration of the Illyrian provinces, the dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the evacuation of all Austrian and Russian provinces occupied by France. Napoleon believed that his acceptance of such terms would destroy his prestige in France and overthrow the Empire. He attended a peace congress at Prague, which was merely a hollow sham, occupied by both sides in military preparations. On August 12 Austria, having completed her preparations and transformed the Coalition from a crusade for German nation-

ality into a joint-stock company for the territorial aggrandizement of the partners, declared war upon France.

The adhesion of Austria transferred to the Coalition the numerical superiority enjoyed by Napoleon in the first half of the campaign. The main Allied attack was directed against the French headquarters at Dresden. Napoleon himself launched an attack on Silesia, but returned by forced marches in time to save Dresden in a great battle fought under the walls of the city (August 27). This victory, however, was neutralized by the successive defeats elsewhere in Germany of five of the French Marshals, which allowed the detached forces of the Allies to join together and oppose Napoleon with overwhelming numbers.

The liberation of Germany was now assured, but was delayed by the lack of confidence of the Allied generals in themselves and by the domestic differences of the Allied statesmen. Stein demanded the deposition, or at least the suspension, of the German princelings and the creation of a united Germany, but Metternich was now displacing Stein in his influence over the Tsar, and the Treaty of Teplitz (September 9, 1813) offered the princelings the continuation of their titles and powers if they joined the Coalition. Bavaria and nearly all the lesser states accepted these advantageous terms. Saxony almost alone remained loyal to Napoleon.

Meantime the campaign continued. Blücher and the Prussians crossed the Elbe and forced Napoleon to retire from Dresden to Leipzig, where he fought the great "Battle of the Peoples" (October 16–18). The Allies lost more heavily than the French, but Napoleon could not maintain his position against their repeated and overwhelming attacks. The French army never halted till it crossed the Rhine. French garrisons still held some of the most important fortresses in Germany, but their surrender was now merely a matter of time. The Confederation of the Rhine and the kingdom of Westphalia collapsed instantly.

Everywhere 1813 was a year of disasters for Napoleon. In Spain Wellington defeated the French at Vittoria, drove them out of Spain, succeeded in forcing the passes of the Pyrenees, and invaded France from the south. In January 1814 he had

advanced as far as Bayonne, and, on April 10, after the abdication of Napoleon, crushed the opposing French army at Toulouse. The French were also expelled from Holland, and the son of the Stadtholder became William I, Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands. Denmark, France's ally, was compelled to withdraw from the war and to surrender Norway to Sweden by the Treaty of Kiel (January 1814). Denmark also surrendered Heligoland to Britain, but was promised compensation in Germany for these cessions.

Section III: The European Settlement (1814–15)

The Allies had now to face a very formidable task—the invasion of France. They had the doubtful advantage of Royalist support. The Count of Provence, brother of Louis XVI, who now styled himself Louis XVIII, offered a general amnesty and urged the French to treat the Allied forces as their friends and liberators. There was, however, little feeling of loyalty to the Bourbons left in France, and open associations with the invaders harmed the Bourbon cause without appreciably helping the Allies. On the other hand, France was weary of war, her commerce was languishing, and the disasters of 1812 and 1813 had undermined the popularity of Napoleon, which was further diminished by the heavy call for 300,000 men made by him on the depleted man-power of France in the winter of 1813. Liberalism began timidly to raise its head.

The Allies were by no means unanimous. Austria, partly owing to the marriage of the Archduchess to Napoleon, would not have been unwilling to leave Napoleon in possession of the Rhine frontier provided her hegemony in Italy and Germany was restored. Prussia was eager to recover her Rhenish provinces and to avenge the humiliation of Jena by dictating peace from Paris. Alexander swayed uncertainly from the Austrian to the Prussian side, according to the momentary ascendancy, now of Metternich, now of Stein, over him. In November 1813 Austrian influence secured the offer to Napoleon of peace terms which would have allowed him to retain the left bank of the Rhine. Napoleon, still confident of victory, rejected these terms, and in January 1814 the

Allied armies began the invasion of France. A winter campaign followed in Champagne, where Napoleon's strategy and tactics enabled him to win a series of minor successes, which lack of men prevented him from following up. Encouraged by these victories, he again rejected at the Congress of Châtillon in February an Allied offer of peace on the basis of the return of France to her pre-Revolutionary (1792) frontiers. It was even suggested at the Congress that Great Britain might restore some of the colonies taken from France. The influence of Lord Castlereagh, who had joined the Allied headquarters in January, did much to secure co-operation and cordiality between the Allies, and on March 1 they concluded the Treaty of Chaumont, which bound the Coalition more closely together than before and laid the foundation of the attempted government of Europe by congresses of the Powers. The Austrians and Prussians were now joined by the army of Bernadotte, which gave them an overwhelming superiority in numbers. Napoleon attempted to check the invasion by threatening the enemy's communications, but the Allies ignored the danger and marched on Paris, which surrendered on March 31. Napoleon's army was still intact, but further resistance was clearly futile, and Napoleon abdicated a few days later "in the interests of France." He was allowed to retain the title of Emperor and retired to the island of Elba.

France herself seemed quite apathetic—there were few signs of enthusiasm either for Bourbons or Bonapartes. The disposal of the throne of France lay virtually with the Allies. Various schemes, such as a Regency for Napoleon's son, the grandson of Francis II of Austria, and the elevation of one of Napoleon's Marshals, were considered and put aside. The Royalist party represented by Talleyrand had the ear of the Allies, and the restoration of the Bourbons was founded on the principle of legitimacy, which made a strong appeal to all the Allied sovereigns and statesmen. Any other solution would have led to discord among them. Talleyrand induced the Senate in the name of the French people to recall the Bourbons to the throne. Louis XVIII at once returned to France, which he had quitted in 1792, and was coldly received in Paris. His first act was to ignore the constitutional articles added by

the Senate to its invitation and to insist that he reigned by divine right as absolute monarch of France. The influence of the Tsar, however, extorted from him on June 2 a 'charter,' or constitution, so called to indicate that it was a voluntary grant from king to people and not a compact between them.

The new constitution was extremely narrow. Only adult males over thirty who paid a large sum in direct taxation received the franchise. The King alone could initiate laws, which were to be discussed by two Chambers, one appointed by the Crown, the other elective. The principle of Ministerial responsibility was, however, expressly recognized, and the elective house had also the right to grant taxes and supervise expenditure. The State religion was to be Roman Catholicism, but a wide toleration of other sects was granted.

The other main question—the limits of Louis XVIII's kingdom—had already been settled by the first Treaty of Paris (August 30). France was treated with marked generosity. She secured the frontier of 1792, including Avignon, and in addition Savoy and fragments of territory in Germany. No war indemnity was demanded; the works of art stolen by French troops were mostly left at Paris; nearly all the French colonies captured by Britain, except Mauritius and a few West Indian islands, were restored. Certain stipulations in regard to the territories conquered by France were made, but the final settlement was referred to a congress which was to meet at Vienna. France was to be represented at the Congress, but Louis XVIII had definitely to promise that he would accept the decisions of the Allies.

The Congress of Vienna began its serious work on November 1. Its task was to provide a settlement of the many thorny questions which the ebb of the Napoleonic wave had revealed in a Europe torn by twenty years of almost incessant war. Its success in its appointed task has been very variously judged, but the settlement which it arranged provides the starting-point of nineteenth-century history, and its outlines were unaltered for nearly half a century. The four Allied Powers intended to reserve all the important decisions to themselves. Austria was represented by Metternich; Prussia by Hardenberg; Britain at first by Castlereagh and later by Wellington;

METTERNICH
Sir Thomas Lawrence

TALLEYRAND
From an engraving

Russia by Nesselrode, although the Tsar himself took a leading part in the Allied deliberations. The obvious intention of the Great Powers to monopolize power was deeply resented by the lesser states, which found a champion in Talleyrand, the representative of the restored Bourbon monarchy in France. Partly by championing the lesser states, particularly the ancient allies of France in Germany, but chiefly by sowing distrust and suspicion between the Great Powers, Talleyrand secured admission to the inner conclave, and played a great part in forming the decisions of the Congress.

The Congress ostensibly took the principle of legitimacy as their guide, but did not follow it when and where it was found to conflict with the vital interests of a Great Power. In practice their decisions were probably due rather to the idea of preserving the Balance of Power. They desired, naturally enough, to prevent France from ever again gaining the ascendancy which had deluged Europe with bloodshed and had only been defeated by the strenuous efforts of all the other Great Powers. But they adopted also the debased conception of the Balance of Power which had gained currency after the partition of Poland—that if any Power secured territorial gains the others were entitled to compensation—and this compensation could be provided only at the expense of the lesser states.

The problem which proved most difficult of solution was the disposal of the territories of the King of Saxony, which included as well as the kingdom of Saxony the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Tsar, who had posed at Paris as the liberal and disinterested friend of the liberties of Europe, now revealed the secret ambitions which had brought him into the Coalition. He demanded the whole of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, including the large territories which Prussia had acquired at the partitions of Poland. Prussia in concert with the Tsar then demanded as compensation the whole of Saxony, including the ancient electorate of which Frederick Augustus was the legitimate prince. Austria, however, was resolute to prevent such an aggrandizement of her Prussian rival in Germany, and Castlereagh regarded the demands of Russia in Poland as likely to overthrow the Balance of Power. After some hesitation Talleyrand joined Metternich and Castlereagh, and the

three Powers concluded on January 3, 1815, a secret treaty of alliance by which they pledged themselves to resist the claims of Prussia and Russia by force if necessary. The substance of the treaty was soon known to the Tsar, and induced him to accept a compromise by which Prussia obtained about half of Saxony, while the remainder was restored to Frederick Augustus. As further compensation for her losses in Poland Prussia obtained not only all her old provinces in Germany, but a large part of the Rhineland, including Cologne, Trier, and Aix-la-Chapelle. Russia received nearly the whole of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, including the capital of the ancient kingdom of Poland, Warsaw, which had formerly been held by Prussia. Alexander promised to form all the Polish provinces under his rule into a kingdom separately organized from the rest of his territories and to grant it a liberal constitution.

The other questions which the Congress had to settle were adjusted without any great difficulty. In Germany no attempt was made to restore the *status quo* of 1792. The Napoleonic secularizations and mediatizations were recognized. Austria recovered Eastern Galicia from Russia and the German lands which she had been forced to cede to Bavaria, who received partial compensation in South-western Germany and became a useful ally to Austria. Hanover, owing to its connexion with Britain, became a kingdom and received an increase of territories.

The national party headed by Stein was anxious to secure some form of national unity in Germany. Metternich set his face against this proposal, and rejected likewise the restoration of the medieval empire. Finally a confederation of the thirty-nine German states recognized by the Congress was formed with a very sketchy constitution, which gave sovereign power to the individual states. In practice Austria recovered her headship of Germany, but on a different foundation from that of pre-Revolutionary years. Prussia, moreover, was now not far behind her. By surrendering her Polish provinces Prussia had obtained the advantage of being a purely German Power, and, although this was not recognized at the time, her acquisition of the Rhenish provinces made her the natural champion of Germany against France.

The settlement of Italy was effected on similar lines, but here Austria more than recovered her pre-war position by the restoration of Lombardy and the acquisition of Venetia. Piedmont received Genoa to compensate her for the part of Savoy retained by France, and to strengthen the defences of Italy against French aggression. The Papal States and Tuscany were restored to their legitimate rulers; Modena passed by marriage into the possession of a Habsburg prince. Murat was left for a time in possession of Naples; but his well-founded fears that he would soon be dispossessed induced him to appeal to the growing national spirit in Italy and raise the standard of revolt after Napoleon's return from Elba. The Bourbons were then restored to Naples and Sicily, and the King promised not to grant a constitution without the consent of Austria. The Liberal reforms and improved and unified administration introduced by Napoleon in the kingdom of Italy disappeared. Italy was more than ever a mere "geographical expression," and her princes were the humble clients of the Austrian Emperor.

The Austrian Netherlands and Luxemburg were joined to Holland to form the kingdom of the Netherlands under the rule of the house of Orange. Austria had long refused to fulfil the *rôle* of guardian of the barrier against France in the Netherlands, and it was hoped that the union would make a state strong enough to resist France. Britain advanced to the kingdom a large loan for the fortification of its frontier, and restored practically all the Dutch colonies, except the Cape of Good Hope. In the capacity of ruler of Luxemburg, the King of the Netherlands became a member of the German Confederation. Switzerland recovered its independence, and its neutrality was guaranteed by the Powers—another indication of the desire of the Powers to erect barriers against French aggression. In accordance with the Treaty of Kiel, Norway was transferred from Denmark to Sweden.

The news that the Bourbons were making a bad impression in France and that the Great Powers were at loggerheads at Vienna over the Saxon-Polish question encouraged Napoleon to make a last effort to recover his empire. Landing on the Riviera coast in March, he advanced in triumph to Paris. The

towns flung open their gates, and the Bourbon army deserted *en masse* to their beloved commander. But the Great Powers refused to treat with the usurper. The British and Prussian armies were soon collected in Belgium. Napoleon managed to thrust himself between them, and won a partial success against the Prussians at Ligny, but was defeated by Wellington at Waterloo. The arrival in the evening of the Prussians, according to the promise of their commander Blücher, transformed a defeat into a rout. The people of France showed no disposition to resist the Anglo-Prussian advance, Paris capitulated, and Napoleon surrendered. Until his death six years later he remained imprisoned on the isolated island of St Helena.

The "Hundred Days" had shown that the Bourbons had no real popularity in France, but once again the Bourbon king was restored by the Allied army. It was, however, no longer possible to adhere to the fiction that France had been the unwilling slave of Napoleon. By the second Treaty of Paris (November 20) France had to pay a reasonable war indemnity, restore the works of art stolen by the Napoleonic armies, and submit to an Allied occupation for five years in the northern provinces. The Prussians, and, indeed, all Germans, would have liked to make France powerless for future harm by taking from her Alsace and Lorraine. But their wishes were overruled by the diplomatists, and the only considerable change made in the frontiers of France was the restoration of the part of Savoy retained by France at the first Treaty of Paris.

The 1815 settlement of Europe has been much criticized in the light of after-events; but it was in fact a very fair settlement of the pressing problems of the time. The most serious criticism of the Congress of Vienna is the dictation of the greater Powers to the lesser states. Its justification lies in the fact that it averted war on a considerable scale for nearly half a century, and that its main provisions remained unaltered throughout this period. It is true that it showed no appreciation of the twin forces of Liberalism and Nationalism, which were to dominate the coming century, but these forces were as yet in their infancy, and might very probably have been weakened rather than strengthened by the attempt of diplo-

matists to enforce them from above upon peoples as yet unprepared, or at best only partially ready, to receive them. And, thanks to Britain, the Congress made one great concession to the humanitarian spirit which was to characterize the opening century in nearly all European countries. The slave-trade was declared inhuman, and was definitely abolished by France, Spain, Holland, and Sweden.

CHAPTER VI

EUROPE AFTER WATERLOO

Section I: Government by Congress

THE overthrow of Napoleon was followed by an attempt on the part of the Great Powers to govern Europe by a series of congresses. This attempt had a double origin in the treaties of the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance.

The Holy Alliance, concluded on September 26, 1815, was the work of Alexander I, who had come under the influence of German mysticism as expounded by the Baroness Krudener. The treaty was signed personally by every sovereign in Europe, except the Pope, the Sultan, and the Prince Regent of Great Britain, who expressed his sympathy with the project, but explained that the British constitution prevented him from signing the treaty without the intervention of a responsible Minister. The members of the alliance promised to treat each other as brothers, to preserve the peace of Europe, and in general to direct their domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the principles and precepts of Christianity. No sovereign or statesman except Alexander himself took the treaty seriously—Metternich jeered at the simple faith of its author, while Castlereagh called it a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." But the Liberals regarded it as a league of sovereigns against their subjects, and Metternich's growing ascendancy over the Tsar changed its character and proved that the Liberals' fears were well founded.

The effective bond that united the Powers which had overthrown Napoleon was, however, the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance, signed at Paris on the same day as the second Treaty of Paris. This treaty was a natural extension of the Treaty of Chaumont. Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia bound themselves to maintain (by armed force for twenty years) the

perpetual exclusion of the Bonaparte family from the French throne and the territorial boundaries assigned to France by the second Treaty of Paris. By the sixth article the Allies definitely pledged themselves to hold reunions at fixed periods for the discussion of their "great common interests."

The first 'reunion' took place at Aix-la-Chapelle in September 1818, and it was agreed that since the conduct of France had proved entirely satisfactory the Allied army of occupation should be immediately withdrawn. Provision was also made for settling the indemnity by raising a loan for France. France was formally restored to the rank of a Great Power and admitted to the Quadruple Alliance—which now became known as the Quintuple Alliance—on terms of equality with the original members. But the Quadruple Alliance was secretly maintained intact in case it should be necessary to act against France at some future date.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had solved with virtual unanimity the immediate problems for which it had been summoned. But the first signs of divergence among the Congress Powers appeared when the Tsar suggested that an Allied force should be sent to help the King of Spain to reconquer the revolted Spanish colonies in South America. Castlereagh insisted that the business of the Congress was limited to the objects prescribed by the second Treaty of Paris, and that the Allies had no right nor duty to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state except France. Metternich's mediation and proposal of a vague formula about the "moral solidarity" of the Powers postponed the break-up of the system of government by congress.

Two years later there came the first of the sporadic outbreaks of revolution in Europe itself—Spain, Portugal, Piedmont, Naples, and Sicily were all affected. Metternich was alarmed at the threat to Austrian hegemony in Italy, and now joined with Alexander to transform the system of congresses into an alliance of sovereigns for the suppression of Liberalism and Nationalism. Metternich and the Tsar deliberately sought to extend the obligations of the Quadruple Alliance to include armed interference to suppress domestic disorder in any European country. The Powers then met in congress at

Troppau in October 1820, and their conferences were continued at Laibach in 1821. Castlereagh had already, by the State paper of May 5, 1820, repudiated the principle of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, but the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia issued from Troppau and Laibach a series of circulars in which they reasserted the principles of absolutism and threatened to make war upon revolution in any country which dared to limit the power of its legitimate ruler. Austria, as the agent of the Congress, suppressed by force the Liberal movements in Piedmont and Naples. Castlereagh publicly dissociated Britain from the principles and conduct of the Allies.

The final breakdown of the system of government by congress was, however, postponed by the outbreak of a rebellion in Greece against the Turks (March 1821). In order to prevent Alexander I from giving support to the rebels, who were oppressed Orthodox Christians, and thus raising the Eastern Question in an acute form, Metternich and Castlereagh patched up their differences and summoned a congress, which met at Verona in the autumn of 1822. Before the congress met Castlereagh had committed suicide and had been succeeded by Canning, who disliked the whole idea of the congress system as it had developed since 1818. Wellington, the British representative at Verona, was instructed to inform the other Powers that, come what might, Britain would not be a party to interference in the domestic affairs of other states. This declaration and the subsequent refusal of Britain to send representatives to any congress proposed by the other Powers virtually ended the attempt at international government. It is true that France on her own responsibility interfered to suppress the revolutionary movement in Spain in 1823, and that a congress composed of representatives of France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia actually met at St Petersburg in 1825. But the St Petersburg Congress broke up without attaining any decision.

For the remainder of the century Canning's ideal of "every nation for itself and God for us all" was accepted by diplomatists as axiomatic. Congresses there were in plenty, but always with defined objects, not with a roving commission to

police the states of Europe. The ideal behind the congress system—the avoidance of disputes and disturbances by the friendly co-operation of the leading European statesmen—deserves commendation, but in practice it became a trade union of autocrats designed to preserve their monopoly of power in their respective dominions.

Section II: Reaction in Germany, Spain, and Italy

The chief interest of the three decades which follow the overthrow of Napoleon is to be found in the struggles between the old *régime*, which had been, as far as possible, restored by the diplomatists at Vienna, and the growing forces of Liberalism and Nationalism. Up to the "year of revolutions" (1848) the forces of reaction, incarnate in Metternich, were everywhere triumphant.

In Germany, naturally enough, Metternich's influence was most strongly felt. "The union of all Germans in one Germany" he regarded as "an infamous object," and the spread of this dangerous doctrine among the university students of Germany filled him with alarm. In 1817, during a festival organized by the students of Jena University to celebrate the tercentenary of the Reformation, various symbols of reaction were solemnly thrown on to a bonfire. Two years later Kotzebue, a dramatist who was in correspondence with Alexander I and had made himself notorious by denouncing the universities as centres of political agitation, was assassinated by a student. Metternich seized these two pretexts to summon a conference of the German states at Carlsbad in 1819 to take steps for their common defence against revolutionary doctrines. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar, the patron of Goethe and Schiller, was almost alone in his protest against the decrees of the Federal Diet which were promulgated from Carlsbad, establishing a strict censorship of all publications, the control of the universities by Government officials, and the establishment of a central commission to collect evidence against members of secret societies. The Carlsbad Decrees riveted the yoke of Metternich on Germany for thirty years.

The only German state strong enough to counteract the

influence of Metternich was Prussia. During the War of Liberation Frederick William III had promised to grant a constitution to his subjects. Later the influence of the Tsar, who had now gone over to the reactionary camp, and the failure of the constitutional experiments in Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, made him repent of his promise and support the party of reaction. But whereas Metternich was content to follow an entirely negative policy of repression, the Prussian bureaucracy enormously improved the administration of the army and the finances, and developed the machinery of local government instituted by Stein. Though nothing was done by the people, a great deal was done for them. Above all, in 1818 Prussia commenced the formation of the Zollverein, or Customs Union. The scattered territories of the Prussian state made this almost a necessity for its economic prosperity. At first Prussia contented herself with the negotiation of customs agreements with the insignificant states which lay between the two main blocks of her territories in East and West Germany. By 1833 the Prussian Union had complete control of the trade-routes between North and South Germany, and within the next two years Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden joined the Union. Metternich was no economist, and awakened too late to the significance of the commercial treaties negotiated by Prussia. Every fresh state added, every renewal of an existing agreement, strengthened the bonds between the members of the Union, and made it more difficult for the independent states to remain out of the Zollverein. By 1848 Prussia had attained an economic supremacy in Germany.

In Spain the reaction was even more extreme than in Germany. The Liberal junta which had governed Spain under the ultra-democratic constitution of 1812 was unpopular with the peasants and was hated by the priests. Whenever Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in 1814 he repudiated the constitution and restored not only the absolutism of the monarchy, but the old *régime* almost in its entirety. The nobles recovered their former privileges, and the monasteries their property. The Inquisition and the Jesuits resumed their activities, and the Liberals were hunted down and imprisoned. The chronic disorder of the Spanish finances was intensified

by the revolt of the American colonies, which cut off one main source of revenue and led to the equipping of expensive but futile expeditions for their recovery. Under the direction of a clique of worthless favourites and fanatical priests the Government became almost incredibly corrupt and inefficient. The Army was honeycombed with secret societies having Liberal sympathies, discontented at the accumulation of arrears of pay, and unwilling to fight in South America.

In 1820 a mutiny broke out among troops collected at Cadiz for a fresh American expedition, and the movement soon spread to the chief centres of Spain. The Government proved utterly incompetent to suppress the revolts, and the King accepted the Constitution of 1812 and appointed Liberals to the chief offices in the State. The Cortes met in July and proceeded to carry out the Liberal programme of reform. The Inquisition was abolished, clerical tithes and the monastic property confiscated, and the right of public meeting and the freedom of the Press recognized. The moderate Liberals were anxious to suppress disorder and establish a stable constitutional monarchy, but the reactionaries supported the extreme Liberals in order to promote disorder and discredit the constitutional experiment. Local revolts of the peasants organized by the priests were suppressed by the Army, and the radicals, who included some of the leading commanders, gained further prestige.

The success of the Liberals in Spain alarmed the restored Bourbon monarchy in France. A French army was collected on the frontier and invaded Spain with the approval of the three Eastern autocrats in April 1823. The faction-ridden Cortes could make no effective resistance and retreated from Madrid to Seville and from Seville to Cadiz, where they were compelled to surrender by a bombardment of the city. Ferdinand VII now recovered his liberty (October 1), and repudiated all the concessions extorted from him in the last three years. The royalist reign of terror which followed disgusted even the Duke of Angoulême, the commander of the French troops, which were not completely withdrawn from Spain till 1827.

French intervention in Spain had momentous consequences

beyond Spain in the New World. The Spanish colonies in Central and South America had long suffered under the oppressive and corrupt colonial system of Spain. Finally they had openly revolted against "the intruder King"—Joseph Bonaparte. Ferdinand VII, shortly after his restoration to the Spanish throne, attempted to reconquer the colonies by force of arms. The Spanish army was assisted by many colonists who were loyal to the mother-country and their ancient line of kings, and for a whole decade civil wars raged in South and Central America.

The Holy Alliance now threatened to assist King Ferdinand to subdue his revolted colonies. Canning was determined that if France secured a dominant position in Spain she should not control both Spain and the Indies. Britain and the United States had a common interest in preventing the reconquest of the colonies by Spain, and Canning proposed joint action in 1822. The United States rejected his overture, but, counting on the support of the British navy, President Monroe sent to congress in 1823 a message which has since become celebrated as the proclamation of the "Monroe Doctrine." While disclaiming any intention to interfere with the existing colonies of any European state in the New World, President Monroe declared that any attempt by a European Power to extend its political influence there would be resisted by the United States. He expressly stated, on the other hand, that the United States was not interested, and consequently would not interfere, in European politics. In 1823 this declaration was mere bluff; but with the growth of the power of the United States it has become the cardinal fact on which all European Powers must base their policy toward the states of the American continent. Thanks to British co-operation the immediate object of Monroe was attained when the remaining Spanish troops were withdrawn from America in 1826, but it was long before Spain would consent formally to recognize the independence of her former American colonies.

In Portugal the struggle between the forces of Liberalism and reaction ran a course parallel to that in the neighbouring Spanish kingdom. The grievances of the Portuguese were, however, different from those of the neighbouring kingdom.

The royal family had fled to the colony of Brazil to escape capture by the French invaders in 1808. The Regent became King John VI in 1816, but continued to reside in Brazil, leaving effective control of the kingdom of Portugal to Lord Beresford, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army. The marked preference of the King for the colony of Brazil and the rule of a foreigner on behalf of their absentee king aroused widespread resentment in Portugal. Risings broke out in 1820 in the leading towns. Beresford was expelled, and a constitution drawn up. The revolution extended to Brazil, where it found an unexpected supporter in the son and heir of John VI, Dom Pedro. Leaving Dom Pedro in charge of Brazil, John VI sailed in 1821 for Portugal, where he was compelled to accept the new constitution. In an attempt to restore the subordination of Brazil to the mother-country Dom Pedro was ordered to return to Portugal. Convinced that obedience would mean the declaration of Brazilian independence, Dom Pedro himself took the lead in the separatist and Liberal movement, proclaimed himself Emperor of Brazil, and granted a constitution to Brazil (1822). He hoped thus to retain both Portugal and Brazil for the house of Braganza. Meantime the Portuguese Cortes was steadily losing ground, and when the French army restored absolutism in Spain in 1823 the Portuguese reactionaries, headed by the wife and younger son (Dom Miguel) of the King, gained a complete victory. Absolutism was restored in Portugal, and the Liberals were proscribed, but the intrigues of the Queen on behalf of her favourite son Dom Miguel kept the kingdom in continual uproar.

The revolutionary movement in Italy attained the same kind of temporary success as the Spanish and Portuguese revolutions. The improved administration introduced by Napoleon and his establishment of the kingdom of Italy (although it never included the whole of the peninsula) left behind them a permanent impression, which was the main stimulus to revolt. Secret societies, notably the Carbonari, organized themselves to attain the freedom of Italy. The outbreak of the Spanish revolt encouraged the conspirators. General Pepé, a popular officer, took the lead in a mutiny among the Neapolitan troops, many of whom were eager to

play the part in politics which the Spanish soldiers had already usurped. Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies, like his namesake in Spain, made no opposition, but accepted the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which had become the rallying-cry of all malcontents in South-western Europe. Secretly the King appealed to Metternich for help, and the affairs of Naples were the main subject of discussion at the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach. Metternich was duly authorized to send an Austrian army to invade Naples and suppress the constitution. The revolutionaries were divided among themselves, and the overwhelming Austrian forces had no difficulty in restoring Ferdinand's absolutism. Not only the rebels, but all those who were suspected of Liberalism, were executed or exiled.

Section III: The Greek War of Independence

The Balkan peninsula, which was to become later in the century the chief battle-ground of Nationalism against non-National Governments, was already influenced by the new movement. The wild tribesmen of Montenegro had always retained a large measure of independence under the nominal rule of the Porte, and the Serbs under Milosh Obrenovič had gained autonomy in 1815. The opposition of Metternich had prevented the Congress of Vienna from recognizing the autonomy of Greece, as Alexander I had wished. Nevertheless the sympathy of the educated public of Western Europe had been won for the cause of Greek independence, and the revolutionary outbreaks in Spain and the Two Sicilies encouraged the Greek patriots. Many of the Greek leaders were members of ancient Greek families which had long been resident at Constantinople, and were in intimate touch with Russia. One of them, Alexander Hypsilanti, tried in March 1821 to raise a rebellion in Moldavia and Wallachia, where Russian influence had been firmly established since the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774), but he was soon compelled to make his escape across the Austrian frontier.

The revolt of Hypsilanti, however, gave the signal for the outbreak of a much more formidable rising in the Morea and the rich islands of the Ægean. Within a few weeks the

Turkish garrisons were driven from the open country into the fortresses and closely besieged. Ali Pasha, "the Lion of Jannina," a Turkish Governor who had quarrelled with the Sultan, joined with the rebels. For a year he drew against himself such forces as the Porte could spare from its campaigns against Persia, and thus allowed the rebellion to secure a firm hold of all the country south of the Isthmus of Corinth. The skill and daring of the seafaring population of the islands gave the rebels naval superiority almost from the outbreak of the rebellion. The Porte was taken by surprise, and, until the defeat and death of Ali Pasha in February 1822, did little to suppress the rebellion, except to hang the Patriarch of the Greek Church at Constantinople and to massacre the Christian population of Asia Minor.

In 1822 a Greek national assembly met, drafted a constitution, appointed a President, Alexander Mavrokordatos, as head of the executive, and entrusted the legislative power to a council of seventy. The remaining Turkish strongholds in the peninsula, Athens, Corinth, and Nauplia, were reduced, and a Turkish relieving-force decisively defeated. In spite of the quarrels of the Greek war leaders and their jealousy of the Civil Government, which led to the temporary breakdown of the central Government within a few months of its establishment, the supineness of the Porte, the raising of a large loan abroad, and the arrival of French, Italian, and British volunteers, among them Lord Byron, enabled the Greeks to hold their own until the end of 1824. In despair the Sultan called in the aid of Mehemet Ali, who had suppressed the troubles which had followed the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt so successfully that he had transformed his Governorship of Egypt on behalf of the Sultan into virtual sovereignty. Mehemet Ali was able to exact his own price, and in February 1825 the Egyptian army, which had been disciplined and equipped on the French model under Mehemet's son Ibrahim, landed in the Morea. The siege of Missolonghi was now resumed by a joint Egypto-Turkish force, and the town fell in April 1826. Athens held out heroically for another year, but was compelled to surrender in June 1827. The protracted rebellion seemed at last to be at an end.

Greece was saved by the tardy intervention of the Powers. Alexander I had at first sympathized with the Greek cause, but had been persuaded by Metternich that the Greeks must be regarded not as oppressed Christians, but as rebels against the legitimate rule of the Sultan. Alexander had therefore abandoned the traditional Russian policy of exploiting the domestic troubles of the Porte to push the frontiers of the Russian Empire toward the Straits and the Mediterranean. The British and French Governments, also, would gladly have done something for the Greeks, but the traditional policy of both Governments was the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russia.

The sudden death of Alexander I in December 1825 brought about a change in Russian policy. Constantine, the brother of Alexander, who stood next in the succession, had formally renounced his claims, but the validity of the renunciation was doubtful, and Alexander's death was followed by an interregnum of three weeks, after which Nicholas, the younger brother of Constantine, ascended the throne. The period of suspense gave to the secret societies which had been formed in Russia, notably the two branches of the Union of Public Good, a chance to organize revolt. At the instigation of their officers the soldiers in the Moscow regiment refused to take the oath of allegiance to the new Emperor, but this military revolt had no backing outside of the army and a small clique of nobles, who had imbibed the Liberal and Republican doctrines of Western Europe. It proved a fiasco, and the conspirators, including "the *élite* of all that was civilized and truly noble in Russia," were executed or exiled to Siberia. The Decembrists were a mere handful of patriots with no popular backing; their failure was inevitable, but their self-sacrifice was a never-failing inspiration to their successors.

The only immediate result of their conspiracy, however, was to impress upon the mind of the new Tsar the danger of revolution. For thirty years he followed a consistent and ruthless policy of repression, which sought to destroy every vestige of freedom of thought and action within the Russian Empire. He strove particularly to undo the work of Peter the Great and his successors and to isolate Russia from the con-

tamination of European Liberalism. Restrictions were laid upon foreign travel, a rigid censorship enforced upon the importation and printing of books, the teaching of the universities closely supervised. Above all the Secret Police, which Alexander I had abolished, was restored under the name of the "Third Section of the Tsar's Private Chancellory," and exercised henceforth unlimited powers of "arresting, imprisoning, deporting, and making away with anyone whom its chief pleased, without any restriction whatever." The Tsar's headship of the Greek (Orthodox) Church was likewise used to buttress his autocracy. As head of this Church the Tsar was the natural protector of the oppressed Christian subjects of the Porte, and he did not share his predecessor's scruples in giving assistance to rebels, always provided that to send assistance would give Russia material gains.

The accession of Nicholas therefore made Russian intervention to save the Greeks practically certain, but the form of this interference remained to be settled. Canning was determined that Nicholas should not interfere single-handed, and sent Wellington to St Petersburg, where a protocol was signed on April 4, 1826, which arranged that Greece should be an autonomous state, but should pay tribute to the Sultan. The adhesion of the other Powers was invited, but France alone accepted the invitation. On July 6, 1827, the three Powers concluded the Treaty of London on the basis of the protocol of April 1826, with the addition that if the Porte refused to accept the mediation of the three Powers they would intervene to put a stop to the war and to secure the autonomy of Greece.

Meantime Nicholas, aided by the complete disorganization of the Turkish military system which resulted from Mahmoud II's massacre of the janissaries, had compelled the Sultan to accept the Convention of Akerman (October 1826). The Sultan recognized the virtual protectorate of Russia over Moldavia and Wallachia and promised to abstain from all interference in the domestic affairs of Serbia. By a show of submission in these and other matters, which concerned Russia more directly than the Greek question, the Sultan vainly hoped to induce the Tsar to leave the Greeks to their fate. The fall of Athens and the arrival of reinforcements for Ibrahim

convinced the Sultan that success was within his grasp. He refused to accept the mediation of the Powers. The Allied fleets under Sir Edward Codrington were sent to enforce the Treaty of London. To force Ibrahim to stop the ravaging of the defenceless villages on the coast Codrington's fleet entered Navarino Bay. An Egyptian ship fired the first shot, and in the resulting battle the Egyptian fleet was annihilated (October 20, 1827).

The battle gave the Greek national movement a new lease of life, but Canning's death deprived Britain of a decisive voice in the final settlement. The French Government sent an expedition to the Morea to follow up the success at Navarino, but the British Ministry publicly deplored the battle as "an untoward event," and made no use of it, except to induce Mehemet Ali to withdraw his troops from the Morea. Mahmoud II was naturally furious at the action of the Powers, and when Russia became involved in war with Persia he repudiated the Convention of Akerman. Nicholas then declared war (April 26, 1828) on Turkey, and the vacillation of his nominal allies, Britain and France, allowed him to act with almost complete independence.

The Russian campaign of 1828 in Europe was a failure, but in Asia the great fortress of Kars was captured. In 1829 the Turkish resistance broke down completely, and the Russians crossed the Balkan mountains and occupied Adrianople. Ignorant that the Russian commander was at the end of his resources, and that a resolute attack would have destroyed his army, already reduced to a mere skeleton by disease and desertion, the Sultan concluded the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829). Russia obtained control of the Danube delta, a strip of territory in the Caucasus giving her control of an important road, and a protectorate of Moldavia and Wallachia. Moreover, the Porte accepted the provisions of the Treaty of London in regard to Greek autonomy.

Russian influence was now in the ascendant in Greece. Capodistrias, a former secretary of Alexander I's, had already been appointed President by the Greek National Convention. The collapse of Turkey in her war against their protector encouraged the Greeks to aim at complete independence, and

they refused to accept the terms of the Treaty of London. Britain was now in favour of complete independence, since the position of a tributary state would merely give opportunities for Russian interference between Greece and the Porte. In February 1830 the three Allied Powers signed a protocol giving independence to Greece and placing the northern frontier from the Gulf of Volo on the east to the mouth of the river Aspropotamos on the west. The crown was offered to Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the widower of Princess Charlotte, daughter of George IV. Ultimately he declined the offer. Capodistrias, the Russophil President, was believed to be aiming at the throne, and was assassinated at Nauplia in October 1831, and the strife of parties degenerated into civil war. In 1832, however, the Powers at last found a suitable candidate for the Greek throne in the person of Prince Otto of Bavaria, who landed in Greece in the following year. The Greek discontent at the narrow limits assigned to the new kingdom was partly conciliated by the extension of the frontier from the Aspropotamos to the Arta.

CHAPTER VII

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

Section I: The Restored Bourbons and the Establishment of Louis-Philippe

BEFORE the settlement of the Greek problem gave peace for a time in the Balkans fresh outbreaks of revolution had occurred all over Europe. The main impulse on this occasion came from France. Napoleon had left behind him a problem which was destined to trouble France and agitate Europe for half a century. France was determined to overthrow the settlement of 1815 which the Quadruple Alliance Powers were resolute to maintain. If the Government of France sought popularity at home by pursuing this policy it found itself involved in difficulties with the Powers; if it sought the friendship of the Powers by loyally accepting the 1815 settlement then it incurred odium at home. The position of Louis XVIII after his return "in the baggage-train of the Allies" was extremely precarious. At first only the support of the Allied army of occupation kept him on the throne.

The first elections resulted in the return of a solid body of ultra-Royalists, who wished to restore the ancient *régime* in its entirety, but who cloaked their selfish ends under the pretence of disinterested loyalty to the Church and to the Throne. This party was led by the heir apparent, the King's brother, the Count of Artois. It demanded the proscription of all who had been connected with the Revolution, and advocated the partial repudiation of the national debt incurred under the Empire. The Duke of Richelieu, who had been in the service of the Tsar and enjoyed his confidence, became Prime Minister. Both King and Minister were well aware that the measures advocated by the 'Ultras' would lead to the speedy overthrow of the monarchy. They made some minor con-

inevitable British suspicions of a revolutionary France, there was a wide divergence of aim between them. France wished the British alliance to strengthen the monarchy against the legitimist Powers and help to recover her 'natural frontiers.' Britain, on the other hand, wished to co-operate with France in order to maintain the peace of Europe, and in particular the 1815 settlement. Both, it is true, were ready to support Liberalism if it did not conflict with the interests of their respective countries, but the inevitable competition to make capital out of their joint support of Liberalism proved another cause of friction.

No general treaty was concluded, but the Quadruple Alliance was signed on April 22, 1834, between Britain, France, and the Constitutional Governments of Spain and Portugal. The Alliance provided for military co-operation between Spain and Portugal only; Britain was to provide a fleet, France's share was to be settled later by the common consent of the four contracting parties. It was, however, sufficient to convince Dom Miguel of the futility of further resistance in Portugal; in May he laid down his arms and left the peninsula. In Spain the Carlists were not intimidated, and the jealousy of Britain and France prevented active co-operation. The Carlist generals, especially Zumalacarregui, were superior to those of the Regent, and for some years maintained the upper hand. The Constitutional party, moreover, broke up into two parties, the *moderados* and the more radical *exaltados*, who demanded, and in 1836 secured, the restoration of the ultra-democratic Constitution of 1812. France supported the moderates, Britain the radicals. In spite of this split in the Constitutional party, the ability of their general, Espartero, gradually wore down the Carlists. By the Convention of Vergara (August 31, 1839) the civil war practically ended; Don Carlos retired shortly afterward from the peninsula.

The partial success of the Western Powers in Belgium and the Iberian peninsula was balanced by the success of Russia in the Eastern question. Mehemet Ali had bitterly resented the intervention of the Powers to prevent his conquest of the Morea. Although the Sultan had rewarded him for his assistance by

granting him the Governorship of Crete, he remained discontented. He picked a quarrel with the Pasha of Acre; his son Ibrahim conquered Syria, routed the Turks at Konieh (December 1832), and threatened Constantinople. Failing to secure help from the Western Powers and in terror of his life, Mahmoud II appealed to the Tsar, who immediately dispatched troops and a naval squadron to protect Constantinople. Torn between his fears of the Egyptian rebels and of his Russian protectors, Mahmoud surrendered to Mehemet Ali and granted to him the Governorship of Syria, in addition to Egypt and Crete. Russian assistance had been of no advantage to the Sultan, but before the Russian forces were withdrawn he was compelled to accept the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 8, 1833), which established a defensive alliance between the Tsar and the Sultan for eight years. If the Porte were threatened by foreign aggression or domestic revolt Russia would send troops to the assistance of the Sultan. Russia obtained by this article something approaching to an exclusive protectorate of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, if Russia were attacked the Sultan was bound to close the Straits to the warships of her enemies and render invulnerable the Black Sea coasts of Russia. The Western Powers showed a disposition to resist the triumph of Russia, but in the end Palmerston contented himself with a private assurance to the Porte that the British Mediterranean squadron could be depended upon to give him immediate protection, if he should prefer to rely upon British rather than upon Russian assistance.

The Sultan meantime was planning a war of revenge against his disobedient and dangerous vassal. In 1839 his armies invaded Syria, but were again defeated by Ibrahim at Nisib on June 24. A few days later Mahmoud II died and his fleet deserted to Mehemet Ali. His successor, Abdul Medjid, was a feeble and dissolute youth, and the disruption of the Empire appeared to be imminent.

Britain and France were determined to resist Russia's claim to an exclusive protectorate of the Porte under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, but they were entirely opposed in their attitude toward the claims of Mehemet Ali, who now aimed openly at the throne of the Sultans. France, partly owing to

THIERS

From an engraving by Hopwood

the exploits of Napoleon and her growing commercial interests in Egypt, partly to the corruption of the French Press by Mehemet Ali, was an enthusiastic supporter of the Egyptian Pasha. Britain was beginning to realize the importance of Egypt as a link with her Eastern dominions, and was determined not to allow the establishment there and in Syria of a strong Power under the virtual protectorate of France. Russia shared the hostility of Britain to Mehemet Ali, because it was in her interest to keep the Ottoman Empire weak and divided, and she feared that Mehemet Ali, once established at Constantinople, might reorganize the Ottoman Empire as successfully as he had already done the province of Egypt. Since Austria and Prussia followed the lead of Russia and Britain France was isolated, but Louis-Philippe lacked the courage to separate France openly from the other Great Powers in the conference which had met at London to settle the Eastern question. Behind the backs of the other Powers France attempted to negotiate a settlement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. Palmerston had already reached a virtual agreement with the Tsar, and when he was informed of French intrigues at Constantinople he concluded with the other three Great Powers the famous Four-Power Treaty of July 15, 1840, by which the Powers proposed and Turkey accepted terms of peace between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. Mehemet was ordered to restore Crete and Northern Syria, and the Powers agreed to employ force if he refused. If he had not accepted within ten days he was to be deprived also of Southern Syria; if he still rejected the terms offered by the Powers at the end of twenty days he was threatened with the loss of Egypt also. By the fourth article of the treaty the "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" of closing the Straits to all warships while the Porte was at peace was restored, and Russia thus abandoned the essential point in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

Thiers, who had recently taken office in France, was astounded, but he was not dismayed. His hopes of winning a diplomatic victory by negotiating a settlement had vanished, but he still believed that the Pasha of Egypt would be strong enough to resist the coercive measures of the European Concert,

weakened by the abstention of France and the rivalries of Britain and Russia. His expectations were rudely shattered. On Mehemet Ali's refusal to accept the terms offered to him the British fleet under Napier bombarded Beirut, and a revolt broke out in the Lebanon. Napier at the head of a Turkish force defeated Ibrahim, captured Acre, and forced Mehemet Ali by the threat of bombarding Alexandria to conclude a convention by which his power was limited to Egypt (November 27), the Governorship of which was to be hereditary in his family.

The defeat of her client completed the humiliation of France. Thiers wished to avenge her humiliation by a declaration of war against the Four Powers, but was dismissed by the King, sensible and pacific as always. His successors, Soult and Guizot, climbed down reluctantly, and France was readmitted to the Concert of Europe by the Five-Power Treaty of July 13, 1841, which merely confirmed the essential provisions of the Four-Power Treaty. Britain had secured the repudiation of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi by depending on French support, and had then obtained the defeat of Mehemet Ali by isolating France. In order to defeat Mehemet Ali and break up the *entente cordiale* Russia had renounced her exclusive protectorate of Turkey, but Nicholas was determined to recover this position, and thus the 1841 settlement contained in germ the causes of the Crimean War.

The Eastern crisis of 1839–41 exercised a decisive influence on the reign of Louis-Philippe. It destroyed the prestige of France in Europe and ruined the July monarchy in France. From 1834 onward Louis-Philippe had sought simultaneously to maintain the *entente* with Britain for the support of Liberalism in Europe and to win the alliance of the legitimist Powers in order to strengthen his throne. The Eastern crisis made the attainment of either aim more difficult than before. French public opinion was irritated against Britain, and although the *entente* was not broken off it became merely an understanding between the two Governments; and the concessions which Louis-Philippe had to make in order to maintain it at all contributed to the unpopularity of his Government. Metternich had already shown, when the proposal of a marriage between

the houses of Habsburg and Orléans was made in 1836, that he had no intention of making an alliance with France. Thiers' bellicose attitude during the Eastern crisis and the removal of the ashes of Napoleon from St Helena to Paris in 1840 caused a violent outburst of French Chauvinism, which provoked a corresponding outbreak across the Rhine and made Metternich less disposed than ever to conclude an alliance with France. Thiers, Metternich said, had done more in six weeks to alienate Germany from France than Napoleon in ten years of war and oppression. Although he realized the difficulties which stood in the way of his attainment of a stable alliance either with Britain or Austria, Louis-Philippe continued his efforts to reconstruct the British alliance, which the French suspected and disliked, and to establish an understanding with Austria, which suspected and detested France.

Louis-Philippe's first advance to Britain—the signature of a convention for the better suppression of the slave-trade—aroused such a storm of indignation in France that the convention was never ratified. Then in 1843 the arrest of a British subject, who combined the *rôles* of consul and missionary, and was accused of provoking opposition to the establishment of a French protectorate in Tahiti, led to another incident. To the disgust of France Louis-Philippe finally agreed to pay compensation. There were other colonial difficulties, notably the resumption and completion in 1847 of Charles X's conquest of Algeria, which aroused the jealousy of Britain, but the final blow to the precarious *entente* was due to events in Spain.

After the defeat of the Carlists the gulf between the moderates and the radicals widened rapidly. The Regent, Maria Christina, supported the moderates, while the successful General Espartero became the champion of the radicals. Maria Christina retired to France in 1840, and Espartero became Regent and virtual dictator. His dictatorship was short-lived, for in 1843 he was forced to take refuge in England. Maria Christina returned to Spain, Isabella was declared of age to govern for herself, and the moderates' triumph was completed in 1844 when reactionary changes were made in the constitution in order to bring it into line with the French

Constitution of 1830. In this, as in all other matters, France exercised a preponderant influence at Madrid.

The great question at Madrid was now the marriage of the Queen. Louis-Philippe was anxious to marry her to one of his sons, but knew that Britain would be hostile to the scheme, which would perpetuate French influence over Spain. He proposed, therefore, to marry Isabella's younger sister, Louisa, to his youngest son, the Duke of Montpensier. The most obvious candidates for Isabella's hand were her two cousins, the Dukes of Seville and Cadiz, neither of whom was likely to have children. Louis-Philippe hoped that the children of his son's marriage with Louisa would inherit the throne. But the scheme was transparent, and when he met Queen Victoria and Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, at Eu he had to promise that his son's marriage would be postponed until Isabella had given birth to more than one child. In exchange the British Government promised to give up its support of the candidature of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the cousin of the Prince Consort. But in July 1846 the Whigs came into office, and Lord Palmerston, the new Foreign Secretary, in ignorance of the Eu agreement mentioned Leopold as a possible candidate. At the same time Maria Christina, weary of Louis-Philippe's delay, pretended to favour the Coburg candidature, and in spite of his instructions Bulwer, the British Minister at Madrid, was busily intriguing in Leopold's favour. Louis-Philippe feared that he might be forestalled by the redoubtable Palmerston, and, regarding himself as freed from the Eu agreement by the revival of the Coburg candidature, he accepted Maria Christina's renewed offers. On October 10, 1846, the double marriage of Isabella to the Duke of Cadiz and Louisa to the Duke of Montpensier took place. Even after all allowances have been made Louis-Philippe's action was dishonourable; it was also a gross blunder, since it snapped the last link between France and Britain—the mutual confidence of the two Governments—and left the Orléans monarchy isolated in Europe when its overthrow was threatened by the trend of events at home.

The main reason for the failure of the Orléans monarchy was undoubtedly the unpopularity of its foreign policy. After the early success of its intervention in Belgium and a half-hearted

LOUIS BLANC
From a lithograph

intervention in Italy, which began and ended with the occupation of Ancona for a few years, the Orléans monarchy had met with nothing but humiliation abroad. Louis-Philippe was invariably pacific, and refused to follow a foreign policy which was acceptable to the mass of his people, who craved for the revival of the glories of the Napoleonic Empire. On more than one occasion, notably in the Eastern crisis of 1839–41, he allowed his Ministers to adopt a policy the logical outcome of which could only be war. When he realized that war with the Great Powers was imminent he hastily dismissed his Ministers and climbed down, thus at the same time offending the susceptibilities of his subjects and violating the practices of constitutional monarchy. Louis-Philippe's policy in these points was undoubtedly the right one, but he imposed it almost single-handed upon his subjects and even upon his Ministers.

France might have been content to purchase glory abroad at the price of absolutism at home, or might have acquiesced in a pacific foreign policy if the Government had granted liberty at home; the combination of a pacific foreign and reactionary domestic policy soon deprived the Orléans monarchy both of the respect and the affection of its subjects. Under the Constitution of 1830 the middle classes had a monopoly of political power, and the close restriction of the franchise led to corruption on a scale hardly less than in eighteenth-century England. Satisfied with the material prosperity which they enjoyed, they resisted any change in the constitution. The Chambers which they elected had no claim to be representative assemblies of the nation; the conflict of parties on matters of trifling importance demonstrated the futility of their discussions. The Chambers, the Ministers, the King himself, lost all touch with public opinion. The industrial revolution was now in full swing in France, and brought with it a dim forecast of the Marxian idea that the fundamental issues in society are economic, and that economics are the basis of politics. The workmen in the industrial centres came under the influence of the Socialist doctrines of Fourier, Saint-Simon, and above all Louis Blanc. Some went so far as to accept Proudhon's maxim "Property is theft"; all were discontented with the existing system and clamoured for a share in political power.

The extreme party, partly composed of Republicans and partly of Socialists, was an insignificant section in the Chambers. In 1847 it boldly appealed to the country and organized a series of political banquets to bring pressure to bear on the Government. Emboldened by success, the reformers arranged a great demonstration in Paris in February 1848, but were intimidated by the Government into cancelling the arrangement. The mob nevertheless assembled in the streets, and the National Guard betrayed its sympathies with the demand for reform. The evident weakness of the monarchy encouraged the Republican leaders to effect its overthrow. Louis-Philippe's dismissal of Guizot and other concessions came too late; he was forced to abdicate, and a provisional Government was formed, composed partly of the leaders of the opposition in the Chambers, partly of the Socialist leaders headed by Louis Blanc. A republic was proclaimed on February 24, and a National Assembly to be elected by all males over twenty-one years of age was summoned to draw up a new constitution.

From 1830 it was clear that the Orléans monarchy could be only a temporary expedient. The extension of the franchise or the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy might have conciliated its enemies and postponed its fall, but would have alienated its only supporters—the *bourgeois* capitalists. The ease of their success astonished the Republican leaders themselves. The Orléans monarchy was rotten at the core; it is truer to say that it collapsed than that it was overthrown.

The Republicans had achieved their aim: their Socialist allies now set about the transformation of the political into a Socialist revolution. A Government commission for the reorganization of labour was appointed, with Louis Blanc as president, which prepared ambitious plans for labour exchanges, national insurance, agricultural colonies, and a ten-hours working day. At the same time Louis Blanc's doctrine of the 'right to work'—*i.e.*, that every workman who demanded it should be employed and paid a reasonable wage—was put into practice in a way of which he himself disapproved. National workshops were established; 120,000 workmen from all parts of France hastened to Paris and demanded work. As no productive labour could be found for most of them, they were set to work on such jobs

as digging holes in the public parks and filling them in again.

When the National Assembly elected on the extended franchise met it showed at once that the provinces did not share the Socialism of Paris, by appointing a new provisional Government from which the Socialists were excluded. The Socialist leaders organized a revolt, which was crushed and they themselves exiled or imprisoned. The workshops, filled with a "rabble of paupers" (to quote Louis Blanc), had entirely failed to serve the purpose for which they had been instituted. They discredited Socialism, and the new Government abolished them as a danger to law and order. After a six-days war of the barricades in the streets of Paris the protest of the working classes against the end of Socialistic experiments was suppressed, chiefly owing to the energy and ability of General Cavaignac (June 24–28). The "June days" undermined the Second Republic, since the fear of Revolutionary excesses alarmed the propertied classes, while the repressive measures necessary to preserve order alienated from the Republic its most enthusiastic supporters.

CHAPTER IX

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTIONS

Section I: Revolution in Germany, Austria, and Hungary

THE French Revolution gave an impetus to the slowly gathering forces of Liberalism in Germany. Within a month every German ruler either granted a constitution or appointed a Liberal Ministry. Everywhere the abolition of feudal privileges, responsibility of Ministers, freedom of the Press, trial by jury, were demanded by the people and granted by rulers, powerless to resist and eager to preserve their thrones. Since there was no real opposition the Revolution in its early stages was bloodless; the half-mad King of Bavaria was the only sovereign who was forced to abdicate.

Even in the stronghold of reaction, the Austrian capital, the Liberals triumphed. Students' demonstrations led to a popular outbreak, and the troops joined the Revolutionaries. Metternich fled without an attempt at resistance, and his flight symbolized the fall of the old *régime*, not only in Germany, but in Europe. The feeble Emperor, Ferdinand I, who had succeeded Francis I (of Austria) in 1835, promised to grant a Liberal constitution and representative institutions, and authorized the formation of a National Guard on the French model.

Even the militarist and bureaucratic state of Prussia could not resist the new impulse. Frederick William IV, who had succeeded his father in 1840, had weakened its powers of resistance by his futile experiments with provincial diets and estates based on medieval models, which awakened his subjects' dormant aspirations toward self-government, but did nothing to satisfy them. The fall of Metternich convinced him of the futility of resistance to the widespread demand for the freedom of the Press and a Liberal constitution. The mob demanded further concessions, especially the establishment of

KOSSUTH
From an engraving

MAZZINI
From a photograph

subject races. The Slavs were bitterly hostile to the Magyars, and past experience made them dread the establishment of an independent Magyar state in which they would be included. Jellachich, the Ban, or Governor, of Croatia, proved an adroit leader of the Croat Nationalist movement. He stirred up the Croats and Serbs against the Magyars, and opened secret negotiations with the Imperial Court. On September 17 he invaded Hungary at the head of a Serbo-Croat army, and thus increased enormously the difficulty of a reconciliation between the Habsburgs and the Hungarian Nationalists. The Emperor had returned to Vienna in August, and war upon Hungary was declared on October 3. The immediate result was the outbreak on October 6 of a third revolt at Vienna, far more formidable than its predecessors. For the second time the Emperor fled from his capital, but the combined forces of Windischgrätz and Jellachich, whose invasion of Hungary had been repulsed, besieged Vienna. Jellachich defeated a Hungarian army, which Kossuth had sent to relieve his Viennese allies, and Vienna capitulated on October 31. The revolution in Austria itself was now at an end. Schwarzenberg, a resolute reactionary who soon gave proof of his outstanding ability, became chief Minister on November 24, and remained the real ruler of Austria until his death in 1852. The feeble-minded Emperor, Ferdinand I, abdicated, and was succeeded by his nephew Francis Joseph. The constitution was superseded and the Constituent Assembly dissolved in March 1849.

The first task of the restored Austrian bureaucracy was the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, which was entrusted to Windischgrätz, the conqueror of Prague and Vienna, who occupied Hungary and captured Pesth on January 5, 1849, almost without resistance. Görgei, the ablest of the Magyar commanders, was organizing his forces in the mountainous eastern districts, while Bem, a Polish refugee in command of Magyar troops, was occupied in crushing a formidable rebellion against the Magyar Government in Transylvania. Windischgrätz now sought to advance eastward from Pesth, but was defeated by Görgei in a series of engagements. Görgei was now able to take the offensive, divide Windischgrätz from

Jellachich, and sweep their armies out of Hungary. The Magyar triumph was marked by the deposition of the Habsburgs and declaration of national independence by the Magyar Parliament at Debreczen (April 14). Kossuth became head of the provisional Government, and openly displayed his Republican and democratic sympathies.

The numerical inferiority of the Hungarian armies, their lack of training, and, above all, the scarcity of ammunition and equipment made their triumph precarious. The magnitude of their early successes alarmed the Habsburgs and induced them to take the humiliating step of appealing to the Tsar for assistance against the rebels. Nicholas I had no hesitation in helping the Austrian monarchy, partly because he regarded himself as the champion of legitimacy and autocracy, but chiefly because he feared that the Hungarian revolution might stir up a fresh rebellion in Poland, especially as many Poles had served as volunteers in the Magyar armies.

Hungary was now invaded by Haynau and the reinforced Austrian army from the west, and by Jellachich and the Croats from the south, while the Russian army, 130,000 strong, crossed the Carpathians and took the Magyar armies in the rear. The evil division between supreme military and civil authority, always a source of weakness, was intensified by the personal jealousies of Kossuth and Görgei, while Kossuth's extremism alienated his more moderate supporters. Görgei showed great skill against overwhelming numbers, but defeat was unavoidable. The southern Magyar army was routed at Temesvar, and Görgei then capitulated to the Russians at Vilagos (August 13). The war was now over, but the Austrian general Haynau won fresh opprobrium by an orgy of military executions. Görgei, however, was spared, while Kossuth made good his escape, and lived on, a homeless wanderer, until 1894. Hungary was deprived of its ancient and cherished privileges, and became for a time a mere province of the Austrian Empire.

Section II: The Revolution in Italy

The Habsburg triumph was soon completed by the suppression of the Nationalist movement in Italy. The restoration of

the Austrian hegemony in Italy in 1815 brought with it not merely a brutal and repressive government of the Austrian provinces, but the re-establishment of the tyranny of the princes in the lesser and nominally independent states. Apart from the Neapolitan and Piedmontese rebellions of 1821, and a few sporadic outbreaks in 1830, the widespread discontent remained underground, but steadily gained in coherence and strength. In 1831 Mazzini, the prophet of the Italian Nationalist movement, founded at Marseilles the Society of Young Italy, which enrolled 60,000 members within two years. The execution of the Bandiera brothers, who had tried to raise a revolution in Calabria, and their followers symbolized the unity of Italy, since the martyrs for the cause of national unity came from Venice, Perugia, the Romagna, and Modena. Scholars and men of letters likewise contributed to the movement. Leopardi and Manzoni prepared the way for Gioberti, who published in 1843 a widely read work, the *Primacy of Italy*, in which he indicated the Papacy as the agent which might give Italy her rightful organization and place in Europe. As if in answer to his prophecy in 1846 Cardinal Mastai Ferretti was elected Pope and took the title of Pius IX. The new Pope was known to have Liberal leanings, and commenced his reign by declaring a general amnesty. The establishment of a council of State and other very moderate measures of reform followed and gave the Pope a tremendous but short-lived popularity. On all sides he was hailed as the destined liberator of Italy.

This outburst of enthusiasm for the Liberal Pope had immediate results in the other Italian states. Charles Albert, who had succeeded to the throne of Sardinia in 1831, but had since then shown no sign of the Liberal sympathies of his youth, was encouraged to draw up a constitution, the Statuto Fondamentale, which was issued on March 4, 1848. It established a Parliamentary monarchy on the British model, and, with a few alterations, became and remained until a few years ago the constitution of the kingdom of Italy. Leopold II of Tuscany, who had allowed many moderate reformers to take refuge at Florence, had already granted a constitution in February. But the chief effect of the advent of a Liberal Pope was felt

in the Two Sicilies, where the corrupt and brutal tyranny of Ferdinand II was suddenly overthrown. The Sicilians threw off the oppressive yoke of Naples, and in Naples itself a rising forced the King to grant a constitution (February 10, 1848).

Pius IX was alarmed by the extent and vehemence of the movement which his declaration of sympathy with the cause of Italy had awakened. He would gladly have drawn back, especially as the extremists in Rome were now coming to the front, but fear compelled him to continue in the course which he had begun. A Ministry composed of laymen was appointed and a constitution issued in March 1848, although the supreme power still remained with the College of Cardinals.

Hitherto the provinces in the military occupation of Austria had remained quiet, but the news of the first rising at Vienna on March 13 and the flight of Metternich gave the signal for revolt. Milan took the lead, and after days of fierce fighting expelled the Austrian garrison. Radetsky, the octogenarian Austrian general, withdrew his forces to the great quadrilateral of fortresses in Eastern Lombardy in order to keep open his communications with Austria. The provincial centres of Lombardy now joined in the rebellion, while Venice re-established the Republic of St Mark under the leadership of Daniele Manin.

Charles Albert now committed himself irrevocably to the national cause by declaring war upon Austria, and thus took the first step which was to lead to the unification of Italy under the house of Savoy. The Sardinian troops then entered Lombardy and pursued the retreating Austrians until Radetsky stood firm at Verona. The Liberals of the other states forced their princes to send troops to co-operate with Charles Albert. Tuscany and Naples sent contingents; Pius IX refused to participate in war against Austria, but his commander General Durando on his own initiative had already crossed the Po. When he realized that the national cause could only be won by military successes against Austria Pius IX went over finally to the reactionary camp; his popularity with Italian patriots vanished, and with it the prospect of a federation of Italian princes under the presidency of the Pope. The great refusal of Pius IX forced the Nationalist movement into other channels,

PIUS IX

From an engraving by W. J. Edwards

and thus gave the house of Savoy an opportunity which it was not slow to seize.

Unfortunately Charles Albert, although sincere in his devotion to the national cause, and brave even to heroism, lacked some of the essential qualities of leadership. He had no military training or capacity; he was incapable of decisive action, and deserves his nickname—"the Hamlet of Savoy." His position was indeed a difficult one. He knew that the other princes of Italy were jealous and would gladly betray him if they dared, while he distrusted equally the Nationalists, many of whom shared the Republican doctrines of Mazzini, and would, he feared, turn against him once the Austrians were expelled from Italy. Mazzini was already in Milan working for the establishment of a republic. Moreover, Charles Albert was a bigoted adherent of the Roman Catholic Church, and the changed attitude of the Papacy increased his uneasiness and his hesitations. Military considerations had a similar effect. The troops sent by the princes were not to be depended upon; the volunteers who flocked to his standard were brave but undisciplined; the core of Sardinian troops was small, and none of their generals was a match for Radetsky. Finally, Charles Albert hoped that the Austrian Government, in view of its embarrassments at home, might be persuaded to buy him off by the cession of Lombardy. The pursuit of the traditional policy of his house was the more attractive, because although the prospective gains were smaller so were the risks to be run.

Accordingly the actions of the Sardinian troops were dilatory in the extreme. It was more than two months after their invasion of Lombardy before they gained their one important success, the capture of the quadrilateral fortress of Peschiera. The capture of Prague and the lull between the second and third risings at Vienna enabled the Austrians to send reinforcements to Radetsky, who at once took the offensive and routed the Sardinians at Custozza on July 25. Milan, knowing that it would be the first to suffer, accused Charles Albert of treachery, and then capitulated to Radetsky without making any attempt to resist. Charles Albert retreated to Piedmont on August 8 and purchased an armistice by promising to

withdraw the assistance which he had sent to Venice. Shortly before the final collapse of the Sardinian armies Venice, Milan, Parma, and Modena had voted for union with the Sardinian kingdom. There had been no time to give effect to this vote, but it pointed out the way by which national unity was ultimately to be achieved.

The other rulers of the peninsula now showed themselves in their true colours. Ferdinand II took the lead. He prevented the Chamber of Deputies from meeting, recalled his troops from the Austrian war, and suspended the constitution. The Sicilians rose once again in rebellion and offered the crown to the second son of Charles Albert, but Messina was taken by storm and cruelly punished (September 1848). Palermo fell in May 1849, and Ferdinand's absolute rule was restored in both parts of his kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The apostasy of the Pope led inevitably to troubles in Rome. His moderate Prime Minister, Rossi, was murdered, and the Pope himself fled from Rome to the Neapolitan fortress of Gaeta (November 1848), whence he issued a series of futile protests against the actions of the Liberals. A constituent assembly now met at Rome, abolished the temporal power of the Pope, and, under the influence of Mazzini, who was a member of the assembly, established the Roman Republic. Shortly afterward the Pope was joined at Gaeta by Leopold of Tuscany, and a republic was proclaimed at Florence.

Meantime Charles Albert was negotiating with the Austrian Government, which insisted upon the restoration of the *status quo* in Italy without modification. The Parliament at Turin clamoured for the renewal of the war; and Genoa threatened to establish a republic if Charles Albert accepted the Austrian demands. Pressed hard by his subjects and encouraged by the temporary triumph of the Magyars and the gallant resistance of Venice, Charles Albert denounced the armistice. But Radetsky was too quick for him. The Austrians invaded Piedmont and crushed Charles Albert's forces at Novara (March 23, 1849). Humiliated by the ruin of his hopes, and believing that his son, Victor Emmanuel II, whose wife was an Austrian Archduchess, would be able to obtain better terms from the victorious Radetsky, Charles Albert abdicated.



GARIBALDI
From an engraving by W. Holl

CAVOUR

Victor Emmanuel had no option but to accept an armistice, reduce his army to a peace footing, and surrender the great fortress of Alessandria as a guarantee of his good behaviour until the conclusion of the definitive peace treaty, which was signed on August 6. The territorial *status quo* was restored, and a large war indemnity imposed upon Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel, whose acceptance of Radetsky's humiliating terms had made him unpopular among his subjects, won their respect by refusing to purchase a reduction of the indemnity by withdrawing the Sardinian constitution. Charles Albert's share in the events of 1848–49, and his son's steadfast support of constitutionalism, gave the half-foreign house of Savoy a claim upon the loyalty of all Italian patriots which it had not hitherto had. Before 1848 the Piedmontese had been only less hated than the Austrians among the peoples of Central and Southern Italy; henceforth the hopes of the Nationalists centred on annexation to Piedmont.

The defeat of Sardinia rendered the Liberal cause in the other Italian states hopeless. The Austrian army restored the absolute rule of Leopold in Tuscany, and occupied Parma, Bologna, and Ancona. France, unwilling to see Austria absolute mistress of Italy, forestalled an Austrian occupation of Rome by dispatching General Oudinot, who landed at Civitâ Vecchia and laid siege to Rome. Inspired by Mazzini and Garibaldi, the Roman Republic held out until July 3, 1849, when Oudinot entered the city and established a Government in the name of the Pope. Garibaldi and a handful of devoted followers escaped to the hills. Venice, under the inspiring leadership of Manin, resisted the Austrian assaults until bombardment, disease, and famine made further resistance impossible (August 24, 1849).

The Nationalist struggle in Italy during 1848–49 is the heroic story of the self-sacrificing devotion and nobility of a handful of patriots. Organization and unity of command were almost entirely lacking. Still more fatal to the cause was the absence of external support. Charles Albert's proud boast that Italy could work out her own salvation (*Italia farà da sè*) had been falsified by events. Cavour, a journalist who had played a prominent part in securing the Constitution of 1848, and who was soon to be called to the highest office in the

Sardinian State, had learned the lesson. The struggle of 1848–49 had not been in vain.

Section III: Failure of the German Nationalist Movement.

The preoccupation of Austria with formidable revolts in her non-German provinces had given the German Liberals a unique opportunity. The National Assembly (or Parliament) met in May 1848; it was representative chiefly of the middle class, and contained a large proportion of professors, lawyers, and authors. The Archduke John, a Liberal member of the house of Habsburg, was elected as the provisional administrator of Germany with the title of Imperial Vicar, and appointed a Ministry. Thus a central executive for the whole of Germany had been created. But the new Government and the central Parliament suffered from a fatal defect—they had no means of enforcing their decrees except by moral suasion. The armed forces at their disposal were insufficient to compel the obedience of the least of the princes, and this was the more serious because the mass of the German people was as yet hardly touched by the Nationalist aspirations of the intelligentzia, to whose enthusiasm the Parliament owed its establishment.

In imitation of the French Constituent Assembly the Parliament determined to draw up a declaration of the fundamental rights of the German people. This led inevitably to a split between the moderate majority and the extreme Democrats. After months of academic discussion and the expulsion of the democratic leaders the declaration was drawn up and published in December 1848; but by this time the force of the movement had spent itself, and the princes were recovering their courage. The Parliament now turned to the really fundamental problem of the relations between Austria and the proposed German federation. On this question also there were great differences of opinion. Gagern, the President of the Assembly, proposed to form two federations, the larger to include the whole Habsburg dominions and the smaller to exclude Austria. Finally, the majority decided to offer to include Austria's German provinces, but to exclude all her

non-German dominions. Schwarzenberg contemptuously rejected this offer and declared in favour of the restoration of the Confederation of 1815 (December 1848).

Schwarzenberg's obvious hostility did not deter the Parliament from completing its draft of the constitution, but it convinced many Liberals that their ends could be obtained only by enlisting the support of Prussia. Accordingly, after the Parliament had decided that Germany should be organized as a hereditary and constitutional empire, the throne was offered to Frederick William IV of Prussia, but a coalition of the Catholic South German party, always hostile to Prussia, with the remnants of the democratic party secured the tacking on to the offer of democratic conditions (*e.g.*, the Emperor was to have only a suspensive veto, and elections were to be by manhood suffrage), in the hope that these conditions would prevent Prussia's acceptance of the Imperial crown.

Frederick William found the offer, even on these conditions, tempting, but in the end he made up his mind to refuse, and there can be no doubt of the wisdom of his decision. To accept the crown would have meant in all probability war not only with Austria, but with the middle states of Germany, always jealous of Prussian aggrandizement. Other motives influenced Frederick William in the same direction. The Constituent Assembly which had met at Berlin on May 22 soon came into conflict with the monarchy, and there was a renewal of the rioting on a still larger scale. The excesses of the mob completely alienated the King, and the fall of Vienna on October 31 encouraged him to take resolute measures. He appointed a reactionary Ministry at the beginning of November, headed by an illegitimate son of Frederick William II, Count Brandenburg. Loyal troops restored order in the capital; the Assembly, which had proved the focus of disorder, was dissolved on December 5; and reactionary changes were made in the constitution.

Frederick William, flushed with triumph over the revolution at home, was little inclined to accept the offer of the Imperial crown from the revolutionaries assembled at Frankfurt. He now leaned more and more on the reactionary Junker party which had restored his authority, and the whole weight of its

influence was exerted to persuade the King to reject the offer. The Junkers advocated a close alliance with Austria and Russia for the suppression of Liberalism in Germany, and feared that the attainment of German unity would merge Prussia in a Liberal empire and destroy the bureaucratic and military system which had made Prussia what she was. The influence of the Tsar was also exerted to induce the Prussian King, as Bismarck put it later, not to pick up the Imperial crown from the gutter.

Prussia's refusal of the Imperial crown and the withdrawal of the Austrian delegates were fatal blows to the Parliament. Although twenty-eight of the lesser states accepted the new constitution of the Empire, the important states held aloof. On May 4 the Prussian delegates withdrew from the Assembly, leaving the Democrats to their own devices. The attempts of the Rump to stir up open rebellion were easily suppressed, and, after it had transferred its sessions to Stuttgart, the Assembly was dissolved by the Württemberg Government. Although the Parliament came to an inglorious end its brighter days were remembered by patriotic Germans and gave an impulse to the attainment of national unity. The Liberal constitution which it had drafted disappeared with the Parliament and was discredited by its failure, but its influence can be traced upon the present German constitution. The political inexperience of the leaders, the lack of organization of their party, and the fact that the lower classes were as yet hardly influenced by Liberalism caused the failure of the romantic and sentimental movement of 1848.

Since Austria's attention was still focused on Hungary and Italy the task of restoring order in Germany was assumed by Prussia, whose troops crushed revolutions in Saxony, Baden, the Rhenish Palatinate, and elsewhere. Frederick William now saw his way to obtain with the consent of the princes the Imperial crown, which he would not accept from revolutionaries. He laid before them in May 1849 his scheme for a federation exclusive of Austria, and obtained the consent of Hanover, Saxony, and the lesser North German states. Although Hanover and Saxony soon deserted him Frederick William persisted in his intention, made a bid for Liberal

support by the issue of a new constitution for Prussia, and summoned a second German Parliament, which met at Erfurt in March 1850, but was attended merely by representatives of Prussia and her small North German satellites.

Schwarzenberg, to gain time, had consented in the autumn of 1849 to an arrangement for the provisional administration of Germany jointly by Austria and Prussia. The end of the Hungarian and Italian revolutions left him free to act in Germany. He had never wavered in his determination to restore the Confederation of 1815, and with it the hegemony of Austria. He could count on the alliance of the Tsar and on the military support of the four kingdoms of Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg. As a counterblast to the Erfurt Parliament he summoned to Frankfurt the old Diet of the Confederation, representing merely the princes. Prussia and her satellites, being already in conference at Erfurt, refused to attend. A revolution now broke out in Hesse-Cassel, which was a member of the Erfurt Union. The Elector, whose misrule was responsible for the outbreak, appealed to the Diet, which at once sent an army to suppress the revolution. This attack upon a member of the Erfurt Union would have led to an Austro-Prussian war had Frederick William not given way, partly because of his chronic indecision, but chiefly owing to the growing ascendancy over him of the reactionary Kreuz Zeitung party (so called from the name of the newspaper in which its views were set forth), which advocated a close alliance with the Austrian and Russian Emperors against revolution. By the Convention of Olmütz (November 29, 1850) Frederick William IV abandoned the Erfurt Union, recognized the right of the Diet to restore order in Hesse-Cassel, and promised to demobilize his forces. The humiliation of Prussia at Olmütz was hardly less than at Jena.

The final settlement of the affairs of Germany took place at a conference of the princes, which met at Dresden in December 1850 and restored the Confederation of 1815. That Prussia's position was much stronger than it appeared was shown when Schwarzenberg tried at Dresden to exploit his victory over Prussia by breaking up the Prussian Customs Union and securing the inclusion of all the Habsburg territories in the restored

Confederation. The Tsar and the middle states at once rallied to the Prussian opposition on these questions, because they were intent on preserving some kind of balance between Austria and Prussia. And Prussia's betrayal of the national cause was atoned for, to some extent, by Frederick William's refusal to repudiate the Prussian Constitution of 1850. Francis Joseph celebrated his victory over the revolution by abolishing the Austrian constitution on January 1, 1852. Schwarzenberg had successfully restored the tottering throne of the Habsburgs and laid down the line of policy which was followed for nearly twenty years—rigid centralization and the ruthless repression of the national aspirations of her subject peoples. His death in April 1852 destroyed any chances of success which his policy may have had; the blundering efforts of his successors to carry it out speedily involved Austria in disaster.

CHAPTER X

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND EMPIRE AND THE CRIMEAN WAR

Section I: The Second Empire

BEFORE the restoration of the old order in Germany the French Revolution, which had such widespread results in Europe, had also been mastered by the forces of reaction. The suppression of the Socialist revolt in June 1848 left the National Assembly free to go on with the work of constitution-making. There was unanimous agreement that the head of the executive should be a President, while the legislative power was given to a single chamber elected by manhood suffrage. It was also generally agreed that the President should be subordinated to the Chamber, but the constitution provided no legal method of securing this principle in practice. After considerable discussion the National Assembly decided that the President should be elected by manhood suffrage, should hold office for four years, and be ineligible for re-election. The presidential election took place in December. Cavaignac, who had suppressed the Socialist rising, received a million and a half votes, and the other candidates, all of whom had been prominent in the early days of the Revolution, received practically no support. The successful candidate was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, son of the King of Holland and head of the house of Bonaparte, who received nearly five and a half million votes.

The new President was a man of many parts. In his youth he had been a Carbonarist conspirator, and had taken part in the futile rising of 1830 in Italy. During the year of revolutions he had acted as a special constable, and had been on duty when Chartism fizzled out on Kennington Common. Between these episodes he had made two futile attempts to raise the Bonapartist standard in France—at Strasburg in 1836 and at Boulogne

in 1840. But the removal of Napoleon's ashes to Paris and the widely read historical works of Thiers and others had created a cult of Napoleon worship in France. Personally the new President was little known; his greatest assets were his name and his capacity for saying little and looking wise. The upper and middle classes hoped his rule would be strong enough to protect their property; all France believed that Napoleon's nephew would revive the military glory and diplomatic prestige of France, sadly tarnished since the days of the Empire.

In spite of his oath as President to protect the new constitution of France, Louis Napoleon set himself from the beginning to usurp the supreme power, and was helped by the wave of reaction which swept over France, as elsewhere in Europe, in 1849. The elections to the first Legislative Assembly gave the clerical and royalist parties—collectively called the "party of order"—a large majority (May 1849). President and Assembly combined to suppress a Republican rising in Paris, to restore the Press censorship, and to restrict the franchise to citizens who had resided in the same place for three years, thus excluding the floating industrial population, and reducing the number of voters by nearly three millions (May 1850).

But gradually, as Louis Napoleon's schemes became known, signs of conflict between the President and the Chamber became manifest. At first—like his uncle before him—he hoped to obtain a prolongation of his power with the consent of the Assembly, but failed to obtain the three-quarters majority in the Assembly which was required to carry any change in the constitution (July 1851). Various ways of attaining his ends were proposed and discussed by the clique of conspirators around the new President. In the end he determined to pose as the champion of democracy and demanded the repeal of the Act restricting the franchise. When the Assembly refused he felt strong enough to carry out the *coup d'état* which had been long discussed by the conspirators. On the night of December 2, 1851, the leading Republicans were arrested and proclamations posted throughout Paris announcing the dissolution of the Assembly and the summoning of a new Assembly to be elected by manhood suffrage. In an appeal to the people he announced that a new constitution with a provision for the

prolongation of his tenure of the office of President would be submitted to their direct vote. "If you think," he wrote, "that the cause of which my name is the symbol—that is, France regenerated by the Revolution and organized by the Empire—is also yours, proclaim it to the world by granting me the powers that I ask for." The preparations of the President to suppress all opposition proved adequate, although there was a good deal of disorder and bloodshed in Paris. The new constitution was speedily submitted to the electors and approved by an overwhelming majority (7,500,000 for, 640,000 against). It was based on the constitution adopted by the first Napoleon after the *coup d'état* of Brumaire. It extended the presidential tenure of office to ten years, and gave the President the right to nominate not only the Ministers and a conservative senate, but the Council of State which was to prepare the laws. The only democratic feature of the constitution was the Legislative Assembly, which was to be elected by manhood suffrage and was to approve the laws and the budget.

Louis Napoleon had now the substance of power, but this did not content him. On December 2, 1852, the anniversary of the *coup d'état* of the previous year, he assumed the title of Emperor after another plebiscite had declared, by an even greater majority than before, in favour of the restoration of the Empire. Although the Duke of Reichstadt, Napoleon I's son, had never reigned, the Bonapartists regarded him as Napoleon II *de jure*, and the new Emperor became Napoleon III.

Attempts have been made to show that the usurpation of power by the new Emperor had saved France not only from the "red peril," but from the unending strife between the supporters of the houses of Bourbon and Orléans, which had threatened to rend France. The enormous majorities in his favour in successive plebiscites prove that the Emperor and the new *régime* were genuinely popular, although official pressure was not absent and doubtless increased the majorities. His protestations of loyalty to France and her people were no doubt sincere, but his guiding motive throughout was personal ambition, and he had won possession of the supreme power in the State by a combination of hypocrisy and intrigue, which left their mark upon his character and policy.

From the beginning of his reign he realized the instability of his position. The fate of Louis-Philippe warned him that it was impossible to pursue a policy of reaction at home and peace abroad. He feared that the popularly elected Legislative Assembly would prove a serious rival, and yet he dared not abolish manhood suffrage. He set himself, therefore, to control the Assembly by various underhand methods. Opponents of the Government were deprived of their votes on the ground that they were guilty of political offences. Constituencies were arranged so as to swamp the radical vote in industrial areas by attaching to them the more conservative country districts around them. The local prefects and mayors were all appointed by the Emperor, and they were ordered to use their powers to secure the return of "official candidates." Napoleon III inherited his uncle's distaste and fear of all criticism. Not content with gagging the Assembly, he sought to gag public opinion. Education from the primary school to the university was carefully supervised by the Government. A strict censorship of newspapers and books was enforced, and the right of public meeting virtually abolished.

In the hope of reconciling France to the loss of her liberty Napoleon revived the Court on the gorgeous scale established by the first Napoleon. Failing to obtain a marriage alliance with one of the legitimate sovereigns, he made a virtue of necessity and proclaimed his democratic inclinations by marrying (in 1853) a subject—Eugénie de Montijo, Countess of Teba, the daughter of one of Napoleon I's colonels. She was a woman of great charm but little intellect or strength of character, and her frivolous gaiety increased still further the lavish expenditure of the Court. Balls and receptions at Court followed each other in rapid succession, and soon Paris became the pleasure-centre of Europe; the capital was largely rebuilt under the superintendence of the Préfet Haussmann—whose name is commemorated in the Boulevard Haussmann. The narrow lanes round the Hôtel de Ville were pulled down to make way for broad thoroughfares, and thus the amenity of the city was improved and the danger of a riot becoming a revolution by the erection of barricades, which turned the narrow and tortuous lanes into fortresses, was greatly reduced.

NAPOLEON III

From the painting at Farnborough

Some attention was now paid to the safeguarding of the public health by adequate water and drainage systems. In spite of all that he did for her Paris was not reconciled to his rule.

Section II: The Crimean War

More successful was the Emperor's attempt to conciliate opposition by the adoption of a vigorous foreign policy. Although he had pronounced at Bordeaux his best-known epigram, *L'empire c'est la paix*, Europe believed that he would adopt a bellicose policy. The British Press feared that his first attack would be directed against Britain, and roused the anti-French feeling of the country to a great height, but when war did break out Britain and France found themselves, somewhat to their own surprise, on the same side. This transformation was the result of the revival of the Eastern question in an acute form, owing to the unprovoked aggression of Russia upon Turkey. Since the end of the crisis of 1839–41 Russia had made no direct attempt either to make territorial gains or to restore the protectorate given to her by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But that she had not abandoned these ambitions was proved by the proposals made by the Tsar to Lord Aberdeen during his visit to London in 1844. The Turk, the Tsar said, was a "sick man," and it would be well if his heirs agreed in advance to a division of his property. Britain might have Egypt and Crete; the Tsar meant to have Constantinople. The British Government unhesitatingly rejected these proposals. To call the Turk a sick man Palmerston said was "pure and unadulterated nonsense," and the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire remained the guiding-line of Britain's policy in the Near East.

In spite of Palmerston's declarations there could be no doubt that the Turkish Empire was slowly disintegrating. The janissaries had been massacred, and the attempts of the Sultan to establish in their place an army equipped and organized on European lines had attained very imperfect success. The Turkish administration, always weak, became steadily less efficient and more corrupt. The subject races were becoming more and more politically self-conscious. The Greeks had

already established their independence; Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia had recently secured a considerable amount of self-government, and the wild tribesmen of Montenegro still maintained their virtual independence. Even in Bulgaria and Macedonia, as yet politically unawakened, the orthodox religion of most of the inhabitants marked them off from their Mohammedan governors and made them look for protection to the Tsar, who was the recognized head of their Church. Conscious of their actual weakness and of the potential strength of their subjects, the Turks became alarmed and resorted, more frequently and on a larger scale, to the wholesale massacres which had always been recognized in Turkey as a necessary instrument of government.

The freeing of these subject nationalities was a worthy aim, but Nicholas used it to cloak his imperialistic ambitions. This antagonized the Western Powers, which, in spite of their Foreign Office traditions, had already shown their sympathy with oppressed Balkan races by sharing in the liberation of Greece, and also the reactionary Government of Austria, which was as afraid of the influence of Balkan Nationalism upon her own subject peoples as she was hostile to Russia's territorial aggrandizement in the Balkans. In January 1853, when the Tsar in a conversation with Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at St Petersburg, renewed his overtures of 1844 for a partition of the Ottoman Empire to the exclusion of France, his offers were again refused.

The renewal of the Russian offers was partly due to the revival of an old dispute between the Greek and the Roman Catholic clergy over the management of the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Since the time of the Crusades France had been considered as the protector of the Christians in the Holy Land, but the expansion of the Russian Empire and the Tsar's headship of the Greek Church had weakened her position. Thus the question of the Holy Places did not merely raise religious fanaticism among the Christians of Palestine, but brought France and Russia into acute conflict.

The Tsar, in spite of Britain's rejection of his overtures, believed that the hostility of public opinion in Britain to the French Emperor would prevent Franco-British co-operation.

He thought that Austria, out of gratitude for his help in suppressing the Hungarian rebellion in 1849, would at least remain neutral. Prussia, humiliated at Olmütz and still under the vacillating rule of Frederick William IV, had ceased to count as a Great Power. The Tsar therefore determined to use the question of the Holy Places to recover his protectorate over the Sultan. A special agent of exalted rank, Prince Menschikov, was sent to Constantinople early in 1853 ostensibly to demand concessions for the Greek Christians in Palestine. The Porte under the influence of Stratford Canning (later Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), the British Ambassador, granted these demands. Menschikov then revealed the real object of his mission by demanding that the Sultan should sign a treaty with Russia and recognize that Russia had the right to protect all his Christian subjects. This would have given Russia a permanent right of intervention in the domestic affairs of Turkey. Advised by the Western Powers, Abdul Medjid offered to confirm the existing privileges of his Christian subjects by charter, but not by treaty. Menschikov then left Constantinople, and a few days later a Russian army occupied Moldavia and Wallachia (June 1853). Since Russia held a special position in the Danubian principalities her action was not an act of war, but it brought war appreciably nearer, and a conference of the Powers at Vienna failed to avert it by finding a formula which would safeguard the Christian subjects of the Porte without admitting the Russian right of intervention.

Turkey declared war at the beginning of October, and at the end of November her Black Sea fleet was practically annihilated by the Russian squadron at Sinope. Britain and France had already sent their fleets through the Dardanelles to protect Constantinople and quite unjustifiably regarded the "massacre of Sinope" as an insult to themselves. The anti-French feeling evoked in Britain by the newspaper campaign against Napoleon died down as suddenly as it had arisen. The popular clamour was now for war with Russia. The drifting policy of Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, did nothing to avert war, and the popular demand found in Palmerston a redoubtable champion in the Cabinet. In France Napoleon seized the opportunity to engage France in a great war, which

he hoped would firmly establish his dynasty in France by conciliating the clerical party, which was keenly interested in the question of the Holy Places, and satisfying the national craving for victory and glory. France and Britain concluded an alliance with Turkey and declared war on Russia in March 1854.

The first object of the Allies was to secure the evacuation of the Danubian principalities, and in this they had the cordial support of Austria. The stubborn defence of Silistria by the Turks foiled the Russian plan of a march across the Balkan mountains to threaten Constantinople, and the Russian troops were withdrawn from the principalities, which were immediately occupied by Austrian troops on behalf of Turkey.

The Franco-British troops had arrived too late to take any part in the Danubian campaign. After some hesitation they were sent to the Crimea and ordered to capture the important Russian naval station of Sebastopol. The home Governments thought that sea-power would make the task relatively easy. In September 1854 the Allied troops landed near Sebastopol and advanced on the city. The Russians were defeated in a pitched battle on the river Alma, but the Allied generals were so dilatory that the Russian commander, Todleben, was able to make elaborate preparations for the defence of the city. The siege lasted for a year, but supplies and reinforcements were never completely cut off from the besieged city, and the Russian field army constantly threatened the besiegers. The sinking of some Russian ships in the mouth of Sebastopol harbour prevented the Allied fleets from effectively bombarding the city. During the war no real use was made in the Black Sea or in the Baltic of the overwhelming naval superiority of the Allies.

The military superiority of the Allies in the Crimea was also unquestionable, and was demonstrated by the defeats of the Russian field army at Balaclava and Inkerman when it attempted to force the Allies to raise the siege. But the incapacity of their commanders and the defective organization and commissariat of their armies, intensified by the severe winter and the outbreak of cholera, almost led to the abandonment of the siege. The sufferings of the troops beggar description, but were relieved by the heroism and devotion of Florence Nightingale and her volunteer nurses.

While the opposing armies watched each other's miseries through the dread months of winter the diplomatists met at Vienna in March 1855 and tried to arrange peace. The death of Tsar Nicholas, hastened by the defeats of his armies in 1854, and the accession of Alexander II (March 1855) gave the negotiations a chance of success. The Allies demanded Russia's acceptance of four points, which had been agreed upon by the Allies and Austria at the end of 1854: (i) Russia must give up her protectorate of the Danubian principalities; (ii) the navigation of the Danube was to be free; (iii) the Treaty of July 13, 1841, was to be revised so as to bring Turkey more completely into "the European equilibrium" and to destroy the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; (iv) Russia was to renounce her claim to exclusive patronage of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Russia accepted these terms as a basis of negotiation, but in the end negotiations, which were conducted by a conference at Vienna (March to May 1855), broke down on the third and fourth points.

The failure of the Vienna Conference compelled the Allies, who had slackened their efforts, to continue the war. The great assault planned for June 18 was a costly failure. After a prolonged and heavy bombardment the French stormed the Malakov, but the British failed to establish themselves in the Redan. The Malakov, however, commanded the city, and the Russian garrison marched out and joined Menschikov's forces (September 8).

The fall of Sebastopol was in no way decisive, as Menschikov now occupied a strong position to the north of the harbour and resisted Allied assaults. But both sides were weary of the struggle; the Allies were satisfied with their conquest of Sebastopol, while the injured vanity of Russia was solaced by the success of her Asiatic army in taking the great fortress of Kars from the Turks. An armistice was arranged, and a peace congress was summoned to meet at Paris.

Although the object of the Congress was to effect a settlement of the Eastern question the Powers took the opportunity to discuss other questions of European interest. On the proposal of the British delegate, Lord Clarendon, the Powers incorporated in the protocols of the Conference the suggestion

that before going to war States should have recourse to the good offices of a friendly Power. This 'wish' of the Congress, although appealed to on several occasions, was never put into force, but it marks a step in the creation of the present elaborate system of international arbitration for avoiding war.

More important were the discussions on maritime law, and in particular on the use to be made of sea-power in time of war, which were incorporated in a separate treaty, the Declaration of Paris. Privateering was abolished. Enemy goods, excepting "contraband of war," were not to be seized on a neutral vessel. Neutral goods, with the same exception, were not liable to seizure on an enemy vessel. Blockades to be binding must be effective—*i.e.*, must be maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the blockaded coast. Paper blockades, such as had been declared during the Napoleonic wars, became illegal. These clauses were intended not merely to humanize naval war, but to strike a blow at Britain's interference with neutral trade in time of war. No attempt was made to define contraband of war, and this was a great advantage to Britain.

The Treaty of Paris, which was signed on March 30, incorporated the four points which had been adopted as the Allied programme in 1854. Russia gave up her exclusive protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia. These provinces and also Serbia were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte, but their rights of self-government were guaranteed by the Powers. To secure the free navigation of the Danube an international commission was appointed, and Russia ceded a strip of Bessarabia; in all other respects the territorial *status quo* was restored. The Black Sea was neutralized, which meant that no warship was to appear there and that no arsenals were to be maintained on its shores. The Treaty of July 13, 1841, sometimes called the Convention of the Straits, was expressly confirmed, so that in case of a future Russo-Turkish war the Allied fleets could pass the Dardanelles and attack the defenceless coasts of Russia. The Tsar further abandoned the claim to a protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Porte, the real cause of the outbreak of war.

But the hopes of the Allies did not centre so much on the checking of Russian aggression by the paper provisions of the

treaty as on the regeneration of Turkey. The Sultan had already issued a *firman* guaranteeing the existing privileges of his Christian subjects and enacting a code of liberal reforms for the benefit of all his subjects "without distinction of religion or of race." The independence of the Porte was therefore affirmed, and all the Powers disclaimed any intention of interfering between the Sultan and his subjects. Moreover, for the first time, Turkey was admitted to the Concert of Europe, and its integrity was guaranteed by the Powers. But the hopes of the Western Powers were doomed to disappointment, as practically nothing was done to give effect to the Sultan's promises. The gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was hastened rather than checked.

Turkish rule in Moldavia and Wallachia, both provinces being inhabited by Rumanes with a large admixture of Jews, had long been little more than nominal, and the guarantee of their privileges by the Treaty of Paris encouraged them to assert themselves. The Powers had refused their plea for union, and decreed that each province should be ruled by elected *hospodars* (or princes) and should pay tribute to the Porte. In 1858 both provinces elected as their *hospodar* a Moldavian nobleman, Alexander Cuza. The new ruler took the title of Prince of Rumania and united the two provincial Parliaments. France and Russia had begun to come together during the peace congress at Paris, and now co-operated to secure the union. Europe recognized the accomplished fact.

The new ruler in a reign of seven years transformed the principality. He transferred to secular uses the greater part of the lands of the monasteries. Then, after dissolving the Conservative Parliament and appealing to the support of his people, he freed the peasants from the 'feudal' burdens and established a general system of peasant proprietorships. Finally he proclaimed the establishment of free compulsory education. These radical measures alienated the clergy and nobles, whose privileges he had destroyed, as well as the towns, which disliked his favouritism of the agricultural interest. He was compelled to abdicate in 1866, and was succeeded by Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a member of a Catholic branch of the house of Hohenzollern.

CHAPTER XI

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY

THE suppression of the Liberal and National movements of 1848 could not be permanent. In 1850 the prospect seemed dark, but within twenty years Nationalism was to triumph in Italy and in Germany, while Hungary obtained recognition of her national status within the Habsburg Empire. The union of Italy and Germany was attained not by the methods of the Liberal leaders of 1848–49, but by an astute combination of diplomacy and force on the part of two states, whose rulers' dynastic interests coincided with the national ambitions of the Italian and German peoples. Victory in 1848 would have established Liberalism as well as Nationalism; its failure in 1848 went far to discredit Liberalism and reduce its influence alike in Italy, Germany, and Hungary when national unity was attained.

The part Charles Albert had played in the events of 1848–49 and the policy of Victor Emmanuel from the moment of his accession gave Piedmont the leadership of the movement for national unity in Italy. Not content to maintain the Constitution of 1848, Victor Emmanuel introduced administrative reforms. In 1850 he abolished the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church in such cases as sacrilege and heresy; and in 1852 he called to the office of Chief Minister Count Camillo Cavour, who was destined to be the architect of Italian unity.

Cavour was of noble birth, but adopted Liberal opinions at an early age. He had travelled widely, chiefly in Britain and France, and studied the working of Parliamentary institutions with sympathy and insight. His work as a journalist gave him valuable experience, for he learned to appreciate the importance of the Press, and the use which can be made of it to influence public opinion. His membership of the Sardinian

Parliament gave him an opportunity to display his encyclopædic knowledge of the politics of Europe, and inspired his fellow-members with confidence in his judgment. Men who remained unmoved by the impassioned prophecies of Mazzini listened with respect and conviction to his pronouncement that the historic mission of Sardinia was to absorb the living forces of Italy, and to lead her to the high destiny to which she was called.

Cavour's grasp of the European situation enabled him to realize more clearly than his contemporaries the difficulties which stood in the way of Italian unity, and to devise the methods by which they might be overcome. His conviction that foreign assistance was necessary marks him off from the Mazzini school of patriots, to whom the union of Italy was a religion. The enthusiasm and violence of Mazzini and his friends seemed to Cavour to endanger the attainment of national unity by alarming the States whose support he considered essential for success. Mazzini, on the other hand, denounced Cavour's use of an unscrupulous diplomacy, which in his view debased the national cause from an idealistic crusade to a huckster's bargaining. Cavour's early successes, therefore, did nothing to conciliate Mazzini, who suspected both his honesty and his devotion to democratic ideals, although Cavour's first act had been the dissolution of the monasteries and the abolition of some clerical privileges. Mazzini's best work—his share in arousing a consciousness of nationality among the dismembered provinces of Italy—was already done; the future lay with Cavour.

The Crimean War gave Cavour his opportunity to place the Italian question before Europe. Sardinia had no interest in the struggle, and Cavour's intervention on the side of the Western Powers was bitterly opposed at Turin, partly on this ground, and partly because of the folly of arousing Russian enmity. Nevertheless by the Treaty of Turin (January 10, 1855) Sardinia joined Britain and France and sent an army to the Crimea, where the Piedmontese troops fought with conspicuous bravery and wiped out the humiliating defeats of Custozza and Novara. They were inspired by the hope that their sacrifices would give unity to Italy. "Out of the mud

of the trenches before Sebastopol," as a Piedmontese soldier said, "Italy will be made." Cavour's main object in intervening in the war was attained when Sardinia took her place as one of the Powers at the Congress of Paris. He failed, however, to make any of the tangible gains for which he had hoped, but thanks to the support of Britain and France the misgovernment of Italy was brought formally before the Congress. Cavour's most important gains were made not at the actual Congress, but in confidential conversations with Palmerston and Napoleon III. Palmerston informed him that he could "say to the Emperor that for every step he might be ready to take in Italian affairs he would probably find us ready to take one and a half." The taciturn Emperor listened in silence, but when Cavour took leave of him at the end of the Congress he remarked: "I have a presentiment that the peace will not last long."

Thus encouraged, Sardinia posed more openly than before as the champion of Italy against Austrian domination. A national subscription was raised, largely from Austria's own provinces in Italy, for the repair of the fortifications of Alessandria. Austria's indignation led her to break off diplomatic relations with Sardinia in 1857; and, as Sardinia was clearly no match for Austria, Cavour redoubled his efforts to secure the active co-operation of the French Emperor. Napoleon's youthful connexion with the Carbonarist intrigues, the memory of his uncle's achievements in Italy, the genuine sympathy which he felt with the doctrine of nationality, the geographical position of Italy, which made it the most suitable field for a French war of aggression, all influenced Napoleon toward intervention in Italy. On the other hand, he feared to alienate the clerical party in France by acting against Pope Pius IX, who was now a staunch reactionary.

In January 1858 an Italian fanatic named Orsini, in the belief that the Emperor had betrayed the cause of Italy, organized a plot to assassinate him. The Emperor escaped, but there was a violent outcry in France at England's granting a refuge to revolutionaries and conspirators, whose plots were a danger to established Governments. A violent Franco-British quarrel followed, and Palmerston's Government had to

resign. The Tory Government which now came into office openly sympathized with Austria.

Orsini's plot destroyed Cavour's last hope of active British support; but, by convincing Napoleon that his life was in danger until he had made manifest his loyalty to the cause of Italy, it secured in the end the intervention of France. In July 1858 Cavour, at the Emperor's invitation, met him at Plombières, a summer resort in the Vosges. The two conspirators agreed that if Cavour provided a good pretext for war against Austria Napoleon would support Sardinia. The Austrians were to be expelled from their Italian provinces. Lombardy and Venetia were to be annexed to the Sardinian kingdom, which would then be joined in a confederation with the other Italian states under the presidency of the Pope. Napoleon hoped that this would enable him at one and the same time to gratify the strong clerical party in France and give to France the glory for which she craved. Moreover, as the price of his assistance he demanded the cession of Savoy, the original possession of the Sardinian royal house, and Nice, the birthplace of Garibaldi. These acquisitions would bring France a step nearer to her 'natural frontiers' and overthrow in an important point the hated treaties of 1815. The arrangements at Plombières were confirmed by a secret treaty in December 1858, which also stipulated that France would send 200,000 men to fight in Sardinia's 'defensive' war against Austria.

It was an essential part of the plans of the conspirators that Austria should appear to be the aggressor. Napoleon, although his irresolution was at times manifest, played his part well. He informed the Austrian Ambassador at his Court on New Year's Day 1859 that he regretted that his relations with the Austrian Empire were not so good as they had formerly been. Austria, since there was no evident reason for Napoleon's remark, naturally became suspicious, and her suspicions were increased when Victor Emmanuel opened the session of his Parliament with a more than usually provocative speech. Suspicion became certainty when the Franco-Sardinian alliance was drawn closer by the marriage of Napoleon's cousin, the Prince Napoleon, to a daughter of the King of

Sardinia (January 30), and by the appearance of a pamphlet, entitled *Napoleon III and Italy* and obviously inspired by the Emperor, advocating the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy and the formation of an Italian federation. Both sides then began to mobilize.

Britain and Russia now tried to avert the impending war by arranging for the settlement of the dispute by a congress, and Napoleon's instability of purpose led him to regard the proposal not unfavourably. Cavour was in despair and contemplated suicide, when Austria defeated the efforts of her friends by dispatching to Turin a haughty ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sardinia within three days. Austria's motives for an act which placed her in the wrong in the eyes of Europe and gave Sardinia the certainty of French support have been hotly disputed. Probably the policy of pin-pricks which Cavour had pursued since 1852 had ended by infuriating the Austrian Government and blinding it to all prudential considerations, while the comparative ease with which the Italian wars of 1848-49 had been ended led it to minimize the danger and expect an easy success.

Austria's action might have been sound had she at once attacked the Sardinian forces and crushed them before their junction with the French. The incompetence of the Austrian commanders let slip this opportunity, and the Franco-Sardinian army took the offensive. The brunt of the fighting fell on the French, who were commanded by the Emperor in person, but "the hunters of the Alps," a body of volunteers raised from the bravest and most enthusiastic Italian patriots and commanded by Garibaldi, did good service by harassing the Austrian right wing among the foot-hills of the Alps. The Austrians, unlike Radetsky in 1848, decided to defend the Milanese, but were defeated at Magenta (June 4) and forced to retire upon the Quadrilateral. On June 24 a prolonged encounter took place at Solferino. With the notable exception of Benedek, the commander of the Austrian right wing, no reputations for generalship were made, but the superior fighting-power of the French troops enabled them to win a victory in spite of the obstinate resistance of the Austrians. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

The success of the Allies had immediate results throughout the peninsula, and especially in the neighbouring provinces. Tuscany, Parma, and Modena declared for annexation to Sardinia; the papal troops were expelled from Romagna and the Legations. Victor Emmanuel gave no answer to the request for annexation, but sent commissioners to administer the principalities.

The Austrian hold on Italy seemed to be doomed, when the Italian patriots heard with dismay and Europe with astonishment that Napoleon had concluded the preliminaries of Villafranca with the Austrian Emperor (July 12). Lombardy was ceded to Napoleon to be handed over to Sardinia. Austria was to retain Venetia and the Quadrilateral, and the old rulers were to be restored in Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. Under the titular presidency of the Pope an Italian federation, including the Italian provinces of Austria, was to be formed.

The key to Napoleon's sudden change of front is to be sought in his own character. He longed for glory, but the means to that end appalled him. The carnage of the battlefield of Solferino made a deep impression on him and rendered him unwilling to shed the blood of France any longer in an alien cause. He believed that he had done enough for honour—like Charles Albert before him, he knew the immense strength of the Quadrilateral and feared to lose such military reputation as he had won by an unsuccessful attack upon it. Too late Napoleon realized that in fostering Italian Nationalism he had evoked a demon which he could not control. If the war continued Sardinia would annex Central as well as Northern Italy and establish a strong power on the south-eastern frontier of France, which would be an effective barrier to French intervention in Italy. Already the determination of the Tuscans to be masters of their own fate had thwarted Napoleon's hopes of establishing his cousin, the Prince Napoleon, at Florence in place of the house of Lorraine. In any event, moreover, France as the ally of Sardinia would incur the hostility of the Pope through the curtailment of his temporal power, and the French clerical party would be alienated from the empire of which they were the chief support. Napoleon

therefore sought to avoid incurring unpopularity in France and at the same time to secure his old object—an Italian federation—by reaching an understanding with Austria instead of conspiring with Sardinia.

Another factor, the international situation, contributed to Napoleon's decision. He had taken great pains before committing himself finally to the Sardinian cause to secure assurances of the neutrality of Russia and Prussia, but had failed to obtain a satisfactory promise from Prussia. Prussia had already placed her forces on a war footing, and national feeling in Germany was inflamed against her 'natural enemy,' France. Prussia now massed troops on the Rhine and proposed to play the part of 'armed mediator,' with the threat that she would invade France if her mediation were not accepted. Francis Joseph was as eager to avoid Prussian mediation as Napoleon, and this common desire made easier the conclusion of the preliminaries of Villafranca.

Napoleon's desertion of the Italian cause was a terrible blow to Cavour, who urged the King to refuse to accept the preliminaries. When the King wisely rejected Cavour's advice he resigned office, and the King accepted the preliminaries "so far as they concern me," thus reserving his liberty of action in Central Italy and gaining a promise from Napoleon that he would not permit the use of force to restore the old rulers in Central Italy. With one voice Central Italy refused to be handed over to its old rulers and demanded union with Sardinia. Representative assemblies met and appointed provisional Governments, which entered into close relations with the Sardinian Government and, with the help of Sardinian officers, organized volunteer forces.

Meantime the final treaty of peace had been concluded at Zürich on November 10. It definitely transferred Lombardy to Sardinia, but left the Central Italian question as doubtful as before. A congress of the Powers was proposed, and, although Austrian and Papal opposition defeated the suggestion, the proposal led to the return of Cavour to office in January 1860, since he alone could represent the Italian cause before the diplomatists of Europe. The failure of his favourite idea for the settlement of dangerous questions—a European congress—

placed Napoleon in a difficult position and forced him to act on his own responsibility. His desertion of the Italian cause at Villafranca before Venetia had been added to Sardinia had deprived him of any claim to Savoy and Nice. He now hoped to recover his waning popularity at home by obtaining these provinces for France, and struck a bargain with Cavour. Savoy and Nice were to be ceded to France; Central Italy to be annexed to Sardinia, subject in each case to a plebiscite. Victor Emmanuel was reluctant to surrender the cradle of his house, but yielded to necessity, and plebiscites in both cases ratified the bargain by overwhelming majorities. Napoleon's insistence upon his pound of flesh deprived him of any claim on the gratitude of Italy, but it was probably necessary to strengthen his position in France. In any case the sympathies of Savoy and (to a lesser extent) Nice were certainly with France rather than with Italy.

The kingdom of Sardinia now included about half of the Italian peninsula—the three important provinces of Venetia, the remaining Papal States, and the Two Sicilies remained to be won. Pius IX and Francis II, who had succeeded his father Ferdinand II as King of the Two Sicilies in 1859, might have saved themselves by making concessions to Liberalism and forming a federation with Sardinia. But Pius IX now regarded Liberalism as heresy of the deepest dye, and Francis II lacked the strength to break suddenly with the traditions of his predecessors. Both clung obstinately to the Austrian alliance.

Victor Emmanuel and Cavour would gladly have availed themselves of the prevalent discontent in Southern Italy to intervene, but were restrained by the hostility of Austria and the attitude of the Powers. Britain was alienated by the cession of Savoy and Nice to France and suspected the renewed friendship of Napoleon and Cavour. Russia and Prussia were alarmed at the overthrow of the treaties of 1815 and resented the deposition of the legitimate rulers of Central Italy. No reliance could be placed on France. But Victor Emmanuel and Cavour gave secretly every assistance in their power to Garibaldi when he organized an expedition at Genoa. With "the thousand" volunteers (the number was really about two thousand) Garibaldi landed in Sicily to support the rebellion

which had broken out in the island in April 1860. The reckless daring of Garibaldi and his red-shirted followers made a great impression on the Sicilians, who rallied to their support. Within six weeks the whole island had thrown off the Neapolitan yoke, and Garibaldi was encouraged to attempt a still more formidable adventure—the conquest of Naples. Crossing the Strait of Messina, he landed on the mainland. No resistance was made, and Francis II, deserted by most of his Ministers, fled to the fortress of Gaeta. On September 7 Garibaldi entered Naples in triumph, and won all hearts by the modesty with which he received the plaudits of the people.

The amazing rapidity of Garibaldi's victory was a surprise to Cavour, but did not find him unprepared. His natural delight was tempered by the fear that the supporters of Mazzini would succeed in establishing a republic in Southern Italy, or that at the least the particularist feeling of Naples and Sicily would lead to demands for some kind of independent position for them in the United Italy which all patriots wished to create. Garibaldi, although his refusal was probably justified by the military position, increased Cavour's fears by refusing to use his dictatorship to proclaim the annexation of the Two Sicilies to the Sardinian kingdom. Cavour decided that the moment for his intervention had come, when it became known that the dictator and his volunteers were already meditating an attack on Rome, although Francis II still held out at Gaeta with a considerable force of loyal troops.

The liberation of the north and south of the peninsula encouraged the Liberals of the Marches and Umbria, which were still under the rule of the Pope, to rise in rebellion. When the papal army proceeded to suppress the rebellion Victor Emmanuel declared that the "cause of humanity" compelled him to intervene. On this feeble pretext the Sardinian army entered the Papal States, routed the papal mercenaries at Castelfidardo, and pushed on to Naples. As a protest against this attack on the Temporal Power all the Powers, with the exception of Britain, withdrew their envoys from the Sardinian Court; but the resentment of Napoleon was skilfully allayed by Cavour, who promised not to attack Rome, and represented

his action in the Papal States and in Naples as necessary to defeat the revolutionary parties.

The arrival of Sardinian troops in the kingdom of Naples soon ended the resistance of the adherents of Francis II, who had inflicted a check on Garibaldi's volunteers on the Volturna, and defeated the schemes of Mazzini and the partisans of South Italian particularism. At first Garibaldi demanded the dismissal of Cavour and an immediate attack on Rome as the conditions on which he would proclaim the annexation of Naples and Sicily to the kingdom of Sardinia. The danger of a collision between Garibaldi's volunteers and the Sardinian troops was averted by Garibaldi, who surrendered his authority as dictator. After a touching interview with Victor Emmanuel, in which he refused all rewards for his services except the thanks of the King, he retired to his island home at Caprera. Plebiscites, as usual, were taken in Naples, Sicily, and the newly conquered Papal territories, all of which declared for union to Sardinia. The first Italian Government met at Turin in February 1861, and in March Victor Emmanuel took the title of King of Italy.

The new kingdom was faced with grave dangers from within and without, and the death of Cavour in June 1861 was a serious blow to it. There was a well-marked divergence, which has proved permanent, between the peoples in the north and south of the peninsula. The Parliamentary system which had worked successfully in Northern Italy broke down in the hands of the politically untrained Neapolitans and Sicilians. The great cities of the North, Turin, Milan, and Florence, were jealous of each other, and each claimed to be the capital of the new kingdom. National unity could not be created in a day, and the domestic discords were the more dangerous because Austria retained an excellent base of operations in Venetia and was eager to recover her hegemony of Italy. Yet more serious was the question of Rome, which was still occupied by French troops. In 1862 Garibaldi tried to repeat his success in Naples by attacking Rome, but he was defeated by regular Italian troops at Aspromonte. Victor Emmanuel, on whom Cavour's mantle had fallen, was too wise to alienate Europe by conniving at Garibaldi's plans, but he was denounced as a

traitor by the hotheads among his own subjects. Undismayed by his unpopularity, he strove by diplomatic means to win for his kingdom her natural capital. In September 1864 he concluded with Napoleon a convention by which the French troops were gradually to be withdrawn from Rome on condition that the kingdom of Italy undertook to defend Rome from all attacks and, as a symbolic renunciation of Rome, removed her capital from Turin to some other city. In 1865 the Italian Court removed from Turin to Florence, and the French evacuation of Rome was begun, but the convention was bitterly attacked in both countries—in France as a virtual cession of Rome to Italy, in Italy as an abandonment of her capital. Ultimately the convention was not carried out, and the completion of the Italian kingdom was obtained by an alliance with Prussia and as a direct result of the attainment of national unity in Germany.

CHAPTER XII

THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

PRUSSIA's humiliation at Olmütz was to some extent balanced by Austria's failure at the Conference of Dresden, and the final result of the year of revolutions had been practically to restore the *status quo ante*, except that Prussia had now some kind of constitution and representative institutions. But the Italian war of 1859 involved Austria in a serious financial crisis and destroyed the military prestige of the monarchy. In October 1860 the Emperor issued the "October Diploma" which provided his empire with a constitution. A council of State, with a few elected members, was established to deal with questions affecting the whole Empire, while local affairs were to be dealt with in local Parliaments (*Landtage*). In 1861 further concessions were made, notably the creation of a central Parliament. The German Liberals of Austria welcomed this tentative step toward a Liberal constitution, but the non-German provinces were dissatisfied, and their refusal to co-operate destroyed the prospects of the success of the new constitution.

While Austria was moving toward Liberalism Prussia seemed to be in the throes of reaction. Olmütz gave a great stimulus to the reorganization of the Prussian army, which henceforth became the chief object of Prussian Ministers. In 1861 William I, who had already acted as Regent for four years, became king on the death of his brother Frederick William IV. He was a true Hohenzollern in his insistence that he ruled by divine right, in his entire lack of sympathy with Liberal ideas, and, above all, in his enthusiasm for the army. His chief adviser during his Regency was the War Minister, Roon, who was anxious to increase the size and efficiency of the army and to introduce the breech-loading needle-gun. His proposals were adversely criticized by the Liberal majority in the

Prussian Parliament, which believed that the unification of Germany could be secured by propaganda and not by the sword, and the General Election of 1861 returned his opponents with an increased majority. When Roon, in September 1862, called on the Chamber to vote for the Army Bill *en bloc* the Bill was rejected by 308 votes to 11. William I thought of abdicating, but not of yielding to the Assembly, and in the end summoned Bismarck to the office of Chief Minister.

Bismarck's reactionary views had long been notorious. In 1848 Frederick William IV had written opposite his name: "Not to be employed until the bayonet governs unrestricted." He had served a useful apprenticeship in the diplomatic service, at first at the Diet at Frankfurt, and then at St Petersburg, and had just gone as Ambassador to Paris when he was recalled to Berlin. He shared the enthusiasm of the Liberals for national unity, and their hostility to Austria as the great obstacle in its way, but believed that the year of revolutions had proved that the obstacle could be overthrown and national unity attained only by 'blood and iron.' He was determined that national unity should be attained by the extension of the bureaucratic and militarist system of Prussia to the whole of Germany, not, as the Liberals hoped, by the merging of Prussia in a democratic German state. He saw also, like Cavour, that a foreign alliance would enormously facilitate the attainment of his ends, and from the outset of his Ministry set himself to gain the alliance of Russia.

Bismarck's first task was to find means to carry out the reorganization of the army in the teeth of the Chamber's opposition. When the Chamber attempted to compel the Government's surrender by refusing supplies Bismarck dispensed with the budget and tore up the constitution. He counted on the loyalty of the army to crush any attempts at armed resistance, and on the timidity of his opponents, who were drawn almost entirely from the middle class and had no desire to run the risks of revolution. His calculations were justified; but his position was nevertheless precarious and could best be strengthened by a striking success in foreign policy which would silence, if not convert, his opponents.

The good fortune which hardly ever failed Bismarck presented

of the Poles, and when Napoleon III proposed to follow up diplomatic protests by military action Britain promptly drew back. To Napoleon it seemed that Britain had deliberately compromised him with Russia and humiliated him before the public opinion of France. Hence the Polish revolt, before its suppression in March 1864, produced two diplomatic results of the first consequence—the alienation of Britain and France and the close alliance of Russia and Prussia. These results enabled Bismarck to act with security and success in the question of Schleswig-Holstein, which had troubled Europe intermittently for several decades, but was now to receive a solution.

For long the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been ruled by the Danish Crown. Schleswig was predominantly Danish, but the nobles were Teutonic in sympathies. Holstein was thoroughly German, and had been included in the German Confederation of 1815. A German professor put forward the theory—on an entirely inadequate foundation of fact—that Schleswig and Holstein formed an indivisible whole, and the National Liberals of Germany seized upon the theory in the hope of including in the united Germany which they wished to form, not only Holstein, but Schleswig (with the valuable port of Kiel). A disputed succession to the Danish Crown complicated the question. Frederick VII, who succeeded in 1848, was unlikely to have children. His nearest male heir was the Duke of Augustenburg, who claimed that female succession was excluded in the case of the duchies. But Frederick VII was anxious to secure the succession to the whole inheritance of Prince Christian of Glücksburg, who would undoubtedly succeed to the Danish throne, where female succession was recognized. The German population of the duchies, hoping to break off the connexion with Denmark, were eager partisans of the Duke of Augustenburg, and established a provisional Government in his name during the disturbances of the year of revolutions. The National Liberals in Germany admitted Schleswig to the federation and induced Frederick William IV to send an army into the duchies to assist the partisans of the Duke of Augustenburg. Russia and Britain then intervened and prevented the duchies from breaking away from Denmark,

but Denmark had to promise to abandon her attempts to incorporate the duchies with the rest of the monarchy. The question of the succession was settled by the Powers by the Treaty of London (1852) in favour of Christian of Glücksburg, who was to succeed to all the possessions of the Danish Crown.

In 1863 Frederick VII died and was succeeded, in accordance with the Treaty of London, by Christian of Glücksburg (Christian IX). The Duke of Augustenburg's son now brought forward his claims and was supported by the German Diet, which had never accepted the Treaty of London. Christian IX, following the policy of his predecessor, now issued a patent separating the administration of Holstein entirely from that of the rest of his dominions. This virtual offer to cede Holstein to Germany in return for a free hand in Schleswig provoked an indignant outburst in Germany. The Diet at once ordered a 'federal execution' in Holstein—*i.e.*, its occupation by German troops, which was accomplished without any opposition from the Danes in December 1863.

The duchies, it has been said, were now ready for Bismarck, and Bismarck, thanks to the Polish rebellion, was ready for the duchies. He hastily arranged for the co-operation of Austria, and a joint Prusso-Austrian army marched through Holstein and attacked Schleswig, which was soon in their hands in spite of the gallant resistance of the Danes. A conference of the Powers at London failed to arrange a settlement, and the war continued until the whole peninsula of Jutland was in the hands of Austria and Prussia. Christian IX had now to accept the terms of the victors, and, by the Treaty of Vienna (October 1864), he ceded the duchies to Austria and Prussia without making any stipulations as to their final disposition. In 1863 Palmerston had spoken as though Britain would defend Denmark, but he was impotent in face of the German sympathies of the Queen and the invincible pacifism of the majority of the Cabinet. Napoleon also sympathized with Denmark, but his championship of Italian Nationalism made it less easy for him to oppose German Nationalism, and, in any event, his hands were fully occupied with his ill-fated attempt to establish the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of Mexico. The Polish fiasco of 1863 had sown

distrust between the Western Powers, and made joint intervention still more difficult. In the result "England failed France and France failed England, and both failed Europe." The virtual abeyance of the Concert of Europe allowed Bismarck to gain his first great success.

The final settlement of the duchies raised difficult questions and gave Bismarck the pretext he required for war against Austria, which he already regarded as the next stage in his plan for the unification of Germany. His first step was to obtain a report from a commission of Prussian jurists that the legal sovereign of the duchies was the King of Denmark. Since Christiân IX had surrendered his claims to Austria and Prussia, they alone had a voice in their disposal; thus the Duke of Augustenburg's claims were ruled out, and the German Diet was excluded from all say in the matter.

Austria already regretted the part she had played as the auxiliary of Prussia against Denmark. Like the Austrian Netherlands in the eighteenth century, a share of the duchies would be a source of weakness rather than of strength to her, but she was determined not to allow Prussia to increase her territorial preponderance in Northern Germany by annexing them.

Austro-Prussian relations were also embittered by the question of the reorganization of the German Confederation. The constitutional concessions made by Austria in 1860–61 and the reactionary policy of Bismarck in Prussia tended to transfer the sympathies of the National Liberals from Prussia to Austria. In 1863 Austria tried to exploit these sympathies by convening a conference at Frankfurt and proposing to strengthen the central executive by the establishment of a directory of five princes, with Austria as hereditary president. The opposition of Prussia, whose control of the Customs Union gave her a hold on the policy of the other states, secured the defeat of the proposal. The opposition of the Magyar and Slav provinces soon compelled Austria to suspend the constitution and thus alienate the National Liberals of Germany and her own German provinces without conciliating her Magyar and Slav subjects.

These domestic difficulties induced the Emperor to accept

a disadvantageous compromise on the Schleswig-Holstein question by the Convention of Gastein (August 14, 1865). Austria was to administer Holstein, Prussia Schleswig with the valuable port of Kiel, which she at once began to fortify, while the little Duchy of Lauenberg was sold outright to Prussia.

Both parties regarded the convention as a temporary arrangement: Bismarck redoubled his diplomatic preparations for war. In October 1865 he met Napoleon at Biarritz, and, although he obtained no definite promises, he satisfied himself that France would not intervene promptly between Prussia and Austria. Napoleon was now suffering from a grave malady which diminished his will-power and increased his constitutional tendency to postpone definite decisions. From this time until his death he lost more and more "the sense of the possible," and lived in a hazy world of grandiose dreams. He believed that Austria and Prussia were fairly well matched, and that the struggle would be prolonged and exhausting and would give him an opportunity to intervene as an armed mediator to terminate the struggle and seize the Rhine frontier as a reward for his services to the peace of Europe.

The only other Power likely to intervene in the coming Austro-Prussian struggle was Italy, which would probably follow the lead given by Napoleon. In her eagerness to win the support of Napoleon Austria offered in June 1866 to hand over Venetia to Italy, whatever the result of the war, but she would not immediately surrender the province, either for money or for territorial compensation elsewhere, since this appeared dishonourable to the Emperor. Austria's offer came too late, for in April 1866 Italy, apparently with the knowledge of Napoleon, had concluded a peculiar treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. By this treaty, if Austria and Prussia were involved in war within three months, Italy would attack Austria with all her forces. Once the war had broken out the Allies would not conclude a separate peace nor lay down their arms until Italy had secured Venetia, and Prussia equivalent gains in Germany.

Even before he was assured of Italian support Bismarck had adopted a provocative policy toward Austria in order to goad her into war. Since the Convention of Gastein Austria and

Prussia had adopted entirely different policies in Schleswig and Holstein. Austria sought to conciliate the Schleswigers, and openly showed her sympathy with the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg. Prussia ruled Holstein with an iron hand and made no secret of her intention of annexing it. Bismarck complained that Austria was breaking the Convention of Gastein and encouraging "demagogic anarchy" by tolerating the agitation in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg. Austria then sought to enlist the support of the princes by suggesting that the dispute should be submitted to the Diet. Prussia retorted by proposing fundamental changes in the federal constitution. Austria was to be excluded and a new constitution for the rest of the Confederation drawn up by a National Assembly. To the astonishment of Europe the reactionary Minister, who had governed Prussia for four years in the teeth of the Parliamentary opposition, and had recently suspended the meeting of the Assembly in Prussia, proposed that the National Assembly should be elected by manhood suffrage. Austria had now either to resign her hegemony of Germany or to fight for it. Without hesitation she chose the latter alternative, and was supported by a majority in the Diet, including Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and Baden.

The Prussian plan of campaign devised by Moltke and Roon proved a brilliant success. Everything was ready, and the needle-gun with which the Prussian troops were armed proved its superiority over the Austrian rifles. Austria's forces in Germany were weakened by the necessity of employing 150,000 troops to resist the Italian attack on Venetia. Within a fortnight of the outbreak of war the Hanoverian army—which alone made a serious attempt to assist Austria—was crushed at Langensalza. A week later the main Austrian army under Benedek was defeated in a pitched battle at Sadowa (or Königgrätz) on July 3. In Italy, however, the Austrians defeated the Italian army at Custozza (June 24) and the Italian fleet at Lissa on July 20. Italy's pride was cut to the quick, and, in spite of Francis Joseph's offer to hand over Venetia to Napoleon for transference to Italy, the Italians were anxious to continue the war and conquer Venetia for themselves.

The Prussian King and army leaders were eager to complete

their triumph by dictating peace at Vienna. Bismarck stood almost alone in opposition to the King's plan, which would merely have alienated South German sentiment from Prussia and aroused the undying hostility of Austria. Moreover, the Austrian armies were still intact, and the fortune of war might turn against Prussia. Finally, every delay in making peace afforded opportunities for the intervention of the Powers, and particularly of Napoleon, who had been staggered by the suddenness of the Prussian victory. Accordingly Bismarck extorted the reluctant consent of his master to the preliminaries of Nikolsburg (July 26).

The definitive Treaty of Prague (August 23) gave Bismarck all that he desired from the Austrian war. Austria recognized the dissolution of the German Confederation. A North German confederation was to be formed and also an association of the South German states "with an independent international existence." Austria surrendered all claims to Schleswig and Holstein, which were annexed by Prussia, although a clause in the treaty provided for the holding of a plebiscite in Northern Schleswig to determine whether it should be returned to Denmark or retained by Prussia. This provision was ignored until after the defeat of Germany by the Allied Powers in 1918. Provisionally, Italy received Venetia from Austria, not directly, but at the hands of Napoleon, to whom Francis Joseph had already surrendered the province.

The defeat of the Austrians at Königgrätz was a disaster to France even more than to Austria. Napoleon tried to conceal the magnitude of the defeat by proclaiming that it was a triumph for the doctrine of nationality, in which he was a sincere believer, and quite inconsistently declaring that Germany had been divided up into three sections, the Northern Confederation, the South German states, and Austrian Germany. Rejecting the advice of his ablest Ministers to mobilize troops on the eastern frontier, he tried to obtain compensation for the Prussian gains without running the risk of war. This attempt might have been successful before Königgrätz, but was futile when Bismarck had already attained his object.

Bismarck skilfully induced Napoleon to make a formal

demand for the cession of part of the Rhenish provinces, including part of Bavaria's territories. He then refused indignantly to surrender a single village on German soil, and betrayed the French proposals to the South German states in order to prove to them the falsity of Napoleon's pose as their champion, and convince them that Prussia was their natural protector against the hereditary enemy of Germany. He thus obtained the signature by the South German states of treaties which placed their military resources at the disposal of Prussia in the event of war. These treaties, which were concluded before the Treaty of Prague, combined with Prussia's control of the Customs Union, virtually obliterated the line of the Main, which was to be drawn by the Treaty of Prague between the Northern Confederation and the South German states.

The South German states had still to be treated with caution, but the states of Northern Germany were powerless to resist the dictates of Prussia, which annexed Hanover and Hesse-Cassel and reduced Saxony to the position of a vassal state. It remained to settle the relations of Prussia with the lesser states of North Germany by drawing up the constitution of the North German Confederation, which was finally adopted in July 1867. The King of Prussia was hereditary President and Commander-in-Chief of the Confederation, and was to be assisted by a Chancellor, to whom the Ministers appointed by the King were strictly subordinated. The executive council of the Confederation (Bundesrat) was composed of representatives of the North German Governments under the presidency of the Chancellor. The Diet of the Confederation (Reichstag), which was to share in legislation, but not to control the executive, was to be elected by direct manhood suffrage. Compulsory military service was introduced for all males over seventeen years of age. This constitution was chiefly the work of Bismarck, and was designed by him to serve various ends. The provision for manhood suffrage gave the appearance of democracy without the reality, and tended still further to conciliate the National Liberals, already fascinated by the success of Bismarck's methods. Prussia secured effective control of the resources of the Confederation, but the federal form of the constitution made easy its extension to include

the South German states. Above all, the Government, and particularly the Army of the Confederation, was kept free from any dependence on fluctuating majorities in the popularly elected Diet.

The failure of the Constitution of 1860–61 had almost convinced Francis Joseph that he must reach an agreement with the Magyars. Austria's defeat in 1866 clinched the matter. The Emperor accepted the demands of the moderate Magyar party, led by Francis Deák, and concluded the *Ausgleich* of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy. The little river Leitha was taken as the boundary between the two parts of the Habsburg Empire—Austria dominated by the Germans, and Hungary by the Magyars. Each part received separate institutions, including a Diet and Ministry. In Austria Francis Joseph was emperor and his capital Vienna; in Hungary he was king and his capital Pesth. Each Diet appointed a delegation, and the joint delegations met to discuss affairs which affected the whole Empire—viz., finance, war, and foreign affairs, each of which departments had a joint Minister for the whole Empire.

The establishment of the Dual Monarchy pacified Hungary, which had been in constant agitation since 1848, and gave the Habsburg monarchy a new lease of life. But it ignored the claims of the less advanced Slav minorities, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs, and also of the Rumanes of Transylvania. The growing national consciousness of these peoples ended in the overthrow of the Empire, but for a generation the problem of Slav minorities attracted little attention. Freed for the time being from serious domestic troubles and from its responsibilities in Italy and Germany, the Habsburg monarchy set out on a new course and resumed with energy and success the forward policy in the Balkans, which its multiplicity of interests had prevented it from pursuing seriously since the death of Prince Eugène (1736).

The efforts of Austria to turn the defeat of Sadowa into a victory were much more successful than those of France. Just as Napoleon had failed to set limits to Italian Nationalism, so had he failed to confine German Nationalism to the north of the Main, and on this occasion his failure was not mitigated by

the acquisition of territory for France. Realizing dimly that it was now too late to undo Bismarck's work in Germany, Napoleon concentrated his attention upon obtaining territorial compensations—*pourboires*, as Bismarck contemptuously called them—for the growth of Prussian power. During the negotiation of the Treaty of Prague Napoleon had tried to secure Bismarck's connivance in a French annexation of Belgium. Bismarck actually induced Benedetti, the French Ambassador, to draw up and leave with him a draft treaty for the annexation of Belgium to France, which he carefully preserved and published in the *Times* in 1870, in order to turn British public opinion decisively against Napoleon at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

Failing to obtain Bismarck's consent to the French annexation of Belgium, Napoleon turned his attention to Luxemburg. This petty state of 200,000 French-speaking inhabitants was ruled by the King of Holland, and had been included in the German Confederation of 1815. The dissolution of the Confederation left it an independent and isolated principality, although Prussia insisted on maintaining a garrison in the town of Luxemburg, which had been a federal fortress. The King of Holland was willing to sell the principality to France, but insisted that the consent of the Powers, and particularly of Prussia, was essential. Bismarck betrayed the secret to "the jackal Press," as he politely called his journalistic allies, and produced an outburst of German national feeling. French sentiment was roused by Bismarck's publication of the treaties he had concluded with the South German states in August 1866. War appeared to be imminent, but was averted by a conference of the Powers at London, which decreed that Luxemburg should remain subject to the King of Holland, and that the Prussian garrison should be withdrawn from its capital. To prevent the renewal of the French scheme of purchase the Powers guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg. The Luxemburg crisis did not cause a Franco-Prussian war, but it so embittered feeling on both sides that war came to be regarded as inevitable. After the crisis Napoleon could no longer conceal from himself the futility of his policy of *pourboires*, and began to consider seriously the restoration of his

prestige in France and of France's supremacy in Europe by a war with Prussia.

Napoleon III had set out to give France order at home and glory abroad. He realized clearly that success in the latter aim was essential to the maintenance of 'order'—*i.e.*, of an autocratic Government. Up to the creation of Rumania in 1859 he had been able to carry out his programme, but since then all his foreign enterprises had miscarried. His blundering intervention in Italian affairs had offended Austria without winning the gratitude of Italy, while by extorting Savoy and Nice he had alienated Britain. His attempt to interfere in Poland cost him the friendship of Russia. His desire to hamper Prussia in her unification of Germany aroused the whole force of German sentiment against him, while the feebleness of his efforts to give effect to his desire won for him the contemptuous hostility of Bismarck.

Worst of all was the expedition to Mexico, where Napoleon hoped to establish a Catholic monarchy with Maximilian, the brother of Francis Joseph, as emperor. Taking advantage of the Republic of Mexico's default in paying interest to French creditors, Napoleon soon disclosed plans directly counter to the Monroe Doctrine, which forbade the acquisition by the European Powers of further territory on the American continent. The preoccupation of the United States with the Civil War gave him a free hand for a time, and French troops succeeded in establishing Maximilian on the throne. But the end of the American Civil War enabled the United States to demand the withdrawal of French troops. Once again Napoleon desired the end and shrank back appalled at the means—a war with Mexico and the United States. The French troops were withdrawn, and Maximilian, who refused to desert his Mexican supporters, was soon afterward captured and shot (June 1867). In America, as in Europe, France did not know which to resent the more—the squandering of her resources in an alien cause or the humiliating abandonment of that cause at the dictation of foreign Powers.

Every failure abroad told against Napoleon within France. His aid to Sardinia in 1859 bitterly offended the clerical party; his subsequent attempts to bolster up the Temporal Power of

the Pope antagonized the Liberals. The economic policy of the Emperor—particularly his conclusion of a treaty of commerce with Britain in 1860, which lowered the duties on imports—aroused the hostility of the manufacturers. His sympathy with free trade, it may be noted, was based chiefly on political and social rather than on strictly economic grounds, since his main objects in concluding the treaty were to strengthen his understanding with Britain and improve the condition of the working classes in France.

This latter was a matter of real and continuous solicitude to the Emperor, who had written a book on the *Extinction of Pauperism*, which he believed would follow the triumph of democracy. The ambitious town-planning and other schemes of public work carried through under the Second Empire were partly designed to diminish unemployment. A more permanent remedy was the great increase of industry and commerce, aided by the development of the railway system and the postal and telegraphic services. The national system of credit was greatly improved by the establishment of the *crédit foncier*, which made advances on real property, and the *crédit mobilier*, which financed large undertakings. Prosperity undoubtedly resulted; but the free-trade sympathies of the Emperor alienated the moneyed interests, while his experiments in Socialism did not go far enough to conciliate the Republican artisans of the urban industrial areas.

As early as 1860 Napoleon had tried to conciliate the Opposition by modifying the absolutism of his rule and allowing the Senate and Legislative Assembly to discuss once a year the policy of the Government as laid before them in a speech from the throne. At the same time a few Ministers were given seats in the Assembly in order to explain regularly the policy of the Government. The elections of 1863 showed that these concessions had encouraged and not conciliated the Opposition, which had increased its voting strength from five to thirty-five, while the Press, notably *La Lanterne*, used its greater freedom to make savage attacks upon the Emperor. The irresolution of the Emperor and his blundering foreign policy encouraged his enemies, and by 1867 Napoleon was convinced that his best hope was to make further concessions. In 1867 he allowed the

Assembly to interpellate Ministers, and in 1868 he gave the Press still more liberty, and permitted the holding of public meetings. Less attempt than before was made to control the elections of 1869, and the Opposition gained further ground.

Obviously the foundations of Napoleon's power were slipping away. He tried to avert the danger to the Empire by transforming it into a 'Liberal empire.' The Assembly was to be allowed to legislate freely and to examine the details of the budget, while its members might be Ministers, although the Emperor retained to himself the discretionary power entrusted to him by the people in 1852 to act as seemed necessary for the preservation of order. The Liberal leader, Ollivier, became head of the Ministry, and the great majority of the French people gave their approval by plebiscite to the reforms. The great towns almost alone remained hostile as ever to Napoleon. Some years of peace might have established a broadly based constitutional monarchy in France. Unfortunately the new system, owing to the opportunities which it gave for criticism of the foreign policy of the Government, made Napoleon doubly sensitive to anything which might be regarded as a rebuff to France abroad.

Bismarck was watching carefully the trend of events in France. The Prussian military machine had been still further improved as a result of the experience gained in the war with Austria. After 1866 Bismarck no longer required the friendship of France, and saw in war against the hereditary enemy the easiest and quickest way to complete the unification of Germany which he had so brilliantly begun. He was confident of success, always provided that other Powers did not interfere. Hence it was essential in his view that France should appear to be the aggressor, and he soon found in the affairs of Spain a convenient pretext to goad France into an 'offensive' war.

The reign of Isabella II in Spain is one long story of faction and intrigue. The Queen was a woman of worthless character and feeble intellect, who was entirely governed by a *camarilla* of bigoted priests and despicable favourites. The real powers in the land were the Army and the Church, which made and unmade Governments, sometimes in unison, sometimes in

opposition to each other. After the expulsion of the Queen-mother in 1854 by a coalition headed by Narvaez, a moderate Conservative, and O'Donnell, the leader of the "Liberal Union," there seemed a prospect of better government, but the jealousies and divisions of the Liberal leaders gave power for the most part to the reactionaries, who had the unfaltering support of the Queen. At last the Court *camarilla* tried to arrest the leading Liberals and institute a royalist reign of terror. Most of the Liberal leaders, however, made good their escape, and soon afterward the death of O'Donnell gave Prim and Serrano the leadership of the Liberals. The new leaders returned to Spain and raised a revolt in September 1868. Deserted by the army and despised by the people, Isabella fled to France, and was deposed in September 1869.

It proved a difficult task to fill the vacant throne. Some Liberals advocated the establishment of a republic, but the vast majority wished to establish a constitutional monarchy. The Cortes met and drew up a Liberal constitution. Meantime Prim and Serrano were hunting for a king among the Roman Catholic princely families of Europe, but none of the suitable candidates was willing to accept the dangerous honour. Finally their choice, probably at the suggestion of Bismarck, fell upon Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a member of a distant and Roman Catholic branch of the house of Hohenzollern, whose younger brother Charles was making his reputation as a ruler in Rumania. In May 1870 Bismarck obtained the consent of William I as head of the house of Hohenzollern to the proposed candidature. He hoped to present France with a *fait accompli*. If France then attempted to dictate the Spaniards' choice of a king she would appear as the aggressor, and Bismarck would obtain the military assistance of the South German states and the moral approval of the disinterested Powers.

But before the Cortes had elected Prince Leopold France was informed of the Hohenzollern candidature, which seemed to her to threaten the revival of the Empire of Charles V. The French Government publicly announced that it would demand the withdrawal of Prince Leopold, and sent Benedetti to Ems, where the King of Prussia was drinking the waters, with instructions

to insist upon William I's ordering his cousin to give up his candidature. William I was conciliatory, and on July 12 he handed to Benedetti the Prince's letter of withdrawal. France seemed to have scored a distinct success, but the publicity given by the Government to the Hohenzollern candidature provoked widespread excitement in France. When Ollivier informed the Assembly that Prince Leopold had withdrawn it insisted that the honour and security of France required a promise from William I that he would prohibit any renewal of the candidature. With unpardonable feebleness and presumption the French Government instructed Benedetti to make this fresh demand upon the King of Prussia, who had already gone as far as France had any right to expect. He now refused to give further guarantees, but left the negotiations open to be conducted by his Ministers. His telegram announcing the last stage in the negotiations reached Bismarck at Berlin when he was dining with Roon and Moltke. All three were in the lowest spirits because the King's action in securing the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature had deprived them of the prospect of the 'defensive' war with France for which Bismarck had schemed. Without altering a word, Bismarck misrepresented the telegram by judicious compression. He made it appear that the King had abruptly broken off the negotiations with Benedetti, and attributed the King's refusal to see him again not to the news of Leopold's renunciation, but to the nature of Benedetti's demands. "Now," said Moltke, "it [the telegram] has a different ring. Before it sounded like a parley, now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." Taking advantage of the King's permission to publish the message, Bismarck inserted his version of the telegram in the Press. This provocative message created the wildest excitement throughout Germany, and roused war-fever in France. Thiers alone thought of asking for an inquiry into what had actually happened at Ems. The French council of Ministers and the Assembly voted almost unanimously for war, which was declared on July 17.

The startling success of the Prussian army, with its three-year term of service for all males, over the long-service veterans of Austria had caused much misgiving in France. Attempts

were made to reform the French system on the Prussian model. France was not yet ready for the adoption of universal military service, but the term of service was lengthened and a new reserve, called the *garde mobile*, was planned. In 1870 the War Minister declared that everything was in readiness for war, but events soon showed the falsity of his boast. The reforms had disorganized the old system, but had not been pursued with sufficient energy and consistency to create a new. Moreover, the arsenals were empty and supplies of the most rudimentary equipment, such as boots, were quite inadequate. For years French statesmen had declared that war with Prussia was inevitable: with criminal folly the Government had not prepared for the war which they had made no effort to avoid, if they did not actually welcome it.

The rapidity of the Prussian mobilization enabled them to take the offensive with greatly superior forces. In the early stages of the war the Prussian army numbered 500,000 men, the French forces less than half that number. The Prussians enjoyed effective unity of command under Moltke, strong in the prestige he had won in the Austro-Prussian War, and with his plan of campaign cut and dried. Owing to the broken health of the Emperor his command of the French forces was nominal: in war, as in diplomacy, he lacked the capacity to form a plan and carry it out with energy and perseverance, and his army commanders failed to co-operate successfully with each other. In artillery, reconnaissance-work, and technical knowledge the Germans also held a marked superiority. It is said that their maps of the districts of France in which they operated were better than those of the French officers. In courage alone were the French the equals of the Germans.

On August 6 the northern French army under MacMahon was defeated at Wörth and the southern under Bazaine at Spicheren. Alsace-Lorraine now lay open to invasion. Left to themselves, the French commanders would have retreated slowly toward Paris, constantly receiving reinforcements, and would have fought with some chance of success not far from the capital. The entreaties of the Empress, who feared that this retreat would imperil the Empire and the prospects of her son, persuaded the Emperor to attempt the defence of Metz

with the army of Bazaine. After a half-hearted attempt to cut his way out of the encircling Prussian forces at the battle of Gravelotte Bazaine shut himself up in Metz with 200,000 men. The Emperor now surrendered the command to MacMahon, who had remained inactive at Châlons since his defeat at Wörth. MacMahon decided wisely to retreat toward Paris and fight the next battle with the support of the reinforcements which were still coming in, while the guns of the forts around Paris would reduce the German superiority in field-artillery. Again the Empress intervened in view of the political situation, and MacMahon was ordered to advance to the relief of Metz. He obeyed and met the Prussian forces at Sedan on September 1. He himself was wounded early in the battle, and the French army was driven into the town and compelled to surrender by a heavy bombardment on all sides. The Emperor himself was among the captives.

These crushing defeats overthrew the Empire. Paris, always hostile to the Emperor, rose in insurrection, and the National Guards joined the rebels. A provisional Government, which took the title of "the Government of National Defence," was formed, consisting of the deputies of Paris in the Assembly. Jules Favre became Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gambetta Minister of the Interior. The Empress fled hastily to England, and on September 4 the Republic was proclaimed. General Trochu made arrangements for the defence of the capital, while Thiers undertook a mission to the chief European capitals in order to "find Europe and invoke its mediation in favour of France."

The diplomatic blunders of Napoleon in the preceding years robbed Thiers' mission of any chance of success. British sympathies were with Germany rather than with France, and Bismarck's publication of the proposed treaty for the annexation of Belgium touched British suspicions of France at their tenderest point. Russia was still less favourable to France, since her benevolent neutrality had been purchased by Bismarck in advance, and early in 1871 the Tsar received payment when the Conference of London unwillingly ratified Russia's denunciation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856). Austria and Italy sympathized with France be-

fore the outbreak of war; Austria because her defeat by Prussia was too recent to be forgotten, Italy because she could not but be grateful to France for her past assistance in spite of recent friction between them. Had Napoleon concentrated his attention on the formation of an Austro-Franco-Italian alliance in the years 1867–70 he might very probably have succeeded, but his refusal to abandon Rome to Italy prevented its formation. The striking successes of the Prussians soon gave Austria and Italy cause to congratulate themselves on their neutrality, and all thoughts of intervention were laid aside.

While Thiers was vainly visiting the capitals of Europe the German armies advanced on Paris, which was closely blockaded by the end of September. The Germans made no attempt to take it by storm, and expected that shortage of supplies would compel an early surrender. The city was garrisoned by an enormous number of regulars, recruits, and National Guards, whose lack of discipline was only partly compensated by their enthusiasm. The surrender of the city was inevitable within a few months unless it could be relieved from outside. Gambetta escaped from the city in a balloon, and succeeded, mainly by his own energy and enthusiasm, in raising an army of 600,000 men and equipping it with supplies and munitions. Unfortunately, before the new army could be properly organized, Bazaine, who had kept a large German force occupied in the siege of Metz, surrendered with all his forces in opposition to the wishes of the army and civilian population of Metz before the supply of provisions was exhausted. This cowardly surrender let loose an avalanche of German troops upon Gambetta's untrained levies. One by one his commanders were overpowered and their armies scattered, although several of them gained reputations as able tacticians and one, d'Aurelle de Paladines, won at Coulmiers the only French victory in the whole campaign. Garibaldi in gratitude to France for her assistance to Italy volunteered his assistance, but could do little against the well-drilled Prussians.

The destruction of the provincial armies, the failure of their own sorties, the exhaustion of supplies, and the rising of the Communists in Paris compelled the provisional Government to conclude an armistice on January 28, 1871. Since the

provisional Government had no constitutional mandate to speak for France it was agreed that a National Assembly should meet at Bordeaux to accept or reject the preliminaries of peace. The first act of the Assembly was to appoint Thiers "head of the executive power of the French Republic" and to entrust him with the difficult task of securing the best terms he could from Bismarck, who had from the beginning of the war decided that France must surrender Alsace and the greater part of Lorraine. In addition a heavy war indemnity was to be imposed upon France, and its payment guaranteed by a German army of occupation. Thiers failed to secure the retention of the fortress of Metz; but, at the price of allowing a ceremonial entry of German troops into Paris, France was allowed to retain the important fortress of Belfort. These terms were reluctantly accepted by the French National Assembly, and transformed on May 10 into the definitive Treaty of Frankfurt.

The outbreak of war with France and the victories gained over the hereditary enemy gave a great impetus to the National movement in Germany. The South German states raised contingents which fought side by side with the Prussian armies. Bismarck used the wave of patriotism which swept over the country to secure the inclusion of the South German states in the Prussian Confederation. The terms of union were settled by separate negotiations between Bismarck and the four South German Governments, and the formal offer of the Imperial crown to the King of Prussia was made by the King of Bavaria. The King of Prussia's reluctance to give up his ancestral and honourable title of King of Prussia for the new one of emperor caused unexpected difficulty. In the end William I gave way, although he was sulky and morose when, during the siege of Paris by the German troops, he was acclaimed German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles (January 18, 1871).

The constitution of the new empire was little more than the extension of the constitution of the North German Confederation to include the southern states. Although styled the German Empire, the new state was really a federal league, of which the King of Prussia was hereditary president. The Bundesrat

(or Federal council) contained representatives of the Governments of the component states. The vote of each state was cast as a whole. In this assembly Prussia had only seventeen votes out of fifty-eight, and could not therefore block ordinary legislation desired by most of the other states, although the constitution laid down that fourteen votes vetoed any changes proposed in the constitution. In practice, however, most of the small states were content to follow the Prussian lead. The Reichstag, or Parliament, was elected directly by manhood suffrage. Its chief power was its right to initiate legislation, which it shared with the Emperor and the Bundesrat. The quotas to the Federal army were fixed in the constitution, and all that the Reichstag could do was to refuse to increase them. Foreign policy, like the army, was in practice out of its control. The political inexperience of its members and its numerous party divisions further reduced the already slender powers which it possessed under the constitution. The Imperial Chancellor and the Federal Ministers attended its meetings, but did not depend on its support for their continuance in office.

Bismarck, the architect of the Empire, became its first Chancellor. Its constitution was mainly designed by him, and is his masterpiece in domestic statesmanship. The constitution, thanks to the pseudo-democratic Reichstag, gave the appearance of Liberalism to an essentially Conservative edifice, and established on a firm basis the supremacy of the reactionary Prussian system throughout Germany. The permanence of his victory seemed assured by the veto of the Prussian Government (through the Bundesrat) on constitutional change. Although the Reichstag occasionally asserted itself, Germany, so long as the constitution endured, had representative institutions, but not responsible government.

The completion of the unification of Italy as well as of Germany resulted from the Franco-Prussian War. Under the terms of the Convention of September 1864 Napoleon's troops had evacuated Rome in December 1866, but the defence of Rome had been immediately taken over by the Legion of Antibes, a body of volunteers openly recruited on French soil and containing numerous officers still in the

French service. The Italian Government was indignant at this trickery, and permitted Garibaldi to organize a new force of volunteers on the papal frontier and launch an attack on Rome. Napoleon acted with unusual decision. French regular troops reoccupied Rome and on November 3, 1867, crushed Garibaldi's invasion at Mentana. Napoleon had saved the Temporal Power at the cost of antagonizing Italian national sentiment, and the French occupation of Rome kept alive the antagonism, which was further inflamed by a series of incidents. The report of the French commander at Mentana to the effect that the new rifles had "worked wonders" was published in the *Moniteur*, the official gazette of France. Shortly afterward during a scene in the French Chamber one of Napoleon's Ministers declared emphatically that "Never, never, would France tolerate Italy's seizure of Rome."

The first defeats of the French in the war with Prussia compelled the Emperor to recall the French garrison from Rome, and Italy lost no time in making an attack on the last fragments of the Temporal Power. Pius IX had long been regarded as the incarnation of the forces of reaction, and in 1869 an œcumenical council had met at Rome and passed various decrees in opposition to Liberal and democratic doctrines. The most notable of these was the declaration that the Pope was infallible "when in the exercise of his mission as supreme teacher of all Christians he defines by his apostolic authority that which should be held by the universal Church in matters of faith or morals" (July 1870). His success in settling a controversy which had been unsolved since the fifteenth century increased the natural obstinacy of Pius IX, and he rejected all the attempts of the Italian Government to arrange a compromise. After a short bombardment Rome was occupied by the Italian troops (September 1870). The usual plebiscite decreed annexation to the Italian kingdom, and Rome became its capital in 1871.

The relations of the Italian kingdom and the Papacy remained unsettled until 1929, and this was one main cause of the weakness of the Italian kingdom. In 1871 Victor Emmanuel, following the declared policy of Cavour—"a free Church in a free state"—secured the passing by the Italian

Parliament of the "Law of Guarantees." The Papacy was left in undisturbed possession of the Vatican, and its independence and spiritual sovereignty fully recognized. To compensate the Pope for the loss of the revenues of the Papal States a generous annual grant was to be provided out of the national taxes, but this grant was never drawn by Pius IX and his successors. By the Vatican Treaty of 1929 the Pope becomes once again a temporal sovereign, but his rule is limited to the palace of the Vatican, the Cathedral of St Peter, and their immediate surroundings. The arrears of the grant offered in 1871, but never accepted by the Pope, were also liquidated.

The vacancy in the throne of Spain, which had been the pretext for the Franco-Prussian War, had been ended in September 1870 by the acceptance of the crown by the Duke of Aosta, the younger son of the King of Italy. The new King did his best to reign as a constitutional monarch, but the factions and intrigues of Spanish soldiers and politicians soon exhausted his patience, and he resigned the crown in 1873. The establishment of a republic which followed soon proved a failure. A Carlist rising broke out in the Basque provinces. Other provinces, jealous as always of the predominance of Castile, demanded the establishment of a Federal system of government. The army and the Church combined to crush the Federalists and Republicans, and the monarchy was restored in the person of Alfonso XII, Isabella's son (December 1874), who suppressed the Carlists and gave Spain a nearer approach to constitutional government than she had yet enjoyed.

CHAPTER XIII

FRANCE AND GERMANY AFTER 1871

Section I: France after 1871

THE political history of France from 1789 to 1871 had been marked by the preponderance of the capital. Successive revolutions had been engineered by Paris and accepted more or less willingly by the provinces. The Third Republic, on the other hand, was the creation of the National Assembly elected by the whole of France. Paris was jealous of the loss of her supremacy, and had many other reasons for discontent. The extreme war party declared that the preliminaries of peace were equivalent to the dismemberment and betrayal of the country. Popular feeling was exasperated by the triumphal entry of the German troops, which seemed to the citizens to efface the glory of their heroic resistance. Above all, the staunch Republicans of Paris had good reason to distrust the National Assembly, in which the supporters of the Bourbons, the Orléanists, and the Bonapartists held a large majority. The Assembly, moreover, offended their pride by sitting at Versailles after its removal from Bordeaux, and its measures touched them in an even more sensible place—their pockets. It refused to prolong the *moratorium*, or suspension of the payment of rent, etc., which had been adopted in Paris during the siege. Worse still, it suppressed the pay of the National Guard, which had been allowed to retain its arms and organization.

More fundamental causes for the rising of the Commune were not lacking. Socialism had steadily gained ground in Paris since 1848 and contributed to the rising, but there is little trace of a definite social programme in the utterances of its leaders. The chief feature of their programme was a resolute hostility to the extremely centralized Government established by the Jacobins, systematized by Napoleon, and

sources of weakness to the new *régime*, but the real dangers to its stability were clericalism, and subsequently Socialism.

The disunion of Germany before 1871 had given the Roman Catholic Church a powerful organization almost entirely free from State control, which gave it considerable political power. By 1874 the Catholic, or Centre, party had over a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag, and formed the kernel of the opposition to the Government. Bismarck was determined to destroy the Centre party by reducing the Roman Catholic hierarchy to complete dependence upon the State. The adoption by the œcumenical council in 1870 of the doctrine of papal infallibility had led to a schism among the Catholics of Germany. The "old Catholics" who refused to accept the new doctrine numbered in their ranks many of the leading Catholic professors and teachers. The bishops were determined to crush the dissidents by persecution, and many of them were deprived of their posts. Bismarck took up this challenge, as he regarded it, to the authority of the State, and between 1873 and 1875 the Reichstag passed the "May Laws"—a series of measures intended to bring the Roman Catholic Church into complete subjection to the State. Roman Catholic priests were forbidden to coerce their opponents by public excommunication; candidates for the ministry were to be examined by State officials; all religious orders were to be dissolved. In 1872 the control of education had been taken from the Church and given to lay inspectors appointed by the Government; civil marriage became compulsory throughout the Empire (1875).

These anti-clerical measures led to a fierce struggle between the Government and the Roman Catholic hierarchy, called the *Kulturkampf*. Only thirty out of 10,000 priests in Prussia submitted to the State, and in 800 parishes all religious services came to an end. Bismarck's alliance with the Conservative, or Junker, party was gravely weakened, but the support of the National Liberals, who were anti-clerical, enabled him to carry his measures through the Reichstag. The strength of the clerical resistance and the growing breach between the Government and the National Liberals on economic policy convinced Bismarck that he would do well to retrace his steps. His retreat was facilitated by the death of the uncompromising

Pope Pius IX, for Leo XIII, who succeeded to the Papacy in 1878, was a man of conciliatory temper. One by one the "May Laws" were withdrawn, and the Catholic clergy regained practically all their power.

In 1872–73 Germany passed through an orgy of speculation and over-production, due in part to the payment of the French war indemnity. The inevitable period of depression followed, and strengthened the demand for protection of home industries by the raising of the low duties imposed on foreign manufactured goods. Bismarck decided to support the movement, partly because he believed that it would strengthen the infant industries of Germany, but chiefly because it might tend to consolidate the Empire and would certainly provide the Federal Government with revenues independent of the contributions to the component states and distract attention from the religious passions aroused by the *Kulturkampf*. In 1879 the Reichstag accepted Bismarck's proposals for a revision of the tariff. Moderate duties were imposed on manufactured imports and light duties for revenue purposes on raw materials, while the agricultural interest was conciliated by the imposition of light customs on imported food-supplies. These changes were carried out in opposition to Bismarck's former supporters, the National Liberals, and brought him once again into alliance with the Conservative and Clerical parties.

The precise effect of these duties has been hotly debated, but they undoubtedly contributed to the industrial and commercial expansion of Germany in the following decades. Another result was the strengthening of the Socialist movement in the towns, where the lower classes were bitterly hostile to the food duties, which were increased in 1885 and again in 1887. The founders of German Socialism were Karl Marx, whose voluminous work *Das Kapital* became the Bible of Socialism not only in Germany, but throughout Europe, and Ferdinand Lassalle, who organized the forces of Socialism in the Universal German Working Men's Association. The Social Democrats by their hostility to militarism and insistence on the rights and powers of the Reichstag threatened the foundations of the Bismarckian empire. In 1878, therefore,

Bismarck carried through the Reichstag a measure for the suppression of the new movement. All societies, meetings, or publications intended to spread the doctrines of Socialism were prohibited, and suspected persons could be deported by the police. For twelve years this Act was vigorously enforced, but in the same period the Social Democrats trebled their voting strength.

Bismarck in his struggle with Social Democracy did not rely entirely upon repressive measures: he tried to strike at its roots by removing or at least palliating the grievances of the industrial classes, and in this endeavour he went far toward establishing State Socialism in Germany. In 1881 the Government in a speech from the throne enunciated the doctrine that the State is bound to interfere in economic matters especially "to advance in positive ways the welfare of all its members, and particularly of the weak." To carry out this policy the Reichstag passed Bills for the insurance of workmen against sickness and accident (1884) and against old age and incapacity (1889). The Government's attempt to kill Social Democracy by kindness was as unsuccessful as its coercive measures, but its Socialistic experiments were soon to be imitated elsewhere in Europe.

CHAPTER XIV

RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

THE Crimean War had shattered the autocratic rule of Nicholas I in Russia. His successor, Alexander II, was faced with the task of building up a new Russia. For this task he had certain outstanding advantages. The relaxation of the old system made him popular with all classes of his subjects. Nearly all reformers at this time looked to the enlightened despotism of the Tsar as the agency by which reforms would be accomplished. Personally the Tsar was honest and conscientious and had a genuine desire to improve the lot of his subjects. His lack of the principles of *doctrinaire* Liberalism was in itself an advantage. Unfortunately he had also serious defects as a reforming ruler—notably his timidity of character and inability to map out a clear line of policy and pursue it to its conclusion in spite of the inevitable difficulties.

By far the most important reform was the liberation of the serfs, which in Russia almost alone in Europe was effected from above and not from below. After preliminary steps had been taken the great edict of emancipation was issued by the Tsar on February 19, 1861. He freed all serfs from servile labour on their lords' estates, gave them for the first time the rights of citizens, and handed over to each village community a share of the lands they had hitherto cultivated for their lords. Compensation was paid to the landowners by the Government, which recouped itself by imposing annual dues—known as "redemption annuities"—on each village community. Thus in some cases the peasants paid in taxes to the State more than the equivalent of their former services to the lords. Nevertheless the reform in its main lines was just and enlightened, although it failed to satisfy the peasants, who, it was said, had become the "serfs of the State." Extensive judicial reforms

were also carried out, including the introduction of trial by jury, and of elected magistrates with jurisdiction in petty cases. The establishment of the District Councils, which were popularly elected, and of the Provincial Councils (or *Zemstvos*), elected by them, marked an important stage in the development of representative institutions in Russia, but the actual powers of these administrative assemblies were closely restricted by the right of veto of the provincial governor and by their lack of financial resources. Attempts were also made to organize a general system of education, but without much tangible result.

The meagre results of these reforms, many of which existed only on paper, led to universal dissatisfaction. The peasants were still discontented, and in large areas lived from year to year on the brink of starvation. The nobles had lost heavily by the reforms; the intelligentzia were now convinced that thoroughgoing reform could come only through pressure on the central Government. From this universal discontent Nihilism—the doctrine that every single institution required complete and unqualified destruction in order to prepare the way for a new order of things—was born. The Tsar, well aware of the temper of his subjects and surrounded by the reactionary Ministers of his father who never tired of saying, "We told you so," decided to draw back before his concessions endangered the stability of his throne. The first sign of the reaction was the restoration of a strict censorship in 1862, and the Polish rebellion of 1863 strengthened the forces of reaction. Henceforth the reactionary character of Alexander II's Government was intensified by the passage of the years.

Failing to achieve success in his domestic policy, the Tsar turned with more interest to foreign policy. His objects were the same as those of his predecessors—namely, imperialist expansion in the Balkans and the occupation of Constantinople, but the extension of the doctrines of Nationalism to Central and South-eastern Europe gave him a new weapon which he was acute enough to adopt. The discontent of the Slavs in the Austrian Empire led to the origin of the Pan-Slav movement. The Slovak poet Jan Kollár and the Slovak grammarian Šafarik are usually regarded as its founders. Its aims were to

combine all the scattered Slav peoples into a united whole. In 1867 delegates from all the Slav races (except the Poles) met at St Petersburg and were addressed by the Tsar as "brother Slavs." Although Pan-Slavism had originated in Austria it soon spread to the Balkans, and Russia's association with the movement strengthened her prestige there and enabled her to conceal her imperialistic ambitions by the pretext of the Tsar's duty to protect the Balkan peoples not merely as orthodox Christians, but as oppressed Slavs.

The hopes of the Balkan Slavs were raised by Russia's repudiation in 1870 of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856). Two years later Russia secured the establishment by the Porte of a separate religious organization for the Slav peoples of the Balkans, who were now freed from the control of the Patriarch of the Greek Church at Constantinople by the creation of a Slav Church under the leadership of an 'exarch,' who was always to be a Bulgar. "The Bulgarian exarchate," as the Turk foresaw, ultimately aroused violent quarrels between Greeks and Slavs, and even among the Slavs themselves, since the Serbs were bitterly jealous of the Bulgars. Its immediate result, however, was to stimulate Slav feeling in the Balkans. In 1874 risings took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and soon became so formidable that the Powers intervened in vain efforts to restore peace. In May 1876 the insurrection spread to Bulgaria, but was soon crushed by wholesale massacres of the inhabitants of the disaffected villages. The "Bulgarian atrocities" weakened the position of the pro-Turk British Government headed by Disraeli, and made the armed intervention of Russia almost certain. The prospect of Russian support encouraged Montenegro and Serbia to declare war on the Porte, but the Serbs were crushed at Alexinatz at the end of October, and only the diplomatic intervention of Russia prevented a Turkish occupation of Belgrade.

A conference of the Powers now met at Constantinople (December 1876) in the hope of preventing the independent action of Russia by arranging a peaceful settlement. Abdul Hamid, who had become Sultan in August, was not long in showing his ability and utter lack of scruple. He granted a constitution to his subjects, and summoned a Turkish national

assembly on the most approved Western model. When the Conference demanded his recognition of the autonomy of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria he submitted the proposals to the Assembly, which promptly rejected them. Abdul Hamid then, still posing as a constitutional monarch, informed the Powers that "public opinion" would not allow him to make such cessions. As soon as the Conference had broken up the constitution was suspended and the leader of the reformers, Midhat Pasha, disgraced and executed.

The failure of the Conference threw Russia back upon the policy of armed and isolated intervention. On April 24, 1877, the Russians invaded Turkey, with the support of Rumania, whose prince seized the opportunity to declare the complete independence of the Danubian principalities. The campaign of 1877 was almost entirely occupied by the siege of Plevna. After a dogged resistance prolonged for five months Osman Pasha, the Turkish commander, was forced to surrender the town (December). The Turkish resistance then collapsed. The Russian general Skobelev opened the way to Adrianople, which fell in January 1878; the Serbs resumed the war and occupied Nish, their ancient capital, and the Montenegrins established themselves on the Adriatic coast at Spizza and Dulcigno. In Asia the Russians captured Kars, Ardahan, and Erzerum and occupied most of the Armenian provinces. On January 31, 1878, Abdul Hamid concluded an armistice, and signed a definitive peace treaty at San Stefano on March 3. In Asia Russia proposed to annex Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars. The independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro was recognized by the Sultan, and their territories were to be increased. A big Bulgaria with a long coastline both on the Ægean and the Black Sea was to be established as an autonomous but tributary dependency of Turkey. The Dobrudja, ceded by Turkey to Russia, was to be handed over to Rumania, while Russia took back from Rumania the strip of Bessarabia which Rumania had received by the Treaty of Paris (1856).

By her armed intervention Russia had made considerable gains, especially as it was universally believed that Bulgaria would become a Russian outpost against Turkey. But her subsequent failure to avert the diplomatic intervention of the

Powers deprived her of most of the gains which her armies had won. Britain, when Constantinople was threatened by the Russian advance, had ordered her fleet to Besika Bay to protect the city (January 1878). She now insisted with the support of Austria on the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by a European congress. For some time a Russo-British war seemed imminent, but in the end Russia, which was in no condition to face another war, surrendered.

Before the congress met at Berlin on June 13 under the presidency of Bismarck the main questions at issue had been settled by separate and secret agreements between the Powers most closely concerned. In accordance with the Russo-British agreement the big Bulgaria was divided into three sections. The most northerly section between the Danube and the Balkan mountains obtained complete rights of self-government, although it was to pay tribute to the Porte. A second section, known as Eastern Rumelia, was to remain under the military control of the Porte, thus giving Turkey a strong natural frontier in the Balkan mountains, but received certain rights of self-government. The third section, Macedonia and the Ægean coastline, was restored to the Sultan as an integral part of his empire.

Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied by Austria-Hungary, which also obtained the right to garrison the Sanjak of Novibazar, which contained an important route toward the Ægean and separated Serbia and Montenegro. The stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano in regard to Rumania were confirmed, but Serbia and Montenegro, although their independence was confirmed, lost a great part of the territories which had been promised to them. Montenegro, however, was allowed in 1880 to occupy Dulcigno and a strip of the coveted Adriatic coastline in exchange for certain Moslem districts which had been assigned to her in 1878, but had resisted successfully her attempts at conquest. Greece had taken no part in the struggle, but was promised a rectification of frontier, which was finally defined in 1881 so as to give to her the Arta district of Epirus and a large part of Thessaly.

In Asia Russia was allowed to retain nearly all her conquests on promising to make Batoum "a free port, essentially com-

mercial." But by a previous arrangement with Turkey, by which she guaranteed the remainder of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, Britain was authorized to occupy Cyprus. This acquisition strengthened considerably a weak point in her communications with India and the Far East. The Sultan undertook also to carry out "necessary reforms" in Asia Minor to improve the position of his Christian subjects there. All these arrangements were embodied in the final act of the congress, which was signed on July 13, 1878.

The Congress of Berlin prevented the outbreak of a general war, and satisfied the Great Powers with the exception of Russia, who was forced by her weakness and isolation to look on while the Treaty of San Stefano was torn up and Britain and Austria obtained territorial gains at Turkey's expense which they refused to her. But the treaty completely failed to satisfy the parties most directly concerned—the Balkan states—and their racial aspirations and hatreds complicated the ancient rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans and made the Near East the storm-centre of Europe in the next half-century.

The one important advantage gained by Russia was the creation of the Bulgarian principality, but she soon deprived herself of it. The Bulgarian constituent Assembly under the guidance of Karavelov—a *doctrinaire* radical—drew up a constitution for the new principality and offered the throne to a *protégé* of Alexander II—Alexander of Battenberg—who had no political experience and was at first guided by the Russian officers whom the Tsar sent to be his Chief Ministers. The constitution was soon suspended, and the Prince's Russian advisers attempted to dragoon both the Prince and the country. Russian dictation brought about a coalition of the Prince and the Liberals. In 1883 Prince Alexander restored the constitution, and the Russian Ministers left Sofia in high dudgeon. This victory strengthened Bulgar sentiment not only in Bulgaria, but in Eastern Rumelia, which expelled its Turkish governor, and proclaimed its union to Bulgaria (1885). Prince Alexander had to choose between accepting the crown of the Bulgarias, which would finally sever his connexion with Russia, and refusing it, which would mean his deposition by his

indignant subjects. Naturally enough he chose the former as being the lesser evil.

Russia's opposition to the union of the two Bulgarias was due partly to Alexander III's jealousy of the aggrandizement of his talented cousin, but chiefly to Russia's discovery by the experience of recent years that gratitude for deliverance from the Turk was not sufficient to make the liberated principalities the obedient vassals of Russia. Austria and Britain, on the other hand, now combined to support the union of the two Bulgarias which they had prohibited in 1878. Thanks to Sir William White, her Ambassador at Constantinople, Britain showed an intelligent appreciation of recent events in Bulgaria, and accepted his contention that a Bulgaria friendly to the Porte and jealous of foreign influence would be a far surer bulwark against foreign aggression than two Bulgarias severed in administration, but united in considering the Porte as the only obstacle to their natural development.

The Balkan states, notably Serbia, regarded the union of the two Bulgarias as a complete overthrow of the Balkan balance of power. They demanded that the union should be annulled or that they should receive compensation, and King Milan of Serbia declared war on Bulgaria (November 14, 1885). But in a three-days battle at Slivnitza the Serbs were completely defeated, and the Bulgarian advance on their capital was only averted by the intervention of Austria, which now regarded Serbia as a client state. Slivnitza made practically certain the union of the two Bulgarias, which was recognized by the Porte in April 1886, although until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire the Prince of Bulgaria was, strictly speaking, merely "Governor of Eastern Rumelia."

When it became clear that the opposition of Russia would not prevent the union the Tsar adopted a new line of policy. He turned his attention to securing the deposition of Prince Alexander. This was successfully accomplished. In August 1886 a clique of malcontent officers, instigated by Russia, kidnapped the Prince and deported him across the Russian frontier. But the weak provisional Government which they established was overthrown by the Nationalists under Stambulov, the strong man of Bulgaria and virtual dictator for

the next seven years. Stambulov recalled Alexander, but the Prince humiliated himself in a despairing effort to recover the goodwill of the Tsar. He was then forced to abdicate for the second time.

Everything now turned on the appointment of his successor. If Russia could appoint her own nominee her sole ground for opposition to the union would be removed, and she would be amply avenged for her defeat in the first part of the crisis. But Russia's intrigues and threats failed to secure the election of her nominee, and the Sobranje finally elected Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (July 1887), the grandson of Louis-Philippe, who had been an Austrian officer and was secretly supported by Bismarck. Thanks to these connexions and the resolute support of the Bulgarian patriots, the new prince was soon firmly established on the throne in spite of the persistent hostility of Russia. A programme of thorough domestic reforms was carried out, which greatly strengthened the infant state. And in 1896, after the deaths of Alexander III and Stambulov, Ferdinand at last secured formal recognition from the new Tsar, Nicholas II.

Even before the failure of its chief Balkan provision became manifest the Asiatic clauses of the Treaty of Berlin had become in part a dead letter. Disraeli had hoped to secure far-reaching reforms in Asia Minor, which would give the Ottoman Empire a new lease of life and enable it to resist the expansion of Russia between the Black Sea and the Caspian. But the Sultan made no attempt to carry out his promises of reform. The military consuls sent out by Disraeli were recalled in 1880 by Gladstone, but the British Government continued its efforts to improve the lot of the Christians of Asia Minor, most of whom were Armenians and not members of the Orthodox Church. British intervention, supported at times by the other Powers, irritated the Sultan and raised expectations among the Armenians which led him to fear that they would shortly follow the example of Bulgaria. He accordingly resorted to the time-honoured expedient of Turkish rulers of deliberately provoking Armenian resistance and then massacring the population. The massacres began in August 1894 in the Sasun district, and continued intermittently for some years.

In 1896 the attack of a handful of Armenian hotheads on the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople gave the Sultan a pretext to extend the massacres to the wealthy Armenian colony in the capital and to organize regular *battues* of Armenians in the leading centres of Asia Minor. Britain, which had undertaken by the Treaty of Berlin a special responsibility for the welfare of the subjects of the Sultan in Asia Minor, made strenuous efforts to prevent the massacres, but the lukewarmness of some Powers and the open hostility of others made her intervention fruitless.

CHAPTER XV

BISMARCK'S SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES

UNDER Napoleon III France, owing to the meddlesome policy and much overrated ability of the Emperor, had been generally regarded as the leading state in Europe. The result of the Franco-Prussian War was to transfer this primacy of the nations from France to Germany. "Europe," as a contemporary diplomatist wrote, "had lost a mistress and gained a master." For the next twenty years Bismarck dominates Europe like a colossus, and throughout this period he pursues by devious ways a carefully considered and consistent policy. The new Empire required a period of peace in which progress could be made with the work of internal consolidation. The desire of France for a war of revenge seemed to him the main danger to European peace. But France after her crushing defeat was clearly powerless for the time being unless she could obtain allies. What Bismarck dreaded was a revival of the eighteenth-century anti-Prussian league engineered by Kaunitz, which had almost brought Frederick the Great to disaster. He set himself, therefore, to keep France in isolation. Austria, defeated and humiliated by Prussia in 1866, might be expected to join with France against the common enemy and might be supported by Italy or even by Russia.

In 1872 Bismarck won his first success—the conclusion of the Dreikaiserbund (or League of the Three Emperors)—an *entente* of Russia, Austria, and Germany for the suppression of revolutionary movements and the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans. The rapid recovery of France after 1871, and especially the reorganization and increase of her army, alarmed Germany. The militarists clamoured for a 'preventive war' against France while she was still weak, and Bismarck seized his chance to force France to reduce her army by the

threat of war. He was thwarted, however, by the intervention of Alexander II, who visited Berlin in May 1875 and warned William I not to break the peace of Europe by renewing the struggle with France. Queen Victoria supported the instances of the Tsar at Berlin, and it was made clear that even the Powers in Europe most friendly to Germany would not permit any further weakening of France.

The war scare of 1875 strained the relations of Russia and Germany and weakened the Dreikaiserbund. The Eastern crisis of 1875–78 broke up the league for a time, since it brought Austria and Russia into acute conflict in the Balkans and forced Bismarck to choose between his two allies. At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck posed as "the honest broker," whose one aim was to preserve the peace of Europe by arranging a settlement which would as far as possible satisfy all the Powers. Nevertheless the Treaty of Berlin had vetoed the cherished ambitions of Russia, and the Tsar attributed his failure to retain the gains which he had made in a costly war to Bismarck's connivance with his enemies, Britain and Austria. Influenced by the bitter Press campaign organized by the Pan-Slav movement against Germany for her 'betrayal' of Russia, the Tsar denounced in an autograph letter to the German Emperor (April 1879) the ingratitude of Germany for the invaluable assistance given by Russia in the attainment of German national unity, and hinted that war might result. A Russian general travelled to Paris and proposed the negotiation of a Franco-Russian alliance.

Bismarck was forced to make a momentous decision. He had already decided that, if and when circumstances compelled him to choose between Russia and Austria, he would conclude an alliance with Austria, and this had determined his attitude in 1876–78. Germany's position in Central Europe required that she should have "a safe friend." Bismarck believed that Austria would fill the *rôle* admirably. In every alliance of the Powers, he argued, one party was the rider, and the other the horse. Since Germany needed Russia's alliance more than Russia needed the support of Germany, he believed that it would be impossible for him to control Russian policy. On the other hand, alliance with Austria could be used to secure

control of Austria's Balkan policy. Therefore alliance with Russia would force Germany to support the aggressions of Russia upon Turkey, and would deprive Germany of the gains which Bismarck hoped to make in the Balkans as the result of his 'disinterested' brokerage at Berlin in 1878. Moreover, the maintenance of Austria as a Great Power was vital to Germany. "Think Austria off the map," Bismarck remarked, "and we are isolated between Russia and France." The Dual Monarchy was the outpost of Germany in the secular conflict between Teuton and Slav. Further, while an exclusive Russo-German alliance would alienate Britain, and might lead to a union of Britain with France and Austria, an alliance of the Central Empires of Austria and Germany could certainly count on British sympathy, and perhaps even on British support. These political arguments were powerfully reinforced by economic and geographical considerations. The Central Empires between them would have complete control of the Rhine and the Danube and partial control of the remaining great river of Central Europe, the Vistula.

Andrássy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, was about to retire, and Bismarck feared that his successor might revert to an anti-German policy. The measures of Russia further strengthened Andrássy's hands in negotiating with Bismarck, and the treaty of defensive alliance which was signed on October 7, 1879, between Germany and Austria showed clear signs that Andrássy had made the most of his advantages. By Article I each Power agreed to assist the other against a Russian attack. By Article II each agreed to remain at least benevolently neutral toward the other if it were attacked by any Power other than Russia—*i.e.*, France. If, however, Russia joined the attacking Power then Austria and Germany were bound to assist each other. The remaining articles fixed the duration of the treaty at five years, with a possible extension to eight years, and provided that in certain circumstances the Tsar might be informed of the existence of the treaty, which was otherwise to remain an inviolable secret. This treaty was renewed from time to time, and remained the basis of action of the Central Empires in all questions of foreign policy until 1918.

The Treaty of Dual Alliance had been concluded in spite of

the opposition of the German Emperor, who was extremely unwilling to do anything which imperilled the good understanding with Russia, which had raised Prussia to greatness. Bismarck contended that the treaty was not incompatible with a good understanding with Russia, and his contention seemed to be justified when the Tsar abandoned his threats and offered to renew the League of the Three Emperors. Russia was isolated in Europe, and was not yet prepared to escape from isolation by an understanding with France. Owing to her failure at the Congress of Berlin the Balkan states were tending to desert her for Austria. Domestic affairs also contributed to the Tsar's decision. Nihilism, which had begun in the sixties as a philosophical and literary movement, had soon tried to put its theories to the test. In the early seventies Nihilists and Socialists secretly conducted classes among the artisans of the towns and sought to permeate the working classes with their doctrines. The discovery of this propaganda could not be long delayed, and the agitators and their converts were deported by tens of thousands to Siberia. In despair the survivors adopted a policy of terrorism. Attempts during 1876–78 to imitate Paris and effect revolutions by street demonstrations failed, and the Nihilists resorted to their last weapon—assassination of prominent Government officials in order to terrorize a Government which they claimed was based on "organized injustice." Women played a considerable part in the terrorist phase of Nihilism. Between 1878 and 1881 outrages, assassinations, and plots followed in rapid succession and culminated in the assassination of the Tsar Alexander II in 1881.

Alexander III, who succeeded his father, concluded on June 18, 1881, the Treaty of the Dreikaiserbund which his father had negotiated. By Article I the contracting parties agreed to remain benevolently neutral and localize the war if one of them was involved in war with a fourth Great Power. The second and third articles were intended to reconcile Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans. The *status quo* in European Turkey was to be altered only by common agreement, and the closure of the Straits to warlike operations was confirmed. By a secret protocol Austria-Hungary was to be allowed to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever she chose. In exchange the

other Powers agreed not to oppose the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, if produced by the force of circumstances. Bismarck declared that the revival of the Three Emperors' League prevented an Austro-Prussian war and a Franco-Russian coalition. This was an exaggeration, but the treaty, which was renewed in 1884 for another three years, certainly brought Russia out of her isolation and enabled Bismarck to intervene with effect to smooth the friction between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans.

Meantime the Dual Alliance had been extended to include Italy, and France was more isolated than ever. With the previous sanction of Britain and at the instigation of Bismarck, who had a shrewd idea of the probable results, France established her protectorate over Tunis (May 1881). Italy, owing to her geographical position and the presence of many Italian settlers there, regarded Tunis as falling within her sphere of interests, and was bitterly offended by the action of France. The Cairoli Ministry, which had been to some extent duped by French professions of disinterestedness in Tunis, was overthrown. The dynasty lost prestige, and Republicanism gained ground. To obtain powerful backing against France and to strengthen the dynasty Italy asked to be admitted to the Dual Alliance. After complicated negotiations the adhesion of Italy was secured by the Treaty of Vienna (May 20, 1882), which established the Triple Alliance, but did not abrogate the provisions of the Dual Alliance of 1879.

The Treaty of Vienna provided that if France attacked Italy Germany and Austria-Hungary would aid her with all their forces. Italy, but not Austria, would assist Germany against a French attack. If any other Great Power attacked one of the contracting parties the others would observe at least benevolent neutrality toward their ally. If two Great Powers—*i.e.*, Russia and France—attacked one or two of the allies then the *casus fœderis* would arise for all. The treaty was to remain in force for five years, and Italy stipulated that the treaty was in no event to be regarded as valid against Britain.

The union of Italy with the Central Empires has been called "unnatural but inevitable." Certainly it would never have taken place but for the French occupation of Tunis; and,

although the treaty was renewed with modifications from time to time and remained in force until 1914, Italy tended to separate herself more and more from her nominal allies. Nevertheless, Italy was the state which gained the greatest advantage from the alliance. She obtained the Austrian Emperor's renunciation of his Italian provinces, a promise that the Central Empires would assist her against France, and the practical certainty that they would not support the Papacy in its efforts to restore the Temporal Power. Moreover, she obtained the assistance of German capital and business capacity in the development of her economic resources, the restoration of her finances, and the reorganization of her army. Germany also benefited by the treaty, for she had obtained from Italy the promise of support against France which Austria-Hungary had refused to give. Germany gained also by the assurance that her ally Austria-Hungary need not fear an Italian attack if she was involved in war with Russia. But in Bismarck's view his chief gain was the perpetuation of the isolation of France and the consolidation of German hegemony of Europe.

There were now three groups of Powers revolving in the German orbit: (i) Austria-Hungary and Germany under the Dual Alliance of 1879; (ii) Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia under the Dreikaiserbund Treaty of 1881; (iii) Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy under the Triple Alliance of 1882. To complete his system of alliances Bismarck turned to the Balkans. The Serbs were jealous of the Russian favouritism of Bulgaria shown in the Treaty of San Stefano, and attributed their disappointment at the Congress of Berlin to the neglect of Russia. They drew closer to the Central Empires, and on June 28, 1881, signed a treaty of alliance which gave Austria control of Serbian foreign policy for ten years. With the support of Austria Prince Milan assumed the title of King in 1882. In 1889 the treaty was prolonged until 1895. Rumania shared Serbia's dissatisfaction with Russia, and her prince was himself a loyal member of the house of Hohenzollern. On October 30, 1883, therefore, Rumania concluded a secret treaty of defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary, to which Germany and Italy acceded. Until 1914

Rumania remained a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance, although she contrived to avoid an open breach with Russia.

The stability of Bismarck's system of alliances was soon tested by the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, which raised in an acute form the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans and almost brought about a European war. It was clear that the Dreikaiserbund, which expired in 1887, would not be renewed. Bismarck was determined to retain his hold on Russia by a separate agreement, since thus alone could a Franco-Russian alliance be averted. He pursued, therefore, a double-faced policy, which in spite of Bismarck's capacity for mendacity aroused the suspicions both of Austria-Hungary and of Russia. The Pan-Slav Press in Russia, headed by Katkov, the editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, advocated the rupture of the old alliance with Germany, which had proved a barrier to the attainment of Pan-Slav ideals, and the conclusion of a treaty with France which would prevent Germany from interfering in a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Bismarck's reply was to demand from the Reichstag the strengthening of the German army, not, as he explained, for war against Russia, but because a successful mediator between Austria and Russia must be armed to the teeth (January 6, 1887).

The hostility of the Russian Press and the Tsar's pointed refusal to muzzle it was the more serious because France, which had for some years past gratefully accepted German support in her policy of colonial expansion, now became restive. The "League of patriots" stirred up French national sentiment against Germany. General Boulanger, the idol of the army and the populace, was closely associated with the league, and his chauvinistic speeches alarmed Bismarck. German opinion was likewise aroused, and several frontier incidents occurred in 1886 and 1887 which might easily have led to the outbreak of war. The Tsar, who in September 1886 had offered his alliance to France if she would support him in Bulgaria, exerted the whole weight of Russian influence at Berlin to prevent Germany from embarking upon a 'preventive' war with France.

The refusal by France of the Tsar's offer of alliance, the reviving influence of the Russian Chancellor, Giers, who was a

consistent advocate of the German alliance, and Bismarck's refusal to permit the return of Alexander of Battenberg to Bulgaria induced the Tsar to conclude with Germany on June 18, 1887, the notorious "Reinsurance Treaty." By Article I it was provided that if one Power was at war with a Great Power the other would maintain a benevolent neutrality and try to localize the conflict. This provision was not to apply to a war in which Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria. By Article II Germany recognized the preponderant influence of Russia in Bulgaria. By Article III, which repeated a clause of the Dreikaiserbund Treaty of 1881, the closure of the Straits was confirmed. Finally, by a very secret protocol, Germany promised to assist Russia in Bulgaria and never to consent to the restoration of Prince Alexander. The treaty was concluded for three years, and remained a secret until 1893.

Austria-Hungary, although ignorant of the Reinsurance Treaty, was dissatisfied with Bismarck's failure to give her real support in the Bulgarian question. In Bismarck's view the Reinsurance Treaty was advantageous to Austria-Hungary, since it enabled him to exercise some measure of control over Russian policy in the Balkans. This, however, was poor consolation to Austria for the lack of Germany's active support, to which she believed herself entitled under the Dual Alliance. Bismarck, however, did something to conciliate his ally by helping her to purchase the renewal for five years of their treaty with Italy on February 20, 1887. The tension between Russia and the Central Powers in the East and between France and Germany in the West of Europe gave Italy an opportunity for driving a hard bargain. Germany had to promise to support by arms the interests of Italy in Morocco and Tripoli and to assist Italy to extend her territories in Europe at the expense of France if the conflict of interests in North Africa led to a Franco-Italian war. Austria was forced to recognize Italy's interests in the Balkans and to promise her an equal share in the partition of Turkey.

A few days earlier Italy had secured from Britain a similar recognition of her Balkan ambitions by the first Mediterranean Agreement (February 12, 1887). The two Powers agreed to oppose any alteration (*i.e.*, at the instance of Russia) in the

status quo in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Ægean, and Black Seas on which they had not previously reached an agreement, and to support each other in the Mediterranean in any disagreement between one of them and another Great Power—*i.e.*, France. Austria, when she realized that Germany could not be counted on for resolute support, turned to the Italo-British combination and promptly acceded to the agreement. When the election of Ferdinand of Coburg to the Bulgarian throne (August 1887) increased the tension between Austria and Russia she drew still closer to Britain and Italy by the second Mediterranean agreement (December 12, 1887), by which the contracting parties declared that they were determined to maintain the *status quo* in the Orient and in particular to prevent the establishment of Russian predominance in Bulgaria. This treaty was a secret one, but the Tsar was well aware that Britain and Italy would assist Austria if he attacked her.

The Reinsurance Treaty, being secret, did not end the tension between Germany and Russia. Bismarck was far from confident that he could maintain his hold on Alexander III, and took a number of precautionary measures. The German money-market was closed to Russian loans (November 1887), and in February 1888 Bismarck published the Dual Alliance Treaty of 1879, thus warning Russia that Germany would not permit her to crush Austria. In the Reichstag he made a jingoist speech, plainly intended to bring further pressure upon Russia. He made a violent attack on the Slavophil Press, and declared that since it "had shown the door to an old, powerful, and effective friend, which we were, we shall not knock at it again." He affirmed that peace would be maintained, but concluded: "I advise other countries to discontinue their threats. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world." The publication of the 1879 treaty and this bellicose speech compelled the Tsar to surrender and recognize, in fact, although not in form, the establishment of Ferdinand of Coburg in Bulgaria.

The results of the crisis were serious to the Bismarckian system. Although he had maintained his system, and had even in appearance strengthened it by winning the closer

adhesion of Britain through her Mediterranean agreements with Austria and Italy, the publication of the Treaty of Dual Alliance convinced Russia that her Balkan ambitions, which could be attained only at the expense of Austria-Hungary, demanded an alliance with a partner who was not bound in the last resort to support her enemy. So long as he remained in office Bismarck kept open the wire to St Petersburg and prevented the Franco-Russian alliance, but in the last years of his administration great steps had been taken toward it.

There were grave difficulties in the way of a Franco-Russian alliance. The Tsar hated the Third Republic as the heir of the Jacobins, and confused Republicans with Nihilists. The French Republicans looked with disgust on the brutal and reactionary Government of the Tsars. While they distrusted the continuity of Russian foreign policy, since it was determined by the will of the reigning Tsar, Alexander III doubted the stability of the Third Republic and was unwilling to discuss matters of consequence with a Ministry which was changed every few months and whose policy might be reversed by its successor. France, above all, feared that the conclusion of an alliance with Russia would provoke a German declaration of war and thus call down on France the danger it was designed to avoid. After 1878 Bismarck adroitly engaged France on a series of colonial adventures which distracted her attention from European affairs for nearly a decade. Moreover, there was a succession of minor incidents between Russia and France owing to the shelter given by France to political refugees from Russia.

On the other hand, the conclusion of the Triple Alliance naturally tended to effect a *rapprochement* between the only two Great Powers on the Continent excluded from it, and there grew up in both countries a strong party which advocated an alliance between them. Bismarck's closure of the Berlin money-market to Russia gave an impetus to the *rapprochement*, since, with the ready consent of the French Government, large Russian loans were henceforth raised at Paris. Between 1888 and 1893 four milliards of francs were lent by French investors to the Russian Government. The economic bond was soon strengthened by political ties. Early in 1889

France undertook to manufacture rifles of a new pattern for the Russian Government on receiving an assurance that they would never be used against France. The Grand Duke Nicholas went further and assured the French Premier that the two armies would be one in time of war. Further progress was almost impossible so long as the Reinsurance Treaty remained in force, but the remaining ties between Russia and Germany were soon to be dissolved.

The death of the old Emperor William I broke the personal link between the two empires. His successor Frederick III died after a three-months reign and was succeeded by his son, William II. The young Emperor was determined to rule and not merely to reign. He was imbued with the idea of monarchy by divine right, and had eagerly imbibed the militarist traditions of his house. Like his ancestor Frederick the Great, he meant to be his own First Minister and Commander-in-Chief. In the first months of his reign he felt that he was overshadowed by the "Iron Chancellor," and bitterly resented the overbearing manner of his Chief Minister. As soon as he felt strong enough he was determined to "drop the pilot," and carried out his intention in March 1890. Bismarck's successor was Count Caprivi, a soldier with no political experience, who knew his own limitations and deferred readily to the Emperor. But a subordinate official in the Foreign Office, Holstein, exercised for the next fifteen years more influence on German foreign policy than successive Chancellors and Foreign Ministers, and came to be known in diplomatic circles as "the Grey Eminence of the Wilhelmstrasse." With new men came new measures, and Germany set out upon "the new course."

The first act of the new directors of German policy was to refuse to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, which therefore expired in June 1890. Bismarck had been a "juggler who could keep five balls in the air at one time." Caprivi felt that this achievement was beyond him, and hastened to simplify German foreign policy. Holstein knew that the decision would tend toward a Franco-Russian alliance, but believed that such an alliance, even if accomplished by Russia in a moment of pique, was unnatural and could not last. William II feared that Russia by publishing the treaty might at any moment

alienate Britain from Germany at a time when he had set his heart on effecting an alliance between the two great "Teutonic peoples." All of them felt that the Reinsurance Treaty was inconsistent with the spirit of the Dual Alliance. Bismarck had already told Russia that in the last resort Germany would support Austria, his successors now informed Russia that henceforth they could not be depended upon to exercise the measure of restraint which Bismarck had imposed upon Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. This momentous decision, although it did not at first seriously impair the friendly relations of Russia and Germany, gave the final impulse to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance.

France now felt strong enough to risk offending Germany by concluding an alliance with Russia, and the sudden collapse of the Boulanger agitation helped to convince the Tsar of the stability of the Third Republic. The isolation of Russia was emphasized by the renewal of the Triple Alliance (May 6, 1891), and in August 1891 the bases of a Franco-Russian agreement were laid down. The two Powers promised to confer with each other on every question which might endanger the general peace. If one of them were threatened by aggression the other would concert measures for its ally's defence. Alexander III was stubborn and slow to move, and resisted for two more years the importunities of France, but at last concluded a military convention in December 1893 which transformed the *entente* of 1891 into a binding alliance.

The preamble of this treaty, which constituted the Dual Alliance, declared that its sole object was to be prepared for an attack by the Triple Alliance upon one of its members. By Article I France promised to assist Russia if attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, while Russia would assist France if attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany. By Article III France promised to employ 1,300,000 and Russia 700,000 or 800,000 men. These forces were to engage immediately, so as to compel Germany to fight on two fronts.

Two alterations were subsequently made in the terms of the alliance. It was declared in 1899 that the military convention, which had been concluded in 1893 for the duration of the

Triple Alliance, was to remain in force until the *entente* of 1891 was denounced, even if the Triple Alliance should come to an end. And in 1912 the fabric of the alliance was completed by a naval agreement which arranged for discussions on naval matters between the two allies and for the co-operation of their fleets in the event of war.

The existence of the Dual Alliance was not certainly known until 1896, when the Tsar proclaimed in a ceremonial speech that France and Russia were *nations amies et alliées*, but it was suspected at the time. The treaty caused a tremendous sensation in Europe, and its mere existence had a profound effect upon European affairs. France had emerged at last from her twenty years of isolation. Bismarck's system of alliances had provoked a counter-alliance. The Triple and Dual Alliances divided the Continent into two hostile camps, and the danger of war between them was the greater because their forces seemed to be not unequal. France had set her heart on recovering Alsace-Lorraine, Russia on extending her power in the Balkans. So long as they were divided they had been powerless to resist the dictation of the Central Empires supported by Italy. Strengthened by union, France and Russia were encouraged to adopt a more resolute attitude in the problems in which they were interested. Moreover, the alliance, by linking up the Balkan and Alsace-Lorraine problems, made it practically certain that war on one of these questions could not be localized, but would involve all the powers of the Continent. The Dual Alliance, however, did not make a general war inevitable—so long as Britain continued to sympathize with the stronger group the Dual Alliance could not hope for success, and would therefore in the last resort avoid taking up arms.

CHAPTER XVI

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

FROM the Congress of Vienna to the Congress of Berlin Britain and Russia, alone among the states of Europe, had devoted serious and continuous efforts to colonial expansion, but France from time to time had made tentative attempts to rebuild her colonial empire. Her most notable success had been the conquest of Algiers, undertaken under Charles X and completed in 1847. France had likewise been interested in Mehemet Ali, but her hope of obtaining through him some hold on Syria had been thwarted by Palmerston in 1840. It was, however, chiefly owing to France that the Suez Canal was built (1859–69), under the direction of Ferdinand de Lesseps, although Britain obtained a controlling interest in the canal through Disraeli's purchase of the shares of the Khedive of Egypt (1875). France's other sphere of operations was in the Far East. In 1844, and more definitely in 1858, she secured a protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Chinese Empire similar to that claimed by Russia over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The murder of some French missionaries gave Napoleon III an opportunity for territorial expansion in an outlying province of the Chinese Empire. The blood of the martyrs, he thought, might well serve as the seed of the Empire as well as of the Church. In 1862 Cochin-China and in 1867 part of Cambodia were annexed; and in 1874 France induced the Emperor of Annam to conclude a treaty which gave her some claims to a protectorate of Annam. In spite of the opposition of China, which had claims to suzerainty over the 'empire,' the French protectorate was firmly established in 1885.

These successes of France were paltry when compared with the enormous expansion of the British Empire in this period. The end of the Napoleonic wars left Britain with an undisputed

command of the sea and improved her position by the acquisition of some colonies which were of strategic importance in controlling sea-routes and commerce. Singapore was added in 1819, Aden in 1839, and a series of wars with China ensured the opening of that enormous empire in theory to the trade of all nations, but in practice chiefly to Britain. The process of colonial settlement naturally followed the control of sea-routes —Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Cape Colony, and the later South African settlements all developed a vigorous life of their own and received sooner or later responsible government. Thus, with the notable exception of the United States of America, the bulk of the North American, Australasian, and African continents which was suitable for white settlement had been secured by Britain, and in Asia she controlled most of the strategic centres on the maritime trade-routes, and had built up an enormous empire in India.

Russia's expansion in the first eighty years of the nineteenth century attracted much less attention, because, apart from the Near East, it was confined to the penetration of the northern and central parts of the continent of Asia—sparsely populated by uncivilized tribes and almost entirely unknown to the European nations. The Russian methods of colonization bear a close resemblance to those of ancient Rome. Military conquest, largely accomplished by Cossack bands, was invariably followed by the settlement of Cossack veterans, immigrant Russian peasants, or transported criminals on the land, the building of roads, and, once the land was thoroughly subdued, the establishment of a civil Government like that of the Roman proconsuls. As early as 1860 the Russians had reached the Pacific and built the port of Vladivostock. The next step was an advance into Central Asia. In 1864 Tashkend was annexed, and four years later the golden city of Samarkand, the ancient capital of the Tartar chiefs Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Soon all Eastern Turkestan was in Russian occupation. Western Turkestan, a nominal province of the Chinese Empire, held out longer, but in 1873 the Khan of Khiva and in 1876 the Khan of Khokand submitted to Russian rule, and only the deserts of Persia and the mountains of Afghanistan lay between Russia and the British Empire in India.

Skobelev drew up a plan of campaign against India by which Russia could avenge herself upon Britain for her defeat at the Congress of Berlin. The conquest of Turkestan was completed, and all resistance was cowed by Skobelev's brutal massacre of the inhabitants after the storming of Denghil-Tepe, the last Turkoman stronghold, in 1881. In spite of previous assurances that she regarded Afghanistan as outside her sphere of operations, Russia now began to encroach upon the weak and divided Afghan tribes, whose territory Britain wished to maintain intact as a buffer State between Russia and her Indian empire. In 1884 Russia seized the oasis of Merv, and in March 1885 the Penjdeh district. Even Gladstone was roused out of the complacent pacifism with which he normally treated foreign affairs, and it was only at the last moment that a war between Britain and Russia was avoided by a compromise. The Tsar was impressed by the danger of war with a Great Power, and decided that the line of least resistance for Russian expansion was at the expense of the Chinese Empire in Manchuria, which had the additional attraction that it would give Russia an ice-free port on the Pacific. The new orientation of Russian policy was shown by the commencement in 1892 of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Russia, Britain, and to a lesser extent France had the great advantage of being first in the field of colonial expansion. After the Congress of Berlin they were followed by the other Powers, and colonial rivalry became one of the main forces which determined the foreign policies of all the Powers. Several explanations for this outburst of colonial activity may be suggested. The industrial revolution was transforming the Continental states in varying degrees into manufacturing and commercial communities. The growth of large-scale industry demanded ample supplies of raw material and an extensive market for the sale of its productions, while the accompanying growth of population led to emigration. Thus colonies were desired to produce raw material, to buy the finished products of the home manufacturers, and to enable 'exports' of surplus population to remain under the flag of the mother-country. The raising of tariff walls against each other by the Continental states increased the desirability of colonies.

The triumph of Nationalism in Central Europe in 1871 may also be adduced as another explanation. The satisfaction in the main of their European ambitions left the newly consolidated states of Italy and Germany free to participate in colonial affairs, and they readily followed the examples set by Britain, Russia, and France. Widespread commerce and a colonial empire came to be regarded as a necessary appanage to a fully developed national state. As the Emperor William II, a true product of the age in this respect, remarked: "World power—without that a nation cuts a deplorable figure."

The main field on which the colonial ambitions of the Powers centred was Africa. Britain and France were already well established along the coastal fringe of the "Dark Continent," and it was their action in increasing their African empires at the beginning of the eighties which gave the signal for a general scramble for African territories, which ended twenty years later in an almost complete partition of the continent among the European Powers. At the instigation of Bismarck and with the consent of Britain France attacked Tunis, a nominal dependency of the Porte, and compelled the Bey to accept a French protectorate by the Treaty of Bardo (May 12, 1881). The resistance of the scattered tribes in the interior was soon ended, but France's acquisition of Tunis drove Italy into the Triple Alliance.

The second step in the partition of Africa—the control of Egypt by Britain—had even greater effects upon the relations of the European Powers. Since Napoleon's expedition, and more definitely after the exploits of Mehemet Ali, France and Britain had both shown a keen interest in Egypt. The construction of the Suez Canal gave Egypt control of the direct route to the East and therefore increased its importance, but the Khedive Ismail squandered his resources and borrowed lavishly at extortionate rates of interest. To protect the interests of foreign bondholders and to avert if possible the Khedive's bankruptcy a dual control by Britain and France of the Egyptian finances was instituted in 1876. Ismail proving recalcitrant, the Powers induced the Porte to depose him in favour of his son Tewfik (1879).

Foreign intervention in Egyptian affairs and the subservience

of the Khedive to the Powers provoked a kind of Nationalist movement in Egypt. The malcontents were mainly army officers, but to win the support of the mob they raised a cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians." The leading spirit among the officers was Arabi Bey, who soon gathered round him a force of 5000 soldiers and established a veiled military dictatorship. France and Britain enormously strengthened Arabi's position and the Nationalist movement by threatening to intervene (January 1882). Riots occurred at Alexandria, in which fifty Europeans were massacred by the mob. France, fully occupied in Tunis and in the Far East and intent on the European situation, refused to co-operate with Britain in restoring order. A British squadron bombarded Alexandria (July), and a military force under Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Port Said, routed Arabi's forces at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, and restored the authority of the Khedive. France by refusing to co-operate had abandoned Egypt to her rival, but she could neither forget nor forgive Britain for taking the opportunity which she herself had failed to seize. Common antagonism to Britain helped to draw France and Russia together into the Dual Alliance, which in its origin and early acts was directed against the colonial empire of Britain almost as much as against Germany.

In 1882 Britain had no intention of remaining permanently in Egypt, but the revolt of the Mahdi in the Sudan completely unsettled the province and threatened Egypt with invasion by a mob of fanatical tribesmen. General Gordon was sent by the British Government to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from the Sudan, but allowed himself to be surrounded in Khartum. After an heroic resistance the citadel was stormed on January 26, 1885, two days before the vanguard of the British relief force, which had been tardily organized, reached the city. Thereafter the revolt was allowed to burn itself out, but the presence of a British garrison at Wady Halfa was necessary to protect Egypt. Occasional attempts were made to arrange for the British evacuation, but it proved impossible to arrange terms which would satisfy all the interested parties, Britain, the other Great Powers, and Turkey, which still maintained a nominal suzerainty over Egypt. As has been said of

other British colonies, Britain had "acquired Egypt in a fit of absence of mind."

Two years after Britain's intervention in Egypt Germany made the first steps toward becoming a world Power. Bismarck was "not a colony man," but the growth of Germany's industries and the rapid increase of emigration forced him to recognize that there was some truth in the propaganda of the German colonial society, which had been founded at Frankfurt in December 1882. In April 1884 he proclaimed a protectorate over South-west Africa, excluding Walfisch Bay, which was already occupied by Britain, from the southern boundary of Portuguese Angola to the Orange River, the northern frontier of the British territories in South-west Africa. In February 1885 he proclaimed a protectorate over a large slice of East Africa, now known as Kenya, in spite of the opposition of the Sultan of Zanzibar. In the Guinea Coast he acquired Togoland and the Cameroons by deliberately tricking the British Government. In each case the way toward German political authority had been prepared by 'commercial' missions and the peaceful penetration of German merchants. In less than two years Germany had become beyond dispute the Third Power on the Dark Continent in respect of the area and population of her territories. Bismarck's success was the more striking since it had been obtained by diplomacy, without moving a single warship and without fighting a single battle.

Germany did not confine her activities to the African continent. In 1885 she also entered the Pacific and obtained a share in the island of New Guinea, hitherto controlled by Britain and Holland, and also annexed the Bismarck Archipelago, hitherto called the New Britain Islands. In 1898 she added Samoa to her Pacific possessions.

The appearance of Germany as a colonial Power, and the methods by which she built up her empire, had momentous consequences. Knowing that Britain required Germany's support against France in Egypt and elsewhere, Bismarck deliberately blackmailed the British Government and extorted its consent to his colonial acquisitions. To strengthen his hands he inspired a Press campaign in Germany against Britain, and thus confirmed the uneasiness which his tactics aroused

in the minds of British statesmen. Another result, which Bismarck certainly did not foresee, followed from his successful intervention in world politics. The defence of Germany's newly won empire demanded a fleet, and thus strengthened the hands of the German imperialists, who were already clamouring for the creation of a powerful navy. Thus Bismarck in the years 1884–85 unconsciously set Germany upon a path which was soon to bring her into conflict with Britain.

Italy, bitterly disappointed by France's seizure of Tunis, was eager to obtain compensation elsewhere in Africa. She established herself at Massowah, on the Red Sea, in 1887, but all her efforts to expand inland were defeated by the warlike tribesmen of Abyssinia. After a crushing defeat at Abba Carima in 1896 the Italian troops were driven back to the coast, and Italy by the Treaty of Addis Abeba recognized the independence of Abyssinia.

Of the other European states Belgium alone, thanks to the foresight and lack of scruple of her king, Leopold II, obtained an important share in the partition of Africa. Leopold had established in 1876 the International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa, and had afterward financed the explorer Stanley in many of his expeditions. Stanley founded numerous trading-stations on the Congo, and concluded treaties with many native chiefs which founded a new state on the Congo. France, whose agents were exploring the northern part of the Congo basin, was jealous of Leopold II's activities, but when an international conference met at Berlin (1884–85) it handed over 870,000 square miles of the Congo basin to Leopold's rule. The new state was called the "Independent State of the Congo," or the Congo Free State. The final act of the Berlin Conference had attempted to secure international control, international free trade, and the suppression of slavery and the slave-trade. In practice the international character of the new state was soon obliterated, and its unscrupulous ruler systematically violated the provisions of the Berlin Act. For over twenty years the unfortunate population of the Congo Free State was ruthlessly exploited and oppressed in the interests of its ruler, but on his death the colony passed under the control of the Belgian Government, and its administration was radically reformed and humanized.

became more and more marked. And the price which Britain had to pay—considerable even in 1890–94, when the Anglophil Caprivi was Chancellor and the Emperor was in the first flush of his enthusiasm for the British *entente*—became exorbitant when the Emperor's enthusiasm cooled and Prince Hohenlohe succeeded Caprivi and gave a distinctly Russian bias to German policy.

Colonial differences in the Congo and Niger basins were the earliest cause of the alienation of Germany from Britain. Anglo-German hostility in Africa came to a head in January 1896, when William II, by the notorious telegram which he dispatched to President Kruger, indicated an intention to support the Boer republics against Britain. There was also friction between them in the Near East. Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, was convinced that the dissolution of the Turkish Empire was inevitable, and was not unwilling to hasten the process if it could be done so as to improve the lot of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, particularly of the Armenians, who were being methodically massacred. Somewhat rashly he explained these views to the German Emperor at Cowes in August 1895. William II, on the other hand, saw in the Sultan a potential ally and in his territories a valuable field for German commercial and colonial exploitation.

The Turkish army reorganized by German officers proved its mettle in 1897, when it crushed a Greek attack and would have occupied Athens but for the intervention of the three protecting Powers, Russia, Britain, and France. With the support of Italy the protecting Powers also forced Turkey to grant autonomy to Crete, whose desire for union with Greece had been the original cause of the Græco-Turkish War. Crete was placed under the rule of Prince George of Greece, as High Commissioner of the Powers, and a constituent assembly drew up a Liberal constitution. The Central Empires remained ostentatiously aloof not only in the Cretan Question, but also in the Armenian Question, where Britain stood practically alone in her remonstrances to the Sultan.

In 1898 William II visited Constantinople and received in person the reward for his support of the Sultan in defeating the Greeks and massacring the Armenians. The Anatolian Railway

Company, which was controlled by German capital, was authorized to extend its line to the Persian Gulf; and Germany thus obtained a short cut to the East by an overland route, free from interruption by Britain's sea-power. The unholy alliance of Kaiser and Sultan was hallowed and strengthened by their mutual satisfaction at the first-fruits of the alliance. William II, in his usual reckless fashion, announced publicly by a notorious speech at Damascus the use which he hoped ultimately to make of it. "The Sultan and the three hundred million Mohammedans scattered over the earth," he said, "may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend." As most of these Mohammedans lived under the rule of Britain, France, and Russia, he believed that their support would be a valuable tool for the pursuit of Germany's world policy.

The rift between Britain and Germany was widened by two general forces. Germany, thanks to her industrial revolution and the protectionist policy of her Government, was rapidly attaining a leading position among the industrial Powers of the world. Overseas commerce naturally followed. Every increase in Germany's colonies, export and import trade, and mercantile marine increased her vulnerability to naval attack and intensified the demand for the creation of a powerful fleet. Tirpitz became chief of the German Admiralty, and began his lifework—the creation of the German navy—by introducing the first Navy Bill in the autumn of 1897. Britain had already discovered that Germany was a serious challenger to her industrial and commercial supremacy: in the next decade she awoke to the peril to her command of the seas.

The increase of tension between Britain and Germany in the nineties was great, but the friction between her and the Dual Alliance was even greater. With Russia the main source of trouble was in the Far East. Since the Revolution of 1868, which restored the power of the Mikado, Japan had been reorganized on European lines. Feudalism was abolished; roads and railways built; a national system of cultural and technical education was organized; industry and commerce made great strides; the civil administration and the army and navy were recast and brought to a high state of efficiency. On this solid

foundation the Mikado granted a constitution to his people in 1889. Japan had ambitions in China which conflicted with those of Russia, and saw with alarm the commencement of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the progress it was making, thanks to the loans which the French investors showered upon their ally.

Japan tried to anticipate her enemy. In 1894 she went to war with China and compelled the Chinese Emperor to accept the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), whereby he recognized the independence of Korea, over which he had claims to suzerainty and whose strategic position made the control of its harbours a vital interest to Japan, and ceded to Japan Formosa and the peninsula of Liaotung, with Port Arthur. Port Arthur, a warm-water port near to Pekin, seemed a valuable acquisition to Japan. Russia had already set covetous eyes on the port as a suitable terminus for the Trans-Siberian Railway and at once intervened. She was supported by her old ally, Germany, and her new ally, France. The three Powers ordered Japan to surrender the Liaotung peninsula. Japan had perforce to submit, but her statesmen redoubled their reforming activities and prepared silently for a war of revenge against Russia. Britain openly sympathized with Japan and refused to countenance the intervention of the three Powers. Russia at once followed up her victory by obtaining concessions from China which gave her a large measure of economic control over China, and in 1898 she obtained for herself a long lease of Port Arthur. Germany was paid for her support by a long lease of Kiaochau (1898), while Britain hastened to maintain the Balance of Power in the Pacific by leasing Wei-hai-wei as a naval base. The Powers seemed to be about to partition China, and Britain stood little chance of success against the combined forces of Germany and the Dual Alliance.

Wherever the British and French empires were in touch with each other there were constant disputes. In the New Hebrides the Anglo-French *condominium* established in 1886 was a continuous source of friction. In the Far East France's position on the flank of Britain's empire in India had caused considerable trouble. When France had pushed her frontier forward by the final establishment of her authority in Indo-China

Britain had annexed Burma (1885). Siam was now a buffer State, and there was keen rivalry to control it, which almost led to war in 1893. But this cause of trouble was removed in 1896 by a 'compromise,' in which Britain surrendered nearly all her claims.

It was in Africa, however, that France and Britain had their most serious quarrels. There were boundary disputes in West Africa, especially on the Niger, where France revived her eighteenth-century policy in America and tried to hem in the British settlements along the coast. Early in 1897 a Niger commission met at Paris, and in June 1898 the most dangerous disputes on the Niger basin were adjusted. Madagascar had become a French protectorate in 1885, and France pursued her invariable colonial policy of trying to confine the trade of the colony to French traders. Her attacks on British trade made Britain extremely unwilling to recognize the protectorate, but she took this step in 1890 in exchange for a French guarantee of her trading rights with the island under former treaties with the native rulers. The guarantee soon proved worthless, and Anglo-French hostility increased after France suppressed the native risings and annexed the island (1896).

More important than any of these causes of friction was the rivalry for the control of the upper waters of the Nile. Britain's claim was based on her succession to the suzerainty formerly exercised by the Khedive over the Sudanese tribes, and thus revived all the old bitterness over the British occupation of Egypt. In spite of official British warnings France secretly fitted out an expedition under Colonel Marchand in West Africa. After a toilsome and dangerous journey Marchand and a handful of followers reached the Nile at Fashoda in July 1898. But he arrived too late. During Marchand's two years' journey across the continent a British force under Kitchener had pushed its way up the Nile, and on September 2, 1898, routed the Sudanese tribes at the decisive battle of Omdurman, outside the walls of Khartum. Kitchener then advanced to Fashoda and invited the Marchand mission to retire from Anglo-Egyptian territory. Ultimately it was agreed that Marchand should remain until he could receive orders from Paris. Britain stood firm in her determination to secure the

Upper Nile, if necessary by war, and France reluctantly agreed to evacuate Fashoda. France knew that in the event of war Britain's overwhelming maritime power would enable her to seize the colonial empire France had painfully acquired. She feared also an attack from Germany while she was fully engaged with Britain. To push her differences with Britain to the length of war would mean the final renunciation of her hopes of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. Her prestige was partly saved by Britain's agreeing not to oppose the expansion of the French Empire north and north-east of Lake Chad into the sandy wastes of the Sahara. Nevertheless France was humiliated, and her humiliation seemed to provide yet another cause of Franco-British hostility.

Britain's success at Fashoda stands almost by itself in the nineties. She was losing touch with Germany, and the hostility of the Dual Alliance toward her increased rather than diminished. The preamble of the Dual Alliance Treaty was apparently directed against Germany, but in the nineties the Allies had done nothing to weaken Germany, and had on occasion co-operated with her. More than ever it seemed that Germany dominated Europe and could choose between Britain and Russia.

The older generation of British politicians, represented by Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, still preferred to adhere to the time-honoured policy of Canning and avoid regular alliances with other Powers. Some of the younger men, notably Joseph Chamberlain, realized clearly the difficulties and dangers of what their elders called the "splendid isolation" of Britain, and were determined to secure an alliance with one of the great groups which dominated the Continent.

They turned first toward Germany, and their efforts to secure an understanding with her occupy the years 1898–1901. This may be described as the second stage in the diplomatic revolution. Britain's preference for Germany as an ally was natural, since the mid-Victorian tradition of friendship was still strong. The traditional friendship of Britain and Germany was supplemented by a similar tradition toward Germany's allies, Austria and Italy, with whom Britain had concluded the Mediterranean agreements of 1887. On the other hand, the old

tradition of enmity to France had been reinforced by the nineteenth-century antagonism toward Russia. Finally, while colonial disputes with Germany were occasional and of a minor character, there had been for twenty years acute and almost continuous conflict with Russia in Asia and France in Africa.

In March 1898, therefore, Chamberlain offered the British alliance to Germany. Such an offer would probably have been eagerly accepted by William II at the opening of his reign; now he and his Ministers made difficulties. They pointed out that the treaty would not be binding unless it received the sanction of Parliament. Was the British Government sure that it could procure the consent of Parliament to the abrogation of Britain's traditional policy of avoiding entangling alliances with Continental Powers? In any case, they argued, the publication of the treaty would in the eyes of Europe commit Germany to the British side in world politics. Russia would be alienated from Germany, and the exclusive Franco-Russian alliance which Germany wished either to enter or to destroy would be strengthened. Moreover, the directors of German policy distrusted the sincerity of Britain. William II wrote that the design of Britain was "either to constrain us to an alliance or, as with Holland in the past, to annihilate us before we are strong enough to resist. If England were in good faith the agreement would be an excellent one for our future." In the end the British offer was quietly shelved, because Germany wished to preserve her freedom to act as her interests dictated in any future quarrel between Britain and the Dual Alliance.

Chamberlain was not discouraged. He renewed his proposals later in 1898 and again in 1899, but with no better result. By this time Germany was trying hard to obtain admission to the Dual Alliance, and the early defeats of Britain in her war against the Boer republics in South Africa gave an impetus to the idea of a Continental combine against her. But the negotiations broke down, because France would not renounce finally all idea of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. Britain was right in her calculation that much as Germany and France disliked her they hated each other more, and that she could therefore choose between them. In the spring of 1901

she gave Germany a last chance to make a bid, and warned the German Government plainly that if her offers were rejected she would approach France. Nevertheless Germany once more refused, and the British Government reversed its policy and tried what had seemed at first the less attractive and less practical policy of reaching an understanding with France. Before this was attained Britain had already emerged from isolation by concluding an alliance with Japan.

The seizure of three of China's best ports by three of the leading Powers in 1898 brought Chinese resentment at foreign intervention to a head. Secret societies, especially the Boxers, were formed to drive the foreigners out of China, and organized serious riots at Pekin and other centres. The German Ambassador was murdered, and the British Embassy, where many of the European residents had taken refuge, was besieged. The European Powers, the United States, and Japan organized an international relief force, which had little difficulty in occupying Pekin and restoring order. Their success destroyed the unanimity of the Powers. Russia tried to extort additional concessions from China for herself, Britain and Japan encouraged Chinese resistance to these demands. Germany in October 1900 concluded the Yangtse Agreement with Britain, by which both Powers pledged themselves to maintain the integrity of China and to uphold the principle of the open door in China and particularly in the Yangtse basin. But within a few weeks the agreement was a dead letter, because Germany insisted that it did not apply to Manchuria, where Russian aggression was to be feared, but only to China south of the Great Wall.

Deserted by Germany, Britain and Japan concluded an alliance on January 30, 1902. Britain had long been interested in the domestic reforms which were transforming Japan, and had given proof of her friendship by surrendering in 1892 the rights of extra-territorial jurisdiction which European Powers demand for the security of their subjects residing in backward and uncivilized countries. Three years later she had refused to join with Germany and the Dual Alliance in robbing Japan of the spoils she had won from China. The common interest which brought Britain and Japan together was hostility to the

aggressive policy of Russia in the Far East. The object of the treaty of 1902, which was to remain in force for five years, was to maintain the independence of China and Korea (Article I). By Article II each Power promised neutrality if the other were involved in war with Russia or any other Power in defence of its interests in the Far East. Article III provided that if any other Power—*e.g.*, France—joined in the war foreseen in Article IV the other contracting party would assist its ally.

Britain had emerged from isolation. Japan had secured recognition as a Power and could now prepare for the long-anticipated struggle with Russia with every confidence that the alliance would prevent the intervention of any other Power on the side of Russia. The Anglo-Japanese alliance disposed of forces ample to resist the ambitions of Russia in the Far East, and this, after Russia had vainly attempted to overthrow the barrier by force, tended to divert Russian activities to the Balkans, where they were more dangerous to European peace.

In itself the Anglo-Japanese alliance might have been a step toward the alliance of Britain and Germany, since the original suggestion of the alliance seems to have come from Berlin. But all idea of this had now been given up at London, and the alliance was regarded as a powerful weapon which might help Britain to reach an understanding with the Dual Alliance. Public opinion in France, notably during the Boer War, was hostile to Britain, but Edward VII visited France in 1903, and by his tact and charm of manner did much to change the tone of French feeling. The French Government asked for nothing better than an understanding with Britain so long as it did not involve a breach of the Dual Alliance. Moreover, France could not conceal from herself that the high hopes she had entertained of the Dual Alliance had hardly been fulfilled. Russia was still on excellent terms with Germany, and her ally's growing preoccupation in the affairs of the Far East almost compelled France to find security against Germany elsewhere. France could not even count securely on the continuance of the alliance. The loose adhesion of Britain would not alienate Russia, but would strengthen the Dual Alliance as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance, and might even encourage Russia to draw closer to France.

Before diplomatic co-operation was possible between France and Britain the colonial quarrels, which had more than once in the previous decade brought them within an ace of war, must be amicably settled. After eight months of arduous negotiation this was effected by the three conventions of April 8, 1904. The most important of these gave Britain a free hand in Egypt in exchange for a British promise to give France a free hand, within certain limits, in Morocco. British trade was not to be injured, and the coast opposite to Gibraltar was not to be fortified. Article IX is important, since it bound the two Governments to give each other diplomatic support in executing the convention. By a secret article a certain part of Morocco was marked out as the share of Spain in the eventual partition of Morocco.

By the second convention France gave up the rights of her fishermen under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to land and build huts on the coast of Newfoundland in exchange for minor territorial cessions in West Africa, which greatly improved the means of communication in her West African empire. The third convention settled some minor causes of friction. Siam was divided into spheres of influence, separated by a neutral area. Britain recognized the French annexation of Madagascar, and submitted to the loss of her trade with the island. The complicated New Hebrides question was referred to a commission, and in 1906 an Anglo-French *condominium* was established. As yet the only tie between Britain and France was the ninth Article of the First Convention, but the termination of hostility between them had undermined the German hegemony of Europe far more effectively than the conclusion of the Dual Alliance.

France meantime had strengthened her position in another direction by the restoration of friendly relations with Italy. In 1896 Italy had bowed to the inevitable and recognized the French protectorate of Tunis. Two years later a tariff war, which had aroused bad feeling between them for a decade, was settled by a compromise. The anti-clerical policy of the French Government evoked the sympathy of Italy, who still dreaded the restoration of the Temporal Power, since the Papacy under Leo XIII continued to refuse any compromise.

In 1900 Humbert I was assassinated by an anarchist, and his successor, Victor Emmanuel III, was not bound to the Triple Alliance by the same personal ties as his father. In the same year the last cause of hostility was removed by a settlement of French and Italian claims in North Africa. Morocco fell within the sphere of France; Tripoli was assigned to Italy. Finally, in 1902, when Italy renewed the Triple Alliance, she assured France that she was in no way bound to take part in an attack upon her, but would, on the contrary, remain neutral in that event. Italy had now a foot in both camps, and tended to move out of the Triple Alliance into the *entente* of Britain and France. But in 1914 she was still nominally a member of the Triple Alliance.

France, encouraged by her agreements with Britain and Italy and strengthened by Spain's acceptance of the share of Morocco offered to her by the Franco-British *entente*, now attempted to secure the gains promised to her in Morocco by direct negotiations with the Sultan. Alone among the Powers Germany had not been consulted by France. Her interests were purely commercial, but this made her sensitive to the establishment of the political control of France in Morocco, since this was invariably followed by restrictions upon the trade of France's commercial rivals. Moreover, Germany undoubtedly hoped to secure a good naval base on the Moroccan coast. The preoccupation of France's ally in the Far East seemed to give Germany a good chance to assert her claims. On March 31 the Kaiser landed at Tangier and, by making a provocative and sensational speech, intervened publicly in the Franco-Moroccan negotiations. A few days later Bülow, who had become Chancellor in 1900, demanded that the question of Morocco should be dealt with by a congress of the Powers. Germany's intervention was justifiable, since France was deliberately trying to exclude her from all voice in an affair in which she had a right to be consulted; the manner of it was quite unjustifiable, and led to the suspicion that Germany was seeking either to break up the Franco-British *entente* before it could solidify, by proving to France the worthlessness of British support, or to provoke France into war.

Encouraged by the attitude of Germany, the Sultan of

Morocco refused to accept the demands of France and broke off negotiations. In spite of the strenuous resistance of Delcassé, the Foreign Minister, the French Cabinet refused to run the risk of war with Germany, and after much hesitation accepted the conference proposed by Germany. Delcassé resigned, and his resignation had the appearance of being dictated by Germany, but there can be no doubt that the decision of the French Cabinet was the correct one. France's ally Russia had been defeated in the Far East and could give no armed support. France had as yet no assurance of more than diplomatic support from Britain. In a conference she was certain of the support of Russia and Britain, and to a lesser extent of Italy and Spain (under their agreements with her), and she was able to obtain also a promise of support from Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, if Germany tried to use the conference for an "unjust or unfair" attack on the interests of France.

The conference met at Algeciras in January 1906, but a settlement was not reached until April. Germany insisted that the control of Morocco ought to be international in character. France was reluctant to admit this, and was particularly anxious to exclude Germany from any share in the control. The main points at issue were the organization of the police—a vital point in an unsettled and uncivilized state —and the constitution of the State bank. Finally the police mandate was divided between France and Spain, with a Swiss Inspector-General, but the State bank was internationalized, each signatory to the final Act of Algeciras being assigned an equal share in its capital. While Germany had in the main successfully maintained her point that the control should be international, the substance of victory rested with France, which had excluded Germany from any effective share in the control. Moreover, German intervention in Morocco strengthened the *entente* of Britain and France which she was anxious to destroy. Britain loyally fulfilled her obligation to give France diplomatic support in the Moroccan question.

Moreover, in the stress of the crisis the *entente* was transformed. The British Government authorized its military and naval experts to discuss with their French colleagues the most

effective methods by which Britain could support France, on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed should bind either Government or restrict in any way its freedom to make a decision as to whether or not it would give that support when the time came. The authorization of these discussions by the British Government was a far-reaching step. No matter how explicitly they reserved their future freedom of action, the fact that these discussions had taken place marked a definite stage in the evolution of the *entente cordiale* into an alliance.

Just as the *entente* of 1904 led to the adoption by France of a forward policy in Morocco, so Japan's alliance with Britain encouraged her to push on her preparations against Russia, who had taken advantage of the Boxer Rising to occupy Manchuria and, after some hesitation, finally refused to evacuate the province. Japan accordingly declared war, and three days later nearly all the Russian warships at Port Arthur were torpedoed and sunk by the Japanese fleet, which thus obtained the command of the sea. Port Arthur surrendered after a prolonged siege on January 1, 1905. A few weeks later the Russian army was decisively defeated at Mukden, and the Russian Baltic Squadron, dispatched in the autumn of 1904 to relieve Port Arthur, was annihilated by the Japanese fleet at Tsushima a few days after its arrival in Chinese waters (May 27, 1905). While passing through the North Sea the Russian Baltic Squadron was taken by a sudden panic and fired on a British fishing fleet off the Dogger Bank. This incident nearly caused war between Britain and Russia.

The succession of Russian disasters staggered Russia and astounded Europe. Japan had now secured her objects in entering the war, and, under the mediation of the United States, peace was concluded at Portsmouth (U.S.A.) on September 5, 1905. Japan secured the Liaotung peninsula with Port Arthur, and recovered the southern half of the island of Saghalien, taken from her by Russia in 1875. Russia promised to evacuate Manchuria, and recognized that Korea was within the Japanese sphere of influence. These gains were secured by the renewal for ten years and the extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (August 12, 1905). If either Power was attacked, even by a single Power, the other would

come to its assistance. Britain was compensated for this notable increase of her obligations by the extension of the alliance to cover British interests in India. Russia could not fail to recognize that she must abandon her projects in the Far East.

The Russo-Japanese War tended at first to bring Russia and Germany together. William II was eager to exploit the services which he had rendered to Russia by securing the Tsar's signature to a treaty of defensive alliance between Russia and Germany, which France could be coerced into joining. On July 23, 1905, he surprised the feeble-willed Tsar into signing the Treaty of Björko without consulting any of his Ministers. By Article I each Power would assist the other with all its forces if attacked by any European Power. The third article provided that the treaty would come into force on the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan, and the fourth that Russia would invite France to accede to the treaty. The Kaiser was delighted with his handiwork. The Continental combine which he believed he had formed "would block the way to the whole world becoming John Bull's private property." But the Tsar's Ministers realized at once the implications of the treaty. Count Witte, when he became Prime Minister on October 20, denounced it as absurd, and the Tsar wrote to the Kaiser and practically repudiated it on the ground that the accession of France was unobtainable.

The disastrous defeat of Russia in her war with Japan, which the Kaiser had encouraged her to begin, tended to alienate her from Germany, and the abandonment of her Far Eastern ambitions at the conclusion of the war removed one of the chief causes of Anglo-Russian hostility. Moreover, the co-operation of Britain and Russia in support of France at Algeciras prepared the way for an understanding between these Powers, which was soon to result in the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia.

The collapse of the Russian Government in the Far East reacted upon the domestic politics of Russia, where fundamental social and economic changes were already in full swing. After 1890 industry on a large scale developed rapidly in Russia. The factory system was firmly established, large towns sprang up, and, in short, Russia underwent an industrial

revolution of the same kind as had occurred earlier in Western Europe, but on a much smaller scale. The development of manufactures had, indeed, begun much earlier, chiefly owing to the initiative of the Government, which adopted throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries all the devices of mercantilism—bounties, monopolies, and tariffs. But little could be done until the emancipation of the serfs provided an abundant supply of cheap labour. After this industry made considerable progress, but was checked by a prolonged industrial depression in the eighties. The lack of capital and of a good system of transport also retarded Russian industry. Count Witte, who became Minister of Finance and Commerce in 1893, sought to supply these deficiencies by borrowing foreign capital. The State led the way with the construction of railways, locomotive depots, and chemical factories, and was closely followed by private capitalists. The Government was not merely the chief producer; it was also the chief consumer of the goods produced in its factories. Hence the industrial expansion was largely forced and artificial, but in spite of several setbacks there was a real and very considerable industrial development in the generation before 1914.

In many respects the Russian industrial revolution differed from that of Western Europe. Notably it did not lead to the disappearance of the very extensive "cottage industries" carried on by the Russian peasants to eke out the scanty income from their holdings of land. All kinds of goods which could be made by hand from wood, bone, fur, and leather were the chief products, but spinning and weaving were also carried on extensively. The improvement of the canal system and the building of railways in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries was of great advantage both to the factory and cottage industries. As a result of increased supply and demand and of improvements in transportation, the fairs, at which most of Russia's domestic trade had been conducted up to the middle of the nineteenth century, almost disappeared from European Russia.

The industrial revolution of Russia was far, however, from being an unmixed good. The Government placed its faith in high tariffs as a means of encouraging the infant industries

it was striving to establish. The effect of these tariffs in developing the new industries is a disputed question, but there is no doubt that they helped to retard the adoption of modern industrial machinery in agriculture, and forced the peasants to pay high prices for manufactured and imported goods. It has been reckoned that in 1914 the Russian peasant paid two and a half times as much as the German peasant for cotton and sugar, and four and a half times as much for iron implements.

Alexander III had continued throughout his reign (1881–94) the reactionary system which had characterized the last years of his father's rule. Nicholas II, well meaning but weak, continued the system he had inherited. Nihilism was now on the decline, and the leading terrorists were one by one tracked down and executed. The new opposition to the autocracy was of a different character. The Nihilists had failed, because they had made little if any impression on the rural population —the movement had plenty of leaders, but no followers. The industrial revolution in Russia created an industrial proletariat, concentrated in a few great towns and permeated by Socialism of the Marxian type. It was this new class which was to provide the new movement with its followers.

Blind to these forces and to the manifold discontents of the peasants, the Government of Nicholas II held on its autocratic course. The district *Zemstvos*, in spite of the narrow limitation of their powers by an autocracy jealous of its powers, did much good work. They established primary schools, hospitals, and village libraries, made great improvements in sanitation, constructed roads, and gave practical assistance to the peasants in improving their stock and their agricultural methods. Yet in 1900 the *Zemstvos* were forbidden, with the deliberate intention of curtailing their beneficent activities, to raise their annual budget by more than 3 per cent. When such was the Government's attitude to non-political reforms it is not surprising that any attempts to obtain political rights were sternly suppressed. Thousands of persons were annually imprisoned or exiled without any regular trial. The secret police organized trade unions and then arrested workmen who had been foolish enough to listen to the blandishments of these *agents provocateurs*.

The Japanese war shook the autocracy to its foundations. All classes were discontented—even the leading Ministers and generals confided to their diaries that the existing system could not continue. They were right. On January 22, 1905, a procession of thousands of workmen with their wives and families assembled before the Winter Palace in order to present a petition to the Tsar. Failing to disperse the unarmed and unresisting mob by peaceful means, the police and the Cossacks fired upon them, killing and wounding large numbers. The events of "Red Sunday" stirred public opinion in Russia to its depths. A series of strikes and political assassinations followed, and in April 1905 the general assembly of *Zemstvos* boldly demanded a whole series of political reforms—notably the establishment of a national Parliament, elected by manhood suffrage.

For some months the autocracy hesitated. Finally, on August 19, the Tsar decreed the establishment of an Imperial Duma, which was to be merely an advisory body and was to be elected on a very narrow franchise. This derisory offer was met by the proclamation of a general strike by the newly formed central council, or Soviet, of Labour delegates. Magistrates, doctors, and journalists joined with railwaymen, factory operatives, and engineers to "down tools." The Government had to give way, and on October 30 issued a manifesto, which promised to all Russians the rights of personal liberty, including the inviolability of the person, freedom of speech, and the right of association, and transformed the Duma into a legislative body without whose consent no law would become binding. In addition all classes were to participate in the elections to the Duma.

Before the Duma could meet the Government had raised large loans in France and Britain, which greatly strengthened its position, while the revolutionary fervour within Russia gradually subsided. The land-hunger of the peasantry was temporarily met by the landlords' sale to the peasants of a quarter of their entire possessions in the single year 1905. The Government announced that it would cancel the residue of the "redemption annuities" imposed upon the village communities by the emancipation of 1861. Thus the villages became full owners of their lands, and the crushing burden of taxes

was greatly reduced. Having by these methods conciliated the great mass of the rural population, the Government felt strong enough to revoke the promises of the October manifesto by the promulgation of a number of "fundamental laws" re-establishing the autocracy of the Tsar without substantial modification.

The Duma met on May 10, 1906. Practically all its members were supporters of reform. The constitutional Democrats (or Cadets) had much the largest number of seats. Other parties were the "Octobrists," who supported constitutional monarchy on the lines of the "October Manifesto," and the Labour group, which was mostly composed of peasant representatives. The Cadets demanded Parliamentary institutions on the British model, denounced the "fundamental laws," and examined the question of agrarian reform. On July 21, 1906, the first Duma was summarily dissolved by the Tsar.

The Cadet and some other leaders withdrew to Viborg, in Finland, and urged the nation to adopt an attitude of passive resistance to the autocracy's demands for taxes and recruits for the army. Lack of national organization rendered their protests futile. Thus encouraged, the Government established courts-martial for the trial of political offences, and enforced the death-penalty for such crimes as insulting Government officials. Fresh elections for a second Duma were ordered, and the Government did its best to intimidate its opponents, but when the second Duma met on March 5, 1907, it was found to be more radical and revolutionary than the first. After a little more than three months of futile discussions it was dissolved on June 16, 1907.

The Government now rearranged the constituencies, disfranchised or reduced the representation of certain classes and nationalities, and adopted the system of indirect election by the Duma by delegates appointed by the voters. Thanks to these measures the third Duma, which met in November 1907 and sat for five years, was a servile instrument of the autocracy. The new Prime Minister, Stolypin, was a man of considerable driving-force, whose efforts to bolster up the tottering autocracy were for a time successful. Reactionary and monarchical organizations, such as the "Union of the Russian People" founded during the revolutionary disturbances of 1905–7,

were encouraged and supported by the Government and roused a certain amount of artificial and superficial loyalty to the throne among the illiterate masses. Stolypin appealed also to Pan-Slav sentiment. The demands of the subject nationalities for autonomy, which had been heard in the revolutionary period, were answered by an intensification of the attempts to 'Russify' Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic provinces by means of colonization. The Ukrainian national movement was forced underground.

Most important of all was Stolypin's bid for peasant support of the autocracy by the transformation of the Russian Empire into a land of peasant-proprietors. The means adopted toward this end were utterly inadequate. The land-hunger of the peasants could be met only from the enormous lands still belonging to the State and the nobles, and on these the autocracy neither would nor could draw. The methods of cultivation remained very primitive. The great mass of the peasants were still too poor to introduce labour-saving machinery, to procure better qualities of seeds and adequate supplies of manures, or even to keep up the fertility of the soil by allowing it to lie fallow. The usual plough was a wooden implement drawn by a single horse or ox; crops were usually sown by hand and cut with the scythe; even threshing was frequently done by hand-labour. In spite of these handicaps there was a considerable increase in the amount of grain exported in the decades before the outbreak of the Great War.

Meantime the autocracy went on its way heedless of the troubles that were brewing. The revolutionary outbreaks of 1905–7 were indeed the last warning which it was to receive. The Liberal movement had been suppressed, but agrarian discontent and Socialism had merely been driven underground, and were to break forth later with terrible consequences not only for the autocracy, but for the Russian people.

The growing forces of Nationalism, successfully bottled up by the three Eastern Empires, were triumphant in the Far North of Europe. The union of Norway and Sweden, forced upon the Norwegians in 1814, had always been unpopular in Norway. After a severe constitutional struggle the Norwegian Storthing (or Parliament) established the principle of Minis-

terial responsibility in 1884, and succeeded in making itself practically a sovereign legislature. Thus the foundations on which the union had rested—the personal rule of the common monarch—were undermined. The Nationalist movement gained ground rapidly in Norway and had a means of expressing itself in the Storthing. Hitherto the foreign policy of the union had been under the effective control of the Swedish Foreign Minister. This grievance was a serious one, because Norway and Sweden had divergent and in places conflicting commercial interests abroad. After prolonged attempts to find a compromise acceptable to both parties the Storthing in May 1905 unanimously decreed the establishment of a separate consular service for Norway. When the King vetoed the Bill the Ministry insisted upon resigning. The King was quite unable to form a new Ministry from among the members of the Storthing, which promptly declared that the King's cessation to perform the functions of a Norwegian king automatically dissolved the union of Norway and Sweden. A provisional Ministry was appointed which made preparations to defend by arms the newly won independence of their country against Swedish attacks. But a plebiscite, held in August 1905, indicated that the declaration of national independence had the support of an overwhelming majority of Norwegians. In September the King accepted terms of separation satisfactory to Norwegian patriots, and shortly afterward abdicated as King of Norway. One of his grandsons, Prince Charles, was elected by the Storthing to fill the vacant throne, and adopted the title of Haakon VII, King of Norway.

Co-operation at Algeciras, the constitutional experiments of Russia, and the good offices of France, eager to secure a good understanding between her friend and her ally, all helped to bring Britain and Russia together. German supremacy at Constantinople, and the use she made of it to carry on the construction of the Bagdad Railway, gave Britain and Russia a common enemy in the Near East, where the British Government no longer set itself immutably to prevent Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean. The abandonment of Russian ambitions in the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War removed another cause of Russo-British hostility.

Serious friction remained only in the Middle East. In Persia Britain and Russia were competitors for commercial concessions and predominant political influence. Britain dreaded particularly Russia's attempts to undermine her position on the Persian Gulf. In Afghanistan Britain's control of the foreign policy of the Ameer was not retained without considerable difficulties, which were naturally attributed to the intrigues of Russia. The most serious cause of friction, however, was Tibet, nominally a dependency of China, but in reality an almost independent state under the rule of a theocracy presided over by the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government for long refused either to adjust frontier disputes with the Indian Government or to admit foreign traders. It coquetted with Russia and sought to play off one powerful neighbour against another, but in 1904–5 a British military force under Colonel Younghusband invaded Tibet and entered Lhasa, the capital. The Dalai Lama then accepted terms of peace which would secure the interests of Indian merchants and prevent Russian control of the political or economic affairs of Tibet.

As early as 1904 King Edward and Isvolsky, then Russian Minister at Copenhagen, had discussed the possibility of a Russo-British *entente* on the model of the *entente cordiale*. After Isvolsky became Foreign Minister serious negotiations commenced and were soon successfully concluded by the signature of a group of conventions (August 31, 1907). The first of these concerned Persia, which was divided into three zones. The large northern zone fell into the Russian sphere of influence, the small southern one into the British sphere. Between these zones lay the third, or neutral, zone, which alone retained the reality of independence. The second convention recognized once again the exclusive British control of the foreign policy of Afghanistan, while the third confirmed the *status quo* in Tibet.

The *entente* thus established remained entirely an arrangement between the Governments of Britain and Russia; there was no bond of sympathy or understanding between the British and Russian peoples. Even between the Governments the understanding was far from complete. It is true that shortly after the conclusion of the *entente* Russia reconciled herself to Japan and definitely renounced her ambitions in the Far East; but,

knowing that the British Government was extremely anxious to maintain the *entente*, Russia did not scruple to violate the convention concerning Persia by intervening in the Persian neutral zone to thwart the plans of the Persian Nationalists and Liberals and prevent the establishment of a strong and popular Government there. Thus the convention soon proved its inadequacy for the defence of British interests in the Middle East.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ARMED PEACE

Section I: The Balkans and Morocco

IMPORTANT as was the Russo-British *entente* in Asiatic politics, its effect upon European diplomacy was much more important. Germany, restive after the conclusion of the Franco-British *entente*, now saw herself completely 'encircled.' Even if we discount German fears of encirclement it is clear that a great diplomatic revolution had been effected to the disadvantage of Germany. Britain had ousted Germany from the position won for her by Bismarck as the arbiter of Europe. Germany was now merely the leader of the weaker of the two leagues which dominated and divided Europe, and was convinced that her position as a world Power was threatened by the coalition of Britain with the Dual Alliance. Russia, on the other hand, having renounced her Far Eastern ambitions and reduced her pretensions in the Middle East, now set her face toward the Near East, with disastrous results to the peace of Europe.

Nevertheless the immediate responsibility for the revival of the Balkan question rests rather with Austria than with Russia. The Austro-Russian Balkan agreement of 1897 had worked well for nearly a decade. When the racial hatreds of the mixed populations under Turkish rule in Macedonia and their common antagonism to the Turks came to a head in 1903. Austria and Russia acted loyally together in accordance with the agreement. But in the same year a revolution occurred in Serbia which had momentous consequences. Alexander I, the last of the Obrenović Dynasty, was murdered by a handful of malcontent officers, and Peter I, the head of the rival house of Karageorgević, was raised to the throne of Serbia. Patriotic Serbs resented the vassaldom of their country to Austria, and the new dynasty threw off the Austrian yoke and turned to

Russia for support. Serbia now became the centre of attraction for all the Slav peoples of the Balkans, and notably for the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been ruled by Austria since 1878.

It had long been clear that the 'dualism' which the Habsburg monarchy had adopted in 1867 could not be a permanent solution of the Austrian problem. The subject peoples, ignored in 1867, became increasingly vocal. Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Ruthenians, Rumanes, all clamoured for self-government at least. Many demanded national independence. Francis Joseph set his face against concessions, but the heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, advocated 'trialism'—*i.e.*, the admission of the Slavs to partnership with the Germans and Magyars and the transformation of the Dual into a 'trial' monarchy. In 1906, with the support of the Archduke, Baron Aehrental was appointed Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. He was alarmed at the growing desire in Bosnia and Herzegovina for union with Serbia, and planned to incorporate the provinces in the Habsburg Empire and then conciliate them by the grant of a limited measure of self-government. The weakness of Russia after the Japanese war seemed to provide Austria with a unique opportunity for the realization of her Balkan ambitions. In January 1908 Aehrental virtually denounced the Balkan agreement by obtaining from the Sultan, without the knowledge of Russia, the concession of a railway through the Sanjak of Novibazar which would place Vienna in direct communication with Salonica and Constantinople.

Aehrental's action was probably hastened by the conclusion of the Russo-British *entente*, which likewise alarmed the Turks, who feared joint intervention by the *entente* to improve the condition of the Christian population in Macedonia. For long opposition to Abdul Hamid had been growing. The malcontents, known as the "Young Turks," formed the Committee of Union and Progress, which removed from Paris to Salonica in 1906. Led by two able and unscrupulous officers, Niazi Bey and Enver Bey, the Young Turks raised a rebellion at Salonica, and proclaimed the constitution which had been in force for a few months in 1876 (July 1908). Abdul Hamid once again

loudly professed his loyalty to the constitution, and as a proof of his sincerity proclaimed a few badly needed reforms, notably the summoning of a national assembly, the dismissal of the army of spies employed by the Government, and the abolition of the censorship of the Press. The Young Turks went far beyond the Sultan in their professions of Liberalism, and for a few months the Christian population believed that their long years of suffering under the Sultan's yoke were at an end. But soon they discovered that they were in reality no better off under the new Government. Abdul Hamid was encouraged by their discontent and by the divisions of his enemies to grasp at the restoration of his absolute power. But after a short struggle the Young Turks triumphed, Abdul Hamid was dethroned and his younger brother, Mahmoud V, placed on the throne (April 1909). The new rulers speedily revealed the hollowness of their Liberal professions. Instead of relaxing they strengthened the centralized system of government built up by Abdul Hamid. They reorganized the army, and aimed at the extermination or assimilation of the Christian population.

The Young Turk revolution had important consequences in Europe. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria seized his opportunity to proclaim the independence of Bulgaria and adopt the title of King. The Greeks of Crete followed the Bulgarian example and secured the annexation of the island to the kingdom of Greece. The Young Turks, fully occupied in securing their power at Constantinople, could not resist these changes, although they obtained financial compensation for the loss of their suzerainty over Bulgaria.

Austria-Hungary's attempt to exploit the difficulties of Turkey raised much more serious questions, because it involved the interests of other states. During the existence of the Three Emperors' League Russia had agreed in advance to Austrian annexation of these provinces, but in the Balkan agreement of 1897 she had expressly reserved her consent. During the spring and summer of 1908 Isvolsky and Aehrental had been negotiating secretly; and on September 15, at a personal interview, the two Foreign Ministers agreed that Austria should annex the coveted provinces, while Russia should acquire the right to send her warships through the Straits from the Black

Sea to the Mediterranean. While Isvolsky was attempting to obtain the consent of Britain and France to the opening of the Straits Francis Joseph publicly announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg Empire (October 6, 1908).

Aehrental's action was received with a chorus of protest. France and Britain were completely taken by surprise, for Isvolsky had not informed them of his negotiation with Aehrental. Isvolsky himself, finding that the attitude of his allies would prevent him from obtaining the opening of the Straits, turned round and protested against the violation of the Treaty of Berlin. Public opinion in Italy was aroused by the successful aggression of her nominal ally and real competitor in the Balkans. Serbian chauvinism rose to a dangerous pitch. The Serbs looked forward to the day when they could re-create the short-lived medieval empire and include all the Southern Slavs under a single rule. So long as Austria merely 'occupied' Bosnia and Herzegovina the Serbs might hope to add them to the Serbian kingdom; the definite incorporation of these provinces in Austria-Hungary seemed to deprive Serbia of the glorious future of which her patriots had dreamed.

Aehrental remained unmoved by these protests. With the brutal realism which characterized his whole policy he saw clearly that the decisive factor would be the attitude of Russia, and he was convinced that Russia would not go to war. He was, however, ready to make two concessions: (i) chiefly in order to appease Italy he withdrew the Austrian garrison from the Sanjak of Novibazar; (ii) he agreed to give Turkey some financial compensation for the loss of her nominal sovereignty over the annexed provinces. When Russia still hesitated to accept the *fait accompli* William II appeared as a "knight in shining armour" by the side of his ally, and the German ultimatum compelled Russia to give up her opposition to Aehrental's proposals (March 1909). Serbia, deserted by her patron, had no option but to surrender, and her humiliation was complete when she was compelled to promise to reduce her army and maintain good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary.

The Bosnian crisis was a great triumph for Aehrental. He

had compelled Europe to acquiesce in the aggrandizement of Austria-Hungary, and had strengthened the prestige of the monarchy within the Habsburg Empire. His success was due largely to the unfaltering support of Germany, and the Austro-German alliance was accordingly confirmed and strengthened. The Central Powers had shown up the weakness of the Triple Entente, but by so doing they had brought war a stage nearer. Russia, which had been publicly humiliated, became openly hostile to Germany, and tried to strengthen the bonds of the Triple Entente, while the need of restoring her prestige led her to adopt a forward policy in the Balkans. In December 1909 she concluded a secret treaty with Bulgaria which brought Bulgaria into the Russian system and was so worded that it proves that Russia was seriously contemplating a war with the Central Powers in order to attain the objects of Pan-Slavism. The danger to the peace of Europe was the greater because the easy triumph of the Central Powers encouraged them to believe that if they once again rattled their sabres in their scabbards Russia and her friends would give way.

Both in the Moroccan and the Bosnian crises Britain's support of France and Russia had increased the tension between Germany and herself, but naval armaments were the main cause of trouble between them. The opening of the Kiel Canal and the rapid expansion of the German fleet forced Britain to take steps for her own protection. A great naval base was constructed at Rosyth, on the Firth of Forth, and after the appointment of Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord in 1904 the British fleet was concentrated in home waters, and a new and much more powerful type of warship, known as the *Dreadnought*, was laid down. The German Government immediately adopted the new type of warship, and replied to the building of Rosyth by deepening the Kiel Canal to permit the passage of Dreadnoughts, thus enabling the German fleet to be concentrated at a few hours' notice either in the Baltic or in the North Sea.

The restless activity of the unstable Kaiser, now blustering, now cajoling, made Anglo-German relations still worse. In 1907 while on a visit to England he tentatively arranged for the participation of Britain in the Bagdad Railway scheme, but

the German Chancellor, Bülow, was dissatisfied with the conditions attached by Britain to her acceptance, and nothing came of the Kaiser's promises. In 1908 he wrote a letter to Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the substance of which became known to the Press and produced an outcry against the attempt of a foreign potentate to influence the naval policy of Britain. A few months later he gave an extremely injudicious interview to the *Daily Telegraph*, in which he posed as the disinterested friend of Britain and indicated that he alone could and would prevent the war with Britain which the majority of his people desired. Suspicion of Germany and her emperor grew apace in Britain, and reached a climax when it was known that Germany in 1908 was anticipating her naval programme for 1909-10. The British public saw Britain's naval supremacy slipping away. In 1908 the British Government had built only two capital ships. "We want eight and we won't wait" became a popular slogan, and the Government reluctantly complied.

Nothing could have been more pacific than the policy of the British Government. They repeatedly approached Germany with proposals for reducing the naval competition. Germany invariably refused to modify the programme laid down in successive navy laws. William II himself declared on one occasion that he would go to war sooner than allow his naval programme to be dictated by a foreign Power. Bülow, the Imperial Chancellor, was even less conciliatory, and his resignation in July 1909 seemed for a time to make agreement on naval limitation possible. Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Bülow, while Kiderlen-Wächter became Foreign Secretary. The new Chancellor's outlook was somewhat narrow and his power limited, but he made a genuine effort to undo the evil wrought by the reckless policy of his predecessor. He declared that the existing navy laws could neither be modified nor repealed, but he offered, late in 1909, to build fewer ships in the next two or three years and to make up the deficiency in the following years. In exchange for this retardation of the rate of construction of capital ships he demanded Britain's promise that if Germany was attacked by any Power or group of Powers Britain would remain neutral. This demand forced the British

Government to decline the proposal, since it could not, in exchange for such a small gain as a temporary retardation of naval construction, agree to bind its hands in the event of a Continental War. Whenever in the following years Britain sought to arrange a real reduction in naval armaments Germany revived this neutrality proposal.

By this time the difficulties inherent in the Algeciras settlement of Morocco had become clear to all parties. Morocco drifted rapidly toward anarchy, while France seized every opportunity to increase her control of the country. In September 1908 the German consular officials gave safe-conducts to six deserters from the French Foreign Legion, although only two of them were German subjects. In spite of their safe-conducts the deserters were arrested by the French authorities. Feeling was at once aroused on both sides, but the dispute was finally settled by arbitration, and early in February 1909 France and Germany signed the "Morocco Pact," by which the special political influence of France in Morocco was fully recognized by Germany, while France was to give Germany equal economic opportunities there. Unfortunately France had no real intention of carrying out her share of the bargain, and her attitude prevented the success of negotiations for Germany's admission to partnership in the Moroccan mines, railways, and public works. Early in 1911 the Sultan of Morocco was besieged in Fez by a host of rebellious tribesmen. If Morocco was not to relapse into absolute anarchy the dispatch of a French expedition to relieve the Sultan was necessary, and in April 1911 France took the decisive step. Germany was naturally suspicious of French action, and her suspicions were shared by Spain, France's partner in Morocco under the secret treaty of 1904. Both Powers knew how easily a temporary military occupation of an uncivilized country is transformed into a political control. But by the end of May 1911 the French expedition had accomplished its work and was shortly afterward withdrawn, although French influence had been greatly increased by her intervention and French officers remained in the interior to organize police forces.

Meantime Kiderlen-Wächter and Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, had been negotiating for Germany's

surrender of all claims to interference in Morocco in exchange for compensation elsewhere in Africa. To strengthen its hands in this negotiation the German Government, at the instigation of Kiderlen, dispatched the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir, a port in the south of Morocco (July 1). This deliberate act of provocation produced a crisis not only between Germany and France, but between Germany and Britain. It convinced Britain that Germany wished to secure an Atlantic naval base at Agadir. Germany was informed that Britain regarded the voyage of the *Panther* as an unprovoked attack on the *status quo* in Morocco, and that Britain would not recognize any new arrangement concluded without her participation (July 4). Kiderlen and Cambon continued to negotiate, but as Kiderlen demanded the whole of French Congo as compensation for the surrender of Germany's claims in Morocco the negotiations soon reached a deadlock. Britain had received no answer to the communication she had made to Germany on July 4. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Lloyd George, with the full approval of Sir Edward Grey, pronounced in a speech at the Mansion House a solemn warning to Germany. If Britain, he said, were to be treated "as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations," then "peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." This public proclamation of Franco-British solidarity provoked an outburst of Anglophobia in Germany, but convinced the German Government that it must give way. Finally, the Morocco and Congo questions were settled by two conventions signed on October 11 and November 4 respectively. Germany recognized France's right to continue a military occupation of Morocco, and early in 1912 the Sultan agreed to a French protectorate, while Tangier and the adjoining territory was handed over to Spain in accordance with the agreement of 1904. The November Convention settled the compensation payable to Germany by a compromise much in favour of France, which ceded to Germany the less valuable half of French Congo.

The Agadir crisis was another milestone on the road to war. In the Bosnian crisis the Triple Entente had suffered defeat at the hands of the Central Powers; in 1911 Germany had drawn

back when Britain had demonstrated her solidarity with France and threatened war. Feeling on both sides was embittered, and the fact that each league had been once defeated made both less able to accept defeat without recourse to war when the next crisis arose.

The preoccupation of the other Powers in the Agadir crisis gave Italy her chance to seize Tripoli, which she had long coveted. She had previously obtained the consent of all the Great Powers to her eventual occupation of Tripoli, but none of them was eager to implement the bargain. Italy declared war on September 29, 1911, and occupied the coastal towns without resistance, but for long the attempts of the Italian troops to advance inland were foiled. Italy sought to bring pressure on the Porte by occupying Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands in the Ægean, but it was not until the Balkan states joined together and attacked Turkey that the Turks consented to purchase peace by ceding Tripoli to Italy. The Dodecanese islands were to be restored to the Porte, but on various pretexts the Italians remained in occupation of the islands. The chief result of the Turco-Italian war was to weaken still further the bonds between Italy and the Central Powers. The Triple Alliance was, indeed, renewed on December 5, 1912, but the Central Powers resented Italy's attack upon Turkey, and the alliance lost all cordiality.

Russia had played a minor *rôle* in the Agadir crisis, because she was intently pursuing her own interests nearer home. She intervened so openly in the neutral Persian zone that there was a real danger of a rupture between her and Britain. She attempted also to secure the opening of the Straits to Russian warships (December 1911), but in vain, because her allies gave her no assistance, and the Turks could count securely on the support of the Central Empires. But her chief aim was to strengthen her influence over the Balkan states, and here she was much more successful. The project of a league of the Christian states in the Balkans against the Turk had long been discussed, although the invincible hostility between Serb and Bulgar had prevented its realization. But the enmity of Austria after 1908 forced Serbia to look to Russia for protection; and Ferdinand of Bulgaria, realizing that the "greater

Bulgaria" which it was his ambition to create could be made only with the help of Russia, turned in the same direction and concluded with Russia in December 1909 a secret treaty of alliance. The diplomacy of their common patron and the exceptional opportunity for joint action offered by the war between Italy and Turkey brought about a temporary reconciliation between them. On March 1, 1912, they concluded a secret treaty of alliance for eight years. Each state guaranteed the integrity and independence of the other. If either state was attacked, or if a Great Power tried to occupy any Turkish territory in the Balkans, both would fight with all their forces. Secret articles attached to the treaty provided for a joint attack upon Turkey, subject to the sanction of Russia, and for the partition of Macedonia in the event of a successful war. If necessary the exact frontier in Macedonia was to be settled by the Tsar. On May 29, 1912, Greece joined the league, and a few weeks later Montenegro also came in. Rumania alone under its Hohenzollern king held aloof.

Russia was now the arbiter of the Balkans, but to secure this position Sazonov, who had succeeded Isvolsky as Russian Foreign Minister, had encouraged the aspirations of the Balkan states and sanctioned an aggressive league against Turkey. When Poincaré, the French President, was informed of the treaties between Russia's clients he pointed out that they "contained the germ of war not only against Turkey, but against Austria." Sazonov realized too late whither his policy was leading, but his belated efforts to hold back his clients were doomed to failure. Even the warning of the Powers that they would not permit any alteration of the *status quo* in the Balkans was ignored. The tiny state of Montenegro opened the attack on October 8, and was immediately joined by Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

The suddenness and vigour of their onslaught took the Turks completely by surprise. The Bulgars won a great victory at Kirk Kilisse, in Thrace, and laid siege to Adrianople within a fortnight of the declaration of war. The Serbs routed the Turks at Kumanovo, won another victory in front of Monastir, and drove the Turks into the arms of the Greeks, who, after a check at Florina, had advanced along the coast

and occupied Salonica. Another Serbian army had reached Durazzo, on the Adriatic coast of Albania. The military position of the Turks was desperate, and an armistice was arranged on December 3. The Ottoman Empire in Europe was now confined to the environs of Constantinople and the three fortresses of Jannina, Scutari, and Adrianople, all of which were closely besieged. A treaty of peace was concluded at London in January 1913, but Enver Pasha overthrew the Turkish Government, established a military dictatorship and repudiated the treaty.

War was resumed on February 3, 1913, but Enver Pasha was no more successful than his predecessors. The Greeks stormed Jannina, Adrianople was taken by the Bulgars and the Serbs, and Scutari was starved into surrender. On May 30 a preliminary treaty of peace was signed at London by all the belligerents, by which Turkey in Europe was restricted to a few square miles around Constantinople.

The success of the Balkan League staggered the Great Powers. The Triple Entente sympathized with the victors, but had no intention of allowing them to lay hands on Constantinople. The Central Powers were astonished at the dramatic collapse of their ally and anxious to restrict as far as possible the gains of the League. In particular Austria-Hungary was determined not to allow Serbia access to the Adriatic. On this and on other questions there was acute friction between Austria-Hungary and Russia; but the mediation of Britain, Germany, and France at the ambassadorial conference which sat at London from December 1912 to August 1913 smoothed over the difficulties. A naval demonstration by the Powers forced the Serbs to withdraw from Scutari, which would have given them a good port on the Adriatic, and the Powers agreed also to create an independent principality, Albania, on the Adriatic coast.

By this method the London conference averted war between the Great Powers, but it failed to arrange a peaceful partition of Macedonia and Thrace among the members of the Balkan League. Bulgaria coveted the important seaport of Salonica, which was occupied by the Greeks, and Central Macedonia, which was occupied by the Serbs. Instead of submitting these

disputed questions to the arbitration of the Tsar, Ferdinand of Bulgaria ordered his troops to make a surprise attack upon the Serbs (June 29). With the support of Greece the Serbs routed the Bulgars. Rumania, jealous of the acquisitions of the other Powers, joined in the attack upon Bulgaria, which was forced to accept the humiliating Treaty of Bucharest (August 10). Rumania secured the fortress of Silistria, which commanded the Danube and the southern part of the Dobrudja. The Serbs retained Central Macedonia in addition to Northern Macedonia and the eastern half of the Sanjak of Novibazar, the remainder of which was assigned to Montenegro. Greece obtained Epirus and Southern Macedonia, with the important ports of Salonica and Cavalla. Bulgaria's gains were thus restricted to Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, with the inferior harbour of Dedeagatch as her sole outlet to the Ægean.

Meanwhile Enver Pasha forced Bulgaria to restore to Turkey Adrianople and the neighbouring parts of Thrace. The London Conference of Ambassadors settled, as they hoped, the future of Albania. Its boundaries were fixed, and Prince William of Wied, a Prussian officer and a nephew of the Queen of Rumania, was chosen as its ruler. In March 1914 he landed in Albania, but after vainly attempting to curb the tribal chiefs he abandoned his precarious throne in September 1914.

The most important result of the Balkan wars was to increase the tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The success of Russia's clients avenged her humiliation in the Bosnian crisis. Flushed with triumph, the Serbs and Montenegrins were less than ever inclined to curb the South Slav agitation, which threatened to disrupt the ramshackle Habsburg Empire.

During the Balkan crisis the co-operation of Britain and Germany to restrain Russia and Austria had been one main factor in preserving the general peace and localizing the war in the Balkans. The continuance of German and British co-operation after the crisis was the only hope for the preservation of the peace of Europe. The main obstacles to this co-operation were naval competition, the Bagdad Railway, and the suspicions of France and Russia that Britain in working with Germany was being disloyal to the Triple Entente. In

February 1912 Lord Haldane was sent to Berlin to attempt to make a naval agreement with Germany, but the proposal broke down on the old obstacles. Failure to reach agreement with Germany compelled Britain to strengthen her naval defences. This brought about a notable strengthening of the Franco-British *entente* in October 1912. Britain withdrew the larger part of her Mediterranean fleet to the North Sea. France was virtually entrusted with the defence of the Mediterranean against the Austro-Hungarian fleet, while Britain undertook the defence of the north coast of France.

The efforts of Britain and Germany to remove the friction over the second obstacle to agreement—the Bagdad Railway —were more successful. In June 1914 the terms of British participation in the railway were arranged to the satisfaction of both parties. But it was impossible to get rid of Franco-Russian suspicions of Britain's negotiations with Germany, and it was partly in order to prove that they were unfounded that in May 1914 Sir Edward Grey permitted the beginning of negotiations for an Anglo-Russian naval convention similar to that concluded in 1912 between Britain and France. The negotiation was betrayed to the German Government by a Russian official. Challenged in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey replied that no agreement had been concluded, and the negotiation was therefore postponed till the rumours could die down.

Section II: The Sarajevo Crisis

Russia's eagerness to strengthen the ties between Britain and the Dual Alliance is to be explained by the position in the Balkans. Turkey, taught by defeat and aided by German experts, was at last seriously reorganizing her army. In November 1913 the appointment of Liman von Sanders, a German general, to the command of the First Turkish Army Corps with headquarters at Constantinople was so vehemently opposed by Russia and France that for a time war seemed probable. Russia, moreover, was no longer content to remain upon the defensive. On February 21, 1914, a Russian council decided that Russia should try to secure command both of the Bosporus and of the Dardanelles, and that this object could

be attained only by a general European war and not as the result of a localized struggle with Turkey.

The Central Powers had been doubly deceived in the Balkan wars, first in the defeat of Turkey by the Balkan League and then in the victory of Austria-Hungary's arch-enemy, Serbia, over Bulgaria. In the next few months the position became still more threatening. Since 1882 Rumania had been a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance, but the treaty was known only to the King and one or two leading Ministers. Rumanian feeling, however, had been aroused by Magyar oppression of the Rumanes in Transylvania, and it was practically certain that when the time for action came Rumania would compel her rulers to repudiate the treaty and take the Russian side. Influential Austrian politicians, including the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, urged upon Hungary the necessity of making concessions to the Rumanes of Transylvania, but the Magyars stubbornly refused to improve the treatment of their Rumane subjects.

Far more serious than the probable defection of Rumania from the Central Powers was the provocative attitude of the Serbs. In Serbia and Montenegro there were some four million Serbs; double that number of Southern Slavs, including Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, suffered under the Habsburg yoke in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Serbia's military forces were exhausted by the Balkan wars, and she was fully occupied in assimilating the territories her arms had won. But, even if it had wished, the Serbian Government could not have suppressed after the Balkan wars the spontaneous outburst of national feeling, which found expression in newspaper propaganda and in the organization of secret societies. The movement was particularly strong among the students, and the agitation was greater in the Habsburg provinces than in Serbia itself. Hot-headed students made attempt after attempt to murder the Austrian-Hungarian Governors (or Bans) of the South Slav provinces. Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, and Tisza, the Prime Minister of Hungary, were well aware of the agitation, which was on so large a scale that it could not be concealed from the authorities. Conrad, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, urged his

Government to declare war on Serbia, but his advice was rejected. Austria-Hungary decided instead to try the effect of a diplomatic offensive against Serbia. Bulgaria was to be brought into the Triple Alliance and reconciled to Turkey; Greece might then be induced to join the league, and Rumania would hesitate to desert the Triple Alliance. Serbia would be isolated and reduced to impotence. Before the details of this plan had been finally adjusted an event occurred at Sarajevo which converted Berchtold and Tisza to the views of Conrad.

As they were driving through the streets of Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered by a Bosnian Serb who had just come from Belgrade. Berchtold determined to use the murder as a pretext to secure the disarmament of Serbia. Although the Austro-Hungarian official who was charged to inquire into the circumstances of the murder reported that there was no evidence of the complicity of the Serbian Government, and that "every probability" was against it, Berchtold accused the Serbian Government of guilt. First of all he obtained a promise from Germany that she would support Austria-Hungary in her attempt "to isolate and reduce" Serbia. This promise was readily given. The German Government may have believed that the Serbian Government was privy to the murder of the Archduke, but it certainly knew that Berchtold meant to go to war with Serbia and that this would in all probability bring in Russia.

Berchtold accordingly dispatched to Serbia an ultimatum which was expressly designed to provoke war. It demanded that the Serbian Government, with the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials, should immediately suppress all Pan-Serb propaganda. Serbia was required to accept all the Austro-Hungarian demands within forty-eight hours. On July 25 Serbia made a judicious reply, in which she accepted nearly all the demands of Austria-Hungary, except the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials in the suppression of Pan-Serbism. She offered further to submit to arbitration the few demands which she had not accepted in their entirety.

The Serbian reply satisfied the German Government, and, at

the urgent request of Sir Edward Grey, the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg on July 28 advised Berchtold to moderate his demands upon Serbia and to make a conciliatory approach to Russia. Berchtold ignored Germany's suggestion—his whole course of action proves that he was determined to crush Serbia even at the cost of bringing on a general European war. Austria-Hungary on July 28 declared war upon Serbia, and the bombardment of Belgrade commenced on July 30.

By this time the views of the general staffs of the three Eastern empires exercised a dominant influence over the minds of the politicians and diplomatists. On the 29th Sazonov had decided on a partial mobilization (*i.e.*, against Austria) of the Russian army. The general staff were anxious to prevent a partial mobilization, since, once begun, it made difficult the transition to a general mobilization against Austria and Germany. Sazonov was accordingly persuaded to make the mobilization general, but before the orders had been dispatched the Tsar intervened and ordered that the mobilization should be partial. But on the afternoon of the 30th the Tsar yielded, and the Russian general mobilization began that evening. This decision destroyed the last hope of a peaceful settlement.

The action of the German Government under the pressure of its General Staff shows that war would probably have come in any case. Owing to the rapidity of her mobilization Germany could well have allowed Russia a start in mobilization without seriously endangering her own position. But already on July 29 Moltke, chief of the German general staff, had advocated immediate mobilization. As soon as Germany was informed of the Russian mobilization she completed the preliminary steps toward her own, and at midnight of July 31 sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding the immediate suspension of her mobilization. On the following afternoon (August 1), without waiting for an answer to her ultimatum, Germany declared war on Russia.

There is considerable doubt as to the attitude of France during the early stages of the crisis. She was, however, bound to stand by Russia, and the actual decision to do so seems to have been taken at a Cabinet meeting on July 29. On the following day, in order to demonstrate to Britain that her

intentions were entirely defensive, practically all the French troops were withdrawn to positions a few kilometres from the frontier. The dispatch of the ultimatum to Russia at midnight on July 31 practically committed Germany to war with Russia, and made her anxious to define her relations with France. Accordingly on August 1 the German Ambassador at Paris was instructed to inquire what France would do in the event of a Russo-German war. If, contrary to expectation, she offered her neutrality she was to be forced into war by a demand for the surrender of Toul and Verdun as a guarantee of her good faith. But all uncertainty was removed when France ordered a general mobilization on the afternoon of August 1. It was not until the evening of August 3 that Germany formally declared war on France.

The British Government was the last to decide upon its course of action; but from the beginning of the crisis Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, had played a prominent part in the negotiations. His experience of the London conference during the Balkan wars led him to advocate most strongly the holding of a conference as the best method of preserving the peace of Europe. Russia, France, and Italy all approved, but the opposition of Germany wrecked the scheme. Grey's position was a difficult one. He had, step by step, and without fully realizing the extent of his commitments, transformed the *entente* with France and Russia into what was virtually a defensive alliance. It is true that he had been careful to stipulate that nothing which he had done should bind Britain's freedom of action when war actually did occur between the Dual Alliance and the Central Empires. But by diplomatic co-operation and naval and military discussions he had created so strong a presumption that Britain would side with the Dual Alliance that failure to do so would seriously impair Britain's prestige and reputation among the nations. Yet Grey steadily refused to give a promise of support to the Dual Alliance, partly because he hoped this would have a moderating effect upon their policy, but chiefly because he could only give such an assurance with the consent of the Cabinet, which was far from unanimous. Germany, therefore, although, in view of Britain's declarations in previous crises,

she ought to have known better, continued to hope for the neutrality of Britain in the Continental struggle. On July 29 Bethmann-Hollweg made a definite bid for British neutrality, offering to preserve the integrity of France, but not of her colonies, and hinting at a possible violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Grey indignantly rejected this proposal, and invited both the German and French Governments to give an assurance that they would respect the neutrality of Belgium. France at once returned a satisfactory answer, while the German reply was evasive.

Britain's attitude was virtually decided on August 2, when the Cabinet, after receiving promises of unconditional support from the leaders of the Conservative Opposition, assured the French Government that if the German fleet came into the Channel or through the North Sea to attack the French coast or shipping, then the British fleet would give all the protection in its power. This decision, Grey argued, did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet attacked France. But it is impossible to wage war by halves, and the naval agreement of 1912 gave France, in spite of its actual wording, a claim upon British support which could hardly be resisted. In the last years of its existence the Entente laid upon Britain "the obligations of an alliance without its advantages and, above all, without its precise definitions."

But the decision of the Cabinet was worthless unless it was ratified by Parliament. On the 3rd Grey made a great speech in the Commons in which he emphasized two points—that the Commons were free to decide for or against intervention and that it was almost certain that the neutrality of Belgium would be violated by Germany. The reception of Grey's speech showed that the Commons would almost unanimously support a declaration of war upon Germany founded on the Belgian question. Grey had already pressed for a definite statement of German intentions in regard to Belgium. As soon as he was informed that German troops had actually crossed the Belgian frontier he instructed the British Ambassador at Berlin to demand once again a "satisfactory reply" and to ask for his passports if this was not given before midnight (August 4–5). Bethmann-Hollweg's reception of the British Ambassador at

their last meeting shows that he had continued to the very last to hope against hope for British neutrality. He could hardly believe, he said, that Britain would attack a kindred people "just for a word—'neutrality'—a word that in wartime had been so often disregarded, just for a scrap of paper." By midnight of August 4 Britain and Germany were at war.

The Belgian question was not a mere pretext, as Bethmann-Hollweg implied. Grey and some of his colleagues were undoubtedly determined to stand by France in any event, but they failed to obtain the consent of the Cabinet until after the Belgian question had come to the front. Moreover, the last word in the decision as to peace or war rested with Parliament. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium roused the indignation of the nation and gave the Government the almost unanimous support of the country, which it would not otherwise have had.

The catastrophe was not due to any single cause, but to the accumulation of combustible material for many years—the Balkan rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Russia, the invincible hostility of France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine, the naval competition of Britain and Germany, the colonial jealousies of nearly all the Great Powers and the economic rivalry which was a main cause of them, and, above all, the amazing growth in the twentieth century of the Serbian Nationalist movement, which was a standing menace to the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy. These manifold causes of friction between the Powers created a European atmosphere of mutual suspicion and fear. Politicians in all countries openly declared that war was inevitable sooner or later, and naturally began to make diplomatic and military preparations for it. Hence the formation of 'defensive' alliances, which the parties excluded from them regarded as 'offensive,' and the division of Europe into two diplomatic groups. Hence the piling up of armaments both by land and sea, until the strain became unbearable, and the growing political influence of the general staffs of the three eastern and militarist empires, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, the effect of which was disastrously revealed by the events preceding the outbreak of the Great War. The marvel is not that war came in 1914, but that it was successfully averted during the earlier crises.

A survey of diplomatic events in the decades before the Great War brings into relief the antagonisms of the different nationalities and the aggressive imperialism of national states. In certain fields, however, there was during this period a less noticeable trend toward national co-operation (or internationalism) in matters of common interest. Thus most European states had agreed upon a common code of laws for the protection of the copyright of books and also of industrial property—



Increase for the eleven years 1888–99, £70 millions = £6¼ millions per annum. Increase for the nine years 1904–13, £153 millions = £17 millions per annum.

From "Organizing Peace," by permission of the League of Nations Union

e.g., patents and trade-marks. Attempts were also made to improve social and industrial conditions by international conventions prohibiting night work for women in certain industries and the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. International attempts were also made to control the opium-trade and enforce the use of the Plimsoll line for the safety of life at sea. Other examples of international co-operation for specific purposes are the International Institute of Agriculture, established at Rome in 1905, and the Postal Union. Apart from Governmental co-operation, the period saw a rapid growth of societies embracing the citizens of various states—notably the Socialist "Internationals."

. Two conspicuous attempts were made to extend this Governmental co-operation to the question of armaments—the Hague Conferences. The First Hague Conference met in 1899 at the invitation of the Tsar. The chief proposal before the Conference was the maintenance, if not the reduction, of the existing military forces and budgets by every state for five years. German opposition wrecked this proposal. The Conference had therefore to content itself with the establishment at The Hague of a permanent arbitration tribunal with sound rules of procedure, but unfortunately able to act only if both parties to a dispute voluntarily submitted it to the decision of the Hague tribunal. Some attempt was also made to establish and humanize the legitimate methods for the conduct of war between 'civilized' states. Eight years later a second conference met at The Hague, but failed to secure the limitation of armaments or the adoption of the principle of compulsory international arbitration. Almost the only concrete result of the Conference was the creation of an international prize court. At the end of 1908 another conference at London agreed upon a code of maritime law to be administered by the prize court, known as the Declaration of London. As the code seriously restricted the belligerent rights of naval Powers, particularly the right of search, it was rejected by the House of Lords and did not become binding upon the British Government. The failure of the Hague Conferences to attain immediate and concrete results was disappointing to their promoters, but they did valuable pioneer work which was to bear fruit after the Great War of 1914–18 had given Europe a costly demonstration of the results of unrestricted international competition.

CHAPTER XIX

THE GREAT WAR

Section I: The Early Successes of the Central Powers

THE outbreak of war found both Germany and France ready with cut-and-dried plans of campaign, which they hastened to put into execution. France was slower than Germany in concentrating her troops, and it was not until the third week of August that her preparations for an offensive in Alsace and Lorraine were complete. By this time the German armies with their enormous howitzers had overcome the gallant resistance of the Belgian fortresses, notably Liége, and were pouring across the north-eastern frontier of France. The German plan was to outflank the northern French armies, pass to the west of Paris, and then envelop and drive the French forces upon the Swiss frontier. Nearly half of the German forces were concentrated on their right wing.

Instead of gathering forces to resist the German thrust, the French General Staff persisted in its Alsace-Lorraine offensives, both of which were beaten back with losses which seriously crippled the French army for the rest of the war. Only the heroism of Belgium and the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force in the firing line on August 22 saved the weak northern armies of France from complete disaster. First at Mons and then at Le Cateau the British army, under Sir John French, fought rearguard actions against overwhelming German forces which delayed the enemy's advance. Nevertheless on September 3 the German armies reached the Marne, and the French Government removed to Bordeaux.

The battle of the Marne (September 6–12) was one of the decisive battles of the War. The British and French armies had been strengthened, and the force of the thrust of the German right wing, which was commanded by Kluck and

Bülow, was weakened by lengthening lines of communication and by lack of concerted action between its commanders, who allowed their armies to be separated from each other. A fierce Franco-British attack, in which General Foch won a great reputation, drove the German right wing back to the Aisne.

The German plan of campaign had miscarried, but Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, was superseded by Falkenhayn, and the German armies resisted all the Allied attempts to drive them from their positions on the Aisne. By the end of September the war of movement had come to an end on the southern sector—both sides had firmly dug themselves in. The adoption of trench warfare on the south freed many troops, and these were transferred to the northern sector, where they were used in an attempt to outflank the enemy's position. The "race to the sea" began. The Allies hoped to retain control of the Belgian coast, Germany tried to secure the Channel ports of France, which would threaten the security of Britain and cut the communications of the British Expeditionary Force. The fall of Antwerp (October 10) destroyed the Allied hopes. The remnant of the Belgian army was driven along the coast to Nieuport, where it was met by the British army, which had been transferred thither after the battle of the Aisne. By the middle of October the lines of trenches extended from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier.

The Germans now made desperate attempts to break through the line in Flanders and reach the Channel ports. The battle of Ypres which followed lasted from October 20 to November 22. Thanks to the heroism of the Allied troops the assaults of the overwhelming forces were repulsed, but at terrible cost. The British armies alone suffered nearly 50,000 casualties in the battle. By the end of November both sides had settled down to trench warfare for the winter. As the official bulletins reported and were to report for weary months in later years, "all was quiet on the Western Front."

Germany's concentration on the Western Front enabled the Russian armies to take the offensive under the supreme command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Tsar. To meet the Russian attack in East Prussia Hindenburg, a German general who had devoted his life to the study of the eastern

months pursued a policy of wavering neutrality. Both sides attached an exaggerated importance to the winning over of Italy. From the beginning the Central Powers sought merely to secure the continuance of Italy's neutrality; the Allied Powers, on the other hand, made steadily increasing bids for her armed intervention. All Italians agreed with the Prime Minister when he declared that Italy would pursue a policy of "sacred egoism" and be guided entirely by her own particular interests. But they differed among themselves as to whether Italian interests would be better promoted by remaining neutral or by intervening on the side of the Entente. "Neutralists" and "Interventionists" squabbled fiercely with each other during the winter of 1914–15.

Meantime Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, was negotiating with both groups of belligerents. His negotiations with Austria-Hungary made so little progress that he was convinced that she was merely playing for time and would repudiate her promises whenever the military situation improved. The Entente, on the other hand, could afford to be generous with their opponents' property, and accepted readily all the exorbitant demands of Italy. By the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) Italy promised to declare war upon the Central Powers within a month. In return she was to obtain from Austria-Hungary the Southern Tyrol and the Trentino, with territories on the eastern shores of the Adriatic sufficient to give her the mastery of that sea and an important accession of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Albania was to be brought within the Italian sphere of influence. Italy was to obtain also a share in Asia Minor in the partition of Turkey, and an increase of her colonies in Africa.

In order to secure the support of Italy the Allied Powers had sacrificed the legitimate claims of their ally Serbia, which was indignant at this betrayal of her interests, while the Yugoslav conscripts in the Austro-Hungarian army lost their enthusiasm for the Entente. They preferred to bear the ills they knew than to be subjected to the equally alien yoke of Italy. The immediate results of the Treaty of London were to buttress the tottering fabric of the Dual Monarchy and to damage the moral prestige of the Entente.

Even after the conclusion of the treaty Italian intervention was not assured, as Austria-Hungary raised her offers in a desperate effort to avert it; finally the interventionists triumphed, and war was declared against Austria-Hungary on May 23. The Allied Powers were soon disillusioned as to the real value of the dearly bought support of Italy, who throughout the War confined her attention to the securing of her own territorial ambitions. Even here her efforts were singularly ineffective until the Austrian *moral* was completely undermined by defeat elsewhere. Economic weakness, military unpreparedness, geographical obstacles, and the continuance of party strife within Italy all combined to hamper Italy's efforts.

The mediocre success of the diplomatic campaign of the Allied Powers was more than offset by the military campaigns of 1915, which increased the strength of the strategic position which the success of her offensive had given to Germany in 1914. Germany now reversed her plan of campaign and tried to crush Russia before dealing with France. Falkenhayn had spent the winter in transforming the German lines in the West into an elaborate system of fortifications. These lines could now be held by a minimum of troops, and the reserves were transferred to the East to participate in a great offensive against the Russians in Galicia. During the winter the Russians had successfully resisted all Hindenburg's attempts to drive them out of the Polish salient, and had strengthened their hold upon Galicia by taking Przemysl (March 22, 1915). But the corruption of the bureaucracy, the disorder of the finances, and the utterly inadequate supplies of artillery, ammunition, and equipment were already manifest. These weaknesses were to render fruitless the bravery and self-sacrificing devotion of the Russian troops in the field.

On April 28 the combined Austro-German army under Mackensen began its offensive in Galicia. The Russian front-line troops were overwhelmed by a terrific bombardment and driven headlong across the San. Within two months the whole of Galicia had been evacuated by the Russians. At the same time a northern German army had occupied Courland. The withdrawal of the Russian wings left their centre in

Poland dangerously exposed on both sides. The apex of the Russian salient was Warsaw, which fell on August 4; the Polish fortresses were taken one by one, although they held out long enough to allow most of the Russian forces to make good their escape. Finally the fall of Brest-Litovsk forced the Russian main army to retreat behind the extensive marshes of the Pripet.

Hardly less spectacular was the advance of the northern German army, which operated along the Baltic coast. Although it failed to take the important port of Riga, Grodno, an important railway centre, and Vilna, the ancient capital of Lithuania, surrendered to it in September. It then threatened to drive a wedge between the Russian armies of the north and the centre, but this danger was averted by the skilful manœuvres of the Russian general, Russky.

The Eastern Campaign of 1915 was the masterpiece of German strategy and organizing power. The original objectives had been more than attained. Galicia had been recovered, Poland, Courland, and Lithuania conquered. Although the bulk of the Russian troops had withdrawn in good order and been reformed on a new line of defence, their future activities had been crippled. Germany was now secure against a serious Russian attack, and the occupied territories gave her new resources with which to carry on the struggle Moreover, the spectacular defeat of the Russian armies shattered the military prestige of Russia and completely undermined the power of the autocracy in Russia. So serious did the situation appear that the British Government sent Lord Kitchener, who had been appointed Secretary of State for War in August 1914, and had done yeoman service in organizing the military resources of Britain, to advise and encourage the Russian Government. Unfortunately the warship on which he travelled was destroyed by a mine, and Kitchener was drowned.

While Germany was winning victories on the Eastern Front Britain was engaged in a spectacular but unsuccessful attack upon the Dardanelles. If successful the attack would have opened up direct communications between the Western Allies and Russia, deprived the Central Powers of a useful ally, given the Allies complete ascendancy in the Balkans, and

exposed to attack the almost undefended southern frontiers of Austria-Hungary. These arguments induced certain members of the British Cabinet, headed by Mr Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, to press the scheme upon their colleagues, who had already, on the expert advice of Lord Kitchener, decided to launch a great offensive in the West in the hope of driving the Germans across the Rhine. In the end an unfortunate compromise was arranged, which made failure both in the East and in the West almost certain.

Since Kitchener declared that no troops could be spared from the Western Front the Cabinet sanctioned a purely naval attack upon the Dardanelles. Such an attack might have succeeded in 1914, but was doomed to failure in 1915, as the Turks had made elaborate preparations for the defence of the Straits. After giving Turkey a month's notice of their intentions by bombarding the forts at the entrance to the Straits, the Allied squadrons attempted to force the Narrows on March 18, 1915. The attempt was a costly failure, and proved conclusively that military assistance was essential. France could send only a few thousand troops, but the British Empire supplied 120,000. On April 25 the Allied troops effected a landing on the hilly peninsula of Gallipoli, which had been strongly fortified by the Turks. During the landing and in the subsequent offensives the troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but were unable to make any real impression upon the Turkish defences.

The brilliant success of Germany in her Eastern Campaign and the failure of Britain at the Dardanelles had immediate results in the Balkans, and especially upon Bulgaria. King Ferdinand was an astute diplomatist whose sympathies had from the beginning been with the Central Powers. The collapse of Russia and the British failure at Gallipoli convinced him that the Central Powers would be the victors, and on September 6 he concluded a treaty with Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria promised to attack Serbia in return for Serbian Macedonia. Moreover, if Rumania and Greece attacked Bulgaria, then Austria in advance gave her approval to Bulgaria's annexation of Silistria and the adjoining strip of the Dobrudja, and Grecian Macedonia, including Cavalla.

The intervention of Bulgaria completed the ruin of Serbia. Until the summer of 1915 the Serbs, though hard pressed at times by the Austrians, had managed to hold their own. Mackensen, the hero of the "Galician drive" against the Russians, was now sent to invade Serbia (September). The Serbs were forced back step by step, and after Mackensen effected a junction with the Bulgars the Serbian army was dispersed, and the whole country occupied by the enemy. Montenegro soon shared the same fate, its capital Cettinje being occupied in January 1916.

The collapse of Serbia gave the Central Powers control of the railway to Constantinople, and facilitated the dispatch of munitions to their Turkish ally. It therefore made the British positions in Gallipoli more precarious than ever. The British Cabinet reluctantly agreed to confess their failure and abandon the enterprise. Thanks to the favourable weather conditions and to the tactical skill of their commanders the troops were withdrawn in two stages without further losses (December 19, 1915, and January 2, 1916).

Throughout 1915 Greece preserved a wavering neutrality. Venizelos, by far the greatest statesman Greece has produced in modern times, was eager to enter the war on the side of the Entente, provided he could do this under reasonably favourable conditions. The King of Greece, Constantine, convinced that the Central Powers would ultimately be successful, and influenced by his Hohenzollern wife, was determined not to act against them. At the elections of June 1915 Venizelos secured an enormous majority, and became Prime Minister on August 23. Greece was bound under its defensive treaties with Serbia to assist its neighbour if attacked by Bulgaria, and Venizelos was ready to fulfil this obligation. The Allies, in response to an appeal from Venizelos, sent troops to Salonica to assist in defending Serbia (October 1915). But Constantine now dismissed Venizelos, refused to give assistance to Serbia, and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. The December elections appeared to confirm the King's actions, and firmly established his autocracy. The defection of Greece upset the Allied plans for the defence of Serbia, but their troops were not withdrawn from Salonica. After the evacuation of Gallipoli most of the

British troops were transferred thither in order to keep in check Constantine's zeal for the Central Powers and to occupy the attention of the Bulgar army.

Even on the Western Front where Germany had decided to stand on the defensive the Allies failed—chiefly through the lack of munitions, but partly also because Britain and France had not yet attained unity of command. The British offensives in the spring at Neuve-Chapelle and Hill 60 both failed to make any serious impression on the German line. In April the Germans introduced the use of poison gas, and, thanks to its aid, reduced considerably the British salient at Ypres. The summer passed in local fighting in which both sides suffered heavy loss and obtained no important results. The main British effort did not take place till near the end of September, when in the battle of Loos the British troops at the cost of 60,000 casualties recovered a few square miles of French soil of no strategic and little tactical value.

The main French offensive in the spring was directed against Lens and Lille, but was no more successful than that of their allies. In the autumn the French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, planned a great offensive in Champagne (September–October), but it also was a complete failure. The Allies had hoped that a break through the German line on a narrow front would roll up the line and compel a general retreat. This belief was certainly wrong, and the whole strategy of the Allies in persisting in a series of attacks upon a strongly entrenched line with inexperienced troops, inadequately supported by artillery and poorly supplied with munitions, has been severely criticized. There can be no doubt that the Allied losses were heavier than those of the Germans in the Western Campaign of 1915, and for these losses the Allies reaped no real political or strategic advantage. Germany's defensive strategy in the West was as successful as, if less brilliant than, her spectacular offensives against Russia and in the Balkans.

Germany in 1916 reverted to the strategy of 1914. She made no attempt to complete her victory over Russia, but concentrated her attention upon the Western Front. Profiting by the costly experiences of her enemy, she prepared the way for a frontal attack upon the historic French fortress of Verdun by

an intense bombardment, which shattered the enemy's fortifications. Undeterred by the failure of the first surprise assault by the pick of their infantry, the Germans sent attack after attack upon the French lines around Verdun. The battle raged from the end of February to the beginning of July, when the opening of a British offensive on the Somme at once relieved the German pressure on Verdun. The losses on both sides were terrific, but the Germans, being the attackers, lost more heavily than the French, and their offensive was as fruitless as those of the Allies in the preceding year. In August Falkenhayn was superseded by Hindenburg as chief of the German General Staff.

The British preparations for the Somme offensive were much more thorough than those for any of the 1915 offensives. Sir Douglas Haig had succeeded Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief. Conscription had been introduced in February 1916 for single men under forty-two, and in May for married men up to the same age. The country had already given a splendid response to repeated calls for volunteers, but the limit had now been reached, and it was necessary to make all men liable for service, so that those in the less important industries could be taken for military service and those engaged in "work of national importance" left at their jobs. Under the guiding hand of Mr Lloyd George the whole industrial system of Britain had been reorganized to serve a special need—the making of munitions and other war equipment. These preparations did not, however, produce the desired results. For five months the battle of the Somme raged, until in the middle of November the autumn rains compelled the British generals to abandon their attempts to break the German line. Nothing had been gained beyond a few square miles of devastated territory, and the British losses on the Somme were hardly less than the German losses before Verdun.

By the end of 1916 a stalemate had apparently been reached in the West. Neither side had gained its objectives; both had proved successful on the defensive. Similarly on the Italian front an Austro-Hungarian offensive broke down and was succeeded by an Italian counter-offensive, which likewise failed to attain its objectives. In the West the war was becoming a test of endurance.

That the Western Allies managed to do rather more than hold their own in 1916 was due chiefly to the unexpected recuperative power of Russia. The Western Powers had been unable to relieve effectively the pressure upon Russia in 1915, but the Russian General Staff answered the appeals of their Allies for a powerful diversion by beginning a month earlier than they had intended a great offensive on the southern sector of the far-flung Russian lines. After an artillery bombardment on June 3 the Russian infantry broke through the Austrian line and swept the Austrian armies in front of them for the rest of the month. Large stretches of Russian territory were recovered, the Bukowina was occupied, and Galicia was re-entered. But there the Russian advance was stayed. Ludendorff, who had won a great reputation as Hindenburg's assistant, organized an Austro-German counter-offensive and stiffened the Austro-Hungarian armies with German divisions. Even two Turkish divisions were hurried across Bulgaria to the Russian front, and when the Russians resumed their offensive in July they were unable to make any appreciable progress. Although the Russian offensive had won much more territory from the enemy, the Eastern Campaign of 1916 was no more decisive than the war in the West. Moreover, it failed to restore the waning prestige of the Russian autocracy, which was one of the chief objects which the Russian Government had had in view. Apart from the valuable assistance rendered to the Western Allies, its chief importance is to be found in its influence on the attitude of Rumania.

The death of King Charles in October 1914 had severed the personal links between Rumania and the Central Empires. Rumania had territorial ambitions which could only be attained at the expense of the Central Empires—the addition to the kingdom of the Rumanes of Transylvania, who were ruthlessly oppressed by Magyars. On the other hand, she was anxious to recover the strip of Bessarabia which Russia had taken from her at the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, and she coveted also a part of the Banat of Temesvar, the whole of which was claimed by Serbia. Moreover, like all the lesser neutral states, Rumania was determined to intervene, if she intervened at all, on the winning side. Hence for two years she maintained a

wavering neutrality, inclining now to one side, now to the other, according to the offers made to her and according to the fortunes of war on the Russian and Balkan fronts.

The domination of the Balkans after the 1915 campaign by the Central Powers placed Rumania in a precarious position, but the early successes of the Russian offensive of June 1916 and the willingness of the Allies, in view of the critical military position, to grant Rumania's demands enabled them to secure her active support. The treaty of August 17 between the Allies and Rumania was a second edition of the Treaty of London (1915), since it promised to Rumania large territories to which she had little if any ethnical claim. The Allies guaranteed to her Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar up to the Theiss, and the Bukowina as far as the Pruth.

The Rumanian army began the invasion of Transylvania on August 28, but was met by Falkenhayn at the head of a well-equipped Austro-German army and driven back across the frontier. Although Rumania had been preparing for war for two years, her supplies of munitions soon proved inadequate. Russia required all her supplies for her own troops, and the Western Allies had no means of communication with Rumania. The end of the Russian offensive enabled the Central Powers to transfer division after division to the Rumanian front. The mixed Allied force at Salonica, which was intended to divert attention from Rumania by advancing into Serbia, failed to carry out its share in the programme. A few thousands of Russian troops did, indeed, co-operate with the Rumanian army, but, apart from this feeble demonstration of good intentions, her new allies left Rumania to her fate. Mackensen, the conqueror of Serbia, now turned his attention to Rumania. Operating on Bulgarian territory, he took Silistria, crossed the Danube, and at the end of November joined forces with Falkenhayn, who had been slowly advancing on Bukarest from the west. The Rumanian army barely escaped disaster by a hurried retreat across the Wallachian plain. Bukarest fell on December 5, and the Government removed to Jassy, near the Russian frontier. The Rumanian army was reformed at the line of the Danube, the Sereth, and the Putna, and managed to preserve in the province of Moldavia the nucleus of an

independent Rumania. The Central Empires had once again demonstrated their military superiority, and had added substantially to their resources by acquiring the Rumanian supplies of oil and grain.

The whole Balkan peninsula, with the exception of Greece, was now controlled by the Central Empires. Even in Greece the duel between Constantine and Venizelos had ended in the triumph of the King, and his opinion that the Central Empires would win the War was naturally confirmed by the Balkan campaign of 1916. He accordingly allowed the Bulgars to occupy Western Macedonia, including Cavalla, without striking a blow. This humiliating submission to the hated Bulgars was too much for Greek national sentiment. A revolt broke out at Salonica and spread rapidly to the islands of the Ægean. Venizelos established a provisional Government at Salonica, and declared war upon Bulgaria. Although the Entente finally recognized the provisional Government, the opposition of the Tsar to the deposition of his cousin Constantine long prevented the Entente from taking effective steps to establish their authority in Greece. It was not until after a revolution in Russia had overthrown the autocracy of the Tsar that Constantine was deposed and expelled from his kingdom (June 1917). Venizelos, at the head of a Liberal Cabinet, now took control of Greek policy.

Section II: The War at Sea

The end of 1916 marks the climax of the successes of the Central Empires. Only in one of the many fields upon which the struggle was fought had they met with decisive defeat. The Allied supremacy at sea remained unshaken. During the Sarajevo crisis the British fleet had been assembled for manœuvres, and on July 26, 1914, the Cabinet decided as a precautionary measure that it should be maintained at war strength. On the same day the German squadron in the North Sea returned to harbour, and before the end of the year every German warship on the high seas, except the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, had been destroyed or forced into neutral harbours. The German Pacific Squadron made its escape from Kiaochau

the German commanders and was skilfully executed under cover of smoke-screens, patchy mists, and torpedo attacks. When night fell, however, Scheer was still cut off from his base by the British fleets. His fleet had suffered severely in the second phase of the battle. The battle-cruiser *Lützow* was so badly crippled that she sank the next day, the *Derfflinger* and the *Seydlitz* were put out of action, and the battleship *König* severely damaged. The night passed in a series of terrific encounters between the light cruisers and destroyers of the rival fleets. Ultimately Scheer made his escape by breaking through the destroyer flotillas, and the only great naval battle of the War ended indecisively.

The British had suffered heavier losses both in units and in men—five ships had been lost. The British destroyers had suffered severely for their daring in attack and in scouting, but they had preserved undamaged the Grand Fleet. Only one of Jellicoe's twenty-seven battleships and battle-cruisers suffered material damage. The Germans lost only one battleship and one battle-cruiser, but the whole of their fleet had been damaged. Both sides had reason to be proud of the tactical skill of their commanders, and the gallantry and seamanship of their fleets. The marksmanship of the British gunners was superior to the German, but the patchy lighting conditions reduced this advantage. On the other hand, it was clear that the German shells were more deadly, and that the British battle-cruisers, if not their battleships, were more vulnerable than those of the enemy.

Nevertheless the battle of Jutland was a British victory. Britain retained her command of the sea and all that it implied. Scheer had attained none of his strategic objectives. He had been successful merely in evading disaster—a very different thing from success. His fleet had fled at the approach of the British main fleet; his officers and men knew that even the evasive tactics of their chief would not have saved them but for the friendly mists and the gathering darkness. The German navy never again challenged the British command of the sea, and when, in the last days of war, it was ordered to put to sea the crews mutinied.

In some ways the battle of Jutland may be regarded as the

turning-point in the World War, just as it is sometimes said that Waterloo was won at Trafalgar. In the early part of the War there had been continuous friction between the neutral maritime Powers, headed by the United States, and Great Britain over the exercise of British command of the sea. Since a blockade of the German coast alone would have been futile, owing to the ease with which Germany obtained supplies from the neighbouring neutral states, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark, the British Government stopped on the high seas ships suspected of carrying contraband of war and took them into port to search them. If munitions of war, food, or materials for the manufacture of munitions were found on board they were seized and bought by the British Government, while the ship was released.

Germany retaliated by proclaiming on February 18, 1915, that enemy merchant-ships in the waters round the British Isles would be sunk by German submarines, and that she could not accept any responsibility for 'accidents' to neutral merchantmen in these waters. But lack of an adequate number of submarines prevented the German blockade of the British Isles from becoming really effective, whereas relatively few neutral merchantmen escaped the clutches of the British fleet. Therefore the British blockade was at first much more deeply resented than the German reprisals.

In the delicate negotiations with neutral Powers over the British blockade Sir Edward Grey proved his skill as a diplomatist. He realized clearly that "the blockade of Germany was essential to the victory of the Allies, but the ill-will of the United States meant their certain defeat." His aim, therefore, was "to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States." He was greatly helped in the successful execution of this policy by the personal friendship and loyal co-operation of Mr Page, the Ambassador of the United States at London, who was an ardent admirer of Britain, and believed that the co-operation of Britain and the United States was essential to secure the establishment of democratic institutions throughout the world. The task of Grey and Page was eased in 1915 by the German submarine campaign. On May 7, 1915, a Cunard liner, the

Lusitania, was torpedoed by a German submarine, and 124 citizens of the United States lost their lives. The sinking of other liners carrying American passengers continued in spite of the protests of the President of the United States, Professor Woodrow Wilson, until in the spring of 1916 a promise was extracted from Germany that no merchant-vessels would be sunk without warning and the rescue of the crew and passengers. The chief results of the first unlimited submarine campaign by the German 'U-boats' were to ease the friction between Britain and the neutral states, to awaken the United States to the fact that a war was being waged in Europe which necessarily involved her interests, and to rouse considerable feeling in the United States against Germany's violation of the "laws of humanity."

The value of British sea-power to the Allied cause can hardly be exaggerated. A minor result of it was the conquest of Germany's colonies, which were isolated from the mother-country and from each other by Britain's command of the sea. The scattered islands ruled by Germany in the Pacific were easily occupied. German Samoa, the Bismarck Archipelago, German New Guinea, had all been conquered by the end of October 1914. The German colonies in Africa were less easy to occupy, chiefly owing to their enormous extent and lack of means of communication. Togoland surrendered on August 27, 1914, and the coastline of the Cameroons was shortly afterward in Allied hands, but the whole of the colony was not overrun till February 1916. Two attempts to raise rebellions in British South Africa (October and December 1914) failed, and by July 1915 the South African troops had crushed all resistance in German South-West Africa.

German East Africa alone remained. Fifteen thousand German and native troops garrisoned the colony, which was twice the size of the German Empire in Europe, and contained great tracts of mountain and impassable swamp—the breeding-ground of the tsetse fly, which killed transport animals by tens of thousands. Early attempts to conquer the colony with inadequate forces were easily repulsed, and it was not till early in 1916, after the arrival of a large South African contingent, that serious operations began under the direction of

General Smuts. The German forces were driven from the coast, and the capital, Dar-es-Salaam, was occupied on September 3, 1916. By November 1917 the colony was completely in British hands, but a considerable body of the German troops escaped into Portuguese territory and did not surrender until after the general Armistice.

The German Government was well aware that the position, in spite of the military successes of 1915 and 1916, was critical. Food-supplies were still adequate, but there was already a serious shortage of the raw material required to manufacture munitions and equipment for the enormous armies of the Central Powers. As soon as the significance of the battle of Jutland was realized the German Higher Command began to advocate the resumption of the unlimited submarine offensive which the protests of the United States had induced Germany to abandon early in 1916. The 'U-boats' had been steadily increased in numbers and efficiency, and the Admiralty calculated that in five months they could bring Britain to her knees by cutting off her food-supplies. The German Government knew that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would almost certainly drive the United States to join the Allies. But they knew also that the United States could not intervene with effect within five months, and in that time, if their Admiralty officials' calculations were correct, the War would have been won. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, therefore, believed that the submarine campaign was Germany's best chance of success in view of the stubborn resistance of the Western Allies and the unexpected recuperative power shown by Russia in the campaign of 1916. They overruled the opposition of Bethmann-Hollweg, and decreed that on February 1, 1917, unlimited submarine warfare should be resumed.

This was a direct challenge to the United States, which at once broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and after an exchange of verbose notes declared war at the beginning of April 1917. The full effect of the intervention of the United States was not felt until the last months of war, since it took about a year to recruit, organize, and train an army large enough to make its weight felt on the Western Front. Yet the certainty of the support of the United States was a great moral

gain to the Allies in the trying campaign of 1917. Even apart from this consideration the Allies secured immediate advantages. The blockade of the Central Empires was tightened up, and the protests of the remaining neutrals disregarded with impunity. The United States navy gave valuable assistance to the British fleets in defeating the German submarine campaign and in organizing the convoy system, which soon proved an effective means of protecting merchant-vessels. Moreover, the large supplies of munitions which the Allies were already obtaining from the United States were greatly increased, and Great Britain, who had hitherto borne the brunt of financing the Allied cause, obtained a much-needed measure of relief.

Section III: Decline and Fall of Russia and the Central Powers

Had the German Higher Command been able to foresee the events of 1917 in Russia they would never have alienated the United States by resuming the unlimited submarine campaign, and they might have won the War. The strain of war on an unprecedented scale brought into increasing prominence the inefficiency and corruption of the Russian bureaucracy. Discontent grew steadily in the army; bread-riots became a common occurrence at Petrograd and other towns, where the industrial proletariat were huddled together in misery. The Tsar and the Court had entirely lost touch with the people, and were more and more dominated by the forces of reaction. Rasputin, a dissolute priest, acquired a fatal ascendancy over the Tsaritsa, which was not without influence on the policy of the Tsar. The murder of this evil genius of the Russian Court at the end of 1916 merely strengthened the reactionary party. The mediocre Ministers who had served the Tsar at the beginning of the War were displaced one by one by nonentities, whose only idea was to repress by terrorism and force the widespread dissatisfaction with their Government. The Duma was prorogued. British machine-guns intended for the Front were sent to Petrograd to intimidate the mob. On March 8 serious disturbances broke out at Petrograd, and within three days anarchy reigned in the capital. Thousands of workmen wandered aimlessly about the streets; the troops, even the house-

The outbreak of the Revolution had been partly due to war-weariness, and this feeling spread rapidly among all classes. The moderate Socialists of the Kerensky type had been held back by the desire to secure the consent of the Western Allies to a general peace. The Bolsheviks had no such scruples—they were determined to end the 'imperialist' war on which Russia was engaged in order to commence a new war—a struggle between the class-conscious proletariat of all countries and their *bourgeois* masters. In any case the complete destruction of discipline in the Russian Army, the wholesale desertions of the peasants, who composed the bulk of the troops and were eager to secure their share in the lands of the nobles, and the disorganization of industry, which left the front-line troops without food or munitions, made it impossible to continue the war.

On December 3 the Bolshevik Government signed an armistice with Germany; and before the end of the year a peace conference between Russia and the Central Empires met at Brest-Litovsk. Negotiations were conducted in public. Russia proposed and Germany accepted as the basis of peace the principle of "no annexations and no indemnities." The Western Allies unhesitatingly refused to take part on these terms in the Conference, and Trotsky proceeded to make a separate peace. He was soon disillusioned as to Germany's sincerity in accepting the principle of no annexations. The German delegate at the Conference announced that certain of the former Baltic provinces of Russia had expressed their desire for separation from Russia and protection by Germany. In vain Trotsky postponed acceptance of these humiliating terms. His hopes that the Communist party in Germany, instigated and supported by the Bolsheviks, would prove strong enough to overthrow the Imperial Government were speedily disappointed. Finally a German advance toward Petrograd forced him to accept the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918). Poland, Lithuania, Livonia, Esthonia, Courland, and the Ukraine were detached from Russia, while Armenia and the Caucasus were ceded to Turkey. The collapse of Russia completed the ruin of Rumania, which purchased peace by ceding the Carpathian passes to Austria-Hungary and the Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

Russian menace, saw in Italy an easy prey. On October 24 a well-planned attack on the Italian centre at Caporetto broke the Italian line and compelled a general retreat. The gains of two campaigns disappeared in a day. The bulk of the Italian troops fought gallantly, but the treachery of some divisions and the inadequate preparations of the Italian General Staff transformed the retreat into a rout. Finally the Italian line was reformed along the Grappa and the Piave. British and French troops were hurried to the Italian front, and with their assistance Venice, which had been seriously threatened, was saved and the invasion checked. At the same time the defeatist intrigues in the towns were to some extent countered by the formation of a patriotic league—the Fascio della Difesa Nazionale. Nevertheless the Caporetto campaign had cost Italy Venetia, an enormous number of casualties, and huge quantities of munitions, equipment, and food.

The collapse of Russia, the weakening of France, and the tottering of Italy flung the whole brunt of the War upon Britain. The troops which had been trained and the munitions which had been accumulated for a gigantic series of offensives were perforce squandered in order to relieve France and Italy from the enemy's pressure. British attacks on the Somme sector continued during the winter (1916–17) and gradually made the German lines untenable. But for months Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been preparing a new defensive system, and the Germans retired to the new Hindenburg, or Siegfried, lines without serious losses (February–April). The new line was both shorter and stronger, and could therefore be held with reduced forces. As soon as the new positions were established Haig began an offensive in front of Arras (April–May) in which the British artillery showed its superiority and the Canadians stormed the Vimy Ridge, but in the end, partly owing to the collapse of the Nivelle offensive, a merely tactical success was obtained.

The chief British offensive of 1917, however, was staged in Flanders. A preliminary attack—the battle of Messines—was brilliantly successful (July 7). The main attack round Ypres began on July 31, but the initial delay and the breakdown of the weather at a critical moment ruined its prospects of success,

although the British attacks were continued until November, largely in order to relieve the pressure on France and Italy, but partly to facilitate the final British offensive of the year in front of Cambrai. The battle of Ypres cost Britain many thousands of her finest troops. Her tangible gains were a few square miles of territory of comparatively little tactical importance; but Ludendorff himself has stated that the effect of the fighting in Flanders was disastrous to the *moral* of his troops.

The battle of Cambrai began on November 20, 1917. Haig hoped to break the Hindenburg line by novel tactics. The usual intensive artillery bombardment, which devastated the ground over which the infantry had to advance, was dispensed with. Haig placed his trust in a new weapon, the 'tank,' which had already proved of value when used on a small scale, notably at the battle of Messines. The tanks had now been greatly improved, and 340 of them began the assault. They crushed down the enemy's barbed-wire entanglements, destroyed the deadly nests of machine-guns, and compelled the defending troops to take shelter underground, until the arrival of the attacking infantry routed them out. At first the new tactics were brilliantly successful, but a determined German counter-offensive robbed Haig of most of his gains.

Britain was more successful in her 'side-shows' in Mesopotamia and Palestine than on the Western Front in 1917. The original purpose of the Mesopotamian expedition had been to block Germany's overland route to the East, but gradually the expedition became an offensive against the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. In the summer of 1915 a rapid advance took place up the Tigris under General Townshend, who was ordered to make a dash for Bagdad. But the advance was too rapid and the British forces quite inadequate for the task imposed upon them. They did, indeed, reach Ctesiphon, barely a day's march from Bagdad, but were then driven back by overwhelming Turkish forces under the German commander Goltz, and shut up in Kut (December 3, 1915). British attempts to relieve Townshend failed, and on April 29, 1916, the survivors of the garrison surrendered.

The sacrifice of Townshend and his gallant troops was not

wholly in vain. Elaborate preparations were made before the advance was resumed in December 1916 under General Maude. The strong defences constructed by the Turks at Sannaiyat were outflanked and then taken by assault. Kut was reoccupied in February 1917, and on March 11, 1917, Bagdad was taken. The summer was spent in consolidating what had been won by Maude's brilliant advance and in establishing contact with the Russian troops in Persia.

The Palestine campaign, like the Mesopotamian 'side-show,' grew out of a defensive occupation by Britain of territory required to secure her communications with the East. Egypt and the Suez Canal zone had been occupied in 1914; and Turkish assaults upon them in 1915 and 1916 were repulsed without much difficulty. Diplomacy prepared the way for military advance. A treaty was concluded with the Sherif of Mecca, and in June he repudiated the authority of the Sultan. The shares of the Entente Powers in the partition of Asiatic Turkey had already been minutely defined by secret treaties, based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 16, 1916). Substantial recognition was given by these treaties to the aspirations of the Arab chieftains, who were eager to secure their independence. In December 1916 the Sherif of Mecca was accordingly proclaimed King of the Hejaz and his support purchased in the coming offensive. The Sinai peninsula was cleared of the Turks and a railway built across it. But the British invasion of Palestine was promptly checked at Gaza. British attempts to storm the Turkish defences failed in March 1917 and again in April. Finally in November Allenby, who had taken over the command in June, outflanked the Turkish lines at Gaza in both directions and pushed rapidly along the coast. Jerusalem was captured on December 9. The fall of Jerusalem and of Bagdad shook the Turkish power to its foundations. These British successes were too distant to have any effect on the campaign in the West, but they helped to encourage the hard-pressed Allies.

Germany's resumption of unlimited submarine warfare added to the anxieties of the British Government in 1917. In April 25 per cent. of the tonnage bound for British ports had been destroyed by German submarines, and the expectations

of the German Higher Command seemed likely to be realized. Gradually, however, the new methods adopted by the British Admiralty, notably the use of depth-charges and decoy, or 'mystery,' ships (*i.e.*, ships constructed to look like ordinary merchantmen, but really armed with guns and manned by officers and men of the navy), and the adoption of the convoy system (June) proved successful. Fewer ships were lost, and many submarines were destroyed. By the end of 1917 Hindenburg and Ludendorff were compelled to admit that their submarine offensive had failed to attain its objects, although it had inflicted an enormous amount of damage upon the mercantile marine of Germany's enemies.

The submarine campaign was not abandoned, although it was no longer regarded as Germany's main weapon. To reduce the danger the British Admiralty determined to block the advanced submarine bases on the Belgian coast. Zeebrugge was perhaps the most important of these bases, and on the night of April 22–23 one of the most gallant actions of the whole War took place there. The German coastal defences were covered with smoke-screens, bombed by aeroplanes, and shelled by heavily armoured monitors. Under this cover the light cruiser *Vindictive* and two Mersey ferry-boats, the *Daffodil* and the *Iris*, ran the gauntlet of the German batteries and landed storming-parties on the Mole. While the enemy was fully occupied three concrete-filled blockships entered the harbour and were sunk right across the canal by which the U-boats came down from Bruges. The storming-parties were then recalled, and the *Vindictive* and her consorts withdrew on the morning of St George's Day. In the words of the *Vindictive's* commander, they had given "the dragon's tail a damned good twist."

War-weariness was not confined to the Allied states. The pressure of the naval blockade, in spite of the enormous resources opened up to the Central Powers by the collapse of Russia, was telling seriously upon the civilian population. Austria-Hungary was eager to end the war which her own obstinacy had begun. The death of Francis Joseph on November 21, 1916, brought to the Habsburg throne a young and inexperienced ruler, Charles I. He was anxious to secure

peace, and various negotiations were opened, partly in conjunction with Germany, partly behind the back of his ally.

Even in Germany war-weariness was growing, although the mass of the people were still convinced that their army was invincible. In 1916, however, under the leadership of Hasse and Liebknecht, the minority Socialists definitely separated from the majority, who were Germans first and Socialists afterwards. The minority placed Socialism before Nationalism, but both groups combined in 1917 to press upon the Government the conclusion of "peace by understanding," and found some support even among the non-Socialist parties. In June 1917 Erzberger, the leader of the Centre party, carried a famous resolution in the Reichstag in favour of peace without annexations and without indemnities. But when Bethmann-Hollweg showed a disposition to accept this policy Hindenburg and Ludendorff secured his dismissal. Henceforth to the end of the War Germany was ruled by a military dictatorship; the civil Government continued to exist, but only as the "shadow of a shade."

The growing exhaustion and war-weariness of the chief belligerents led to a number of attempts to end the War by a peace of compromise. But all of these were doomed to failure. The German military dictators were not yet prepared to surrender the spoils of war; the Allies, on the other hand, were strengthened by the certain knowledge that the British army would be greatly augmented, and that a large United States army would also fight on the Western Front in the next campaign. The issue, in fact, was still in doubt, and both sides preferred to fight to a finish, in the hope that a complete victory would crown their efforts.

During the tentative peace moves, however, President Wilson laid down the "Fourteen Points," which were ultimately to serve as the basis of the peace settlement. They included the unconditional evacuation and restoration of Belgium; the evacuation of all Russian territory occupied by the Central Powers; the restoration to France of all occupied territory and of Alsace-Lorraine; the readjustment of the Italian frontier in accordance with principle of nationality; the autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-

Hungary and of the subject nationalities in the Ottoman Empire; the settlement of all frontiers in the Balkans along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and the permanent opening of the Dardanelles to all nations; the erection of an independent Poland under international guarantee; and absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas alike in peace and war. Other points reveal the idealistic tinge which the President vainly tried to give to the policy of the United States—open covenants of peace, openly arrived at; the removal of economic barriers as far as possible; the limitation of armaments and the formation of an association of nations to guarantee the independence and integrity of all its members.

The proclamation of the Fourteen Points in January 1918 merely confirmed Hindenburg and Ludendorff in their determination to strike a decisive blow in the West before the arrival of the United States army. The collapse of Russia freed 1,500,000 German troops, many heavy guns, and large quantities of munitions, all of which were transferred to the Western Front. Ludendorff knew that the British line had been extended by twenty-eight miles in February and that no additional troops had been brought up. The line was therefore weakly held, and a successful attack on the Somme sector of the British line would drive a wedge between the British and French armies and might fling the British armies back upon the Channel coast.

The German offensive began around Saint-Quentin on March 21, 1918, and when the offensive ended on April 5 the British line had been forced back on a front of over fifty miles to a maximum depth of over thirty miles. The battle of Saint-Quentin was, however, no more decisive than the battles of Ypres or of the Somme. The British line had been bent, but was not broken. Both sides suffered tremendous but probably not unequal losses. A hundred and sixty thousand troops were at once hurried to the Western Front to reinforce the shattered divisions of the British army, and within a few weeks every gun lost had been replaced. Still more important was the establishment of unity of command over the Franco-British armies under the chief of the French General Staff,

General Foch (March 26). It was clear that the French reserves were being brought up slowly and inadequately, and that the northern sector of the British line had been dangerously denuded of troops to reinforce the sector under German attack. To meet these pressing perils a strategic reserve of Allied troops was formed and concentrated behind the weakest points in the line.

The second German offensive, originally intended to be a minor operation, proved so successful that the German staff was induced to make the mistake of transforming it into a major offensive and aiming at the Channel ports. At times it seemed that this objective might be attained, but once again the British line was bent, but not broken, and in the end the Germans found themselves in a dangerous salient, which could only be held at ruinous cost.

On May 27 a third German offensive was launched—this time against the French lines on the Aisne between Rheims and Soissons. The attack was a complete surprise, and within three days the Germans had reached the north bank of the Marne at Château-Thierry and pushed along the Aisne to the edge of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets. But there the advance stopped, and British troops helped the French to repulse desperate German assaults round Rheims. The fourth German offensive on June 9 between Noyon and Montdidier was followed by the final offensive on July 15 round Rheims. Both gained some ground, but neither attained its strategic objectives.

Ludendorff's strategy in 1918 was a colossal blunder and brought ruin upon his country. Had he been able to maintain the pace set at Saint-Quentin he would almost certainly have won, but this was beyond the power of the German armies. He was compelled to use up in subsidiary offensives the reserves which he had hoped to keep for a final offensive in the north. By persisting throughout the summer in costly and ineffective attacks he undermined the *moral* of his best troops and squandered the resources which might have enabled him to stand fast at the Hindenburg line.

The newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the Western Front soon gave convincing proofs of his

capacity. On July 18 the Allied counter-offensive began and transformed the German advance into a dogged retreat. Enormous fleets of tanks of all sizes played a great part in the Allied offensives. First the salient left by German assaults between Rheims and Soissons was driven in at the second battle of the Marne. Then on August 8 Haig commenced the battle of Amiens and won a conspicuous success, which was soon followed up by victories in the battles of Bapaume and the Scarpe (August–September). The army of the United States likewise distinguished itself by smashing in the Saint-Mihiel salient, held by Germany since 1914. All along the line the Allied troops began an advance which was to terminate only with Germany's abject surrender.

Hardly less important than the military results of the Allied counter-offensive were its political consequences. German victories, subsidies, and military assistance had alone held the Quadruple Alliance together, and the moral effect of the crushing defeats Germany was now suffering was perhaps even greater upon her Allies than upon herself. Bulgaria was discontented, and Ferdinand shrewdly suspected that he had thrown his weight upon the wrong side. After the opening attack upon Serbia he had taken little active part in the War, and when on September 15 the Allied forces around Salonica commenced a grand offensive in Macedonia Bulgarian resistance collapsed. On September 29 Bulgaria withdrew from the struggle, and Ferdinand was forced to abdicate. Rumania, which had never ratified the definitive treaty of peace forced upon her after the collapse of Russia, now prepared to reenter the War. By the middle of October Serbia was cleared of Austro-Hungarian troops, and the Yugoslav provinces of the Habsburg Empire were in open revolt.

Turkey was now completely isolated. In Palestine Allenby, whose forces had been depleted in the spring of 1918 to reinforce the Western Front, commenced his great drive on September 19. The Turkish army was surrounded and surrendered. Allenby's troops were then joined by Arab auxiliaries, who had been operating against the Hejaz Railway. Damascus was occupied on October 1, and Aleppo a month later. Meantime the British forces in Mesopotamia resumed their

advance up the Tigris. The opposing Turkish forces were completely defeated, and surrendered *en masse*. Enver Pasha's Government was then overthrown, and on October 30 the new Government concluded the Armistice of Mudros, which gave the Allied Powers control of the Straits.

Shortly afterward Germany's remaining ally, Austria-Hungary, fell to pieces. The prestige of the monarchy and the army, which alone had held the ramshackle Habsburg Empire together for half a century, was now completely broken. Charles I had made feeble efforts to withdraw from the struggle while there was yet time, but he lacked the strength of will and statesmanlike mind which alone, aided by a miracle, might have saved his throne. On June 15 Austria-Hungary had launched a desperate offensive on the Italian front. The frontal attack against Italian troops was at first successful, but the French and British troops on the flank held firm, and a sudden flood broke the Austrian bridges across the Piave and compelled the immediate withdrawal of the attacking troops in the centre. At the end of October, encouraged by the universal successes of the Allies elsewhere, the Tenth Italian Army, partly composed of British troops and led by a British commander, Lord Cavan, succeeded in crossing the Piave and broke the Austrian lines. The retreat speedily became a rout, and on November 3 the Austrian Government signed an armistice. The subject nationalities now proclaimed their independence. German Austria and Magyar Hungary severally established republics. The dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine was formally deposed, and Austria-Hungary broke up into its constituent elements.

Germany's position was now hopeless. The Allied advance in the West continued. By the middle of October the Belgian coast was completely recovered. On November 4 Haig struck a decisive blow between the Sambre and the Scheldt, while Franco-American armies advanced in the centre to the Belgian frontier and the line of the Meuse. The German armies were rapidly ceasing to be a controllable, organized force; they were now little more than a mass of defeated troops hastening homeward. The German Higher Command had broken down completely. Ludendorff alternately ordered the

Government to obtain peace at any price, and demanded a *levée en masse* of the whole population in order to fight to the bitter end. He was dismissed on October 26, and his successor recognized that the problem of evacuating Belgium was insoluble. Accordingly, on November 10 Germany accepted the conditions on which the Allies were willing to grant an armistice. In the opinion of the Allied commanders these conditions were sufficient to prevent Germany resuming the struggle with any prospect of success. All German troops were to be withdrawn beyond the Rhine; the important Rhine bridge-heads were to be surrendered to the Allies and a neutral zone established on the right bank. Enormous quantities of guns and munitions were to be handed over to the Allies. The German fleet, including all submarines, was also to be surrendered. The Armistice came into force, and hostilities ceased at 11 A.M. on November 11.

It is still a hotly disputed question whether the military disasters overthrew the German Empire, or whether the collapse of the home front was a main cause of the military breakdown. In any case it is clear that revolution had been brewing for some time in Germany. Labour representatives had been included in the civilian Government of Germany formed by Prince Max of Baden as Imperial Chancellor, and on October 4 the new Government had accepted the "Fourteen Points" as a basis for the negotiation of a general peace. President Wilson's reply strengthened the hands of the Socialists by leading Germany to believe that she would obtain better terms if the military autocracy were overthrown. At the end of October serious mutinies broke out in the navy, and the workmen of Kiel showed their sympathy with the mutineers by going on strike. The movement spread like wildfire over Northern Germany. In the south an independent outbreak at Munich expelled the King of Bavaria from his kingdom on November 7. Two days later the Emperor William II abdicated and fled to Holland, leaving the way clear for the proclamation of a republic. The remaining princes of Germany fled in haste from their capitals. Everywhere workmen's, soldiers', and sailors' councils were established on the model of the Bolshevik Soviets.

CHAPTER XX

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

On January 18, 1919, the Peace Conference met at Paris. It was attended by seventy plenipotentiaries from twenty-seven Allied and Associated Powers. Over a thousand 'experts' on naval, military, economic, and other technical matters were present to assist the plenipotentiaries—presumably in the belief that in a multitude of councillors there is wisdom. M. Clemenceau, the French Premier, presided over the Conference; other leading members were the British Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, President Wilson of the United States, Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino, the Italian Premier and Foreign Minister, M. Pashitch, ex-Premier of Serbia, and M. Venizelos, the Prime Minister of Greece. No representatives of the defeated states were admitted to the Conference, and the Bolshevik Government of Russia was also unrepresented.

The meetings of the whole Conference were few in number and formal in character. They merely registered the decisions of the Great Powers, which were taken in the early weeks of the Conference in the "Council of Ten," a body composed of the two chief delegates of Britain, United States, France, Italy, and Japan. In the middle of March the Council of Ten was superseded by the "Council of Four," which consisted of the Premiers of Britain, France, and Italy, and the President of the United States. Six weeks later the Council of Four obtained the approval of the whole Conference to the draft treaty which they had drawn up, and on the following day the draft was handed to the German delegates who had been specially summoned to Versailles to receive it.

The Council of Four refused to allow oral discussion of the treaty, but agreed to receive the written comments of the German Government. The German counter-proposals called for

radical alterations in the treaty, and were unhesitatingly refused, but some not unimportant modifications were made in the original draft. Germany, being quite unable to resume the struggle, had no option but to accept the amended treaty, which was signed on June 28 in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

Part I of the treaty contained the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was the work of a committee presided over by President Wilson, and including Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, and M. Bourgeois. The objects of the League were stated in the preamble—"to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security." Its organs were to be an Assembly of all its members, meeting at stated intervals, in which each member has one vote; a council, meeting at least once a year and composed chiefly but not exclusively of representatives of the Great Powers; and a permanent secretariat at Geneva, the seat of the administration of the League. The council was expressly authorized to prepare plans for a general reduction of armaments. Moreover, the members of the League were bound to submit to arbitration any dispute which could not be settled by diplomacy, and to carry out in good faith the award of the arbiter. If a member resorted to war in disregard of its obligations it was to be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members, which would immediately sever all commercial and financial relations with it, and, if necessary, might use armed force against it.

The League was an integral part of the peace treaty, and without it the Treaty of Versailles and the treaties later concluded with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey would probably have broken down. The establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice soon proved a great gain, but little progress has hitherto been made toward a general reduction of armaments, and the most recent attempt in this direction, the Naval Conference which met at London in January 1930, has produced few tangible results. Closely bound up with the Covenant of the League was the "mandate system," by which peoples occupying territories conquered by the Allies, which were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," were to be en-

trusted to members of the League under mandates drawn up by it. This expedient solved some thorny questions in regard to the disposal of the German colonial empire. It has on the whole worked well, although there are some conspicuous exceptions.

The disarmament of Germany was secured by the military, naval, and air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Her army was reduced to 100,000 men, voluntarily enlisted. The fortifications on the Rhine, those controlling the Baltic and those of



MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE AND NON-MEMBERS

The countries shown in black, containing one-fifth of the world's people, are still outside the League.

From "Organizing Peace," by permission of the League of Nations Union

Heligoland, had to be destroyed. Her navy was limited to a few ships, and no submarines were to be included in it. The great bulk of Germany's navy had been surrendered at the Armistice to the Allies and interned at Scapa Flow, where it was scuttled by the German crews. Most of the ships have, however, been raised by salvage operations and broken up at Rosyth. Finally, Germany was prohibited from maintaining any aeroplanes or airships for purposes of war.

Germany and her allies accepted responsibility for all damages directly due to the War, but no attempt was made to assess the War indemnity in the treaty. Subsequently in 1921 the amount was fixed at 132,000,000,000 gold marks. Payment is being made by annual instalments. Provision was made in the treaty itself for reparations in kind. Huge quantities of

coal, iron, and livestock have been delivered by Germany to France, Italy, and Belgium, and these deliveries in kind have seriously curtailed the coal-export trade of Britain to these countries.

In accordance with precedents, security for these payments in money and in kind was sought by an occupation of enemy territory. The left bank of the Rhine with the important bridge-heads was to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years or longer if the Allies thought it necessary. Evacuation of the left bank was to be completed in three stages if Germany was punctual in payment of reparations. On the plea that Germany was deliberately defaulting in her reparation payments France invaded and occupied the important industrial area of the Ruhr early in the spring of 1923. This act of aggression, for which no sanction could be found in the Treaty of Versailles, brought Germany to the brink of economic disaster and would thus have defeated its own objects. Moreover, French action strained the *entente* of France and Britain almost to the breaking-point, and made Franco-German relations even more difficult than before. In August 1929 a conference at The Hague arranged the conditions on which the complete evacuation of the occupied territory of Germany was carried out in June 1930.

The colonial empire of Germany was taken from her and divided among the Allied Powers as mandatories of the League of Nations. German East Africa was divided between Britain and Belgium. Almost the whole of the Cameroons and half of Togoland were assigned to France, the residue falling to Britain. German South-west Africa was to be administered by the Union of South Africa. The mandate for the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator was given to Japan, while Australia secured the administration of those south of the equator, except Nauru and German Samoa, which were assigned to Britain and New Zealand respectively. Germany also surrendered to Japan all her rights in Kiaochau and the Chinese province of Shantung. These territories amounted in all to over 11,000,000 square miles, and had a population of over 13,000,000. Although they were not, however, of great intrinsic value, their loss was bitterly regretted by many

have already been and could be still further reduced by agreements between the German and Polish Governments. Germany renounced also all claim to Danzig, a German town set in the midst of a rural Polish population. To safeguard its German population the town became a free city under the League of Nations, but to give Poland an outlet to the sea and complete control of the Vistula Danzig was included in the Polish Customs Union. Germany ceded also another of her Baltic ports, Memel, along with the surrounding territory, to the Allies, who finally transferred it (March 1924) to Lithuania, one of the new states which sprang up on the Baltic coast after the collapse of Russia. Finally, arrangements were made to hold plebiscites in certain disputed areas by which the inhabitants could determine their own destiny. The Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscite areas, in the south and east of East Prussia respectively, voted for the maintenance of their union with Germany. The third area, Upper Silesia, with its great coalfields, was divided between Germany and Poland by an award of the League of Nations in March 1921. All these cessions were at the expense of Prussia, and did something to reduce the overwhelming preponderance of Prussia in the German Empire.

To complete the settlement with Germany the Treaty of Versailles had to be ratified by the signatory states. The exchange of ratifications took place at Paris on January 10, 1920, and the treaty then came into force. One of the Great Powers, however, refused its ratification. Under the constitution of the United States all treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate, and President Wilson failed to obtain this majority. To accept membership of the League of Nations was to depart from the traditional policy of the United States of avoiding entangling alliances with foreign Powers. American imperialists also feared that the League would restrict the domination wielded by the United States under cover of the Monroe Doctrine over the states of Central and Southern America. The deadlock thus produced between President and Senate was removed by the presidential election of 1920. President Wilson and the Democrats were decisively defeated by the Republicans, and

Senator Harding became President. Soon afterward the United States negotiated separate treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, which were subsequently ratified by the necessary majority of the Senate.

Even before the Treaty of Versailles had been signed the Peace Conference at Paris had been engaged in drafting treaties with Germany's former allies. The first to be signed was the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria (September 10, 1919), which disarmed Austria and imposed on her the burden of paying reparations. Then came the Treaty of the Trianon with Hungary (June 4, 1920), which dealt similarly with Hungary. The remaining clauses of the Treaties of Saint-Germain and the Trianon recorded in the main an accomplished fact—the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. They outlined also the distribution of its territories among the new states of Central Europe, along with Italy and Rumania, although they had later to be supplemented by agreements such as the Treaty of Rapallo (November 12, 1920), which settled the exact frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria was penalized for her support of the Central Empires. The Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919) disarmed her and imposed upon her the payment of reparations in money and in kind. In common with Austria and Hungary, however, Bulgaria has escaped payment of reparations, the burden of which has fallen solely on Germany. Slight alterations of her frontier with Yugoslavia were made in favour of Yugoslavia. More serious was the cession of Western Thrace to Greece, which shut Bulgaria out from the Ægean. The cessions to Yugoslavia and Greece were small both in area and population, but the aggrandizement of her neighbours made Bulgaria a much less important state than she had been in 1914.

Alone of the enemy Powers Turkey was able to reject the demands of the Allies, and in the end obtained much more favourable terms than those at first offered by them. The Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) had left Turkey nothing beyond a small strip of territory around Constantinople and the greater part of Asia Minor. It was never ratified by the Turks, and was drastically modified three years later by the

own territory of Nejd at the end of 1925. During the War the Young Turks had carried out systematic massacres of the Armenians on a scale that would have aroused the envy of the "Red Sultan," Abdul Hamid. The Armenians who survived were allowed to set up an autonomous state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

CHAPTER XXI

EUROPE SINCE THE GREAT WAR

Section I: The New States of Central and Eastern Europe

THE consequences of the Russian Revolution and the disruption of the Habsburg Empire remodelled the pre-War map of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia and Austria-Hungary had contained numerous 'submerged nationalities,' which in the years preceding and during the Great War had become increasingly self-conscious. The immediate cause of the outbreak of war had been the aggressiveness of the Yugoslavs; the chaotic condition of Central and Western Europe at the end of the War had enabled practically all the 'submerged nationalities' to assert themselves.

The Peace Conference adopted as its guiding principle here the doctrine of 'self-determination.' Other factors, however, forced themselves upon the attention of the Conference. It was impossible merely to divide up the centre and east of Europe into ethnic groups. The history of the various 'debatable lands' had to be considered, and so far as possible it was desirable that the new frontiers should follow the natural geographical features of the continent. Moreover, it was generally agreed that the new states ought to have access to the sea, if possible by giving to each a coastline and ports, but if not, by arranging a free outlet and inlet for its foreign trade over the territory of a neighbouring maritime state. As these factors were frequently in conflict with each other, the settlement of the frontiers of the new states presented a series of delicate and complicated questions, which the Peace Conference had to solve. It attempted to mitigate the hardships which its decisions inevitably brought upon minorities by forcing the new states to sign treaties for the protection of their racial or religious minorities. These 'minority treaties'

were bitterly resented by the majorities, and although very imperfectly enforced they have caused acute friction between various states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The most powerful of the new states is Poland. The survival of Polish national sentiment for over a century in the face of the most adverse conditions is one of the miracles of the nineteenth century. After the outbreak of war both sides made bids for Polish support, with the result that ardent Polish Nationalists fought against each other in the contending ranks of the Russian and Austro-German armies. The collapse of the three militarist empires which had partitioned Poland in the eighteenth and held her dismembered fragments apart in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries made certain the attainment of Polish national ambitions.

Poland recovered practically all the territories held by her on the eve of the first partition—Posen, West Prussia, and part of Upper Silesia from Germany; Eastern and Western Galicia and other smaller districts from Austria-Hungary; Vilna, Grodno, and the western parts of Volhynia and Minsk from Russia. Her gains at the expense of Russia were the result of a successful offensive against the Bolshevik troops in the summer of 1920. These acquisitions gave Poland a population of about 30,000,000, with valuable industrial resources and great wealth in minerals. Poland has exploited her natural resources with the aid of foreign capital, and is now a formidable competitor in the markets of the world. Nominally a republic, she was for some years in reality ruled by a military dictator, Marshal Pilsudski, up to his resignation in December 1930.

The Slavs who were not included in the new Poland organized themselves in two separate groups—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, each of which has a population of about 14,000,000. Czechoslovakia corresponds roughly to the medieval kingdom of Bohemia—including Bohemia proper, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia—with the addition of the northern fringe of the Hungarian kingdom peopled by the Slovaks, and marked off from the new Poland by the mountain barrier of the Carpathians. For centuries these Slav peoples had been ruled by Germans and Magyars. The meeting of a Pan-Slav conference of scholars in Prague while Windisgrätz was bombarding the

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city during the year of revolutions may be taken as the beginning of the Czechoslovak renaissance. At first confined to a small band among the educated classes, the Nationalist movement gradually spread to all classes. Thousands of Czechs and Slovaks fought on the side of the Allies against their oppressors during the War; and over a year before the final disruption of Austria-Hungary the *de jure* Czechoslovak Government established by Masaryk and Beneš at Paris was recognized by the Allies. Although the new state has no coastline, its agricultural and mineral resources are considerable, and its people well-educated and industrious. Like Poland, however, owing to medieval and modern colonization of Slav lands by German and other colonists, it has considerable racial minorities which may prove troublesome.

Yugoslavia was formed by the union of Serbia and Montenegro with the Yugoslav provinces of Austria-Hungary—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Carniola, and parts of Dalmatia, Styria, Carinthia, and Istria. Unfortunately the three branches of the Yugoslav people, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes, failed to get on with each other. The Croats and Slovenes were soon almost as hostile to the centralizing policy of the Belgrade Government as they had been to their German and Magyar oppressors. After years of fierce and futile party strife King Alexander I carried through a *coup d'état* at the end of 1928. The Parliament was dissolved and a dictatorship proclaimed. The first measures of the new Government were to institute a strict censorship of the Press, and to suppress all organizations which tended to perpetuate the provincial jealousies. It is too early to say whether these measures, which are professedly of a temporary character, will prove successful in consolidating the kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

Two pre-War states shared largely in the spoil of the Habsburg Empire—Rumania and Italy. Rumania is now the largest of the Balkan states, having more than doubled its pre-War population (18,000,000 in 1921). Transylvania, Rumania's *irredenta*, the Bukowina, and the eastern part of the Banat of Temesvar, all taken from Austria-Hungary, and Bessarabia, taken from Russia, were added to Rumania. Unfortunately

the strife of parties has been complicated by a disputed succession to the throne. The Regency which governed in name of the boy-king was overthrown in June 1930 by the supporters of Prince Carol, whose conduct had led to his exclusion from the throne in favour of his son, but who is now recognized as King of Rumania. These party and dynastic struggles have kept Rumania in a very unsettled condition.

Italy obtained even more than she had been promised by the secret Treaty of London (1915). The frontier assigned to her in the north-east gave her control of the passes into Austria, and included in the Italian kingdom not merely the Italian *irredenta*, but extensive predominantly German districts. The Italian Government has shown itself as harsh to these German minorities as the Habsburg Empire was to the "unredeemed Italians." On the east the settlement of the frontier with Yugoslavia proved extremely difficult. In addition to the Adriatic territories promised to her by the Allies in 1915, which were ample to make the Adriatic an Italian lake, Italy demanded Fiume, an Italian town in a Yugoslav country district. Yugoslavia insisted that Fiume was an essential outlet for her trade, as the Adriatic coast assigned to her had no good natural harbours. For a time a fierce struggle was waged in the town itself by rival factions, but by the Treaty of Rapallo Fiume was to become a free state. Finally in January 1924 Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to partition the contested zone, and the free state disappeared from the map. Other causes of friction, however, remained between Italy and Yugoslavia—notably Italy's claim to predominant influence in Albania.

The cessions which they were compelled to make to Italy, Rumania, and the new states of Central Europe transformed Austria and Hungary into national states. The Austrian republic, German in culture and predominantly German in population, has six million inhabitants, two million of whom are resident in Vienna. It is completely cut off from the sea and surrounded on all sides by larger states with a tradition of racial antagonism to it. In 1919 the new republic was anxious to escape isolation by union with Germany, but this avenue of escape was barred by the Allies, who were determined not to allow Germany to gain strength. Now the 'unionist' move-

ment in Austria is much weaker. The National Assembly, which met in 1919, drew up a Liberal constitution under which the moderate Socialists control the destinies of the new state, and have so far resisted all attempts by reactionaries and extremists to overthrow their power. Partly owing to the assistance of the League of Nations the economic crisis which followed the War has been successfully surmounted, but the strife of parties, and in particular the land question, in which the Vienna Socialists are in conflict with the peasants, is still a menace to the internal peace of the republic.

Hungary was more fortunate than her former partner. Her dominions were, indeed, reduced to about one-third of their pre-War extent, but the residue consists chiefly of rich agricultural land, which makes her almost self-sufficing. Her population is now homogeneous, but the Magyars resent the loss of their position as a caste ruling over subject peoples. The Hungarian People's Republic was overthrown in March 1919 by the Hungarian Bolsheviks under Bela Kun, who governed for some months by terrorism, until he was suddenly overthrown in August 1919. In January 1920 the Magyar National Assembly met and at once showed its reactionary temper. The moderate Socialist Government which had succeeded Bela Kun was overthrown, and Admiral Horthy became Premier. In December 1920 the new Government declared in favour of the establishment of a constitutional and elective monarchy, but attempts by the former Habsburg Emperor to secure recognition as King of Hungary failed miserably. In the meantime the throne remains vacant, and the royal power is exercised by a Regency.

In Eastern Europe also a group of new states has emerged from the empire of the Tsars. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Russia had renounced all claim to her Baltic provinces. Germany had then sought to secure control by military occupation, but the collapse of her Western Front foiled her plans. In 1919 and 1920 the Bolshevik Government attempted to reincorporate the provinces which had proclaimed their independence, but the Bolshevik troops were decisively defeated, partly by the aid of German troops. During this period the domestic affairs of the Baltic provinces were in utter chaos. The *bourgeois* and

Socialist parties were at each other's throats, and the racial antagonism between the native population and the German colonists (or Balts) complicated the class struggle. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks the new states expelled the remaining German troops, suppressed the Balts, and secured recognition from the Allies.

The largest of these states is Finland, peopled almost exclusively by the Finns, a Mongolian people who have maintained many of their racial characteristics in spite of centuries of Swedish and Russian domination. Closely allied in race, language, and culture to the Finns are the Esthonians, who were conquered and Christianized in the Middle Ages by the Danes and the Teutonic knights, and subsequently ruled in turn by Sweden and Russia. They now form an independent republic called Esthonia. The peoples of the two other newly created Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania, are apparently of Indo-European stock; but whereas the Letts now united in Latvia have never played any great part in history, the Lithuanians in the Middle Ages built up a powerful state reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which was united under the personal rule of the common sovereign with Poland from 1569 till the partition of the double monarchy of Poland-Lithuania at the end of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless the Lithuanians never lost the sense of their own nationality, and since the establishment of the Lithuanian republic its relations with Poland have been so bad that war has more than once seemed imminent. The Lithuanians are determined to recover their former capital, Vilna, which was assigned to Poland by the Allies. All four Baltic states, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have Liberal and republican constitutions.

The remodelling of the map of Central and Eastern Europe has inevitably raised almost as many questions as it has settled. Even if the states which have been dismembered to satisfy the Nationalist aspirations and economic needs of the new nations are content to accept the accomplished facts, which is improbable, the rivalries of the new states over the division of the spoils have already caused much bitterness and on several occasions have brought war within measurable distance. The fact that most of the newly created states are democracies, whose peoples

are politically inexperienced and in many cases immature, increases the danger of a conflagration in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the "Little Entente," composed of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, in spite of its defensive character, may be regarded as an additional danger, since, like the Triple Alliance before the Great War, it naturally tends to bring the states excluded from it into a rival league, and thus, by linking up the various causes of friction, makes a general conflagration more probable.

Section II: Bolshevik Rule in Russia

Undoubtedly the most striking single event of the last decade in Europe has been the establishment and consolidation of the Bolshevik rule in Russia. Immediately they were in power Lenin, by birth a member of the petty nobility although his father was sprung from peasant stock, and Trotsky, a Jew of *bourgeois* antecedents, proceeded to establish Communism in Russia. Private property was abolished. Railways, banks, forests, and mines were declared "national property" and operated directly by the Bolshevik Government. Factories were handed over to the employees. The result of these drastic measures, and of the murder and rapine with which they were accompanied, was to cause the complete breakdown of Russia's economic system. Disease and famine stalked through the land; the workmen and their families who were supposed to benefit by the Revolution were reduced to misery ten times worse than they had ever known under the Tsars. The only class which benefited by the Revolution was the small minority who had become members of the Communist party, which, since the mere suspicion of opposition to the Government was punished by death, soon came to be called "the Party." This clique, never numbering more than half a million, became the new dictators of Russia, and maintained their autocracy by ever-increasing acts of savagery, which shocked the conscience of the civilized world. Several attempts, notably those of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin, assisted by the Allies, were made to save Russia from the barbarism into which she was fast relapsing, but these expeditions proved costly failures

and merely riveted the Bolshevik yoke more firmly than ever upon the unhappy country.

Officially Bolshevik Russia is known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), and forms a federation consisting of Russia proper, which dominates the other republics: White Russia, to the south of Lithuania; Ukrainia, an enormous and wealthy territory covering the southern steppes north of the Black Sea around the valley of the Dnieper; and three small republics in the Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

The Bolshevik military autocracy is in part revealed and in part cloaked by a constitution drawn up by the Congress of Soviets in 1918. Political power is confined to those who live exclusively on the fruits of their own personal labour. Clergymen, business and professional men, merchants, even peasants who employ other peasants on their farms, have no votes and no rights under the constitution. A regular hierarchy of Soviets has been established reaching from the village and urban Soviets upward to the Russian Congress, which meets only once a year and delegates its powers to a central executive committee of 300 members. This selects, again indirectly, the supreme executive—the Council of People's Commissaries. Ordinary citizens vote only for the local Soviet, and it is dangerous to vote for any man who is not on the official list of candidates—*i.e.*, is not an active member of "the Party." Hence the appearance of popular election can be maintained without impairing the Bolshevik dictatorship.

The fundamental problem which the Bolsheviks had to face was the reconciliation of the peasants, who form 90 per cent. of the population and have little if any sympathy with Bolshevik ideals. This serious difficulty was complicated by the breakdown of the economic fabric of Russia, which was the immediate consequence of the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. The first attempts of the Bolsheviks to meet the starvation of the urban areas by compelling the peasants to sell their grain to Government agents at nominal prices were defeated by the passive resistance of the peasants, who stopped growing any more grain than was necessary for their own subsistence. Partly because of this, partly because of the need for foreign capital, the Bolsheviks

reluctantly recognized that complete communism could not be introduced in a day, and in 1921 they inaugurated the "new economic policy" (N.E.P.), which left intact the system of peasant proprietorship, tolerated private trading within Russia, although all foreign trade remained a State monopoly, and recognized different rates of pay for specially skilled labour. Under this system there has been a certain improvement in social conditions, while industry and agriculture have begun to revive.

In January 1924 Lenin, whose supremacy over the other leaders alone held the party together, died. The specially constructed shrine before the Kremlin at Moscow, in which his mummified body is preserved in a glass case, is already a place of pilgrimage for thousands of admirers. The mystical 'cult' of Leninism has spread with amazing rapidity throughout the whole of Soviet Russia. The death of the master-mind which had directed the movement from its humble origins was immediately followed by dissensions between Trotsky and a clique of rivals, in which each party held that the other was abandoning the principles of Lenin. These dissensions, temporarily appeased by Trotsky's withdrawal from politics, culminated in Trotsky's banishment from the territories of the Soviet Union in 1928, and in the submission of his followers to the victorious clique. It is almost certain that there will soon be further personal and faction quarrels within the Bolshevik party.

Unlike the French Revolution, with which it is too often compared, the Bolshevik Revolution has run its course almost entirely undeflected by foreign intervention, apart from its earliest stages, when certain of the Allied Powers gave support to the anti-Bolshevik forces within Russia. The Bolshevik leaders, however, have never concealed their hostility to the *bourgeois* states of Europe. They have been in constant touch with the extremist leaders in all European states, and have pursued by new means the old imperialist policy of expansion in the Middle and Far East. The U.S.S.R. is regarded by its founders as merely the first step toward "the union of the toilers of all countries into one world Soviet Socialist Republic' —with its capital, of course, at Moscow.

Section III: The New Germany

While the Soviet propaganda has exercised a potent disturbing force in Asia it has had little effect upon Europe. Apart from the short-lived rule of Bela Kun in Hungary, its influence has been chiefly felt in Germany and in Italy. The overthrow of the old *régime* in Germany gave the German minority Socialists, whose views were not far removed from those of the Bolsheviks, an opportunity which they tried to turn to account. Three of their leaders were included for a few weeks in the provisional Government established after William II's abdication, and their hopes rose high when that Government proclaimed "a democratic republic with a Socialist tinge." But the Spartacists, as the minority Socialists called themselves after the slave leader of a revolt against Rome in 73–71 B.C., failed to establish Soviets in the industrial centres of the Rhine valley, and after much bloodshed their demonstrations against the majority, who now controlled the Government, were suppressed by the troops of the republic (December 1918–January 1919). In the elections to the Constituent Assembly the German nation emphatically rejected the principles of Bolshevism. In February 1919 the Assembly, in which the majority Socialists were the largest single party (163) and the minority had only twenty-two seats out of four hundred, met at Weimar, and established a coalition Government, including representatives of the majority Socialists and other moderate parties. "The counter-revolution had begun, and the control of the German republic passed from the manual workers to the *bourgeoisie*."

The first task of the Weimar Assembly was to draw up a constitution for the new Germany, which is now a composite commonwealth (*Reich*), consisting of eighteen federated republics, each of which has extensive rights of self-government. Foreign policy, military and naval affairs, colonies, tariffs, coinage, and other matters of common interest are reserved to the central legislature, which has also a prior right of legislation on all other subjects over the local legislatures.

The Council of the Commonwealth (Reichsrat) takes the place of the Bundesrat, and consists of the delegates of the

eighteen federated republics. Prussia's former measure of control of this assembly was destroyed by a provision that no state may have more than two-fifths of the votes in the Reichsrat. The Reichstag is now the supreme authority in the State. In legislative matters it can override the veto of the Reichsrat, and the constitution makes the central Government responsible to it. The place of a constitutional monarch is taken by the President, who is elected by direct vote of all citizens, and holds office for seven years. This office has been filled with conspicuous success by Hindenburg, the hero of Tannenberg and the former chief of the General Staff.

Other provisions of the constitution complete the transformation of Germany from a militarist autocracy to a genuinely democratic and progressive state. The equality of all men before the law, the abolition of all privileges of class or of creed, and the adoption of universal suffrage complete the political emancipation of Germany. The republic has had to face repeated assaults from reactionary monarchists on the one hand, and the aggressive Communist party on the other, but so far it has more than maintained its position, although there has been a steady trend away from Socialism and in favour of the Centre parties in the Reichstag.

Although the majority Socialists have never been in a position to carry out their economic programme, notable economic and social results have followed from the Revolution. The most interesting of these is perhaps the attempt to build up, alongside of political democracy, with its institutions based on elections organized on a territorial basis, an industrial democracy based on elections organized on a vocational basis. Two parts of this scheme have been put into force—the Works' Councils and the provisional Federal Economic Council, both established in 1920. Every business employing not less than twenty persons must organize a works' council, chosen by ballot vote of the employees. In agreement with the employer, and in accordance with the general policy of the trade unions, the council regulates conditions of labour, methods for preventing accidents and vocational illnesses, the administration of pension funds, and, most important of all, exercises a real check upon arbitrary dismissal of employees.

The provisional Federal Economic Council consists of 326 members, divided into ten groups, each of which contains representatives of a group of industries. Thus agriculture and forestry have sixty-eight members; commerce, banking, and insurance forty-four; transport and public undertakings thirty-four; and so on. The representatives of each group are equally divided between employers and employees, and are chosen in various ways, but in most cases by the existing vocational organizations of employers and employees. This council at present has no legislative or administrative authority. Its duties are to advise the Government in economic and social matters and to introduce into the Reichstag social and economic measures proposed by its members. Its supporters, however, hope that it may develop into an economic Parliament, supreme in economic as the Reichstag is in political affairs.

Section IV: Italy and Spain since 1918

In Italy the Bolshevik peril was for a time more serious than in Germany, and the swing of the pendulum toward reaction was correspondingly violent. Communism had made great strides in the industrial centres of Italy during the gloom and disillusionment of the Great War. Victory, when it came, seemed merely to make the position of the industrial population worse, and in November 1919 the Communists won over 150 seats, and became the largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies. Encouraged by this success and instigated from Moscow, the extremists during 1920 seized factories in the industrial centres and attempted to run them by works' councils of the most approved Bolshevik pattern. These experiments lasted only a few days, but exercised a potent effect upon public opinion, which believed that the Communists were on the point of carrying out a *coup d'état* which would establish their power and plunge the country into "the morass of Bolshevism and internationalism." The Government at Rome followed a temporizing policy; its corruption and weakness were notorious, and increased the fears of patriotic Italians, who banded themselves together into black-shirted companies and adopted the name of Fascisti, derived from the

Latin word *fasces*, used for the bundle of rods wrapped round an axe and carried before the highest magistrates as the symbol of authority.

The leader of the new movement was Benito Mussolini, a former Socialist and a journalist by profession. The triumph of Fascism is chiefly due to his ruthless energy and outstanding ability. When the personal and party rivalries produced a complete deadlock in the Chamber in 1921 the newly formed Fascisti won twenty seats in the elections to the new Chamber, and the Communists suffered a setback. The extremists then proclaimed a general strike, which gave the Fascisti their opportunity. The black-shirted patriots, recruited chiefly from ex-soldiers and from the *bourgeoisie*, took over the essential national services from the strikers. Civil war followed, in which both sides were guilty of excesses. Soon the Fascisti were completely successful. In October 1922 their converging columns occupied Rome and placed Mussolini at the head of the Government.

The constitutional monarchy and the fabric of Parliamentary government were maintained, but in reality a military dictatorship had been established. A vigorous Press censorship was enforced, the trade unions depressed by a policy of terrorism, and all opposition to the new Government stamped out by calculated brutality. These methods gave the Fascisti a five to two majority in the elections of 1924. Outside of Italy the methods of the Fascisti were generally disapproved of, but opinion is still divided as to whether these measures were really necessary to save Italy from Bolshevism and the complete overthrow of her civilization. The few anti-Fascists who have managed to escape from Italy defend the policy of the politicians whom the Fascisti overthrew as Fabian tactics, which would have saved the State without serious disturbances, by postponing the decisive conflict until the Communists had shot their bolt and were on the decline. They point out with truth that the Fascisti exaggerated the Communist peril in order to justify their own assumption of power and subsequent terrorism. They emphasize the entire absence of personal liberty in the new Italy. They produce imposing masses of statistics to show that the economic and spiritual revival of

Italy had begun before the Fascisti seized the supreme power.

There can, however, be no doubt that Fascism has important economic achievements to its credit. The Italian budget has been balanced, and extensive improvements have been effected in the efficiency of the public services. The economic disorders of the War period have been successfully surmounted, and in spite of the lack of mineral resources a new economic era has begun. The means of communication have been greatly improved by the building of roads and railways and by the partial electrification of the railways where water-power is cheap. In place of the Socialist trade unions a national Fascist trade-union organization has been built up. Trade corporations, including both employers and employees, and pledged to substitute economic co-operation for class war, have been formed and were recently amalgamated into a single national organization, which approximates much more nearly than the German Federal Economic Council to a national economic Parliament. There has been a marked increase in the prosperity of nearly all classes, which has gone far to content them with Fascist rule. Outside the strictly economic sphere the example of classical Rome has become a real inspiration to higher things in certain aspects of the national life.

In political matters Mussolini's Government has two great achievements to its credit. The chronic disorder of outlying parts of the kingdom, notably Sicily and Corsica, has been firmly suppressed and these districts brought under the rigid control of the central Government. And it has found a solution of the difficulties which, ever since the attainment of Italian national unity, had kept the Papacy and the Italian kingdom at arm's length. The Concordat of 1929 re-establishes the Temporal Power of the Papacy over a minute territory round the Vatican and St Peter's, and awards the Pope some financial compensation for the loss of the revenues of the former Papal States. This concordat has already greatly raised the prestige of Fascism; if it secures the co-operation of the Papacy and the Fascist State it may guarantee the stability of the edifice reared by Mussolini.

The Fascist experiments have attracted in Europe and

beyond only less attention than the Bolshevik Revolution. This has been partly due to the self-assertive foreign policy of their leader. Italy has been involved in serious disputes with Yugoslavia, at first over the delimitation of frontiers, and subsequently for control of Albania and mastery of the Adriatic. With Germany and Austria there have been occasional squalls over the ruthless treatment of Teutonic minorities in the Tyrol. With France the friction has been most acute owing to Italy's deliberate challenge to French ascendancy in the Western Mediterranean. Some observers see in Italy the greatest menace to the peace of Europe, but it must be admitted that Mussolini, however provocative his words, has been on the whole conciliatory in his diplomacy when concrete questions have arisen and have had to be settled.

Fascism has had a notable repercussion in the neighbouring peninsula. In Spain a military dictatorship under Primo de Rivera was organized under the cloak of the constitutional monarchy established in 1874. This Government, however, had ample precedents in nineteenth-century Spain, the political history of which during the long reign of Isabella II was little more than the succession of one military adventurer by another.

Unlike his predecessors, Primo de Rivera made strenuous and in part successful efforts to promote the economic development and to raise the international prestige of Spain. But he had more serious opposition to face than the Fascist Government, partly because of discontent in the army itself, and partly because the old hostility of Aragon and Catalonia to the domination of Castile reappeared in an economic form and produced a succession of outbreaks among the industrial and commercial proletariat of Barcelona. Primo de Rivera was forced to resign early in 1930, and died shortly afterward. The relaxation of the dictatorship which followed gave the malcontents a chance to voice their grievances. Several attempts have been made to overthrow the existing system of government, and Spain is at present in an extremely unsettled state.

The post-War developments in Russia, Italy, Spain, and many of the minor states of Central and Eastern Europe have raised a doubt as to whether the Parliamentary system of government is destined to endure. Bolshevism and Fascism have

one fundamental in common—the repudiation of the merely political democracy, which the Liberals of the nineteenth century strove successfully to attain. Now the struggle in nearly every European country is fundamentally economic, and the ideal aimed at is economic (or industrial) democracy. Bolshevism and Fascism are merely the most notable of the experiments which are going on in nearly every country with a view to the attainment of this ideal.

CHAPTER XXII

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Section I: The Economic Development of France (1789–1929)

In the economic as in the political sphere the starting-point of modern France is to be found in the Revolution, which swept away the hampering feudal restrictions both in agriculture and in industry, and established a universal status of personal freedom. Even before the Revolution there had been a large increase in the number of peasant proprietors, and this process was greatly accelerated by it. The lands of the Crown, the Church, and the nobles were sold in small portions and on easy terms to the peasants in the early years of the Revolution, and subsequently the Code Napoléon tended to increase the number of peasant proprietors still further by insisting that the bulk of any landholder's property should be divided equally among all his children.

France is to-day the land of peasant proprietors *par excellence*, and nearly one-half of her population is still engaged in agricultural occupations. During the Napoleonic wars new crops, such as beetroot, flax, chicory, and dyes, had been introduced. Rotation of crops and the use of manures soon became more general, and the thirty years after the battle of Waterloo may be regarded as one of the golden ages of French agriculture. Under the Second Empire agriculture was less prosperous, but toward its close the increasing use of machinery for reaping and threshing, more scientific manuring and rotation, and the reclamation of waste land gave a fresh impetus to agriculture. Wheat and wine are the chief products, but other cereals, dairy-produce, and fruits of all sorts are produced on a large scale.

Agriculture in France was protected by tariffs throughout the century, and the duties became heavier and more comprehensive in the generation before 1914. Much good work was

and is still done by the Ministry of Agriculture and its inspectors. Husbandry is a regular subject of instruction in rural schools, and a well-organized system of agricultural schools and colleges is in operation. The State support of agriculture is supplemented by the activities of thousands of local agricultural societies, whose primary aim is usually to improve agricultural methods. Many of these societies, however, devote much attention to co-operative buying of implements, seeds, and fertilizers and the sale of the surplus produce of their members. In addition there are many purely commercial co-operative unions of farmers—notably in the cheese-making and wine-producing areas.

Although France has remained a predominantly agricultural country, she was the first of the Continental states to undergo an industrial revolution comparable to that of Great Britain in the late eighteenth century. Here again the preliminary steps which made subsequent development possible were directly due to the Revolution. The guilds of craftsmen were clearly decadent in the eighteenth century, but their regulations were still sufficiently enforced to be serious fetters upon industrial development. The National Assembly in 1791 terminated the monopolies and other privileges of the guilds, and most of them disappeared rapidly, although a few survived even beyond the middle of the nineteenth century. The disappearance of the guilds prepared the way for the transformation of French industry from the domestic to the factory system. By the thirties of the nineteenth century the revolution was in full swing. The mechanical loom was driving the hand-workers from the textile trades; coke-smelting and the puddling process were beginning to transform the metal industries; the use of steam-power began in mines and metal-works and spread slowly to the textile industry; the output of coal was enormously increased, although the fact that France is not rich in minerals, and that her coal and iron deposits are not found together, as in England, has delayed the development of her heavy industries.

Industrial developments were partly the cause and partly the result of an immense improvement in internal means of communication. Here France had great advantages over England

in the possession of four great navigable rivers, the Seine, the Loire, the Garonne, and the Rhône, which gave her without any effort on her own part inland waterways aggregating nearly 1400 miles. Even in the eighteenth century France had increased the usefulness of her rivers by a system of canals, which was greatly developed later. The most important canals are the Est, connecting the Meuse with the Moselle and the Saône; the Nantes-Brest Canal, and the famous Canal du Midi, linking the Atlantic to the Mediterranean by way of Toulouse, where it leaves the Garonne, and Béziers.

In roads also France was probably in a better position than England had been at the opening of her industrial revolution. Since then great improvements have been made. The *routes nationales*, which radiate from Paris to the chief provincial cities, and the *chemins de grande communication* provide an excellent system of highroads, while the *routes départementales* and the *petite voirie* are adequate for local traffic.

The French genius for organization, seen in the elaborate classification of their roads, is equally manifest in the development of their railways. Before actual construction of any line was commenced Government engineers prepared plans for a general system of railways. The questions of ownership and management were then discussed on broad grounds of principle. Finally, Thiers' plan for the building of nine trunk lines radiating from Paris and linking the Mediterranean with the Atlantic and the Rhine was adopted in 1842. Within fifteen years the trunk lines were practically complete, and the whole railway system of France was controlled by six companies, each of which had a monopoly in its own area. Freed from competition, the companies showed little enterprise in building local lines; and persistent pressure by the State was required to secure a network of lines at all adequate to local needs. In its attempts to animate the railway companies to a more progressive policy the State from time to time had built a few scattered lines, and in 1908 the chronic inefficiency of one of the six companies—the Ouest—compelled the State to take over its entire system. Hence the State operates directly about one-fifth of the French railroads. Since the end of the Great War the efficiency of the railways has been gradually restored.

Certain developments in the system of transportation are now taking place, notably the new railway line to Barcelona across the Pyrenees and the Marseilles-Arles Canal, the first link in the opening of the Rhône to 1200-ton vessels from Switzerland to the Mediterranean.

Under the Third Republic industry has continued to flourish. The hand-loom has practically disappeared from the textile trades; electric power is not infrequently used. The production of coal and iron has increased by leaps and bounds, and the Treaty of Versailles has given to France extremely valuable mineral deposits, already carefully exploited by German enterprise. Nevertheless industrial France has continued to be primarily a producer of luxury goods of all sorts. Most of her industries, therefore—apart from textiles and minerals—continue to be organized on a relatively small scale. Here hand-labour is essential, and the taste and skill of the individual workman and workwoman count for much. Partly because of this characteristic of French industry the number of paid employees is not much in excess of the number of employers and independent craftsmen.

In spite of the social effects of the survival of luxury trades the industrial revolution inevitably left its mark on France in the depression of the handicraft industry, the reduction of wages, and the differentiation of capital and labour. These evils, as in every other European state affected by the growth of modern industrialism, have been met in two ways: by State intervention to regulate the conditions of labour, and by voluntary organization of the artisans themselves to raise the standard of life.

The first tentative efforts to regulate the hours and conditions of labour were made in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. The most notable of these was an ordinance of 1813 which prohibited the employment of children under ten years of age in mines—a step not taken in England until a generation later. The first great Factory Act was passed by Louis-Philippe's Government in 1841 after an agitation led by the Société Industrielle de Mulhouse. This statute prohibited the employment in factories of children under eight years of age, and fixed the working day of all employees under sixteen, with provision for a lunch interval. As in England, great difficulty

was experienced in enforcing the early Factory Acts. The Revolution of 1848 left as its abiding legacy to the working classes of France a law limiting the hours of labour to twelve a day, but this statute, although amended under the Second Empire, remained practically a dead letter. Napoleon III's sympathy for the working classes was genuine enough, and led to a crop of legislative proposals, but it failed to find expression in administrative Acts.

The credit for establishing an efficient system of labour legislation rests with the Third Republic, which adopted in 1874 the statute on which the whole system is based. It raised the age at which children might be employed to twelve, with rare exceptions, and greatly curtailed their hours of labour, with prohibition of night work. No female under twenty-one might be employed in night work, and the first extension of the factory code to protect adult males was made by the provision for the rudiments of sanitation in factories and workshops. Finally, it created on the British model a staff of permanent inspectors to supervise the enforcement of its provisions. Other enactments soon followed, and in the years immediately preceding the Great War a beginning was made with the consolidation of the existing labour statutes into a clear and comprehensive labour code.

The individualistic philosophy of the *laissez-faire* school in nineteenth-century England, which placed so many obstacles in the way of trade-union development, was inherited by them from the French Revolutionaries. In 1791 the National Assembly passed a law which prohibited under severe penalties the formation of any kind of working-men's association intended to interfere with the free exercise of industry by individuals. The Napoleonic legislation, notably the Penal Code of 1810, confirmed and extended this prohibition. Nevertheless, in spite of the law, working-men's associations continued to exist. Most of them were merely benefit societies, but a few, known as societies of resistance, concentrated their attention upon collective bargaining with their employers, and pursued an aggressive policy. They had, however, in the first half of the century little hold on the mass of the working classes, who were led away from trade-union action by the Socialist

Utopias of Saint-Simon and Fourier. The collapse of revolutionary Socialism in 1848 gave an impetus to the formation of societies of resistance with more practicable objects. The Second Empire was finally forced by popular agitation to legalize strikes in 1864 and to announce in 1868 that it would 'tolerate' trade unions without repealing the laws against them.

After this trade unionism gained ground rapidly. The rights won from Napoleon III were retained after the establishment of the Third Republic, but it was not until 1884 that trade unions, now called *syndicats*, were fully legalized and authorized to form national federations. The first French labour congress had been held in 1876 at Paris, and three years later at Marseilles the congress adopted Socialism as part of its policy. Almost immediately the movement broke up into rival cliques, each of which supported the panaceas of one of the many prophets of Socialism. At last it was realized that these divergences were threatening to wreck the whole movement, and in 1895 the Confédération Générale du Travail, popularly known as the C.G.T., was founded. The basic principle of the new confederation was the exclusion of politics —its object was to be the unification of all working men for the better promotion of their economic interests. The general strike and *sabotage* were to be its weapons. In 1902 the General Confederation of Labour amalgamated with the chief rival organization, and until its dissolution by the Government in October 1921, after the unsuccessful general strike of that year, it played a dominant part in the French trade-union world. Its leaders were revolutionary syndicalists; they despised Parliamentary action, and sought to overthrow the capitalist system and transfer the control of production to the manual labourers engaged in the various industries. Since 1921 the French trade-union movement has been hopelessly divided against itself, and its resistance to the attempts of employers to reduce wages and encroach on the eight-hour day has accordingly been weak. As in all other European countries, membership of the unions has fallen greatly from the unprecedented heights reached during the War, but even at its zenith the French trade-union movement never contained more than a small section of the working-class population.

Relatively little progress has been made in the organization of agricultural workers, and the Government has steadily refused to permit its servants, including postal workers and railwaymen on the State lines, to form unions affiliated to the C.G.T.

Section II: The Economic Development of Germany (1789–1929)

Germany was much slower than France to follow the example of Great Britain. At the beginning and for the greater part of the nineteenth century Germany was more predominantly agricultural than France. Moreover, partly owing to political and social conditions, partly to the poverty of her natural resources, her agriculture was considerably less advanced in its technique than that of France in this period. The emancipation of the German peasants was gradual. It began in the north-west at the close of the Middle Ages, spread to the south-west in the following centuries, and was greatly accelerated by the reforms of Hardenberg and Stein, but it was not complete until after the middle of the nineteenth century. Whereas in the west the disappearance of serfdom led to the establishment of numerous peasant proprietors, as in France, in the north-east, and notably in Prussia, it helped to build up, as in England, large estates on which the former serfs worked as landless labourers.

As a result of improved fertilization and rotation of crops and of the growing adoption of agricultural machinery, the amount of grain produced in Germany was approximately doubled in the course of the nineteenth century. The great part of this increase, however, took place in the middle decades of the century. As in England, a serious agricultural depression began in 1874–75, which was partly caused by the decline in prices due to American and Russian competition, which the moderate protective duties then in force failed to counteract. But the fundamental cause of the depression was probably the beginning of the industrial revolution, which led to rural depopulation, scarcity of labour, and increased cost of production. The influence of the landlords (or *Junkers*) of Prussia upon the Imperial Government was sufficient to secure the repeated raising of the protective duties upon agricultural pro-

ducts, but in spite of this agriculture was far from flourishing in the decades before 1914. Moreover, the artificial raising of the prices of the necessaries of life was bitterly opposed by the industrial classes, and led to an acute conflict between the agricultural and industrial interests.

The outstanding feature of the industrial revolution in Germany is that it has been borrowed *en bloc* from Britain. This is almost as true of France, Italy, and the other countries in which modern industrialism has become firmly established, but in Germany the development and the process of adaptation of the British system to the needs of another people's governmental system were more rapid and thoroughgoing. As a German writer says:

> Modern technology has come to Germany ready-made, without the cultural consequences which its gradual development and continued use has entailed among the people whose experience initiated it and laid down the line of its development.

The adoption of the system was determined in Germany during the middle decades of the century; but it was not until after the establishment of the Empire in 1871 that the great era of German industrial expansion begins. As in Britain and France, the textiles, especially cotton, and the iron industries are *the* industries where the new methods are first employed. In 1850 the cotton production of Germany was almost negligible; by 1871 Britain was already beginning to feel the competition of the German cotton-mills. The woollen industry of Saxony, the silk manufactures of the Rhenish provinces, the linen production of Silesia—all developed hardly less rapidly than the cotton industry. Coke-smelting of iron was hardly known in 1840, but improved methods were rapidly introduced, and the production of iron went up by leaps and bounds.

Various factors, however, hampered the development of German industry in the first period—*i.e.*, up to 1871. The country, partly as a result of the Napoleonic wars, was poor; the lack of capital was accentuated by the backwardness of the German banking and credit system. The mass of the people were poor and lived frugal lives; hence the demand of the home market for manufactured goods was strictly limited, and

lack of transport facilities made it difficult to meet the demand in the few centres where it existed. The stimulus of foreign trade was practically negligible. Finally, the political divisions of the country were a serious hindrance to German industry, since each of the thirty-eight states was a separate economic unit. The rise of the Zollverein somewhat reduced this evil, but only indirectly, since its regulations were confined to commercial matters and did not deal directly with industry.

After 1871 industrial expansion gained steadily not only in speed, but in momentum. The establishment of the Empire made Germany for the first time an organized economic unit, and the new Government soon adopted a comprehensive and, on the whole, well-thought-out economic policy. The enormous war indemnity exacted from France helped to supply the lack of capital available for industrial development. The acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine greatly strengthened the industrial resources of Germany, notably in the textile trades, and the competition of the factory-workers of Alsace-Lorraine accelerated throughout Germany the decay of the handicraft system and the adoption of the new methods of manufacture. Other factors, themselves in some degree the result of industrial development, gave added impetus to the movement. Population grew hardly less rapidly than in the England of exactly a century earlier; the home market expanded, and the foreign and colonial markets, partly owing to the growth of a mercantile marine, were developed with phenomenal rapidity.

Within Germany transport was brought up to a high standard. The first great era of road improvement in Germany was much later than in Britain and France; little was done till after the middle of the nineteenth century. Rather later the improvement of the exceptionally favourable system of navigable rivers by the construction of canals was seriously taken in hand, and Germany now, even though the Treaty of Versailles took the Vistula valley from her, possesses probably the finest system of inland waterways in Europe. The Rhine was linked with the Weser, the Danube, and the Meuse; the Vistula with the Elbe and the Oder; even the Kiel Canal between the Baltic and North Seas was used largely for commercial purposes, although primarily built for naval needs.

Although lagging far behind France in road and canal construction, Germany was on the whole earlier than her rival in railway-building. The first important line between Dresden and Leipzig was opened in 1839, and within ten years nearly 4000 miles were built. Whereas in unified and centrally administered France a general programme of trunk-lines radiating from Paris was carried out, in Germany, divided and decentralized, chief attention was paid to local needs. After the creation of the empire Bismarck tried in vain to nationalize the whole railway system of Germany, but the opposition of the states, headed by Bavaria, defeated his plans. Gradually, however, the whole Prussian railway system became State-owned and State-operated; and the efficiency of the Prussian railways was for long one of the chief arguments of the advocates of nationalization in other countries. In 1919 the Weimar constitution provided for the nationalization of all the German railways; the experiment was tried under extremely unfavourable conditions, and was a complete failure. In 1924 the operation of the lines was transferred to a joint-stock company, but the lines remain State-owned.

Some outstanding features of German industrial development under the Empire may be noted. The old textile and mineral industries rapidly increased their output, and in 1914 Germany, along with Britain and the United States, was one of the three leading producers of coal, iron, and cotton goods. Side by side with the old, new industries sprang into existence. Large quantities of machinery were turned out at Leipzig, Magdeburg, Berlin, Dresden, etc., and shipbuilding added to the prosperity of the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Danzig. Thanks to her unrivalled system of technical education, the application of science to industry became a notable feature of the German industrial system, and led to the creation of the important chemical and electrical industries. In 1897 a German chemist discovered how to make artificial indigo—within a few years Germany, which had hitherto imported vegetable indigo to the value of £1,000,000 a year, was exporting artificial indigo to the value of £3,000,000 a year. In the chemical industries German supremacy in the decade before 1914 was unchallengeable.

The organization of these industries, both old and new, was almost entirely on the factory system. In this point Germany resembled Britain and differed from France. Another feature of their organization is notable—the tendency to the amalgamation of relatively small businesses into enormous concerns, such as the Krupp firm, which controlled, among other enterprises, six coal- and numerous iron-mines, six iron- and steel-works, and a shipbuilding yard. Even when actual amalgamation did not take place numerous cartels and syndicates were formed in order to control prices, avoid competition, and sometimes even to pool the profits of the associated firms. Here Germany, notably in the decade before 1914, led the way, and Britain and France followed.

As in Britain and France, the firm establishment of the new industrial system was followed by State regulation of labour. The law of 1839, issued by the King of Prussia and applicable only to his own territories, prohibited the employment of children under nine years of age. Children under sixteen were to work for not more than ten hours and attend school for five hours daily. They must not be employed on night work. In 1853 the Prussian Parliament—created during the year of revolutions—passed a drastic law on the subject, raising the age at which children might be employed to twelve, and limiting the hours of children under fourteen to six at work and three at school. Special inspectors of factories were appointed, but the law was for long not much enforced. The other German states had passed similar laws before the establishment of the North German Confederation in 1867.

It was now clear that uniformity in the existing regulations, adequate means of enforcement, and the extension of the system from child to adult labour was urgently necessary. In 1869 an elaborate industrial code was passed for the whole confederation, which applied to mines and quarries as well as factories, and insisted for the first time upon the provision of safety appliances. After the establishment of the empire inspection became stricter, but there were still many loopholes, and no special protection was given to women. Agitation on these points failed to attain its objects until after the fall of Bismarck. The young Emperor, William II, was eager to win popularity

among all classes of his subjects. In 1890 he assembled at Berlin an international congress to discuss the problem of labour legislation, and in the following year a new industrial code was issued which, frequently amended in later years, remains the basis of labour legislation in Germany. Protection was given to women, and the enforcement of the code became more efficient.

Like labour legislation, trade unionism in Germany was a later growth than in Britain and France. Its origins date only from 1868, and from the beginning it was closely identified with politics and impregnated with Socialism. Little progress had been made when in 1878 Bismarck began his war with Social Democracy. Practically all the unions which existed, being essentially Socialist organizations, were dissolved. The fall of Bismarck and the abandonment of his policy of repression enabled trade unions to develop. Gradually the right of combination was recognized, except in the case of agricultural labourers, seamen, and domestic servants, and the legality of strikes was established, although under much narrower restrictions than in Britain.

In pre-War Germany various groups of unions, organized on different principles and jealous of each other, existed. Much the most important was the Social Democratic group, which included many men who were not members of the Social Democrat party, but habitually co-operated with it for the attainment of their common ends. Another powerful group were the Christian unions, organized by priests under the patronage of the Church and composed exclusively of Roman Catholic working men. Although divided into these and many smaller groups, German trade unionism in the decade before the War had come to be a potent force, and in the industrial centres of North and West Germany a state of extreme tension, with frequent strikes and boycotts, existed between employers and employees. For a time these troubles were appeased by the War, but from 1917 onward the tension and frequent strikes recurred. The end of the War and the establishment of a Socialist republic in which the unions played their part was followed by a phenomenal development of the Socialist unions, which quadrupled their membership in little over a year. The

Bolshevik period induced most employers to change their attitude toward trade unionism; and on November 15, 1918, they concluded with the trade-union leaders an agreement by which they recognized the unions as the sole representatives of their employees and accepted the eight-hour day. At the Nuremberg Congress in June 1919 all the Socialist unions agreed to federate themselves as the General Federation of German Unions, and in the same year the various Christian unions combined to form the Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Germany. In all, German trade unionists and their families number well over one-third of the population of Germany. They form the strongest bulwark of the German Republic against the forces of reaction, and, in fact, it was largely owing to the general strike organized by the Socialist unions in March 1920 that the most serious attempt of the monarchists to restore the monarchy—the Kapp *Putsch*—was a complete failure.

The general lines of development in France and Germany have been followed by the lesser states of Western and Central Europe as they have gradually been subjected to industrial development. In each case the evils of the factory system led to the creation of a code of labour legislation more or less adequately enforced. In Switzerland and Belgium the origins may be traced back to the end of the Napoleonic wars; elsewhere State regulation of the conditions of labour is a much more recent growth. In each case there has been a marked development of voluntary organizations for the protection of the industrial and also, but to a less extent, the rural proletariat, and in most cases trade unionism has been bound up with Socialism. Collective bargaining, the mainstay of British trade unionism before the War, was of minor importance in Continental trade unionism.

Section III: The Rise and Growth of Socialism

The Industrial Revolution of Western Europe, following upon the break-up of the medieval economic system under the impetus of the French Revolution, created or at least enormously increased two new classes—on the one hand the rich and powerful capitalist class, on the other the landless and

property-less wage-earning class. The later progress of the Revolution only widened the gulf between the two. Under the old system the mass of the population had been serfs, under the new they became 'wage-slaves.' The enormous wealth created by the increased productive power of machinery and steam-power was concentrated in the hands of the capitalist class; the mass of the population, if they were no worse off under the new system than under the old, had certainly gained little. Low wages, high prices, long hours, bad conditions, periodic unemployment, and the rarity of opportunities of rising by merit from one position to a better aroused widespread discontent, while the concentration of the wage-earners in the urban areas facilitated their organization in voluntary associations for the improvement of the conditions of labour and of life.

These associations were everywhere at first forbidden by the law, partly because of the influence of the capitalist class upon the Governments of the various states, partly because the Governments themselves feared to be overthrown, but chiefly because of the individualist philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century. Society had formerly been based on status; the French Revolution, in protesting against the irritating and burdensome restrictions on individual liberty, went to the opposite extreme and proclaimed that every individual was the best judge of his own interests and should be permitted to attain them by individual contracts with his fellow-citizens. The idea of State intervention in economic affairs was therefore discredited, and the negative policy of *laissez-faire* was almost universally adopted.

It was only very gradually realized that "freedom of contract" might be another name for the freedom of the strong to coerce the weak. Hence the earliest reformers set themselves against the doctrine of *laissez-faire*. In the teeth of the economic orthodoxy of the day their efforts gradually established a partial protection of the weak by factory legislation and by securing from the State a grudging recognition of the right of association of workmen for the pursuit of their economic interests. Other reformers, less patient or more far-seeing, believed that these attempts to tinker with the new industrial system

were mere palliatives and would never give working men the place in society to which they were entitled. They looked about for a new system on which society could be based, and thus Socialism was born.

The essentials of Socialism are twofold: (i) The instruments of production and distribution—*e.g.*, land, factories, railways—are to be owned and operated by the State. Rent, interests, and profits would no longer accrue to individuals, but to the community as a whole. Private property would not, however, be entirely abolished, as under Communism, for the members of the Socialist state would retain an exclusive right to their own clothes, household furniture, books, perhaps even to a house and garden. (ii) All members of the Socialist community would have to engage in useful work, either mental or manual. The leisured classes would be eliminated, as the only form of individual income would be the wages paid by the State to its employees. The amount of wages paid to each employee might be equal, or might vary with the efficiency of the workman and the relative value of the services performed. Socialists have hitherto failed to agree upon any principle of division.

Socialism, therefore, is not identical with the public ownership of railways, telegraphs, and telephones, etc., which is now so common throughout Europe. The State operates those services on the same lines as a joint-stock company would do; the Socialist method of distribution is not adopted. There are still a leisured class and unearned incomes. Similarly social reform is quite distinct from Socialism. Factory inspection, poor laws, minimum-wage regulations, housing schemes, are all attempts to improve the existing economic system, not to create a new one in accordance with the fundamental dogmas of Socialism.

Socialism first became a powerful force in France, where the doctrines of Saint-Simon and Fourier and the popularization of them by Louis Blanc exerted a considerable influence upon the Revolution of 1848. The crushing defeat of the Socialist workmen of Paris in the "June days" and the improvement in working-class conditions under the Second Empire kept French Socialism quiescent for twenty years. Socialist agi-

tators, however, played a part in organizing the fierce outbreak of the Paris Commune in 1871, and the proscription of Socialists which followed the collapse of the movement almost extinguished the organized Socialist party. The revival of French Socialism was largely the work of Jules Guesde, and the first great landmark was the capture by the Socialists of the French trade-union movement in 1879. This success almost proved fatal to French Socialism, which broke up into rival groups, anarchists, revolutionaries who denounced any compromise with capitalism as treachery, and moderates, who welcomed and co-operated with the *bourgeois* parties to effect any improvement in working-class conditions.

In spite of these differences the Socialists secured the return of forty members in the elections of 1893 under the leadership of Jean Jaurès, a professor of philosophy in the University of Toulouse, and a leader of such outstanding strength and ability that his personality did something to avoid the worst consequences of the factious struggle of the various cliques. The strength of his influence may be gauged by the fact that nearly every town in France has its Rue Jean-Jaurès. He set himself to reunite as many Socialists as possible in a single party, but his efforts were for long ineffectual because the Dreyfus case (1898) provided a fresh occasion for Socialist schisms, and the struggle between moderates and revolutionaries came to a head when a prominent Socialist, Millerand, was offered and accepted office in a Radical Ministry (1899). Finally in 1905 the United Socialist party was formed, "not as a party of reforms, but as a party of class war and revolution." It grew rapidly in membership and in representation in the Chamber, although it never included all French Socialists. In spite of its declaration in 1905 in favour of revolution its leaders, who were mainly drawn from the *bourgeois* class, pursued an opportunist policy and participated in all the social reforms of the twentieth century in France.

During the War the French Socialists, like their German *confrères*, continued to support the Government almost until the end of the struggle. The first elections after the War were a great disappointment to them, and the Socialist party was further weakened by the secession of the extremists to form the

French Communist party. Since 1920, however, there has been a distinct strengthening of the French Socialists, notably when in 1924 their support placed the Liberal Herriot Government in power for a short time.

While French Socialism has advanced by a series of sudden leaps, followed by longish periods of retrogression, the advance of Socialism in Germany has been marked by steady progress. It was during the time of Socialist quiescence in France, between the year of revolutions and the Paris Commune, that Socialism first became a power in Germany. The first influential Socialist treatise to appear in Germany was, curiously enough, the work of a Prussian landlord, Karl Johann Rodbertus (1842). But the real founders of German Socialism were three later writers, Karl Marx, his lifelong associate Friedrich Engels, and Ferdinand Lassalle.

Alike in intellectual power and in influence upon nineteenth- and twentieth-century Socialism, Marx is the outstanding figure in the whole Socialist movement. After his final expulsion from Germany in 1849 he made his home in London, and there in 1867 he published the first volume of his monumental work *Das Kapital*, which became almost at once the Bible of Socialism. The essential contribution of Marx to the Socialist movement was its rationalization. He was primarily an economist, and had no use whatever for the Utopian schemes of his predecessors. Labour, he taught, was the source of all value; yet under the existing economic system the labourer receives only a small fraction of the product of his labour. The rest goes to the capitalist. Capitalism, therefore, although the necessary result of large-scale industry, is an intolerable system which will not endure for ever. Sooner or later, independently of all human action, it will be outgrown, and Socialism will take its place. This inevitable economic revolution could, however, be hastened by political action in preparation for the day when the wage-earners would seize control of national Governments and use them to socialize the means of production and distribution. Then the State, at present an agency of the *bourgeois* class for holding the proletariat in subjection, would become superfluous and disappear.

While Marx, aided by Engels, provided the Socialists of all

countries with a systematically arranged armoury of ideas, Lassalle gave to German Socialism the beginnings of its organization. In 1863 he founded the Universal German Working Men's Association, but his death, as the result of a duel in the following year, deprived the new association of its guiding spirit. Shortly afterward two other pioneers, Liebknecht and Bebel, transformed the educative working men's associations of South Germany into Socialist bodies, which formed in 1869 the Social Democratic party. In 1875 the Working Men's Association founded by Lassalle amalgamated with the Social Democrats, who henceforth until the Great War included the great bulk of German Socialists. Union gave strength, and the universal-suffrage provisions of the constitutions of the North German Confederation and the empire enabled the new party to make its influence felt in the Reichstag. In spite of the vigorous attempts of Bismarck from 1878 to 1890 to crush Social Democracy by repression and remedial legislation Socialism went from strength to strength. Although the electoral law of Germany gave a disproportionate representation to rural constituencies where Socialism was weakest, in 1902 the Social Democrats polled one-third of the total votes cast, and obtained over a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag.

The organization of the party was remarkable and its propaganda extremely efficient. It controlled seventy-five daily newspapers, the most important of which was the well-known journal *Vorwärts*. Its programme, as promulgated at Erfurt in 1891, included a statement of orthodox Marxian economics, but laid stress upon practical measures of political and social reform. In practice, despite the spasmodic efforts of the extremists, the stress had always been on the latter, and in the twenty years before 1914 the party became steadily more moderate. This fact helps to explain why Socialism was stronger in Germany than in any other country before the Great War. Its candidates at elections were supported by many electors who were not professing Socialists at all. Although the party had never come within measurable distance of controlling the Government it had made its influence felt in the labour-legislation and social-insurance

policy of Germany, which was on the whole further advanced than that of any other European country.

After the Great War the Socialists took the chief part in establishing the German republic, and for a short time controlled its destinies. But the breach between moderates and extremists and the tendency toward reaction—natural after a revolution—soon deprived the Socialists of their commanding position. Although the Social Democrats remain the strongest single party in the Reichstag, the most notable feature of the 1930 elections was the greatly increased strength of the reactionary National Socialist, or "Nazi," party.

The growth of Socialist parties and their increasing influence in politics was not peculiar to France and Germany. Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, and the "successor states" all have Socialist parties of varying degrees of coherence and strength. In Italy the growth of Socialism was particularly rapid in the decades before 1914, and further marked increase took place in the few years preceding the establishment of the Fascist state.

Various attempts have been made to unite the Socialists of all lands in an international organization. The first of these —inspired by Marx—was the International Working Men's Association, which was founded in 1864, but came to an end after a troubled existence of ten years. Subsequent attempts at international organization had until 1914 little permanent success, but there has been since the Great War a marked revival of international Socialism. Communism also, under the leadership of Moscow, has set up a 'third' international in opposition to the less extreme and revolutionary labour internationals.

Section IV: International Trade and Tariffs

The Industrial Revolution was partly the result and partly the cause of an enormous development of international trade which took place during the nineteenth century. It has been calculated that the volume of the international trade of the world expanded in that period by 1200 per cent. The great improvements in transport, which made the carriage of goods

very much cheaper and faster, and the development of telegraphs, telephones, and still later of wireless-telegraphy, enabled merchants to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market as never before, so that the whole world has now become a single market, rather than a series of local markets, each with varying quantities of different goods for sale at prices fluctuating from market to market. The development of banking and the adoption by most countries of the gold standard contributed to the creation of this world market. Since the War, however, the gold standard has been restored by most European countries under such restrictions that pre-War conditions no longer operate.

Britain, being the first country to undergo the Industrial Revolution, had acquired such a predominant position in world trade in the first half of the nineteenth century that she was able to sweep away protective tariffs without danger to any of her industries at the time, except agriculture, which inevitably suffered because less advanced countries could only buy British manufactured goods if Britain took their grain and other agricultural products. For a time it seemed likely that the leading Continental states would in this, as in other economic activities, follow Britain's example.

Under the Orléanist monarchy in France the free-trade movement began to gain ground, and after the Revolution of 1848 it found a convinced though somewhat irresolute champion in Napoleon III. After 1852 the rates of duty on food-stuffs and raw materials were considerably reduced, and the volume of French trade doubled. The culmination of this policy was the conclusion of the famous Cobden Commercial Treaty between Britain and France in 1860. Before 1866 similar agreements were concluded by France with practically every other country of Western and Central Europe, by which the contracting parties agreed to reduce duties on each other's exports. Thus France gradually became a low-tariff country, but in spite of the rapid increase of French trade and the prosperity of agriculture in the sixties, the protectionist elements never became reconciled to the treaty, and their opposition to the Second Empire was a main cause of its decline and fall.

. Germany, industrially backward and influenced by the economic justification of protection by the great economist List in his *National System of Political Economy*, was actually raising her protective duties in the forties of the nineteenth century. But in the following decade Prussia, having consolidated her mastery of the Zollverein, steadily modified its (and after 1871 the imperial) tariffs in the direction of free trade. By 1875 Germany had gone even farther than France and maintained a tariff purely for revenue purposes. The remainder of Western and Central Europe, chiefly owing to the various commercial treaties concluded with France, was not far behind France and Germany in the sixties and seventies.

After 1875 various causes combined to render Cobden's vision of a free-trade Europe an impracticable dream. The most important of these, since it affected every country, was the widespread economic crisis of the late seventies. In France agriculture was the chief sufferer, especially as a dread disease wrought terrible damage in the vineyards while the crisis was at its worst. The wine-growers now joined forces with the manufacturing magnates, most of whom had always been hostile to free trade, and forced the Government to begin in 1881 the raising of duties upon imports. For a time French elections were fought largely on the tariff question, and the protectionists gained steadily in strength. One by one the commercial treaties negotiated by Napoleon III were allowed to lapse, and in 1892 a comprehensive new tariff was adopted which gave agriculture almost complete protection from foreign competition and substantially increased the protective duties in favour of industry. The rates were still further increased in 1910.

In Germany also the economic depression of the later seventies led to a union of industrial capitalists and landowners for the restoration of protection. Bismarck had hitherto been a staunch free-trader; but he now championed the protectionist cause, partly on economic grounds, but chiefly because customs duties were the chief source of the revenues of the Imperial Government, apart from the contributions of the constituent states, and he was anxious to lessen the dependence of the Imperial Government upon the states. Accordingly in 1879

Bismarck carried through an important but moderate measure of tariff reform, and higher duties were imposed on agricultural products in 1885, 1887, and 1902 at the demand of the landlords. Although heavy duties for the protection of industry were also imposed, notably by the new general tariff of 1902, they were not widely enforced owing to the conclusion of special commercial treaties with Russia, Austria-Hungary, and other states, and the admission of the rest of Germany's best customers to "most-favoured-nation" agreements. Nevertheless Germany was only less protectionist than France in the three decades before 1914, and the swing of the pendulum toward 'high' protection was manifest in every country of Western Europe. Even in Great Britain it resulted in the adoption by the Conservative party of the policy of tariff reform.

The Great War intensified the trend toward high protection. In the trying years of reconstruction after 1918 every state raised its tariffs in order to safeguard its old industries, to retain the new industries established under War conditions, and to obtain revenue. The triumph of Nationalism in the former Habsburg Empire and in the Balkans accentuated this tendency, since the new states were eager to attain economic self-sufficiency, which they regarded as the essential complement of national independence. The collapse of the currencies of Central Europe and the weakening of those of France and Italy also led to the raising of tariffs by states whose currencies were not depreciated in order to prevent unfair industrial competition. The restoration of more stable conditions has, however, been followed by the conclusion of numerous commercial treaties and "most-favoured-nation" agreements. The latest proposal is the formation of a European Customs Union in order to counter the rigidly protectionist policy of the United States. Although Britain has twice refused to go in wholeheartedly for protection there is no sign elsewhere in Europe of any general reduction of the existing tariffs.

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